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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the extent to which the 
political ideology that formed the basis for the American 
republic shaped American diplomacy, using John Adams, James 
Madison and John Quincy Adams as case studies. American 
statesmen drew on a variety of sources for republican 
principles of diplomacy. The law of nations and the Scottish 
political economists supplied the ideas of an international 
balance of power and freedom of trade. English writers of 
the Opposition Whig school provided concepts such as 
political separation from Europe, reliance on a navy for 
defense, abhorrence of a standing army and, indirectly, the 
belief that the United States could use its economic power 
to secure its diplomatic goals.
John Adams began his career with a high degree of 
confidence in the virtue of the American people and the 
coercive power of American trade. He combined a classical 
martial ethic with an Opposition Whig strategic sense. 
Adams's experience in Europe disproved these beliefs, and as 
president he fell back on the republican realpolitik, based 
on naval power and separation from Europe, suggested by the 
Opposition Whig school.
James Madison never held out a classical model of 
virtue and never lost faith in the coercive power of 
American commerce. His combination of political economy with 
Opposition thought led him to reject both an army and a navy 
as monarchical tools of diplomacy. He saw the Constitution 
as a vehicle for harnessing American economic power. 
Madison's conception of a republican diplomacy led him, as 
secretary of state and president, to rely on the Embargo and 
similar economic measures.
John Quincy Adams combined republican realpolitik with 
a sense of Christian purpose and saw American government and 
diplomacy as a vehicle for moral improvement. Adams's 
republic rested on a continental union and a diplomacy 
directed against European colonization, as a manifestation 
of monarchy. Non-colonization included removing Spain as a 
neighbor in North America, preventing European political 
encroachment in the Western Hemisphere, and securing a 
hemisphere-wide consensus on neutral rights. As a 
congressman and critic of slavery-driven expansion, Adams 
demonstrated the persistence of Opposition Whig thought in 
American politics.
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CHAPTER 1: THE REPUBLICAN WORLD
When asked at the conclusion of the Constitutional 
Convention what the convention had created, Benjamin Franklin 
answered that the delegates had given the American people a 
republic, "if you can keep it."1 Keeping the republic placed 
a double burden on the founding generation: to preserve
liberty and free institutions at home and to defend national 
interests abroad. John Quincy Adams captured this duality in 
1837 when he observed that "the Declaration of Independence 
recognized the European law of nations, as practiced among 
Christian nations, to be that by which they considered 
themselves bound, and of which they claimed their rights.In 
American thought, the liberties of individuals and nations 
proceeded from the same source. American foreign policy would 
therefore be conducted on the same principles that shaped 
American government.
The study of republican thought and its impact on the 
revolutionary era has generally focused on domestic issues
* James McHenry, anecdote, 18— , in Max Farrand, ed. The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1911-1937), 4:85.
 ^John Quincy Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A 
Discourse Delivered at the Request of the New York 
Historical Society (New York: S. Coleman, 1837), 73.
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3such as constitution making and political economy.^ Students 
of foreign relations have either denied or lamented that a 
connection between domestic principles and diplomacy existed. 
Hans Morgenthau argued that in the history of American 
diplomacy "political thought has been divorced from political 
action." He divided early American foreign policy into a 
"realist" period (dominated by Alexander Hamilton), in which 
diplomacy was conducted in terms of pure power politics, and 
an "ideological" period (dominated by Thomas Jefferson), in 
which diplomacy was formulated in moral terms but executed in
The survey of the "republican synthesis" in this study 
derives from Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1969); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian 
Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1978); and Drew R. McCoy, The 
Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). 
Robert E. Shalhope's two articles, "Toward a Republican 
Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of 
Republicanism in American Historiography," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 29 no. 2 (January 1972), 49-80; 
and "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 39 no. 2 (April
1982), 334-355, provide an overview of the literature of 
republicanism. For the English and European background see 
Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen: 
Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of 
English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II 
to the WLr with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1959); Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke 
and His Circle: the Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of 
Walpole (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); 
and J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
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terms of power.4 George Kennan perceived a "legalist-moralist 
approach" to American diplomacy which he blamed on "the memory 
of the origin of our political system."-*
Foreign relations provided the severest tests for 
republican government and deserve equal treatment with 
constitutional issues. If the proper distribution of power 
within the branches of government was the central question of 
republicanism domestically, the distribution of power among 
nations was even more so the ultimate diplomatic question.® 
Furthermore, a focus on republican ideology gives a truer 
picture of early American diplomacy than the realist-idealist 
dichotomy, which assumes that one set of statesmen could 
divorce political thought from diplomatic action while another 
could not. Under a commitment to republican government, 
Americans in the founding generation saw no division between 
foreign and domestic spheres.
Republican principles of diplomacy may be divided into 
two groups: ideas drawn from the law of nations and political 
economy compatible with but not exclusive to republican 
government, and ideas derived directly from republican 
thought. A reliance on a balance of power and the precept that
4 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interests A 
Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 7, 13.
5 George Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York: 
Mentor Books, 1952), 82-83.
6 Wood, Creation, 21-22; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 55-59.
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5neutral ships carrying enemy goods were not subject to 
capture, usually known as "free ships make free goods," fall 
into the first category. Royal absolutists, such as 
Metternich, embraced a balance of power primarily because it 
promoted stability. American republicans saw a balance of 
power abroad as a way to preserve liberty, analogous to a 
balanced government in domestic affairs. "Free ships make free 
goods" was a principle common to powers with small navies, 
from republican Netherlands to autocratic Russia. In American 
thought, it too was an expression of liberty. Both principles 
were certainly elements of "realist" diplomatic thought, but 
also promised to limit the scale and scope of war, which was 
generally believed to be fatal to republicanism.
The second group of ideas, taken from republican thought, 
mainly concerned the methods by which a balance of power and 
freedom of commerce might be achieved. The first diplomatic 
rule of a republican government, on which all American 
statesmen agreed, demanded a political separation from Europe 
and neutrality between European nations. Europe was, in Thomas 
Paine's words, "too thickly planted with kingdoms to be long
7
at peace." Paine's argument combined the republican
assumptions that monarchies were prone to war and that wars, 
which tended to augment executive power to the point of 
tyranny, were fatal to republics. Neutrality would prevent
7 Thomas Paine, Common Sense [1776]. Isaac Kramnick, ed.
(New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 87.
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6encroachments of monarchy from without.
Republicanism limited the tools available to enforce 
neutrality and separation from Europe. A republic was a 
government of limited powers and could not, for example, 
establish standing armies, raise taxes at will, or conduct 
wars by executive fiat. Such policies were hallmarks of royal 
despotism. Thomas Paine spoke for millions when he wrote that
"in England a k hath little more to do than to make war and
give away places.”® The United States had to find measures of 
defense that did not endanger republican government. With a 
permanent standing army ruled out the choice generally fell 
between a navy or some sort of economic coercion. A navy paid 
for itself by protecting commerce and avoided the danger of 
standing army. Economic coercion, denying American 
agricultural exports to Europe and its colonies and closing 
the American market for manufactured goods, promised to 
substitute for any military system.
Disagreement over which choice was better is a main theme 
of this study. If one believed that the United States could 
manipulate the European balance of power in their favor (as 
did John Adams during the Revolution and Madison throughout 
his career), commercial power was an ideal weapon and 
perfectly suited to a republic. If one believed that a large- 
scale domestic shipping industry was improper for a republic, 
as did Madison, a navy was largely a waste of resources and a
8 Ibid., 81.
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7provocation to other nations. Conversely, those who favored 
domestic shipping and did not believe the United States could 
manipulate other nations approved of the navy as a 
particularly republican form of defense.
Two other aspects of the nature of a republican 
diplomacy, which appear sporadically in this study, concern 
the idea of a republican style of diplomacy and the extent to 
which republics had a common interest. The question of 
republican style turned on whether or not Americans were more 
virtuous than Europeans. If so, republican diplomacy would be 
plain and straightforward, shorn of royal trappings. If not, 
there would be little practical difference in the conduct of 
American and European diplomats.
The question of whether there was a common interest among 
republics depended on whether or not self-styled republics 
such as revolutionary France and South America were republics 
in fact as well as in name. Few suggested anything like a 
republic league; that would violate the first republican rule, 
that of political separation. There was, however, always a 
large gray area between active alliance or opposition and an 
inactive sympathy or hostility.
The United States existed in a world full of governments 
that were not limited in actions. Consequently, American 
leaders did not always have complete freedom to base diplomacy 
on purely republican principles. The alliance with France 
during the American Revolution, to cite an obvious example,
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8was a deviation from the idea that the survival of the 
American republic depended on a separation from European 
politics. American statesmen had to strike a balance between 
diplomatic necessity and ideological commitment, to find 
policies that would secure diplomatic goals abroad without 
endangering liberty at home.
The careers of John Adams, James Madison and John 
Quincy Adams are case studies, although certainly not the only 
ones, in reconciling republican thought with diplomatic 
practice. Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin also claim a 
place in a study such as this. For both pragmatic and thematic 
reasons they have been omitted. John Adams and James Madison 
were the two most systematic political thinkers and writers of 
the early republic, and they provide more convenient templates 
for this study than Franklin and Jefferson, who thought as 
deeply about ideology and diplomacy but wrote less in the way 
of republican treatises. Neither Franklin nor Jefferson 
produced a body of writing similar to Adams's Thoughts on 
Government, Defence of the Constitutions and Discourses on 
Davila or Madison's Federalist and "Helvidius" essays. 
Furthermore, Adams's and Madison's executive careers were 
dominated by maritime crises and make for an obvious 
comparison. John Quincy Adams represents a second generation 
of American statesmen, which was more assured of the survival 
of republican government. As the most successful secretary of 
state in American history and the sharpest critic of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9Jacksonian Democratic diplomacy, John Quincy Adams believed, 
as had his father and James Madison, that foreign policy must 
reflect a commitment to republican government.
Americans learned their republicanism from a variety of 
sources. The classical authors of Greece and Rome were the 
foundation of colonial secondary and college preparatory 
education and supplied many of the key concepts of American 
republicanism. The idea of balanced government, for example, 
derived from Aristotle and Polybius. Americans read classical 
history not to understand the classical world on its own 
terms, but to extract moral examples. Americans could adopt 
classical models, such as Cato or Cicero, and condemn as 
enemies of republicanism others such as Caesar or Catiline, 
without sharing all of the assumptions of classical society. 
For diplomacy, the most important difference between classical 
and modern republicanism was that the classical state was 
designed to wage war, and Americans generally sought to avoid 
war as subversive of republican government. Furthermore, 
American republicanism generally, although not unreservedly, 
accepted commerce as a public good, whereas the classical 
world feared commerce.9
9 Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical 
Republicanism and the American Founding (Chapel Hills 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 57-59, 72-76,
324, 333-334; Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the 
Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment 
(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1994), 12-25, 
55, 90-91, 126-127.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
The American republic was founded in war and as such used 
the classical martial tradition when needed. In general, in a 
republic war was to be avoided, but when war was inevitable 
the classics served as a cultural reservoir to provide a 
republican justification for war. John Adams, for example, 
spent his executive career trying to avoid war. Yet in 1813 he 
wrote that "Republicks have been the most Warlike of all 
Governments." Adams also believed that if the United States 
had remained at peace in 1812, "the American Nation would have 
been, as timorous as a Warren of Hares.”10 John Quincy Adams 
also exhibited the two republican views of war. In 1844 be 
feared war with Mexico over Texas as the precursor to 
despotism at home. In 1846, he saw war with Great Britain over 
Oregon as a show of virtue.11 James Madison never completely 
embraced war, but in 1812 he did draw on the classical martial 
tradition when he saw no other option.
For ideas concerning the relations between men and 
between nations, Americans turned to four categories of 
Enlightenment thinkers. Three categories were mainly
10 John Adams to Richard Rush, August 11, 1813, in J.H. 
Powell, ed., "Some Unpublished Correspondence of John Adams 
and Richard Rush, 1811-1822," 3 parts. Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography, Vol. 60 no. 4, Vol. 61 nos. 1-2 
(October 1936, January 1937, April 1937), 1:144; John Adams 
to Richard Rush, July 14, 1813, Adams Family Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society, Letterbook, reel 95.
11 Diary entries, June 16, 1844 and March 25, 1846, in John 
Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 12 vols. Charles 
Francis Adams, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott and Co., 
1874-1877), 12:52, 254-255.
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theoretical: those writers who were primarily concerned with 
the emerging law of nations, such as Hugo Grotius and Emmerich 
de Vattel; those who wrote on constitutional issues, such as 
John Locke and Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu; and 
those who were political economists, such as the French 
Physiocrats and the Scottish Common Sense school. All of these 
theorists sought to discover and codify the natural laws that 
governed human conduct. Authors such as Vattel represented a 
foreign policy analog to the constitutional writers who 
influenced the revolutionary generation. For a guide to 
British politics, in both diplomatic and constitutional 
matters, Americans turned to the fourth category, the works of 
the English Opposition, from the republicans of the 
seventeenth-century Commonwealth to James Burgh in the 1770s. 
Three of Robert Walpole's opponents, John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon, who wrote jointly as "Cato,” and Henry St. John, 
Viscount Bolingbroke were the most important writers of this 
group. Colonial experience in both politics and diplomacy 
served to unite theory with practice.12
The law of nations emerged as a coherent body of thought 
in the century after the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). with 
the end of that war, the idea of a "universal monarchy" such 
as the Holy Roman Empire as secular counterpart to a universal
12 Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual 
Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1985), 70-82; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 22-54; 
Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 33-34, 167-168; 
Robbins, Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen, 9-21.
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church gave way to recognition of multiple religions in the 
wake of the Reformation and a corresponding system of a 
balance of power among competing nation-states, no one of 
which could be allowed to predominate. The survival of each 
nation depended on the maintenance of a balance of power 
system, and presumably no nation would risk upsetting that 
system for fear of reprisal from other nations. The 1713 
Treaty of Utrecht, by separating the French and Spanish 
Bourbons, codified the new system, replacing transnational 
dynasties with discrete nations as the fundamental diplomatic 
units.*3
The law of nations that Americans read was the work of 
many hands who worked in both theory and practice. Most 
commentators, including James Madison and John Quincy Adams, 
called the Dutch lawyer and diplomat Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 
the father of the law of nations, based on his 1625 work, The 
Rights of War and Peace.14 Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694), 
the Saxon philosopher and diplomat, followed Grotius and later
13 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), 24-25, 45; 
Daniel G. Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The 
Law of Nations and the Balance of Power (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 2-10, 35-36; Peggy 
K. Liss, Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and 
Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins university Press,
1983), 1.
James Madison, "An Examination of the British Doctrine, 
which Subjects to capture a Neutral Trade not Open in Time 
of Peace," in The Writings of James Madison, 9 vols. 
Gaillard Hunt, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900- 
1910), 7:210; Diary entry, April 2, 1835, in MJQA, 9:229.
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influenced the Genevans Jean Jacques Burlamaqui and Jean 
Jacques Rousseau.15 The dominant figure in framing the law of 
nations was the Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767). 
Vattel was a native of Neuchatel, a Swiss canton that John 
Adams later praised for its balanced constitution. Vattel 
served as Saxony's minister to Bern and later as a member of 
the Saxon privy council. His crowning achievement was his 1758 
work The Law of Nations, which transformed Christian Wolff's 
The Law of Nations treated according to a Scientific Method 
into a handbook for diplomatic practice.1® The law of nations 
was not an exclusively republican science; vattel's Law of 
Nations went through dozens of editions in every major 
language in western Europe.17 The law of nations was 
compatible with American republicanism in two ways. First, the 
two shared a similar theoretical basis, with an emphasis on 
natural equality and contractual association. Second, the law 
of nations protected the interests of small, neutral powers 
and provided a justification for many American foreign policy
15 J.H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought 1450-1700 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 690.
1® Lang, Foreign Policy, 15-16; John Adams, "Defence of the 
Constitutions of Government of the United States of 
America,” Vol. 1, in The Works of John Adams, 10 Vols. 
Charles Francis Adams, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1850-1856), 4:377.
17 Francis Stephen Ruddy, International Law in the 
Enlightenment: The Background of Emmerich de vattel's "Le 
Droit des Gens" (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications,
Inc., 1975), 280-285.
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goals.
The law of nations was built on the idea of natural law, 
which formed the basis for both individual and national 
rights. Because nations recognized no superior authority, they 
could therefore be said to exist in a state of nature, which 
gave each nation the right to pursue its own ends. In The Law 
of Nations Vattel wrote that "nations art* free, independent 
and equal," and each holds the right to judge its own actions. 
The state, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui argued, is a "moral 
person."*® The primacy of the individual, rather than the 
whole, emerged in the law of nations as in modern 
constitutional thought. In The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, C. B. Macpherson argued that the idea of 
possessive individualism, which emerged in the mid-seventeenth 
century, posited that individuals owned themselves and their 
capacities and did not owe their rights to the existence of a 
larger society. Society itself was a collection of free 
individuals rather than an organic whole.19 Americans
19 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations [1758]. Joseph 
Autty, ed. (Philadelphia: L. & J. W. Johnson & Co., 1876), 
Preliminaries, lxiii, par. 21; Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The 
Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 2 vols. 4th ed.
Thomas Nugent, trans. (Boston: Joseph Bumstead, 1792),
2:208; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order 
in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1977), 48; Lang, Foreign Policy, 16-20; Peter S. Onuf and 
Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: the Law of 
Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (Madison, Wis.: 
Madison House Publishing, Inc., 1993), 10-22.
19 Richard D. Brown, Modernization: The Transformation of 
American Life, 1600-1865 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 
12-14; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive
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implicitly accepted the idea of possessive individualism as it 
applied to diplomacy. Diplomacy may have paved the way for the 
acceptance of possessive individualism in domestic politics, 
as seen in John Adams's Defence of the Constitutions and James 
Madison's Federalist #10.
Given that nations began in a state of nature, the next 
question concerned the natural relationship among them. Thomas 
Hobbes in Leviathan took the pessimistic view that the natural 
state of both individuals and nations was war, or at least 
potential war. without a central organ of control, there were 
no moral or legal limits to any state action.2® Most 
theorists, including Burlamaqui, Grotius and Pufendorf, took 
the more optimistic stand that the state of nature was a state 
of peace and that, although no positive law of a world 
community governed nations, natural law and morality did.21 
Republican government and natural law sprang from the same 
roots, they argued, the free association of individuals. 
Locke's argument that men in a natural state formed societies 
for mutual safety found its counterpart in Vattel, who went so
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), 1-3.
20 Bull, Anarchical Society, 24-25; Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan: or the Matter Forme and Power of a Commonwealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil [1651]. Michael Oakeshott, ed* (New 
York: Collier Books, 1962), 99-100.
21 Bull, Anarchical Society, 26-27; Burlamaqui, Natural and 
Politic Law, 1:121; Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, The Law 
of Nature and Nations, 5th ed. Basil Kennett, trans.
(London: J. & J. Bonwicke, 1749), 108.
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far as to call the European system "a kind of republic.”22
The law of nations provided a theoretical basis for many 
American foreign policy goals, particularly concerning freedom 
of trade. "It is necessary that there should be some law among 
nations to serve as a rule for mutual commerce,” wrote 
Burlamaqui.23 The first rule was that the sea was free to all. 
Grotius argued in The Rights of War and Peace that the sea was 
too large for any one nation to control and was therefore the 
common property of all.24 According to Vattel "the nation that 
attempts to exclude another from that advantage [free 
navigation] does her an injury, and furnishes her with 
sufficient grounds for hostilities.”25 Vattel extended natural 
freedom of trade to cover the complete freedom of neutrals to 
trade in non-contraband goods.25 The natural right to trade 
became a cornerstone of American foreign policy.
Enlightenment thought generally celebrated economic 
freedom as an expression of natural law. The French 
Physiocrats, whose name meant "rule of nature," called for
22 Lang, Foreign Policy, 35, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 
III, ch. Ill, par. 47, 311; John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government [1690], Peter Laslett, ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963), par. 134, 401.
23 Burlamaqui, Natural and Politic Law, 1:120.
24 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace [1625]. A. C. 
Campbell, trans. (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), 389-390.
25 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I, ch. XXII, par. 282, 125- 
126.
26 Ibid.. Book III, ch. VII, par. 112, 336.
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free trade in reaction to long-established feudal and noble 
restrictions on the French economy. The Physiocrats held that 
private landed property and agricultural production were the 
source of all wealth. Although the physiocrats advocated an 
absolutist royal government to protect free trade from noble 
interference, physiocratic economic thought was compatible 
with that of a major voice in English republican thought, 
James Harrington, who held that power followed wealth, by 
which he meant landed property, and that widespread private 
holding of landed property guaranteed freedom.2  ^ A century 
later, on the eve of the American Revolution, the Scottish 
philosopher Adam Smith called for complete economic freedom in 
all fields in An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. "To prohibit a great people . . . from
making all that they can out of every part of their own 
produce, or from employing their own stock and industry in the 
way that they judge most advantageous to themselves," Smith 
wrote, "is a manifest violation of the sacred rights of 
mankind."28
Smith took aim at three hundred years of British and
2  ^Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy: 
Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth Century 
France (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976), 9- 
11, 306; James Harrington, "The Commonwealth of Oceana," in 
The Political Works of James Harrington. J. G. A. Pocock, 
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 167;
McCoy, Elusive Republic, 67-68.
28 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations, 2 vols. Edwin Cannan, ed. (Chicago: 
university of Chicago Press, 1976), 2:95.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
European economic policy which he labeled "mercantilism." 
Mercantilism was not a set policy but rather a cluster of 
accumulated policies and assumptions regarding trade and 
national power. Mercantilism assumed that world politics was 
a zero-sum game, which no nation could win without another 
losing. Winning was defined as maintaining a favorable balance 
of trade by hoarding and preventing the export of gold, by 
preventing the export of raw materials such as wool that were 
needed for domestic industry, and by encouraging exports and 
discouraging imports. Colonies in the mercantile system 
existed to serve the mother country by providing raw materials 
and an exclusive market for exports.29 Smith attacked 
mercantilism in each of its assumptions and argued that free 
trade was a surer way to wealth. At a certain point the amount 
of gold stockpiled would exceed demand, Smith argued, and 
nothing could prevent its export. Similarly, taxes designed to 
prevent importation were counterproductive. Smith criticized 
the mercantile conception of empire and wrote that the expense 
of defending colonies far outweighed the economic benefit of 
their markets.30 The British national debt, incurred in 
defense of the colonies, which spawned the Stamp Act and the 
Townshend Acts, proved Smith correct.
29 Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American 
History, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934- 
1938), 4:13-20, 323; Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest:
The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1970), 5-6, 48-49.
30 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1:457, 495, 2:180.
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Economic theory was a part of the broader mid-eighteenth 
century inquiry into the nature of human society. Scottish 
thinkers, such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, 
believed that human society passed through four stages —  
hunting, pasturage, agriculture and commerce. At each stage, 
virtue consisted in the full use of natural talents, with 
commerce as the highest and most virtuous stage of society. 
David Hume argued that the development of commerce and 
manufacturing, including luxury goods, promoted wealth, 
happiness, refinement and the spirit of improvement.31 
Competition among nations improved societies as economic 
competition improved individuals, Adam Ferguson argued in 
1752.3  ^ The Scottish analysis of societal evolution held 
tremendous implications for American diplomacy, which centered 
on trade. The nature of American contact with the world would 
be in part determined by the nature of American society.
Political writers in the colonial era generally supposed 
luxury to be incompatible with republicanism. They believed 
with Montesquieu that "a soul depraved by luxury has many 
other desires [than the public good] and soon becomes an enemy 
to the laws that confine it."33 The central problem for
31 David Hume, "Of Commerce," in Writings on Economics. 
Eugene Rotwein, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1955), 13-14; McCoy, Elusive Republic, 19-30.
32 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society 
[1767] (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1971), 36.
33 Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the 
Laws, 2 vols. [1749]. Thomas Nugent, ed. and trans. (New
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Americans was at what stage did republican government become 
viable. American agrarians such as Jefferson, Madison and 
Franklin believed that the third stage as the Common Sense 
thinkers defined it was best suited to republicanism, and saw 
extensive manufactures as a sign of old age and decay. The 
mercantile system and the Navigation Acts were the devices by 
which a dying system prolonged its life at the expense of a 
younger and more vigorous society. Land was relatively widely 
distributed in America, making manufacturing inappropriate. 
The commerce of the new nation would be based on agricultural 
exports.3  ^Thomas Jefferson summed up the agrarian creed in 
his Notes on the state of Virginia: "Those who labor in the 
earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen 
people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for 
substantial and genuine virtue.” As for manufacturing, 
Jefferson proposed to "let our work-shops remain in Europe."35 
Of the three figures in this study, Madison took the greatest 
interest in political economy and linked his diplomacy to the 
preservation of a republican economy. John Adams and John 
Quincy Adams, who were not primarily economic thinkers, 
accepted and encouraged manufactures and domestic shipping in 
their diplomacy, whereas Madison did not.
York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1949), 1:96.
3  ^McCoy, Elusive Republic, 46-49, 56-60, 66-69, 107-110.
35 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia [17871. 
William Peden, ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1955), 164-165.
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For a guide to British politics, Americans turned to the 
writings of the English Opposition school, particularly those 
of "Cato" and Bolingbroke, who led the literary opposition to 
Robert Walpole. These writers provided Americans with their 
basic understanding of the workings of British politics and 
diplomacy. "Cato” shared much with natural rights thinkers 
such as John Locke, writing that men "are naturally equal, and 
none ever rose above the rest but by Force or Covenant." 
"Cato" used natural law to defend balanced government and 
attack Walpole for exceeding the natural bounds of executive 
authority.36 The South Sea Company and the political machine 
that Walpole built on its ruins were the symbols of all that 
was wrong in British politics. To the opposition, the attempt 
to create a tyranny at home through the use of executive 
patronage and a standing army led Walpole into a diplomacy 
that embraced tyranny abroad and sacrificed Great Britain's 
national interests to France and Spain.37
The accession to the English throne of the Dutch prince, 
William of Orange, in 1689 completely reoriented English
36 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 34-36; Michael P. Zuckert, 
Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 299-301; John Trenchard 
and Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters: Or essays on Liberty, 
Civil and Religious, and other important Subjects, 4 vols. 
[1733] (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), #45 (Sept. 16,
1721) and #60 (Jan. 6, 1721/22), 2:85, 229.
37 Rodger D. Parker, "The Gospel of Opposition: A Study in 
Eighteenth Century Anglo-American Ideology," 2 vols. 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State university, 
1975), 1:41, 281-282.
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foreign policy. In the second half of the seventeenth century 
England thrice fought the Dutch over commercial and colonial 
issues. After 1689 England and the Netherlands were allies, 
and England became the primary opponent of French hegemony on 
the continent. William's accession brought England directly 
into the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) against 
France, and shortly afterward England fought the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1702-1713) to prevent the union of the 
French and Spanish crowns. The accession of the Hanoverian 
King George I in 1714 made continental entanglements 
unavoidable. Robert Walpole spent most of his first decade as 
prime minister engaged in continental politics, constructing 
alliances with France and Prussia to protect Hanover. Fear of 
war with Spain and Austria in 1729 prompted Walpole to raise 
taxes, build an army and pay for German mercenaries, leaving 
the government open to the charge that it allowed the 
Hanoverian tail to wag the British dog. The 1730s were by 
comparison a quiet decade. Walpole realized that his political 
system depended on peace and sought to limit European 
commitments. Opposition figures, however, attacked Walpole's 
passive policy as vigorously as his active policy. French 
commerce in America boomed in the 1730s, especially with the 
Newfoundland fisheries, allowing France to challenge Great 
Britain as a naval power. Worse still, Walpole acquiesced in 
the Spanish crackdown on British smuggling in the West Indies. 
Parliamentary outrage allowed Walpole's opponents to force him
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into war against Spain, and eventually out of office.38
Opposition Whigs perceived Ruling Whig foreign policy as 
the diplomatic side of the corruption they saw at work in 
domestic politics. The satirist and Tory pamphleteer Jonathan 
Swift sketched out the beginnings of the Opposition critique 
of Ruling Whig foreign policy in his 1711 pamphlet The Conduct 
of the Allies. Swift attacked the Marlborough ministry for 
pursuing a backward strategy. The ministry, Swift argued, 
sacrificed men and money on a continental war, when the 
correct strategy was to focus on the navy. Great Britain had 
conquered German provinces on behalf of Austria, Swift 
continued, while Austria was slow to move against France. 
Swift concluded that Great Britain could not depend on 
continental allies for its safety.38 The outbreak of war with 
Spain in 1739 fully revealed what the Opposition considered 
the proper strategy: emphasis on the navy and on the colonies, 
with no continental engagements. Opposition thought accepted 
the idea of a balance of power among nations but interpreted
38 Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of 
Walpole (Edinburgh, Scotland: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 
1985), 112; J.R. Jones, Britain and the World 1649-1815 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, Inc., 1980), 
189-197; Paul Langford, The Eighteenth Century 1688-1815 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 18-19, 32-33, 89-103; 
J.H. Plumb, England in the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, Inc., 1950), 60; Arthur McCandless Wilson, 
French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal 
Fleury 1726-1743: A Study in Commercial Development 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936), 291-294.
39 Jonathan Swift, "The Conduct of the Allies", in Political 
Tracts, 1711-1713. Herbert Davis, ed. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1951), 19, 38.
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it to mean among continental nations while Great Britain stood 
apart. In this position, the Opposition recognized its debt to 
Queen Elizabeth, who strengthened the navy and sent the "sea 
dogs" to raid Spanish commerce. In focusing on a war in the 
colonies, the Opposition owed an unacknowledged debt to Oliver 
Cromwell's Western Design. Cromwell assumed that an attack on 
the Spanish colonies and plate fleet in 1655 would pay for 
itself.40 Eighty years later, the Opposition saw the colonial 
trade, rather than the plate fleet, as the main objective in 
the West Indies and the basis for British naval power. Naval 
power avoided the need for a standing army and paid for itself 
by protecting commerce, thus providing revenue, and was 
therefore the means of defense most compatible with free 
government.
Lord Bolingbroke was the Opposition figure most connected 
with foreign policy. He began his political career in 1700 at 
age twenty-one, when he became Member of Parliament for Wooten 
Basset. Tory leader and secretary of state Robert Harley chose 
Bolingbroke as secretary of war in 1702, but both were 
replaced when Marlborough and the Whigs came to power. Harley 
and Bolingbroke returned to office in 1710 with the express 
purpose of ending British involvement in the War of the 
Spanish Succession. The Tories were satisfied with French 
defeats in Italy and the Spanish Netherlands and feared the
40 Bernard Capp, Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet in the English 
Revolution, 1648-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989), 87, 96-97,
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war would produce a fiscal burden that would increase the 
influence of the Bank of England. Bolingbroke completed this 
task as the principal British negotiator of the 1713 Treaty of 
Utrecht. Bolingbroke's career in public office ended with the 
death of Queen Anne in 1714. He opposed the Hanoverian 
succession and joined the Pretender's forces in 1715.4*
Bolingbroke spent the last thirty-six years of his life 
as a critic of the course of British politics, producing a 
body of work that John Adams began reading in the 1750s and 
had read through five times by 1 8 1 3 . Bolingbroke saw the 
Glorious Revolution as the founding moment in modern English 
history, "a new Magna Charta" and a triumph over parties. 
Parties soon re-emerged in English politics and according to 
Bolingbroke fell into three groups: opponents of the
government, opponents of the constitution, and opponents of 
the constitution who supported the government. The third group 
was the most dangerous, Bolingbroke believed, and was 
responsible for public debts and taxes that degraded the 
nation's spirit and morals and threatened the independence of 
Parliament, which Bolingbroke considered the "key-stone of 
liberty. 1,4 ^
41 Kramnick, Bolingbroke and Bis Circle, 8-13.
42 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 25, 1813, in Lester 
J. Cappon, ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 410.
42 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, A Dissertation on 
Parties: In Several Letters to Caleb D rAnvers, 9th ed. 
(London: T. Davies, 1771), 10-12, 102-103, 137-139, 151,
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Bolingbroke saw the same spirit that unbalanced the 
constitution undermining British foreign policy as well. He 
equated a belief in a balanced constitution with advocacy of 
a balance of power among nations. Isaac Kramnick labels this 
view realpolitik devoid of any other considerations.44 On the 
contrary, Bolingbroke always based his view of the balance of 
power on its relationship to balanced government at home. In 
his opinion, the safest position for Great Britain —  
politically, economically and diplomatically —  was to remain 
apart from the alignments that formed the European balance. 
Unlike Walpole, who kept a hand in European politics, 
Bolingbroke believed that the European balance would take care 
of itself. "Great Britain," Bolingbroke wrote in A 
Dissertation on Parties, "should maintain such a dignity and 
prudent reserve in the broils of Europe, as become her 
situation, suit her interest, and alone can enable her to cast 
the balance." in Letters on the Study and Use of History, 
Bolingbroke criticized the "rage of warring," which created an 
oppressive system of taxation, and the "rage of negotiating," 
which preserved it. Bolingbroke argued that Great Britain 
"inhabits an island" and was a neighbor to the continent 
rather than a part of it.4-5 Such an isolation from European
298; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 26-28.
44 Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 184-185; Parker, 
"Gospel of Opposition," 1:270.
45 Richard Pares, "American versus Continental Warfare, 
1739-1763." English Historical Review, Vol. 51 no. 204 (July
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involvement, he declared, would allow Parliament to "take all 
Opportunities, by saving unnecessary Expenses, to pay off our 
Debts, and ease the People of their taxes," cutting out the 
roots of the Walpolean system.4^
Bolingbroke counted on trade to give Great Britain the 
power to act as arbiter of the European balance of power. By 
the early eighteenth century Great Britain began following a 
Dutch economic model that focused on trade and shipping rather 
than solely on production. "It is not the extent of territory 
that makes a country powerful," the English political 
economist Charles Davenant had written in 1699," but numbers 
of men well employed, a good navy, and a soil producing all 
sort of commodities."47 Bolingbroke, like later Scottish 
political economists such as Smith and Hume, linked trade with 
freedom and wrote that British wealth depended on trade. The 
most important facet of British trade was with the American
1936), 436-440; Bolingbroke, Dissertation on Parties, 14-15; 
Henry St. John, viscount Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study 
and Use of History, 2 vols. [1752] (New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1970), 2: 167, 169-170.
4  ^Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Contributions to 
the "C r a f t s m a n Simon Varey, ed. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), #511 (April 17, 1736), 206-207.
47 Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in 
Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1978), 78-79; Charles Davenant, "An Essay 
upon the Probable Methods of Making a People Gainers in the 
Balance of Trade," in The Political and Commercial fforks of 
that Celebrated Writer Charles D'Avenant, LL.D., 5 vols. 
(London: R. Horsman, 1771), 2:192-193.
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colonies.40 Trade had its political uses. Bolingbroke inserted 
an Anglo-French commercial agreement into the treaty of 
Utrecht, hoping that the promise of reciprocal trade would 
gain a French alliance against Austria. Parliament feared 
French competition and rejected Bolingbroke's articles.49 The 
navy was the foreign policy tool best suited to protecting 
trade without risking British liberties. The army, Bolingbroke 
and other opposition writers believed, was a vehicle for 
tyranny and, if foreign policy was conducted correctly, an 
unneeded expense. "The sea is our barrier, ships are our 
fortresses," Bolingbroke wrote, "and the navies that trade and 
commerce alone furnish, are the garrisons to defend them."50
Bolingbroke tied together his ideas on foreign and 
domestic policy in The Idea of a Patriot King, published in 
1749. Bolingbroke had largely given up the hope that 
Parliament would reform itself, virtue was not impossible to 
achieve, Bolingbroke believed, but it was a slow, uphill 
climb, and the way of corruption was much easier.5 *
48 "Craftsman" #114 (September 7, 1728), in Bolingbroke, 
Contributions, 54, 64-65.
49 Jones, Britain and the World, 174-176; Charles Jenkinson, 
Earl of Liverpool, A Collection of all the treaties of 
Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other 
Powers, 3 vols. [1785] (New York: August M. Kelley, 1969), 
2:5-144 (whole treaty), 2:40-65 (Anglo-French articles).
50 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, The Idea of a 
Patriot King [1749]. Sydney W. Jackman, ed. (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), 65.
51 Parker, "Gospel of Opposition," 1:269-270; Bolingbroke, 
Patriot King, 6.
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Bolingbroke struck a modern note regarding the presence of 
political parties and factions in societies. "Thus factions 
are in them, what nations are in the world; they invade and 
rob one another: and, while each pursues a separate interest, 
the common interest is sacrificed by all: that of mankind in 
one case, that of some particular community in the other," he 
wrote. "This has been, and must always be, in some measure, 
the course of human affairs, especially in free countries, 
where the passions of men are less restrained by authority.
The solution to factionalism and corruption was the rise 
of a charismatic leader whom Bolingbroke called the Patriot 
King, without whom the "way of salvation will not be open to 
u s . «53 T^e patriot King would defeat factions by transcending 
them and by drawing the nation to the example of virtue. "As 
soon as corruption ceases to be an expedient of government, 
and it will cease to be such as soon as a Patriot King is 
raised to the throne, the panacea is applied," Bolingbroke 
wrote. "A Patriot King is the most powerful of all reformers; 
for he is himself a sort of standing miracle," Bolingbroke 
continued, "so rarely seen and so little understood, that the 
sure effects of his appearance will be admiration and love in 
every honest breast, confusion and terror to every guilty 
conscience, but submission and resignation in all." "A new 
people will seem to arise with the new king," Bolingbroke
Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 62.
53 Ibid., 7.
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believed.54 The Patriot King may favor one faction or another, 
as the situation dictated, "but he will espouse none, much 
less will he proscribe any."55 Regarding specific policies, 
the Patriot King "will not multiply taxes wantonly, nor keep 
up those unnecessarily which necessity has laid, that he may 
keep up legions of tax gatherers."5®
After the American Revolution, George Washington was the 
closest equivalent to a Patriot King in American politics. 
Bolingbroke's model for the Patriot King was Queen Elizabeth, 
who "united the great body of the people in her and their 
common interest, she inflamed them with one national spirit: 
and, thus armed, she maintained tranquility at home, and 
carried succor to her friends and terror to her enemies 
abroad."57 Bolingbroke credited Elizabeth with encouraging 
English trade and giving "rapid motion to our whole mercantile 
system"; he attacked James I for squandering England's 
advantages.58 Elizabeth's reign offered further proof that 
England was easily defended under the right monarch. As an 
island, England had no powerful neighbors and did not have to 
undertake continental engagements. Elizabeth recognized that 
England was first and foremost a maritime power and cultivated
54 Ibid., 39; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 167-168.
55 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 52-53.
56 Ibid., 67-68.
57 Ibid., 62; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 33-34.
58 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 66-67.
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naval power. She knew that England had an amphibious 
character. "Like other amphibious animals, we must come 
occasionally on shore; but the water is more properly our 
element, and in it, like them, as we find our greatest 
security, so we exact our greatest force," Bolingbroke 
wrote. 69
John Trenchard, the senior author of Cato's Letters, 
agreed with Bolingbroke that Elizabeth's reign was a golden 
age. In his 1698 work A Short History of Standing Armies in 
England, Trenchard contrasted the glory of Elizabeth with the 
folly of James I, who soon blundered away most of Elizabeth's 
gains.60 In Cato's Letters, which ran from 1720 to 1723, 
Trenchard and Gordon shared much with Bolingbroke. Like the 
younger Bolingbroke, "Cato" saw a reformed Parliament as the 
foundation of British liberty. In Letter #70 "Cato" 
recommended the election of legislators "who are not already 
pre-ingaged, nor, from their Circumstances, Education, 
Profession or Manner of Life are likely to be engaged, in a 
contrary interest."61 "Cato" did not last long enough to 
become as disillusioned as Bolingbroke. Cato's Letters ended 
with Trenchard's death in 1723, and Gordon later became one of
59 Ibid., 68-70.
60 John Trenchard, A Short History of Standing Armies in 
England (London, 1698), 3-4.
61 Letter #70 (March 17, 1721/22), in Cato's Letters, 3:15- 
16; Parker, "Gospel of Opposition," 1:55-56.
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Walpole's propagandists.62
"Cato" fully agreed with Bolingbroke's view of foreign 
policy, fearful of continental alliances and standing armies, 
favoring trade and the navy. "What did England gain formerly 
by their Conquests upon the Continent, but constant Wars, 
Slaughter and Poverty to themselves, and to their Princes 
precarious foreign Provinces at English Expense," Trenchard 
and Gordon wrote in Letter #93, reflecting on recent British 
experience in continental politics. Conquests bred armies, 
"Cato" wrote in Letter #95, and "all the Parts of Europe which 
are enslaved, have been enslaved by Armies."*’3
The navy was the proper weapon of a free people. In 
Letter #64 "Cato" argued that "despotick Monarchs, though 
infinitely powerful at Land yet could never rival Neptune, and 
extend their empire over the Liquid World."6  ^ "Cato" drew a 
direct equation between freedom, trade and naval power. 
Merchants naturally sought out free countries as trade "cannot 
long subsist, much less flourish, in Arbitrary Governments." 
Trade was the foundation of naval power, both as a training 
ground for seamen and as a source of customs revenue. Commerce 
had the added virtue of giving employment to those who might 
become troublesome at home.65 Like Bolingbroke, "Cato" gave
62 Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 118.
63 Letter #93 (September 8, 1722); Letter #95 (September 22,
1722), in Cato's Letters, 3:229, 251.
6  ^Letter #64 (February 3, 1721/22), ibid., 2:274.
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the colonial trade a high priority, arguing in Letter #106 
that, "our Northern Colonies do, or may if encouraged, supply 
us most or all of the Materials of Navigation . . . which
Management would soon make us Masters of most of the Trade of 
the World."®6
The implication of Opposition thought on military and 
diplomatic affairs was that Great Britain, separated from the 
continent, had the best chance at freedom. The Netherlands had 
escaped the fate of the rest of Europe but were constantly at 
risk. "Almost all Europe are Witnesses of the brutish Havock 
which the Conquerers make, and of the dismal Scenes of Ruin 
that they leave behind them," wrote "Cato" in letter #93.67 
The equation between isolation and liberty passed whole into 
American thought. Thomas Paine recognized Britain's unique 
place in Common Sense when he wrote that "Freedom hath been 
hunted round the globe." "Asia, and Africa, have long expelled 
her," Paine continued, "Europe regards her like a stranger, 
and England hath given her warning to depart."66 Even though 
England had turned against liberty, liberty had survived there 
longer than anywhere else. Separation from European politics 
was at the center of John Adams's Model Treaty. Madison 
specifically compared the United States' physical situation to
65 Letter #64 (February 3, 1721/22), ibid., 2:271-272.
66 Letter #106 (December 8, 1722), ibid., 4:6.
67 Letter #93 (September 8, 1722), ibid., 3:231.
66 Paine, Common Sense, 100.
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Britain's in Federalist #41. John Quincy Adams, in his 
contribution to the Monroe Doctrine, sought to codify and make 
permanent that separation.
James Burgh (1714-1775) echoed many Opposition themes in 
his book Political Disquisitions: An Enquiry into Public 
Errors, Defects and Abuses (1774-1775). Burgh also served as 
a direct link between Opposition thought and its American 
adherents, personally sending a copy of Political 
Disquisitions to John Adams, who called the book "the best 
Service, that a Citizen, could render to his Country."^ To 
Burgh, the standing army was the ultimate tool of oppression. 
"No nation ever kept up an army in times of peace, which did 
not lose its liberties," Burgh wrote. Englishmen need look no 
further than Cromwell, Burgh continued, for proof "that a man 
of courage backed by an army, is capable of any thing."70 
Burgh summed up Opposition military thought in Book Three: "A 
Militia with the Navy, [is] the only proper Security of a free 
people in an insular Situation, both against foreign invasion 
and domestic Tyranny."71 Like Bolingbroke and "Cato," Burgh 
emphasized the colonial contribution to British power. Burgh
^  Robbins, Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen, 364-365;
John Adams to James Burgh, December 28, 1774, in The Papers 
of John Adams, 8 vols. to date. Robert J. Taylor, et al.. 
eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977- 
), 2:205.
70 James Burgh, Political Disquisitions: An Enquiry into 
Public Errors, Defects and Abuses, 3 vols [1774-1775] (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1971), 2:349, 379.
71 Ibid., 2:389.
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argued that the colonies consumed the most British-made goods 
and were a general national benefit.72
Opposition foreign policy, emphasizing colonies and 
commerce over continental objects, enjoyed a brief and partial 
ascendancy during the Seven Years' War under William Pitt. 
Pitt's career as a symbol of reform and patriotism began in 
1734, ironically as the member for Old Sarum, the most 
notorious of Great Britain's rotten boroughs. Pitt soon joined 
the Patriot group, which was influenced by Bolingbroke and 
formed the parliamentary opposition to Walpole, particularly 
to Walpole's Spanish policy. Pitt cemented his reputation as 
a disinterested patriot in 1746 when he refused to use his 
office as Paymaster of the Army as a vehicle for personal 
profit, contrary to accepted practice.73
Throughout his career Pitt showed little regard for 
Hanoverian interests and much regard for colonies and maritime 
supremacy. His appointment as secretary of state for the 
southern department, covering France, Spain, and the colonies, 
made him responsible for the main theaters of the Seven Years' 
War and forced a partial shift in his opinion. Even though 
obliged to protect Hanover, Pitt reversed the British strategy
72 Ibid., 2:281-290.
73 Peter Douglas Brown, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham: the 
Great Commoner (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1978),
33, 46-47, 61, 79-80; Carol Lynn Holmsky Knight, "The 
Political Image of William Pitt, First Earl of Chatham, in 
the American Colonial Press, 1756-1778" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1973), 41-42.
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of the War of the Austrian Succession by putting continental 
strategy in the service of his American strategy, rather than 
using the colonies as bargaining chips over European 
objectives. Pitt sent troops to Hanover and subsidized Prussia 
to tie France down and prevent it from mounting an effective 
counteroffensive in America. Pitt's policy bore fruit with the 
fall of Louisbourg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759, leading Pitt to 
proclaim in 1761 that "America had been conquered in Germany." 
In America, Pitt was a hero because he was the first high 
official who gave primacy to colonial interests.74 Pitt soon 
ran into conflict with the new King George III and his 
favorites, who feared pushing France too hard would bring 
Spain into the war. By April 1761, Pitt was committed to 
holding all of the newly-won American territories and pushing 
on to absolute victory over the Bourbon powers. Faced with 
stiff opposition in the cabinet, Pitt resigned in October 
1761. The colonial press generally sided with Pitt.75
To many British and American commentators, British 
foreign policy in the post-Pitt era sank back into a Walpolean 
pattern of meekness in the face of Spanish and French action. 
The Royal Navy captured the Philippines in October 1762 and
74 Stanley Ayling, The Elder Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London, 
Collins, 1976), 197-198, 230-231; Knight, "Political Image 
of William Pitt," 68-72; Richard Middleton, The Bells of 
Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the 
Seven Years' War, 1757-1762 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 10-11, 148.
75 Knight, "Political Image of William Pitt," 88; Middleton, 
Bells of Victory, 184, 196-198.
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accepted the Spanish governor's offer of four million Spanish 
dollars not to sack Manila. The Manila Ransom, as it became 
known, was never paid, and remained a stumbling block in 
Anglo-Spanish relations. French Foreign Minister Etienne- 
Fran^ois, due de Choiseul offered mediation in 1765. The 
British government refused but also consistently lowered its 
monetary demands. The Manila Ransom merged with the Falkland 
Islands controversy. In 1766 Great Britain established a post 
at Port Egmont on West Falkland, which Spain protested. 
Choiseul again offered mediation of the Manila Ransom if Great 
Britain withdrew from the Falklands. British hesitancy to go 
to war encouraged Choiseul to press the Spanish case and may 
have encouraged Spain's abortive attack on Port Egmont in 
1770.76
Choiseul also saw the opportunity to boost French 
interests in the Mediterranean by taking Corsica. France 
purchased the island from the Republic of Genoa on May 15, 
1768, without consulting either the Corsican people or their 
leader, Pasquale Paoli. Popular British sentiment, encouraged 
by the author James Boswell, who publicized the Corsican 
cause, supported Paoli, and Paoli himself actively sought 
British help. Lord Shelburne concluded that Corsica was not a 
vital British interest and stood by as France completed its 
conquest in 1769. Not only had Shelburne sacrificed Great
7® H. M. Scott, British Foreign Policy in the Age of the 
American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990), 91-94, 104-107, 141-146.
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Britain's strategic position and continental reputation, he 
also appeared to let a free people be absorbed by the ancient 
symbol of absolute monarchy.77
British policy toward Corsica was complicated by the 
domestic political situation caused by the John Wilkes 
controversy. Wilkes was the publisher of the Pittite journal 
North Briton and was prosecuted for seditious libel over #45, 
which attacked the 1763 Treaty of Paris and accused the 
ministry of having the king lie when the king stated the 
treaty was beneficial to Great Britain. The government issued 
a warrant for Wilkes's arrest, even though he was a member of 
Parliament and therefore immune from arrest in most cases, 
including seditious libel. Wilkes's expulsion from the House 
of Commons in 1764 removed his immunity, and Wilkes fled to 
Paris. He returned in 1768 seeking a pardon that was not 
granted. Wilkes was elected an alderman in London and was 
returned as member for Middlesex in two by-elections. The 
House of Commons refused to seat him both times. By 1769, 
Wilkes became a cause celebre and a champion for parliamentary 
reformers.78
Opposition thought drew no distinction between foreign 
and domestic policy. Americans who absorbed that thought also
77 Ibid., 115-122; Thadd E. Hall, France and the Eighteenth- 
Century Corsican Question (New Yorks New York University 
Press, 1971), 206.
7ft Ian R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain, 1760-1815 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 63-66, 
75-78.
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saw British foreign, domestic, and colonial policy as a single 
broad-gauged plot against liberty. The Sons of Liberty in the 
northern colonies saw Paoli as a hero, and John Hancock named 
one of his ships after the Corsican. Benjamin Franklin linked 
American and Corsican liberty and saw the Townshend Acts and 
the French conquest of Corsica as a "horrid Spectacle to Men 
and Angels."79 The American resistance championed Wilkes's 
cause with equal fervor as their own, and Wilkes returned the 
favor. Arthur Lee, a Virginia doctor and future diplomat, 
lived in London in the 1760s and worked closely with Wilkes. 
Lee was ultimately disappointed that more Englishmen did not 
see their liberty linked to colonial liberty. Wilkes was a 
hero to American radicals, who saw him as fighting for their 
cause in Great Britain.80
Americans believed the spirit that produced the Wilkes 
persecution, a spirit of opposition to liberty, was the 
determining factor in colonial policy as well. The Stamp Act 
and Townshend Duties themselves were nothing short of an
79 George P. Anderson, "Pasqual Paoli, an Inspiration to the 
Sons of Liberty," Publications of the Colonial Society of 
Massachusetts, Vol. 26 (1927), 182, 200; Pauline Maier, From 
Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the 
Development of American Opposition to Great Britain, 1765- 
1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 180-182; Benjamin 
Franklin, "A Horrid Spectacle to Men and Angels," in The 
Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 30 vols. to date. Leonard W. 
Labaree, William B. Wilcox, Claude A. Lopez, et al, eds.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959- ), 16:18-19.
80 Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 162-165, 199-200; Louis 
W. Potts, Arthur Lee: A Virtuous Revolutionary (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 59-65.
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attempt to create a Walpolean fiscal machine in America. The 
army sent to America, which many feared would be quartered in 
American homes, provided a variety of constitutional horrors 
and completed the Walpolean machine. Americans well read in 
the Real Whig works believed that an army designed to combat 
a foreign adversary (in this case the Indians on the western 
frontier) would inevitably be turned against domestic liberty. 
The Boston Massacre in 1770 confirmed fears of such British 
intentions. 81
Opposition writers taught the colonists to oppose the new 
Parliamentary actions and, without directly recommending a 
course of action, suggested a power Americans might possess, 
inasmuch as Bolingbroke, "Cato” and other writers emphasized 
the colonial contribution to British power. The colonists 
hoped to force repeal of the Stamp Act by exploiting a 
supposed British dependence on American markets through non­
importation. Non-importation seemed to solve a number of 
constitutional problems. It allowed Americans to strike a 
significant blow without committing treason. Also, conspicuous 
non-consumption increased the Americans' sense of their own 
superior virtue. The success of the resistance in securing the 
repeal of the Stamp Act convinced many American leaders that
8* Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 99-102; Richard H. Kohn, 
Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the 
Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1975), 2-6; John W. Shy, Toward Lexington: The 
Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American 
Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1965), 140-143, 376, 380-381.
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the colonies were the linchpin of the empire. By the eve of 
the Revolution, some Americans saw all British regulations as 
attempts to stunt American growth. Boston merchants began 
calling for complete free trade by 1772, and after the 
outbreak of war American writers lumped the Navigation Acts 
with all other forms of British taxation.82
Non-importation was not the cure-all that many Americans 
believed it to be. The idea of American taxation, if not the 
exact form, was widely accepted in British politics. The 
British merchants who traded with America were too few in 
number to form an effective lobby. Caution by merchants on 
both sides of the Atlantic assured that non-importation would 
be less effective against the Townshend Duties. In 1775 non­
importation failed to prevent armed conflict.88 However,
82 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Fall of 
the First British Empire: Origins of the War of American 
Independence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982), 56-57; John E. Crowley, This Sheba, SELF: The 
Conceptualization of Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century 
America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974), 127-131; John W. Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots:
Boston Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 22-23, 172; 
Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 137-138; McCoy, Elusive 
Republic, 94-95.
83 Tucker and Hendrickson, Fall of the First British Empire,
50-56; Kammen, Empire and Interest, 129; Robert Middlekauff,
The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 153-154; P. D. G.
Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First
Phase of the American Revolution, 1763-1767 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 31-32; Jack M. Sosin, Agents and 
Merchants: British Colonial Policy and the Origins of the 
American Revolution, 1763-1775 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1965), 89.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Americans continued to believe for a half- century that 
commerce could secure American goals without recourse to large 
military establishments. Most saw commercial diplomacy as 
particularly suited to republican government. Trade was not 
just a lure, as Bolingbroke depicted it, but the ultimate 
weapon. Americans held the upper hand, Thomas Paine wrote, 
"while eating is the custom of Europe."84
A commitment to republican government shaped the way 
Americans viewed the world, and consequently the course of 
American foreign policy. When the Continental Congress took up 
the question of foreign policy in 1775, its members looked to 
the political thought and experience that had led them to 
rebellion for guidance. Over the next 75 years changing 
circumstances and differing experiences led John Adams, James 
Madison and John Quincy Adams to different answers to 
questions concerning the relationship between republican 
government and foreign policy.
0 4
Paine, Common Sense, 83.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DIPLOMACY OF INDEPENDENCE
If the elderly John Adams is to be believed, it would 
appear that he always believed in the first rule of republican 
diplomacy, that American liberty depended on a physical and 
political separation from Europe. Adams remembered listening 
to his father discuss the return of Louisbourg to France in 
1748, from which Adams "received very grievous impressions of 
the injustice and ingratitude of Great Britain towards New 
England." British military failure in the Seven Years' War 
convinced Adams "that we could defend ourselves against the 
French, and manage our affairs better without, than with, the 
English."^- Adams's youth and early adulthood were shaped by 
his early exposure to foreign relations through his reading of 
the republican texts, both classical and whig, and through the 
events of his day. From English Opposition thought Adams 
learned that liberty at home and independence abroad depended 
on a balance of power among branches of government and among 
nations. Furthermore, separation from Europe could be 
maintained only by means compatible with a limited government, 
specifically a navy. Adams's experience in politics before the
1 John Adams to Skelton Jones, March 11, 1809, in WJA, 
9:611-612.
i2
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American Revolution taught him that, in the absence of a navy, 
economic power could secure American diplomatic goals.
Resistance to British taxation convinced Adams that Americans 
were an especially virtuous people and could expect a quick 
triumph over a corrupt Britain. Adams's diplomacy during the 
American Revolution combined these elements of republican 
theory.
Adams's diary and autobiography reveal a mind steeped in 
the classics of English Opposition thought. "I carried with me 
to Worcester, Lord Bolingbroke' s Study and Use of History, and 
his Patriot King,” Adams later recalled.2 Adams recorded in 
his diary that he spent much time reading not only Bolingbroke 
but also Cato's Letters, and Montesquieu's Spirit of the
Laws.3 These authors taught Adams that the central question of 
politics was the distribution of power. Power was a natural 
and necessary element in society, but it was too dangerous to 
be left uncontrolled. To maintain liberty, both within a state 
and among nations, power must be dispersed as widely as 
possible, so that no one received an overly large share. For
Adams, power was the ability to control others. Power was
necessarily aggressive and expansive, and it gained at the
2 "Autobiography," in John Adams, Diary and Autobiography of 
John Adams, 4 vols. L.H. Butterfield, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1961), 3:264.
3 Diary entries for Jan. 16, Feb. 15 and July 19, 1756 and 
June 26-27, 1760, ibid., 1:2, 35, 40, 142-143.
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expense of liberty and right.4 In A Dissertation on the Canon 
and Feudal Law, Adams described power as the "Desire for 
Dominion, that encroaching, grasping, restless, and 
ungovernable Principle in human Nature, that Principle which 
has made so much Havock and Desolation."5 "No simple Form of 
Government, can possibly secure Men against the Violence of 
Power," Adams wrote in a 1763 essay.®
Only a balanced government could contain power, but Adams 
believed that a republic must be virtuous as well as 
balanced.^ "The Preservation of Liberty depends on the 
intellectual and Moral Character of the People," Adams wrote 
in his notes for a speech in March 1772. "As long as Knowledge 
and virtue are diffused generally among the Body of a Nation, 
it is impossible they should be enslaved."® A people that 
remained virtuous and vigilant kept its liberty. Americans 
generally praised the British constitution for its ability to 
balance the forces of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, 
represented by the crown, lords and commons. However, by the
4 Wood, Creation, 21-22; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 55-59.
5 John Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law," 
February 1765, in DAJA, 1:255-256.
® John Adams, "An Essay on Men's Lust for Power," post Aug. 
29, 1763, in PJA, 1:83.
 ^Peter Shaw, The Character of John Adams (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 92; John R. Howe, 
Jr., The Changing Political Thought of John Adams 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 88.
8 Notes for an oration at Braintree, March 1772, in DAJA, 
2:58.
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1760s it seemed that the British had lost their virtue. The 
degradation of the British people allowed the crown to grow 
too powerful and corrupt Parliament, disturbing the balance of 
power. Drawing on classical history, Americans noted that in 
Greece and Rome the loss of freedom followed the loss of 
virtue.9
British corruption and British jealousy of American 
power, for Adams, were the foundations of colonial policy 
after 1763. According to legend, the pilgrims carved the poem, 
"The eastern nations sink, their glory ends/ An empire rises 
where the sun descends,” on Plymouth Rock. Adams believed the 
sentiment, if not the legend.*® He had accepted the theory 
Benjamin Franklin put forth in 1754, that the American 
population would double every twenty years. The next year he 
observed that Rome and Great Britain rose to power from humble 
origins, and speculated that "the great seat of Empire" might 
cross the Atlantic to America. "For if we can remove the 
turbulent Gallicks, our own people according to the exactest 
computations, will in another Century, become more numerous 
that England itself," Adams wrote. "Should this be the Case,
9 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 65-77; Wood, Creation, 52; H. 
Trevor Colboum, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and 
the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 25.
*° James H. Hutson, John Adams and the Diplomacy of the 
American Revolution (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1980), 1-8; John Adams to Benjamin Rush, May 23, 
1807, in Alexander Biddle, ed. Old Family Letters: Copied 
from the Originals for Alexander Biddle (Philadelphia: J. B. 
Lippencott and Company, 1892), 143.
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since we have (I may say) all the naval stores of the Nation 
in our hands it will be easy to obtain mastery of the seas, 
and then the united force of all Europe will not be able to 
subdue us."11
Great Britain would not permit American power to match 
its own. In 1774 Adams wondered how to date the history of the 
conflict between Great Britain and the colonies. After 
considering various events such as the accession of George III 
and the administration of Governor Francis Bernard, Adams 
concluded that the conflict began with the American articles 
of the 1763 Treaty of Paris —  "The Cession of Canada, 
Louisiana, and Florida to the E n g l i s h . " More specifically, 
the fall of Canada led the British government, like Cronos, to 
devour its young to maintain power. "Suffice to it say, that 
immediately upon the Conquest of Canada from the French in the 
year 1759, Great Britain seemed to be seized with a jealousy 
against the colonies," Adams wrote in 1780, using an 
Opposition Whig framework of analysis, "and then concerted the 
plan of changing their forms of government, of restraining 
their trade within narrower bounds, and raising a revenue 
within them by authority of parliament, for the avowed or 
pretended purpose of protecting, securing and defending
H  John Adams to Nathan Webb, Oct. 12, 1755, in PJA, 1:5.
12 Diary entry, March 31, 1774, in DAJA, 2:95.
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1 3them."-LJ American liberty depended on both a constitutional 
and an international balance of power. The Continental 
Congress sought to redress the international (or at least 
transatlantic) balance of power through the use of American 
trade and the conquest of Canada.
John Adams shared the common belief that through the use 
of trade, denying it to Great Britain and offering it to the 
rest of the world, Americans could manipulate the European 
balance of power and achieve their diplomatic goals without 
submission to any power and without involving themselves in 
European politics. On September 30, 1774, the Continental
Congress approved a Continental Association that banned the 
importation of British and Irish goods after December 1, 1774, 
and banned exports to Great Britain, Ireland and the British 
West Indies as of September 10, 1775.14 At heart Adams was a 
free trader. "I am against all shackles upon Trade,” he wrote 
to James Warren in 1777. "Let the Spirit of the People have 
its own Way, and it will do something."15 Adams feared that 
non-exportation would hurt America more than Great Britain.16
13 John Adams to Hendrik Calkoen, Oct. 4, 1780, in WJA,
7:266.
14 Gerard Clarfield, "John Adams: The Marketplace and 
Foreign Policy." New England Quarterly, Vol. 52 no. 3 
(September 1979), 348-350; Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of 
National Politics: An Interpretive History of the 
Continental Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 49.
15 John Adams to James Warren, April 6, 1777, in PJA, 5:145.
16 John Adams to James Warren, July 17, 1774, ibid., 2:110.
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"Can the Inhabitants of North America live without foreign 
trade?" he asked.*7 Adams did recognize that commerce was the 
only real weapon America had, and in October of 1775 he called 
the non-importation and non-exportation agreements a 
"formidable Shield of Defense."*®
"The Battle of Lexington on the 19th of April, changed 
the Instruments of Warfare from the Penn to the Sword," Adams 
wrote in his autobiography.19 To secure continental union, 
Congress authorized an attack on Canada. The Canada expedition 
falls into a gray area between military and foreign policy. 
Radicals in Congress saw the Canadians as fellow victims of 
British oppression, theoretically no different from residents 
of Massachusetts. Partially at John Adams's insistence, the 
congressional committee that drafted a list of grievances 
cited the Quebec Act, "establishing the Roman Catholick 
Religion in the Province of Quebec, abolishing the equitable 
system of English laws, and erecting a tyranny there."20 In 
his own notes Adams described the Quebec Act as "Danger to us 
all. An House on fire."2* In practice, the invasion was a
*7 John Adams to James Warren, Oct. 20, 1775, ibid., 3:216.
*® John Adams to James Warren, Oct. 28, 1775, ibid., 3:254- 
255.
*9 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:314.
20 H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental 
Congress (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1974), 40-41; 
List of Grievances, Oct. 14, 1774, in PJA, 2:162.
21 Notes of Debates, Oct. 17?, 1774, in DAJA, 2:154.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
measure of foreign policy. Unlike Massachusetts, Canada did 
not ask the Continental Army to come to its aid. Also, 
Congress eventually sent a special delegation to sway the 
Canadian people, a measure not used to bring in any of the 
thirteen colonies.
Adams fully supported the 1775 invasion of Canada, writing 
in his autobiography that, being a member of several 
committees related to the invasion, he was "wholly occupied" 
by its conduct.22 Adams emphasized strategic as well as 
ideological reasons for taking Canada. For 150 years, New 
France had been a dagger aimed at New England. Adams fully 
expected Great Britain to use Canada the same way. "In the 
Hands of our Enemies it [Canada] would enable them [the 
British] to influence all the Indians upon the Continent to 
take up the Hatchet," Adams warned James Warren, "and commit 
their Robberies and Murder upon the Frontiers of all the 
Southern Colonies as well as pour down Regulars Canadians and 
Indians together upon the borders of the Northern."23
Two different and uncoordinated American forces attacked 
Canada in 1775. In July Congress ordered General Philip 
Schuyler to invest Fort Ticonderoga and eventually take 
Montreal. Schuyler linked up with General Richard Montgomery 
at Lake Champlain in September. General George Washington, on 
his own accord, sent a force through Maine under Colonel
22 DAJA, 3:327.
23 John Adams to James Warren, Feb. 18, 1776, in PJA, 4:28.
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Benedict Arnold. Montgomery captured Montreal in November and 
met Arnold twenty miles from Quebec on December 2. Although 
short on supplies, the Americans attacked on December 30, 
hoping to take Quebec before losing Arnold's troops, who were 
due to go home the next day. The attack failed, with General 
Montgomery among the dead.
In planning the invasion, Congress operated under the 
fatal assumption that no one would live under the French 
system of government if given a choice. Congress sent its 
"Letter Addressed to the Inhabitants of the Province of 
Quebec" in 1774, which praised representative government and 
denounced the Quebec Act as a violation of the rights of 
Englishmen.^5 The French Canadians held the opposite 
assumption, that the Quebec Act was a genuine attempt by Great 
Britain to accommodate the new province. Even if the French 
Canadians had not completely embraced their new rulers by 1774 
(attempts to raise French-speaking royal regiments generally 
failed), they could not forget that their supposed liberators, 
mainly New Englanders, represented the most virulent strain of 
anti-Catholicism in the British colonies. The siegneurs, the 
feudal landholding class, rallied behind the British governor, 
and enough habitants followed to insure that Canada would
24 Higginbotham, War for Independence, 109-114.
25 Gustave Lanctot, Canada and the American Revolution 1774- 
1783. Margaret M. Cameron, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 27-28, 247-256.
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remain British.26
Adams shared Congress's assumptions, and in February of 
1776, he proposed a commission be sent to Canada. Congress 
selected Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase of Maryland, who had 
supported the invasion, and two Catholics, Charles Carroll of 
Carrollton, a member of the Maryland safety committee, and his 
cousin John Carroll, a Jesuit priest.27 Adams served as 
chairman of the committee drafting instructions, completing 
his work on March 20, 1776. Adams took great pains to show 
that French Catholics would be welcome in a union with 
American Protestants. "You are to . . . declare, that we hold 
sacred the rights of conscience," Adams wrote, "and may 
promise the whole people, solemnly in our name, the free and 
unfettered exercise of their religion; and to the clergy, the 
full, perfect, and peaceable possession and enjoyment of all 
their estates."2®
Even a well-chosen commission bearing a carefully worded 
message of friendship could not convince the French Canadians 
that the Americans who had vilified them so long and so 
recently were now their protectors. Upon reaching Canada, the 
commissioners realized that the political mission was as
26 Sir Reginald Coupland, The Quebec Act: A Study in 
Statesmanship (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 123- 
124, 165-168.
27 Thomas O'Brien Hanley, Revolutionary Statesman: Charles 
Carroll and the War (Chicago: Loyola University Press,
1983), 101-103, 109.
28 Instructions of March 20, 1776, in PJA, 4:8.
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hopeless as the military effort had been. Franklin noted that 
the French Catholics were hostile to America and that at least 
half of the English Canadians were Loyalists. Franklin saw no 
reason to continue the mission and left Canada on May ll.2  ^
Before he left, the commissioners reported to Congress that 
"it would be advisable, in our opinion, to withdraw our army 
and fortify the passes on the lakes to prevent the enemy, and 
the Canadians, if so inclined, from making irruptions into and 
depredations on our frontiers. Charles Carroll wrote in his 
journal of the "bad prospect of our affairs in Canada."31 
Congress learned of the failure of the Canadian mission in 
June. Adams blamed the loss of Canada on congressional 
indecision, lack of information on the Canadian political 
situation, lack of a competent general after Montgomery's 
death, and a general lack of supplies, money, men and 
medicine.32
As the Continental Congress learned of the military 
failure in Canada, it was beginning to consider what Adams 
later called "three Measures, Independence, Confederation and
2® Carl Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin (New Yorks The Viking 
Press, 1938), 546.
3® Commissioners to John Hancock, May 6, 1776, in Franklin, 
Papers, 22:418.
31 Charles Carroll, Journal of Charles Carroll of 
Carrollton. Brantz Meyer, ed. (Baltimore: Maryland 
Historical Society, 1876), 93.
32 John Adams to Samuel Cooper? June 9, 1776, in PJA, 4:242- 
243.
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Negotiations with foreign powers [which] ought to go hand in 
hand."33 Radicals in and out of Congress demanded quick action 
on all fronts. "I expect soon to hear that the Continental 
Congress have published the Confederacy of the Colonies —  
compleated the Republic of America —  and formed a commercial 
Alliance with France and Spain," Joseph Ward wrote Adams in 
late 1775.34 Adams was a central figure in all three measures. 
He wrote Thoughts on Government to guide the formation of new 
colonial governments, which Adams saw as the precondition for 
independence and confederation. He drafted the Model Treaty as 
the basis for American relations with the world. Both the 
foreign and domestic halves of Adams's plan of 1776 proceeded 
from the same principles and drew on a combination of 
classical and English Opposition republicanism.
"I had read Harrington, Sydney, Hobb[e]s, Nedham, and 
Lock[e], but with very little Application to any particular 
views: till those debates in Congress . . . turned my thoughts 
to those Researches which produced the Thoughts on Government, 
the Constitution of Massachusetts, and at length the Defence 
of the Constitutions of the United States and the Discourses 
on Davila," Adams later recalled.35 In domestic affairs, 
opposition thought suggested that the model for free 
government was an uncorrupted version of the British
33 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:327.
34 Joseph Ward to John Adams, Oct. 23, 1775, in PJA, 3:237.
35 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:358-359.
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constitution. Adams believed that the British constitution 
represented "a government of laws and not menf" and as such 
was "nothing more or less than a republic, in which the king 
is the first magistrate."3® Adams hoped to preserve the best 
elements of the British constitution, even if the British 
themselves chose to abandon it. "A Legislature, an Executive, 
and a Judicial Power," comprehend all of what is meant and 
understood by Government," Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee. 
"It is by balancing each of these Powers against the other 
two, that the Effort in humane Nature towards Tyranny, can 
alone be checked and restrained and any degree of Freedom 
preserved in the Constitution."37
For his model citizen, whether on the foreign or domestic 
scene, Adams turned to classical martial virtue. He wrote in 
January 1776 that, "I am so tasteless as to prefer a 
Republic," that would "produce Strength, Hardiness Activity 
Courage Fortitude and Enterprise." "Under a well regulated 
Commonwealth," he continued, "the people must be wise and 
virtuous and cannot be otherwise."38 If the people did not 
already possess a virtuous spirit, Adams hoped that the war 
would force such a spirit on them. "It May be the will of 
Heaven that America should suffer Calamities still more
36 "Novanglus" VII, March 6, 1775, in PJA, 2:314.
37 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 19; John Adams to Richard 
Henry Lee, Nov. 15, 1775, in PJA, 3:307.
38 John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, Jan. 8, 1776, ibid., 
3:398.
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wasting and Distresses yet more Dreadfull," Adams wrote to his 
wife after Congress voted for independence. "If this be the 
Case, it will have this good Effect, at least; it will inspire 
Us with many Virtues, which We have not, and correct many 
Errors, Follies, and Vices, which threaten to disturb, 
dishonour and destroy Us."3** The enemy of republican virtue 
was the "Spirit of Commerce" which was "incompatible with that 
purity of Heart, and Greatness of Soul, which is necessary for 
a happy Republic."*®
Adams expanded on these ideas in his first theoretical 
work, "Thoughts on Government," which began as a letter to 
George Wythe and emerged as a pamphlet in April of 1776.41 
Adams implied that virtue was necessary to implement his 
model, writing that, "the noblest principles and most generous 
affections in our nature then, have the fairest chance to 
support the most generous models of government." Adams linked 
his ideas of the republican nature of the British constitution 
to his theory of government and emphasized the rule of law. He 
wrote, "that form of government, which is best contrived to 
secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the
3** John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776, in L.H. 
Butterfield, Marc Friedlaender and Richard Allen Ryerson, 
eds., Adams Family Correspondence, 6 vols. to date 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963- ),
2:28.
40 John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, April 16, 1776, in PJA, 
4:125.
43 John Adams, "Thoughts on Government," editorial note, 
ibid,, 4:65-66.
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best of Republics. "42
On constitutional matters, Adams's suspicion of human 
nature led him to advocate a bicameral legislature. "A single 
assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties of 
an individual," he wrote, "subject to fits of humour, starts 
of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice, 
and consequently productive of hasty results and absurd 
judgement." However, a properly balanced government could act 
as a guarantor of virtue. Adams advocated laws to promote 
education, and sumptuary laws to keep the spirit of luxury 
under control. "Frugality is a great revenue," wrote Adams, 
"besides curing us of vanities, levities, and fopperies which 
are antidotes to all great, manly and warlike virtues."43 A 
constitution, Adams concluded, could be a great inspiration to 
a people. A properly designed constitution could, "make the 
common people brave and enterprizing. That ambition which is 
inspired by it makes them safer, industrious and frugal."44
Adams knew that men often acted on their passions and 
interests rather than for the public good.45 This 
characteristic could also work for the public good. The desire 
for fame and honor implied some contribution to the public
42 Ibid., 86-87.
43 Ibid., 88, 91.
44 Ibid., 92.
45 Howe, Political Thought of JA, 16-18.
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good, regardless of motive.4® "Ambition in a Republic, is a 
great Virtue, for it is nothing more than a Desire, to Serve 
the Public, to Promote the Happiness of the People, to 
increase the wealth, the Grandeur, and Prosperity of the 
Country," Adams wrote.47 "The utility of Medals, has been 
impressed Strongly upon my Mind," he informed Nathanael 
Greene, "Pride, Ambition, and indeed what a Philosopher would 
call Vanity, is the strongest Passion in human Nature, and 
next to Religion, the most operative Motive to great 
Actions."48
The second half of Adams's plan of 1776, the question of 
foreign alliances, also emerged in the midst of the Canada 
debacle. On November 29, 1775, Congress established the
Committee of Secret Correspondence "for the sole purpose of 
communicating with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and 
other parts of the world." Great Britain forced the issue of 
foreign involvement when Parliament passed the American 
Prohibitory Act, which declared American ships subject to 
capture and declared the colonies beyond the protection of the 
law. The act arrived in the Continental Congress on February 
27, 1776. In response, Congress opened American ports to the
Douglass Adair, "Fame and the Founding Fathers," in Fame 
and the Founding Fathers. Trevor Colboum, ed. (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1974), 8.
47 John Adams to unknown, April 27, 1777, in PJA, 5:163.
48 John Adams to Nathanael Greene, May 9, 1777, ibid., 186.
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world on April 6.^
Both moderates and radicals recognized that formal 
alliances with foreign powers presupposed independence. 
Moderates who opposed independence naturally opposed 
alliances. In February 1776 Robert Morris feared that making 
an agreement with France would prevent a reconciliation with 
Great Britain. "When we have bound ourselves to an eternal 
Quarrel with G.B. by a Declaration of Independence," John 
Dickinson argued in his July 1, 1776 speech against
independence, "France has nothing to do but hold back and 
intimidate G.B. till Canada is put into her hands, then to 
intimidate Us into a disadvantageous Grant of our Trade."5® 
Even some who favored independence shared Dickinson's concerns 
that an alliance should come first. Patrick Henry, whose 
radical credentials were unquestioned, opposed resolutions in 
the Virginia Assembly calling for independence, believing that 
confederation and foreign alliances should precede 
independence.5 *
AQ
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John Adams argued that, instead of needing foreign 
alliances to declare its independence, America needed to 
declare independence before any nation would sign an alliance. 
Merely opening the ports was not enough.52 "Foreign powers 
could not be expected to acknowledge Us," Adams wrote, "till 
We had acknowledged ourselves and taken our Station, among 
them as a sovereign Power, and an Independent Nation."53 Adams 
dismissed Dickinson's fears of French domination, because 
America did not seek a political or military alliance. "I wish 
for nothing but Commerce," Adams wrote.54 In March of 1776, 
Adams argued in Congress, "is any Assistance attainable from 
F[rance]? What Connection may We safely make with her? 1st. No 
Political Connection. Submit to none of her Authority —  
receive no Governors, or Officers from her. 2d. No Military 
Connection Recieve no Troops from her. 3d. Only a Commercial 
Connection."55 A treaty based on trade, Adams believed, would 
gain French support without violating the principle of 
separation from European politics. His policy temporarily 
matched that of the moderate- dominated Committee of Secret 
Correspondence, which instructed the congressional 
commissioner to France, Silas Deane, acting the part of a
52 John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 12, 1776, in AFC, 
1:377.
53 DAJA, 3:327.
54 John Adams to John Winthrop, June 23, 1776, PJA, 4:331- 
332.
55 Diary entry, March 1, 1776, ibid., 2:236.
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private merchant so as not to give the impression that the 
colonies had already decided on independence, to emphasize to 
the French that British wealth came from American trade.56
Adams believed that American commerce would exploit a 
balance between Great Britain and France that would allow the 
United States to remain independent. The constant demand for 
grain on the European continent, aggravated by endemic 
warfare, would guarantee American independence and commerce 
without requiring the United States to make any political 
commitments to other nations. "We have always said in 
America," Adams wrote in 1781, "'By and by will come a scarce 
year for grain in Europe, and then the nations there will 
begin to think us of some consequence.'"57 Furthermore, 
American commerce would strike a blow for the principle of 
freedom of the seas, as set down by writers on the law of 
nations and endorsed by American republicans. "Every body 
throughout the world sees, that a renewal of the English 
monopoly of the American trade, would establish an absolute 
tyranny upon the ocean, and that every other ship that sails 
would hold its liberty at the mercy of those Lordly 
Islanders," Adams wrote in 1780. Adams wanted to break the 
British monopoly on American commerce, opening markets to
56 Committee of Secret Correspondence to Silas Deane, March 
2, 1776, in Letters of Delegates to Congress, 4:321.
57 John Adams to C.F.W. Dumas, Jan. 31, 1781, in John Adams, 
Correspondence of the Late President Adams, Originally 
Published in the Boston Patriot (Boston: Everett and Munroe, 
1809), 366.
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France and other countries, eventually including Great 
Britain. Both Great Britain and France would benefit from 
American commerce, and neither of them would allow the other 
to attack the United States.5® Adams later recalled that the 
Americans hoped to "annihilate all Domination at Sea, and 
establish a universal and perpetual Liberty for all Nations 
Neutral and belligerent on that element."59
Congress placed John Adams in charge of a committee to 
draft a treaty of alliance that would serve as the model for 
American treaties with European powers. In July of 1776, Adams 
presented his draft of the Model Treaty. He was influenced in 
framing it by the Anglo-French articles of the 1713 Treaty of 
Utrecht, which gave France and Great Britain limited most- 
favored-nation status and established free navigation in each 
other's European possessions.60 Whereas the architect Lord 
Bolingbroke attempted to use trade as a prelude to a political 
alliance, Adams intended to use trade as a substitute for one. 
The Model Treaty's 30 articles guaranteed reciprocal trade, 
protection for each signatory's ships in the other's ports,
58 John Adams to Edmund Jennings, published Jan. 17, 1782, 
in James H. Hutson, ed, Letters from a Distinguished 
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59 John Adams to Benjamin Rush, April 18, 1813, in Old 
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60 Model treaty, editorial note, in PJA, 4:263; Max Savelle, 
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of Angloamerica (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 
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and, by excluding food and ships' stores in the definition of 
contraband, took a step toward the principle of "free ships, 
free goods." The only military concessions included merely a 
commitment that the United States would remain neutral (rather 
than ally with Great Britain) if Great Britain declared war on 
the allied nation, and that in the present conflict the United 
States would not seek a separate peace with Great Britain. 
Furthermore, the treaty barred a signatory from taking over 
any British colonies in North America. Congress adopted a 
slightly modified version on September 17, 1776.61
The Model Treaty revealed the connection between ideology 
and diplomacy, as it reflected the fear of foreign engagements 
inherited from the English Opposition and made a careful 
distinction between commercial and political treaties.62 The 
treaty showed that Adams viewed the European balance of power 
as Bolingbroke had, as an external system that could preserve 
national liberty without political or military commitments. 
Adams believed that the "Spirit of Commerce," the pursuit of 
self-interest rather than a common good, which he deplored in 
domestic politics, was the organizing principle of 
international relations.63 Like his domestic system, Adams's 
diplomatic system depended on the martial virtue of the
61 Model treaty, in PJA, 4:265-277, 290-300.
62 Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early 
American Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), 43, 46-48.
63 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:329.
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American people. Like his radical colleagues, Adams believed 
that a combination of divine favor, American virtue and 
British corruption would bring a quick victory, making 
permanent foreign alliances unnecessary. "The Officers drink 
a long and moderate War,” Adams wrote in 1777. "My toast is a 
short and violent War."6^
Adams hoped to avoid a political treaty well into 1777. 
"I have often been ashamed to hear, so many Whiggs groaning 
and Sighing with Despondency, and whining out their Fears that 
we must be subdued unless France should step in,” he 
complained to James Warren. "Are We to be beholden to France 
for our Liberties?"**5 However, military necessity and French 
interests intervened. On September 24 Congress gave the 
American envoys in Paris more leeway to agree explicitly not 
to ally with Great Britain against France.66 The moderates who 
had held out against independence rushed forward to embrace a 
full French military intervention. Military collapse in 
December led Congress to abandon the Model Treaty and 
authorize the envoys in Paris to agree to whatever was
6  ^Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The 
Continental Army and the American Character, 1775-1783 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 12- 
23; John Adams to Abigail Adams, Sept. 2, 1777, in AFC, 
2:336.
65 John Adams to James Warren, May 3, 1777, in PJA, 5:174.
66 Sept. 24, 1776, in Worthington C. Ford, ed. Journals of 
the Continental Congress 1774-1789, 34 vols. (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), 5:815.
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necessary to bring France into the war.67 The French foreign 
minister, the Comte de Vergennes, intended to use the united 
States to increase French power relative to Great Britain, and 
would not commit French resources without greater assurances 
that the Americans would continue to fight.66
On November 7, 1777, Congress appointed John Adams to 
replace Silas Deane as a commissioner to France, and Adams set 
sail on February 13, 1778.69 He accepted the appointment at 
the urging of such congressional allies as Henry Laurens, 
Richard Henry Lee and James Lovell, hoping to implement his 
ideas of a proper foreign policy.70 However, Adams did not get 
that chance. He arrived at Bordeaux on April 1, 1778, only to 
learn that Franklin, Deane and Arthur Lee had signed two 
treaties on February 6; a commercial treaty based on the Model 
Treaty, and a military alliance that the Model Treaty had been 
designed to prevent.71
Although Adams did not originally believe a political 
commitment to France was either desirable or necessary, he did 
support the treaties for two practical reasons. First, as long
67 Committee of Secret Correspondence to the commissioners, 
Dec. 30, 1776, in Franklin, Papers, 23:97; Rakove,
Beginnings of National Politics, 115.
68 Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign 
Policy (Chicago: University Press, 1954), 136-140.
69 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 33-34.
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as Great Britain occupied a foot of ground in North America, 
the United States would need French support. "Will it ever do 
to think of Peace, while G. Britain has Canada, Nova Scotia 
and the Floridas, or any of them?" he asked James Warren. 
"Such a peace will be but Short." "We . . . have the surest 
Ground to expect the Jealousy and Hatred of Great Britain," 
Adams wrote to Samuel Adams, "[therefore] We have the 
Strongest Reasons to depend upon the Friendship and Alliance
of France."^
Second, the treaties, once signed, held the force of 
American and international law. If the United States did not 
fulfill its obligations under the law, it could expect no 
further help from Europe. "This faith [in upholding the 
treaty] is our American Glory, and it is our Bulwark," Adams 
wrote to James Warren, "it is the only Foundation on which our 
Union can rest secured, it is the only Support of our Credit 
both in Finance and Commerce, it is our only Security for the 
Assistance of Foreign Powers."72 Adams believed that French 
support was solid, informing Samuel Adams that, "Every
suspicion of a wavering disposition in this court concerning 
the support of America is groundless."74
72 stourzh, Franklin and Foreign Policy, 154-155; John Adams 
to James Warren, July 26, 1778 and John Adams to Samuel 
Adams, July 18, 1778, in PJA, 6:321, 326.
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Once in Europe, Adams had to translate the republican 
theory that shaped his foreign policy in Congress into 
diplomatic practice. The problem fell into three overlapping 
questions. The first question related to the personal conduct 
of republican diplomats, and more generally to whether or not 
there was a specifically republican style of diplomacy. The 
second question was what military strategy was best suited to 
a republic. The third question was the degree to which the 
United States shared a common interest with other republics, 
or with other nations sharing similar diplomatic goals.
Upon arriving, Adams was immediately forced to deal with 
the first question, concerning personal conduct. Congress had 
recalled Adams's predecessor, Silas Deane, on August 5, 1777, 
on the grounds that Deane had issued too many commissions to 
non-English-speaking French officers. Soon afterward, Arthur 
Lee accused Deane of using his position to further his 
commercial interests. In 1776, Pierre Augustin Caron de 
Beaumarchais had organized Rodrigue Hortalez et Cie, a trading 
firm to serve as a vehicle for sending military supplies to 
America. Louis XVI gave the company one million livres in 
starting capital, leading Lee to believe the company was 
merely a front for a royal subsidy. Because the king 
authorized the company to sell stock to private investors, 
both Beaumarchais and Deane treated the company as a 
legitimate business. Deane invested heavily and expected a
Office, 1889), 3:48.
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personal return, often mixing his private and official 
financial accounts in the process. Lee, by nature suspicious 
of those around him, spent 1778 accusing Beaumarchais and 
Deane of defrauding Congress. Deane responded with an essay in 
the December 5, 1778, Pennsylvania Packet, in which he
attacked the Lee family in general and Arthur Lee in 
particular, charging them with disloyalty to the alliance and 
outright treason. The story reached Paris in February of 1779, 
causing an immediate rift between Adams, the Lee family's 
ally, and Franklin, who did not believe Deane was guilty of 
any wrongdoing.75 Adams wrote in his diary, "that there 
appeared to me no Alternative left but the Ruin of Mr. Deane, 
or the Ruin of his Country. That he appeared to me in the 
light of a wild Boar, that ought to be hunted down for the 
Benefit of Mankind."76
Although the Deane affair was in Adams's mind a fairly 
straightforward case of corruption, it was in a more important 
sense an obvious example of how a republican should not 
conduct himself. Franklin's conduct was an even more 
complicated problem. Adams, a self-described "stern and 
haughty Republican," objected to Franklin's lifestyle, calling 
it "a Scene of continual dissipation." Arthur Lee had earlier 
formed the same opinion.77 More important, Adams criticized
75 C. F. Adams, Life of JA, 1:395; Rakove, Beginnings of 
National Politics, 249-255; Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of 
Revolution, 42-43; Potts, Arthur Lee, 154-159, 185-186.
76 Diary entry, Feb. 8, 1779, in DAJA, 2:345.
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Franklin's approach to diplomacy. Just as Adams called for a 
government of laws and not men, he called for a diplomacy 
based on national interests and not diplomats. Interest was 
the only firm basis for a long-term policy in Adams's opinion, 
whereas Franklin based his diplomacy on his personal 
relationship with the French, playing on Louis XVI's ego as 
much as on French interest. Franklin expressed his gratitude 
toward France for its generous help in effusive public 
displays that Adams found distasteful for a republican.7® 
"Franklin, while in France, was very French," according to one 
Franklin biographer, unlike Adams and Lee, Franklin did not 
conceive of a republican style of diplomacy. For Adams that 
was the problem. Adams advocated a blunter style of diplomacy. 
"He [Adams] thinks . . . that America has been too free in 
Expressions of gratitude to France," Franklin wrote in 1780, 
"I apprehend he mistakes his ground, and that this court is to 
be treated with Decency and Delicacy."79 Adams believed the 
American cause needed no embellishment. "The dignity of North 
America does not consist in diplomatic ceremonials or any of
77 John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 12, 1778, in AFC, 3:9; 
DAJA, 4:118; Potts, Arthur Lee, 200-201.
78 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 11; Stourzh, 
Franklin and Foreign Policy, 164-165.
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of Paris (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 10; Shaw, 
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of Benjamin Franklin, 10 vols. Albert Henry Smyth, ed. (New 
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the subtleties of etiquette;1' he wrote to Vergennes in 1781, 
"it consists solely in reason, justice, truth, the rights of 
mankind and the interests of the nations of Europe, all of 
which, well understood, are clearly in her favor."®0
Despite his feelings toward Franklin, Adams fully 
recognized Franklin's talents as a publicist and believed it 
would do more harm than good to remove the doctor. "Franklin 
is a Wit and a Humorist, I Know. He may be a Phylosopher, for 
what I know, but he is not a sufficient Statesman. He knows 
too little of American Affairs or the politics of Europe, and 
takes too little Pains to inform himself of either, " Adams 
wrote to Thomas McKean in 1779. "Yet such is his Name on both 
Sides of the Water, that it is best, perhaps, that he should 
be left there."8  ^ Congress agreed and reorganized the 
diplomatic corps on September 14, 1778, naming Franklin as 
sole minister. Adams received the news on February 12, 1779, 
and learned that he had not been sent even a formal letter of 
recall. For several weeks he waited at Nantes for passage 
home, spending his time nursing his resentment of Franklin and 
Congress. He finally left on June 17, arriving at Boston on 
August 2.82
John Adams spent the summer and fall of 1779 writing the
80 John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, July 18, 1781, in 
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Massachusetts constitution before returning to the world of 
diplomacy. Once again, the battle between pro-Lee and pro- 
Deane forces, in conjunction with French political interests, 
shaped Adams's career. Conrad Alexander Gerard, the French 
minister to the United States, shared the American desire to 
draw Spain into the war, and used the divisions in Congress to 
make American peace demands more acceptable to Spain.83
Initially, the United States presented a fairly ambitious 
list of peace demands. On February 23, 1779, a committee
created to draft the peace ultimata recommended that the 
United States demand absolute independence, control of all 
territory to the Mississippi River, British evacuation of 
American territory, access to the Newfoundland fisheries, free 
navigation of the Mississippi, free commerce on the 
Mississippi below the American boundary, and either the 
cession or the independence of Nova Scotia. Gerard hoped to 
moderate these demands to make them more acceptable to Great 
Britain and less threatening to Spain, which entered the war 
as a French (but not an American) ally on April 12, 1779. 
Gerard used his influence to have Congress drop the issue of 
the fisheries, and on August 14, Congress settled on absolute 
independence and control of territory west to the Mississippi 
and south to 31 degrees north latitude as its demands. The
83 Rakove, Beginnings of National Politics, 255-256.
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fisheries were not to hold up negotiations.84
Gerard lobbied for John Jay, then linked with pro-Deane 
forces, to be peace commissioner and to replace Arthur Lee as 
minister to Spain. Gerard achieved only a partial victory. 
Pro-Lee members, led by Samuel Adams, opposed Jay and 
abandoned Arthur Lee in favor of John Adams, whose election 
would secure the fisheries even without specific instructions. 
Congress deadlocked until both sides agreed to divide the two 
jobs, electing John Adams peace commissioner and John Jay 
minister to Spain on September 27.85
John Adams learned of his appointment, much to his 
surprise, in October of 1779. Elbridge Gerry urged him to 
accept, and Adams agreed that the commission was too important 
to turn down. However, Adams believed that Franklin would 
attempt to frustrate the mission, and asked that Congress 
order Franklin to authorize payments to him. Adams sailed once 
more for Europe on November 13, 1779. En route, the ship began 
leaking, and put in at El Ferrol, Spain, on December 8.86
Neither Vergennes nor John Adams looked forward to seeing 
the other again. In the summer of 1779, Gerard had reported to
84 Journals of the Continental Congress, 14:456-460; Richard 
B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American 
Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 15-18;
William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the 
French Alliance (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 
1969), 65.
85 Stinchcombe, French Alliance, 66, 73-76.
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Vergennes that John and Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee 
were part of a pro-British faction, and Adams and Vergennes 
had clashed at their first meeting over whether or not to 
inform London of Adams's powers to treat for peace. Adams's 
insistence on advising the British of his commission served to 
convince Vergennes that Adams was indeed pro-British.®7 Adams 
believed that revealing his commission to the British, "would 
. . . draw out from them some proofs of their present designs, 
and it is always important to discover early the intentions of 
the enemy.”®® Vergennes considered such a move premature. 
Great Britain had made no peace overtures, and offering peace 
and commerce would only convince the British that the 
Americans would cave into any demands the British might 
make.®9
Adams's insistence on a frank style of diplomacy 
overlapped with the second great question he faced in Europe, 
what military strategy was appropriate to a republic. The 
question put Adams for much of his time in Paris in the 
position of offering Congress and France unsolicited and 
unwanted advice on how to run the war. English Opposition 
thought and his own experience taught Adams that a navy was 
the means of defense best suited to a republic; for him a navy
87 Ibid., 56-59.
®® John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, July 17, 1780, in 
WJA, 7:228-229.
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was "our only natural and adequate defense." With a tiny navy 
itself, the United States had to rely on France. Like many 
Americans, Adams believed that French sea power would prevent 
the re-supply of British troops in America, allowing the 
United States to win without relying on French ground troops. 
This belief supplied the strategic assumptions of the Model
Q  A
Treaty. u However, France and Spain concentrated on British 
rather than American waters, planning an invasion of Great 
Britain. The allied fleet joined on July 22, 1779, but fell 
victim to delays and shipboard illness, and allowed the 
British fleet to escape to Portsmouth on August 31. The 
Franco-Spanish fleet withdrew from the English Channel on 
September 8.9*
"Yet I must own to you, that I think France and Spain are 
yet to be convinced of the true Method of conducting the War,” 
Adams wrote to Benjamin Rush. "It is not by beseiging 
Gibraltar nor invading Ireland, in my humble opinion, but by 
sending a clear Superiority of naval Power into the American 
Seas."92 Adams reported to the president of Congress in March
Qfi John Adams to Samuel Huntington, Oct. 14, 1780, in Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 101, Massachusetts 
Historical Society; Stinchcombe, French Alliance, 151; R. 
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in America, 1775-1783 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1975), 93, 123-124.
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N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 154-157.
92 John Adams to Benjamin Rush, Sept. 19, 1779, in PJA, 
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of 1780 on the strength of the French fleet, writing, "one 
would think that there was force enough in them to protect Us 
and quiet all our Fears but the Battle is not always to the 
strong and we must wait for Time to decide Events.1,93 Adams 
criticized allied naval action in Europe, especially after he 
learned of Admiral Rodney's victory on January 16, 1780,
against the Spanish at Gibraltar. Adams complained that vast 
fleets were wasted on Gibraltar, "which is but a Trifle," 
while even a smaller fleet would triumph off America.9  ^Adams 
took these themes up with Vergennes on July 13, warning that 
some in the united States were still suspicious of the French. 
A show of naval force in American waters would reassure the 
country and force the British out of Philadelphia, isolating 
them in New York City.95 Vergennes, with a smaller fleet than 
the British, and a reluctant ally in Spain, could not 
accommodate Adams, who concluded that although Vergennes 
wanted to see America independent, he did not want it to grow 
strong.9**
On July 27, 1780, John Adams left for the Netherlands, to 
deal with the third question regarding diplomacy and
93 John Adams to Samuel Huntington, March 4, 1780, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 98.
9  ^Dull, French Navy, 178-179; John Adams to Samuel 
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republicanism, to what degree were American fortunes linked to 
other republics and maritime states. This question raised 
issues regarding both Adams's opinion of the Armed Neutrality 
and his dealings with the Dutch government. On September 16, 
Adams received permission to negotiate with the Dutch until 
Henry Laurens, former president of the Continental Congress 
and member of the Adams-Lee faction, arrived. The British had 
captured Laurens at sea on September 3, leaving Adams as de 
facto minister.®7 While Adams was in the Netherlands, American 
interests seemed to coincide with Dutch entry into the Armed 
Neutrality. The chain of events leading to the formation of 
the Armed Neutrality began in July of 1778, when an American 
privateer attacked eight British ships sailing out of 
Archangel, Russia. Empress Catherine II proposed a treaty 
between Russia and Denmark in August, calling for mutual 
protection of neutral ships and British ships trading with 
neutrals in the North Sea. Denmark countered with an offer of 
mutual protection in all seas, which Russia rejected for fear 
that such an agreement would protect Danish shipping at 
Russian expense, when Spain entered the war in 1779, it 
claimed the right to seize and condemn as lawful prize all 
ships bound for the Mediterranean, on the grounds that any 
such ships might in reality attempt to land at Gibraltar. The 
Spanish capture of a Dutch ship carrying Russian cargo, 
followed by the capture of a Russian ship, revived the project
97 Ibid., 71-73, 78-79.
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of an agreement among the northern neutrals. Catherine II 
issued the Declaration of Armed Neutrality on February 28, 
1780. Of the five principles of the Armed Neutrality, the 
first three —  freedom of neutrals to trade with belligerents, 
free ships make free goods, and a limited definition of 
contraband —  appeared in the Model Treaty. The fourth 
principle stated that only an effective blockade could be 
legal, and the fifth set the first four as the basis for 
judging the legality of prizes.98
Adams was happy to take partial credit for the agreement, 
calling it "one of the most brilliant events which has yet 
been produced by the American Revolution."99 Adams hoped that 
the northern powers could tie up the British fleet in Europe 
and make up for the lack of French naval cover. He reported 
that "either the War will be pushed this year with more 
vivacity than ever, both by Land and by Sea, or that Peace 
will be made without delay."100 Congress shared Adams's 
enthusiasm, and sent Francis Dana, Adams's secretary, to apply 
for membership in the Armed Neutrality.101
98 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution, rev. ed. (Bloomington: University of Indiana 
Press, 1957), 150-156.
99 John Adams to the President of Congress, Feb. 1, 1781, in 
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Adams was not sure if the United States would be admitted 
to the Armed Neutrality. "Has there been any deliberation or 
Consultation," Adams asked his diary, "between the maritime 
Powers in forming the armed Neutrality, concerning the 
American Question?"102 However, it seemed certain that the 
Dutch would join. When the British captured Henry Laurens, 
they also captured evidence of Dutch-American cooperation. The 
Dutch joined the Armed Neutrality for their own protection on 
November 20, 1780, and the British authorized attacks on Dutch 
shipping on December 20. The Dutch appealed to Russia for help 
on January 12, 1781. Adams hoped that Armed Neutrality would 
then join the war, forcing Great Britain to negotiate for 
peace and reducing American dependence on France. Adams's 
hopes, along with the Armed Neutrality itself collapsed when 
Russia refused to go to war for the Dutch.103 Adams's hopes 
for the Armed Neutrality reflected his belief that all 
maritime powers formed a natural common interest with the 
United States.
Like his Opposition forebears, Adams believed that the 
Netherlands was the only modern continental nation that had 
achieved liberty, resulting in part from its maritime nature. 
He assumed that, in addition to a common maritime interest 
with the Armed Neutrality, America had a common political 
interest with the Netherlands, the sole republican member of
102 Diary entry, Jan. 14, 1781, in DAJA, 2:455.
103 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 79-82, 93.
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the League. That assumption shifted the basis of his diplomacy 
from an emphasis on strategic interest, the foundation of the 
American appeal to France and Spain, to an ideological 
consideration, the common interest of republics. Adams opened 
a question that would resurface during the French Revolution 
and again during the Latin American wars for independence: to 
what degree does a similarity in government, real or 
perceived, dictate relations among nations?
"The permanent friendship of the Dutch may be easily 
obtained," Adams wrote to Franklin in June 1782.104 The basis 
for that friendship was to be republicanism and commerce. On 
April 19, 1781, Adams presented a memorial to the States- 
General of the Netherlands, outlining the American case, and 
the Dutch interest in it. "If there ever was among nations a 
natural alliance, one may be formed between the two 
republics," Adams wrote. Adams went on to discuss the 
Pilgrims' residence at Leyden and parallels in the origins of 
both countries, as well as similarities in religion, 
government and commerce. Adams concluded that "in all the 
particulars the union is so obviously natural that there has 
seldom been a more distinct designation of Providence to any 
two distant nations to unite themselves together. " ^ 5 
Unfortunately for Adams, republicanism was not a sufficient
104 John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, June 13, 1782, in
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5:491.
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bond. The Dutch simply wished to trade with all belligerents 
and were not interested in schemes to remake the law of the 
sea. Fear of British reprisals prevented Dutch recognition of 
the United States until after the American victory at Yorktown 
and the British Parliament's decision to suspend offensive 
action in America.106
Adams's Dutch negotiations reflected his general approach 
to diplomacy, that the United States should not become 
dependent on any power. "It seems to me of vast importance to 
us to obtain an acknowledgement of our independence from as 
many other sovereigns as possible, before any conferences for 
peace should be held," he wrote to Benjamin Franklin.107 
Adams's system of appealing to every nation that might listen 
to American claims conflicted with Franklin's more cautious 
approach. Like Adams, Franklin wished to keep the United 
States out of European politics as much as possible. He wrote 
in 1777 that the United States should not "go suitering for 
Alliances, but wait with decent Dignity for the applications 
of others." Once the alliance with France was signed, Franklin 
believed that no other nation could offer as much help as 
France, and that American interests would be best served by 
relying on France rather than introducing more powers and 
deeper American commitments to European nations.108 Adams
106 Dull, Diplomatic History, 124-125; Hutson, JA and 
Diplomacy of Revolution, 110-114.
107 John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, May 23, 1781, in WJA,
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certainly agreed that "France deserves the first Place, among 
those Powers with which our Connections will be the most 
intimate."109 in Adams's mind, Franklin's system rested on two 
things that Adams did not trust; Franklin's personal 
relationship with Vergennes, and the basic goodwill of the 
French.
Vergennes's actions seemed to confirm Adams's distrust. 
The failure of American arms in 1780 and growing strain on the 
French treasury, led Vergennes to look for a quick end to the 
war, even if that meant limiting American territorial claims. 
Russia and Austria seemed to offer a way out when they 
proposed to mediate at Vienna in May 1781. Neither power 
recognized American independence, but Vergennes accepted the 
offer nonetheless. John Adams was the American authorized to 
attend such a conference, but he balked at going, objecting to 
the fact that recognition of the United States was not a 
prerequisite. The mediation ultimately came to nothing, as 
Great Britain refused to negotiate with the Americans under 
any circumstances.110
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Vergennes always considered Adams a loose cannon and 
tried to convince Congress to control Adams or recall him. 
Military failure and congressional panic operated in 
Vergennes's favor. In the spring of 1781 the Chevalier de la 
Luzerne, Gerard's replacement as minister, complained about 
Adams's conduct, and asked Congress to do something about it. 
Leaders in Congress shared the French belief that Adams, 
acting alone, might prolong the war by insisting on access to 
the Newfoundland fisheries as a condition of peace. In a show 
of anti-Adams and anti-New England sentiment, Congress revoked 
Adams's peace commission on June 15 and instead named a 
delegation comprised of Adams, Franklin, Jay, Laurens and 
Jefferson. Only Connecticut and Massachusetts opposed the 
measure. Congress instructed the new commission to be guided 
by France in negotiating peace. Congress delivered the coup de 
grace on July 15, revoking Adams's commission to negotiate a 
commercial treaty with Great Britain.
Adams received his new commission on August 24, 1781, and 
saw the first sign of the decay that eventually came to all 
republics. On that day Adams concluded he could no longer 
count on the virtue of the American people. The instructions 
were both a personal insult and a dereliction of duty. They 
were a symbol of Congress's abandonment of its agents 
comparable to its lack of support for the winter camp at
111 Stinchcombe, French Alliance. 153-154, 157-159, 162,
174.
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Valley Forge.112 In any case, Adams wrote Franklin, "I am very 
apprehensive that our new commission will be as useless as my 
old one." The optimism of 1776, based on a belief in American 
virtue, had faded, and after years of disappointment Adams 
warned his wife, "not to flatter yourself with hopes of Peace. 
There will be no such thing for several years."113 Not even 
the British surrender at Yorktown changed Adams's mood. "I 
congratulate you, on the glorious news contained in these 
dispatches," Adams wrote to Robert R. Livingston, the 
secretary of foreign affairs, "but I cannot be of your 
opinion, that, great as it is, it will defeat every hope that 
Britain entertains of conquering a country so defended."114 At 
best, Adams warned his wife, there would be no peace before 
1784.115 He was thus surprised when on September 28, 1782, 
John Jay informed him that Great Britain was prepared to 
negotiate and that he should come to Paris.116
By the time Adams arrived in Paris, a war that had begun 
as a colonial rebellion had ballooned to involve several major
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European powers, whose war aims were not necessarily those of 
the United States. "The Political Machine that is now in 
Motion is so vast, and comprehends so many nations, whose 
Interests are not easy to adjust," Adams observed in 1780, 
"that it is perhaps impossible for human understanding to 
forsee what events might occur to disturb it." *^7 The United 
States wanted its independence and possession of all territory 
to the Mississippi River. France wanted American independence, 
as it would weaken Great Britain, but did not wish the United 
States to become so strong as to not need French aid, or 
become so large as to threaten Spanish interests. Spain 
naturally could not openly side with a colonial rebellion, but 
saw the war as an opportunity to retake Minorca and Gibraltar 
from Great Britain. The Dutch merely wished to trade and avoid 
destruction at the hands of the Royal Navy. By 1782 that 
machine had two differing effects: to divide the alliance and 
make the British more conciliatory. Jay and Franklin met with 
Vergennes on August 10. While Jay objected to the fact that 
the instructions of British peace negotiator Richard Oswald 
did not recognize American independence, Vergennes did not. 
Joseph-Matthias Gerard de Reyneval, an advisor to vergennes, 
added that the American claim of the lands east of the 
Mississippi was extravagant, and Vergennes agreed. The meeting 
convinced Jay that the Americans might have to violate their
H 7 John Adams to Samuel Huntington, Dec. 6, 1780, Adams 
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instructions and sign a separate peace. 118 The earl of 
Shelburne, the British prime minister, was ready to give the 
Americans much of what they wanted. Great Britain had enough 
enemies and wanted to split the alliance. Shelburne believed 
the territory north of the Ohio River was lost. Better to give 
it to the Americans, who would continue to trade with Great 
Britain, than to France or Spain.119
Jay submitted a draft treaty on October 5. It called for 
recognition of American independence and British evacuation of 
American territory. It set American boundaries at the 
Mississippi on the west, 31 degrees north latitude on the 
south, the St. Lawrence River and 45 degrees north latitude on 
the northwest, and the St. John's River to the Bay of Fundy on 
the northeast. The draft gave the United States the right to 
catch and dry fish off Newfoundland, and granted the United 
States and Great Britain free navigation of the Mississippi. 
Oswald approved of the treaty, but the British cabinet 
rejected it on October 17. The cabinet wanted to exclude the 
Americans from the fisheries, establish a Maine boundary more 
advantageous to Great Britain, and make some provision for 
American Tories.120
John Adams arrived in Paris on October 26. He was still 
suspicious of Franklin, but discovered that Jay, previously
118 Morris, Peacemakers, 307-310.
119 Dull, Diplomatic History, 145-147.
120 Morris, Peacemakers, 346-350.
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connected with the pro-Deane moderates, was now fully anti- 
French. "Mr. Jay likes Frenchmen as little as Mr. Lee and Mr. 
Izard did," Adams noted with some satisfaction in his diary. 
"Our Allies dont play fair, he told me."121 Adams joined the 
negotiations on October 30, and sessions ran daily until 
November 4 when Great Britain accepted the western and 
southern boundaries that Jay proposed and both sides agreed on 
the St. Croix rather than the St. John's River as the Maine 
boundary. They could not agree on which of the three St. Croix 
Rivers, however. Adams offered in a partial concession to 
have Americans pay debts they incurred to Britons before 1775. 
Adams also proposed an article granting the Americans the 
right to fish off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.122
Fish and Tories remained the sticking points. By November 
11, the British had accepted the loss of the Northwest and 
were willing to exclude the most outspoken American Tories 
from compensation for lands the rebels seized, but still the 
British insisted on compensation for neutrals. Adams opposed 
any compensation, fearing that it would create British and 
French parties in the United States. The British watered down 
their demand for compensation to an official request, to which 
the Americans agreed.123
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The last sessions began on November 25. The fisheries, 
perhaps the main reason John Adams was in Europe, remained the 
final problem. Adams, of course, was long familiar with the 
issue. "My Practice as a Barrister in the Counties of Essex 
Plymouth and Barnstable had introduced me to more Knowledge 
both of the Cod and the whole fisheries and their importance 
both to the commerce and the Naval Power of this Country than 
any other man possessed," Adams wrote in his autobiography.*24 
Adams connected access to the fisheries to the survival of 
republican government in two ways. First, both the origins of 
the republic and its right to the fisheries rested on the same 
principles of natural law. Second, Adams believed that the 
United States was destined to be a great naval power and, like 
the Opposition writers before him, he believed that the 
fisheries formed the training ground for the sailors who would 
defend the republic. For the next three days, Adams defended 
American rights to the fisheries the same way that he gave 
advice to Vergennes —  he buried Oswald in an avalanche of 
fact and argument. He also lavishly added his opinions on what 
was in Britain's interest. Adams's main point was that 
acknowledging the united States' rights to the fisheries was 
safer for Britain than making concessions to France. The 
fisheries were a training ground for sailors. Was it not 
safer, he asked, to allow the United States to add to its tiny 
navy than the French to theirs? Since the fisheries were a
124 DAJA, 4:5.
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source of great profit, moreover, if the Americans shared in 
the fisheries, much of their profits would end up in London in 
trade. Could the British expect the same from the French? The 
fisheries were a potential source of naval conflict. Would it 
not be better to remove sources of Anglo-American conflict 
than to drive the Americans closer to France?125 Adams 
presented a draft article on November 28 that gave the United 
States the right to fish on the Grand Banks and wherever else 
Americans traditionally fished. Americans would also have the 
liberty to dry fish on Cape Sable and the unsettled parts of 
Nova Scotia.12®
Adams turned the pressure up a notch on November 29, 
claiming a natural, if not a divine right, to the fisheries. 
"When God Almighty made the Banks of Newfoundland at 300 
Leagues Distance from the People of America and at 600 Leagues 
distance from those of France and England, did he not give as 
good a Right to the former as to the latter," Adams thundered 
at Oswald. "If Heaven in the Creation gave a Right, it is ours 
as much as yours. If Occupation, Use, and Possession give a 
Right, We have it as clearly as you." Allyne Fitzherbert, 
Oswald's secretary, conceded the point, but saw no way around 
Oswald's instructions, which prohibited any such agreement. 
Adams vowed that he would never sign a peace that kept the 
Americans out of the fisheries and Henry Laurens and John Jay
125 Diary entry, Nov. 25, 1782, ibid., 3:72-74.
12® Morris, Peacemakers, 376.
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quickly agreed.127 Oswald realized that the negotiations had 
come too far to collapse over the fisheries. He proposed 
reducing the Americans' claimed "right" to the coastal 
fisheries to a "liberty," and yielded on drying privileges but 
only in uninhabited areas. The Americans agreed to the 
compromise, and signed the Provisional Treaty on November 30, 
1782.128
Adams was pleased with the treaty, even though the 
American commissioners had to violate their instructions to 
obtain it. "The great Interests of our Country in the West and 
in the East are secured, as well as her independence. St. 
Croix is the boundary against Nova Scotia. The Fisheries are 
very safe, the Mississippi and the Western Lands to the middle 
of the Great Lakes are as well secured to Us as they could be 
by England," Adams wrote to James Warren. "All these 
Advantages we could not have obtained if we had literally 
pursued our Instructions."129 Adams also acknowledged that the 
treaty was mainly the work of John Jay. Although the French 
had called Adams the "Washington of Negotiation," Adams wrote 
in his diary, that title belonged to Jay.128
The treaty presented Congress with an embarrassing
127 Diary entry, Nov. 29, 1782, in DAJA, 3:79-81.
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problem. It could not repudiate a treaty that met and even 
exceeded Congress's demands. Neither could Congress ignore the 
fact that the commissioners openly violated their 
instructions. Robert R. Livingston sent a letter to the 
commissioners on March 25, 1783, praising the treaty but
criticizing the commissioners for not consulting the 
French.131
The commissioners defended their stroke for independence 
in violation of their June 15, 1781 instructions. "Since we 
have assumed a Place in the Political System of the world," 
they averred "let us move like a Primary and not a Secondary 
Planet."132 in his diary and private correspondence, however, 
Adams was far more bitter. "Congress will not cutt off our 
Heads for making Peace, and that is some comfort," he wrote 
sarcastically to his wife. Adams blamed congressional weakness 
for preventing a commercial treaty. "It is a Glory to have 
broken such infamous Orders," Adams wrote in his diary.133
The Americans had hoped for better terms, particularly 
regarding American trade with the British West Indies, in the
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final treaty. "The commerce of the West Indies is part of the 
American system of commerce," Adams wrote to Secretary 
Livingston, "They can neither do without us, nor us without 
them."^-3  ^ However, the British would make no further 
concessions to the Americans. The Provisional Treaty brought 
down the Shelburne ministry. The succeeding government, under 
Lord North and Charles James Fox, appointed David Hartley as 
Oswald's replacement. Although Hartley favored a treaty 
granting the Americans extensive privileges in the West 
Indies, neither the new government nor British public opinion 
would approve such a treaty. An Order-in-Council issued on 
July 2, 1783, excluded American ships from the British west 
Indies. The order essentially ended negotiations. Adams 
himself left soon afterward to negotiate loans in the 
Netherlands. Adams returned in mid-August, and with Franklin, 
Jay and Hartley, signed a final treaty that repeated the terms 
of the November 30, 1782, provisional treaty. On September 3, 
1783, the negotiators read the November 30, 1782, agreement 
into a general peace settlement, ending the war.135 "Ours is 
a Simple Repetition of the provisional Treaty," Adams wrote 
his wife, "So we have negotiated here, these Six Months for
-^3  ^John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, June 23, 1783, in 
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:500.
135 Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 249-250; 
Dull, Diplomatic History, 159-160.
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nothing." 13 ^
Having spent five years in Europe, and eight years 
involved in the formation of American foreign policy, John 
Adams believed as firmly as ever that the survival of 
republican government in the United States depended on a 
balance of power in Europe and limited political contact 
between America and that continent. Diplomatic experience 
therefore confirmed for him many English Opposition theories 
on foreign policy and strengthened his conviction that the 
United States was well rid of any political connection with 
Europe. "For my own Part I thought America had been long 
enough involved in the Wars of Europe. She had been a Football 
from the Beginning, and it was easy to see that France and 
England both would endeavour to involve Us in their future 
Wars," Adams wrote in his diary. "I thought [it] our interest 
and Duty to avoid [them] as much as possible and to be 
completely independent and have nothing to do but in Commerce 
with either of them."137 Adams hoped to expand commercial 
connections all over Europe in order to avoid dependence on
1 O Q
France. Only by an impartxal conduct toward all nations 
could the United States preserve the balance of power. "If We
13® John Adams to Abigail Adams, Sept. 4, 1783, in AFC, 
5:233.
137 Diary entry, Nov. 11, 1782, DAJA, 3:52; Adams wrote a 
similar letter to Robert R. Livingston on the same day, 
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5:877-878.
13® John Adams to Thomas Mifflin, Sept. 5, 1783, in WJA, 
8:146.
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give exclusive priviledges in Trade, or form perpetual 
Alliances offensive and defensive with the Powers in one 
Scale," he warned James Warren, "We infallibly make enemies of 
those in the other.” Adams argued in his diary that "it was 
not in our interest to hurt Great Britain any further than was 
necessary to support our Independence and our Alliances."139
However, Adams came to believe that republican theory did 
not, and perhaps should not, dictate diplomatic style. "It may 
be said that Virtue, that is Morality applied to the Public is 
the Rule of Conduct in Republicks, and not Honor," Adams wrote 
his wife; "True. But American Ministers are acting in 
Monarchies, and not Republicks."1^0 This opinion was a subtle 
but significant shift in Adams's thought. He did not follow it 
to the logical conclusion that Franklin had been right about 
how to approach the French. In later diplomacy, however, 
particularly during the Quasi-War with France, Adams accepted 
European practices that he did not accept in 1777.
Adams continued to believe that foreign policy was a 
crucial test of republican government and that it was a test 
the United States was in danger of failing. Adams told Robert 
R. Livingston that the United States would have to strengthen 
the confederation or "Great Britain will take advantage of it
139 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 142-143; John 
Adams to James Warren, March 20, 1783, in Warren-Adams 
Letters, 2:142; Diary entry, April 30, 1783, DAJA, 3:115- 
116.
John Adams to Abigail Adams, Feb. 27, 1783, in AFC,
5:103.
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in such a manner as will endanger our peace, our safety, and 
even our very existence."141 In a letter to Elbridge Gerry on 
the day of the signing of the final treaty, Adams outlined 
what American policy should be. The United States should 
protect the liberties of its citizens and strengthen the 
confederation. It should depend on Europe for nothing, send 
ministers that could be trusted and support them to the 
fullest.142 Adams's program still, to a certain extent, 
depended on the republican virtue of the American people. The 
events of the 1780s revealed how much and how little virtue 
remained and led Adams to rethink the basis for republican 
government. As during the revolution, the conduct of foreign 
policy played a key role in that rethinking.
141 John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, July 16, 1783, in 
WJA, 8:103.
142 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Sept. 3, 1783, in 
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:667-670.
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CHAPTER 3: THE DISILLUSIONING OF A REPUBLICAN
Republican government in the united States had survived 
the war, but it faced a far more difficult task in surviving 
the peace. Without an external threat —  although several 
loomed internationally —  support for the central government 
under the Articles of Confederation collapsed. For John Adams, 
the decade after the end of the American Revolution was the 
shakedown cruise of American republicanism, revealing 
weaknesses in both the ship and its crew. By the end of the 
decade, John Adams had lost two key illusions at the center of 
the system of diplomacy he advocated during the revolution. 
First, he came to see that the American people were not more 
virtuous than any other people. He began to doubt American 
virtue in 1781 and lost all faith in it by 1787. Failures in 
diplomacy, specifically failure to combat British trade 
restrictions, contributed to his disillusionment. The second 
illusion, which Adams held throughout the revolution, was that 
the United States could use trade to manipulate the European 
balance of power. Balanced government, as in 1776, was the 
solution to a lack of virtue. By the 1780s Adams saw balanced 
goverment as a replacement for the virtue that Americans did 
not possess. Such a belief mirrored Adams's view of diplomacy,
9!
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in which he expected balance, rather than virtue, to restrain 
nations. In diplomacy, Adams fell back on the republican 
realpolitik of the English Opposition school; a neutrality 
from European politics and aloofness from the balance of power 
defended by a navy.
Since 1776, Adams based his diplomacy on the premise that 
all nations would open trade with the United States because it 
was in their interest to do so. Adams, like most Americans, 
tended to view British interest in terms of American interests 
and expected the two to coincide and prompt Great Britain to 
allow the United States back into the West Indian trade as if 
no war had occurred. Chancellor of the Exchequer William Pitt 
was prepared to offer such trade, until a severe nationalist 
backlash in Parliament, bent on punishing the United States 
for its independence, forced the Fox-North ministry to act 
otherwise. On July 2, 1783, the Privy Council approved an 
order barring American ships from the British West Indian 
trade. The normally powerful West Indian lobby, who like the 
United States favored a quick return to business as usual, 
assumed the measure was temporary and did not protest.1 The 
order became permanent with the Limiting Act of 1788. British 
shipping replaced American ships in the West Indian carrying
1 Frederick W. Marks, III, Independence on Trial: Foreign 
Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 54-56; Charles R. 
Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy toward 
the United States 1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1969), 6-9.
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trade, and the British government groomed Nova Scotia as the 
new focal point of trade.2 To John Adams, the new policy 
sacrificed British interest to wounded pride. "The liberal 
sentiments in England, respecting the trade, are all lost for 
the present," Adams warned Secretary Livingston. When Adams 
learned of the Order-in-Council passed on July 2, 1783, he 
wrote Livingston that ”a jealousy of American ships, seamen, 
carrying trade, and naval power, appears every day more and 
more conspicuous." Four days later Adams added that "the 
present ministry swerve more and more from the true system, 
for the prosperity of their country and ours."3
British policy was most clearly explained in the earl of 
Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the American 
States, which appeared just before the July 2 Orders-in- 
Council. Sheffield's pamphlet reflected the resumption of 
British West India policy since 1651, and set policy for the 
next 50 years. Sheffield first reminded his readers of the 
outcome of the American Revolution, writing that, "it is in 
the light of a foreign country that America must henceforth be
2 S. Basedo and H. Robertson, "The Nova Scotia-British West 
Indies Commercial Experiment in the Aftermath of the 
American Revolution, 1783-1802," Dalbousie Review, vol. 61 
no. 1 (Spring 1981), 53-54; Herbert C. Bell, "British 
Commercial Policy in the West Indies, 1783-1793," English 
Historical Review Vol. 31 no. 123 (July 1916), 440.
3 John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, July 9, 14 and 18, 
1783, in WJA, 8:86, 97, 107.
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viewed."* To preserve British shipping, and the rest of the 
empire, the Americans could not be allowed back into the West 
Indies. Great Britain could not allow American shipping into 
the West Indies without destroying its own. Sheffield 
advocated developing Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as 
substitute granaries, and using only British ships to carry 
the merchandise. "Rather than give up the carrying trade of 
our islands, surely it would be better to give up the islands 
themselves," Sheffield wrote. "It is the advantage to our 
navigation which in any degree, countervails the enormous 
expense of their protection."5 Great Britain did not have to 
make any concessions to win American trade. Sheffield believed 
that "British manufactures will for ages ascend the great 
rivers of that continent."6 In the end, the United States 
could do nothing to influence British policy. "It will not be 
an easy matter to bring the American States to act as a 
nation," Sheffield argued, "they are not to be feared as such 
by us."7
Exclusion from the British West Indian trade was only 
the beginning of the united States' diplomatic problems. From 
the end of the war the United States were surrounded by
* John Holroyd, earl of Sheffield, Observations on the 
Commerce of the American States, rev. ed. [1784] (New York: 
August M. Kelley, 1970), 2.
5 Ibid., 59-60, 86, 174-175, 152.
6 Ibid., 188.
7 Ibid., 198.
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troublesome if not hostile nations. Great Britain refused to 
evacuate the northwestern forts or sign a commercial treaty as 
long as pre-war debts went unpaid. In addition, Great Britain 
kept a hand in the Northwest through missionary work and 
contact with Mohawk Chief Joseph Brant. Spain supported Creek 
Chief Alexander McGillivray in the Southwest, and closed the 
lower Mississippi to American shipping in 1784. The 1778 
commercial treaty with France was of little use in replacing 
British commerce. On August 30, 1784, France shut all
foreigners out of the French West Indian trade. Furthermore, 
France did not produce the sort of tools and textiles that 
American consumers preferred, and Americans desired to return 
to pre-war patterns of trade.® Congress's failure to meet its 
financial commitments abroad was already taking its toll on 
the United States's international reputation. Adams observed 
that by early 1784, American credit in the Netherlands was, 
"dead, never to rise again, at least until the United States 
shall agree on some plan of revenue, and make it certain that 
interest and principle will be paid."9
As minister to Great Britain, John Adams endured the
8 Marks, Independence on Trial, 10-14, 19-24; Ritcheson, 
Aftermath of Revolution, 49-52; Vernon G. Setser, The 
Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States 1774-1829 
(Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 1937), 86- 
89; Doron S. Ben-Atar, The Origins of Jeffersonian 
Commercial Diplomacy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 
70-71.
Q
John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, Jan. 24, 1784, in WJA, 
8:171.
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highest level of diplomatic frustration in Europe. Adams had 
two goals to his mission; to sign a commercial treaty and to 
ensure British adherence to the peace treaty, especially 
regarding British evacuation of the northwestern forts. Adams 
expected that the British anger that blocked a commercial 
treaty in 1783 would still shape British policy. "The popular 
pulse seems to beat high against America," Adams observed 
early in the mission. "The people are deceived by numerous 
falsehoods industriously circulated in the gazettes and in 
conversation, so that there is much reason to believe that, if 
this nation had another hundred millions to spend, they would 
soon force this ministry into a war against us.”10 Adams's 
first meeting with the foreign secretary, Lord Carmaerthen, on 
June 17, 1785 set the tone for Adams's three-year mission. 
Adams brought up British violations of the peace treaty and 
Carmaerthen responded with complaints about American 
violations, specifically interference with the collection of 
pre-war debts and the return of confiscated estates.11
Adams's hope of signing a commercial treaty soon 
vanished. Adams wrote to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay 
on June 26 that "we shall have no treaty of commerce until 
this nation is made to feel the necessity of it."12 A little
1{^ John Adams to John Jay, July 19, 1785, ibid., 8:282.
11 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 42; John Adams to 
John Jay, June 17, 1785, in WJA, 8:269-271.
12 John Adams to John Jay, June 26, 1785, ibid., 8:274.
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over a month later Adams reported that "the boast is that our 
commerce has returned to its old channels, and that it can 
follow no other." Adams believed that British policy was 
rooted in the fear that a trade treaty would build American 
maritime power at Britain's expense."This nation is 
strangely blinded by prejudice and passion," Adams wrote in 
November. Although Adams was mistaken in seeing British policy 
as rooted in anger rather than interest, he was correct in 
believing that maritime power was the central issue.14 Adams 
gave up on a commercial treaty in December 1785, informing Jay 
that the king and ministry were completely committed to the 
present navigation system and had no fear of American 
retaliation.15
Adams believed that the United States had justice on 
their side in pursuing a commercial treaty. The issue of 
violations of the peace treaty was not as clear cut, as both 
sides were in the wrong. Whenever Adams asked when the British 
planned on evacuating the forts, the British responded by 
asking when pre-war debts would be paid. Adams met with 
William Pitt on August 24, 1785, and the prime minister told 
him that the problems of the debts and posts were linked and 
would have to be solved together. Adams met with Carmaerthen
13 John Adams to John Jay, Aug. 6, 1785, ibid., 8:289-290.
14 John Adams to John Jay, Nov. 4, 1785, ibid., 8:337; 
Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 17.
13 John Adams to John Jay, Dec. 3, 1785, in WJA, 8:350-356.
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on October 20, when the foreign secretary informed him that 
nothing could be done regarding the posts until the debts had 
been repaid. Adams protested that the treaty did not require 
that the debts be paid, only that the United States place no 
legal impediments on their collection.18 The distinction was 
for all practical purposes meaningless. On February 26, 1786, 
Lord Carmaerthen presented Adams with a report showing that, 
although Congress had not, Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Georgia had all passed laws interfering with the 
collection of debts. Secretary Jay conducted his own study and 
concluded that "there has not been a single day since it [the 
peace treaty] took effect, on which it has not been violated 
in America, by one or other of the States."17 Adams believed 
that the British used the debt issue merely as a pretext to 
hold the forts; yet it was a pretext that the United States 
had provided. He criticized Massachusetts action against debt 
collection as "a direct Breach of the Treaty."18
Adams had no answer for British complaints about debt
16 John Adams to John Jay, Aug. 25 and Oct. 21, 1785, ibid., 
8:303, 326-327.
17 Lord Carmaerthen to John Adams, Feb. 28, 1786, in The 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1783-1789, 3 
vols. (Washington, D.C.: Blair and Rives, 1837), 2:581-591; 
John Jay to John Adams, Nov. 1, 1786, in Jay,
Correspondence, 3:214.
18 John Adams to John Jay, May 25, 1786, in WJA, 8:394-396; 
John Adams to Cotton Tufts, May 20, 1786, Adams Family 
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 368; 
Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 63-67, 77-78.
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collection, as the Americans themselves were at fault and the 
states would continue to act independently unless the 
confederation government was strengthened. "Our Federal
Government is incompetent to its objects," Jay warned Adams.
In turn, Adams wrote Jay that "it is now with the states to 
determine whether there is or is not a union in America. If 
there is they may easily make themselves respected in Europe, 
if there is not, they will be little regarded."19
Adams saw the Eden Treaty, concluded between Great 
Britain and France on September 26, 1786, as further evidence 
that the United States were little respected in Europe. The 
treaty granted each nation most-favored nation status in 
Europe. Both France and Britain hoped the treaty would
encourage trade and ease domestic fiscal problems.20 Since
1782, Adams had argued that American trade was more valuable 
to Britain than French trade, and could not believe that the 
Eden Treaty was economically motivated. In reality, it was a 
hostile move against the United States. "The time may not be 
far distant, however, when we may see a combination of England 
with the house of Bourbon against the United States," Adams
19 John Jay to John Adams, Oct. 14, 1785, in Diplomatic 
Correspondence, 2:420; John Adams to John Jay, Dec. 6, 1785, 
in ffJA, 8:356.
20 Jeremy Black, British foreign policy in an age of 
revolution, 1783-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 111; W.O. Henderson, "The Anglo-French Commercial 
treaty of 1786." The Economic History Review, 2nd Series, 
Vol. 10 no. 1 (August 1957), 105-106.
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warned Jay.21 Adams expected no settlement with Great Britain 
concerning the posts, and told Jay that the United States "had 
never more reason to be upon their guard." Before his 
departure in 1788, Adams observed that he, and by extension 
his nation, had been treated with "dry decency and cold 
civility. ”22
What was to be done? The first order of business was 
to abandon one of the key assumptions of the plan of 1776, 
that the United States could use national interest, which John 
Adams defined as European desire for American trade, to 
manipulate the European diplomatic system to work in the 
interest of the united States. Adams believed that the promise 
of trade would shield the United States from the effects of 
European diplomacy. His vision of free trade assumed that 
American navigation as well as agriculture would be protected. 
Yet no one nation could carry out a policy of free trade in a 
mercantile world. "We have hitherto been the bubbles of our 
own philosophical and equitable liberality," Adams warned John 
Jay in August 1785. six months later Adams issued a direct 
attack on the French Physiocrats, writing to Jay that a policy 
of free trade would eliminate the need for diplomacy. That 
would not be the only effect. "The consequence nevertheless 
would be the sudden annihilation of all their manufactures and
21 John Adams to John Jay, Oct. 27, 1786, in FfJA, 8:416.
22 John Adams to John Jay, Nov. 30, 1787 and Feb. 14, 1788, 
ibid., 8:463-464, 476.
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navigation," Adams continued. "We should have the most 
luxurious set of farmers that ever existed, and should not be 
able to defend ourselves against the insults of a pirate."23
"I hope our Countrymen will learn Wisdom, be frugal, 
encourage their own Navigation and Manufactures and Search the 
Globe for a Substitute for British Commerce,” Adams wrote his 
son.24 Wisdom, to Adams, clearly meant building a navy, the 
politically safest method of protection, and passing 
commercial legislation to match British policy. Adams wrote 
the marquis de Lafayette that "our Timber and Masts will very 
soon, vindicate themselves from all English slanders." "The 
United States have nothing to do but go on with their 
Navigation Acts," Adams advised Rufus King.26 Furthermore, as 
the French had been no more friendly than the British to 
American shipping, Adams advocated a strict neutrality.26 
Adams cheered congressional attempts to pass an impost aimed 
at British ships, writing that such a measure would "instantly
23 Clarfield, "John Adams: The Marketplace and American 
Foreign Policy," 345-347; Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 
65-66; John Adams to John Jay, Aug. 10, 1785 and Feb. 26, 
1786, in WJA, 8:299, 380-381.
24 John Adams to John Quincy Adams, Sept. 9, 1785, in AFC, 
6:355.
25 John Adams to the Marquis de Lafayette, Jan. 21, 1786, 
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 113; John Adams to 
Rufus King, Feb. 14, 1786, in Rufus King, The Life and 
Correspondence of Rufus King, 6 vols. Charles R. King, ed. 
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894-1900), 1:161.
26 John Adams to Samuel Adams, Jan. 26, 1786, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 113.
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raise the United States in the consideration of Europe, and 
especially England."27
Adams believed that the states should act if Congress did 
not. In June of 1785, Massachusetts passed a navigation act 
which prohibited exports in foreign bottoms after August 1, 
levied tonnage duties and tariffs on nations with no 
commercial treaty with the united States, and restricted 
foreign trade to Boston, Falmouth and Dartmouth. Adams fully 
approved of the act and hoped other states would copy it. "Go 
on," Adams urged his brother-in-law Richard Cranch. "Lay on 
heavy Duties upon all foreign Luxuries especially British and 
give ample Bounties to your own Manufactures. You will of 
course, continue to do all these Things upon the condition to 
continue in force only untill they shall be altered by a 
Treaty of Commerce, or an Ordinance of Congress."28
Congress could not and did not follow the example of 
Massachusetts, and by 1789 Great Britain controlled 60 percent 
of the American foreign trade.29 For Adams, failure to 
strengthen the national government and stand up to Great 
Britain showed the same lack of national character that led 
Congress to give France control of the peace negotiations. If
27 John Adams to John Jay, May 16, 1786, in WJA, 8:391.
no
Van Beck Hall, Politics without Parties: Massachusetts 
Politics 1780-1791 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1972), 123-125; John Adams to Richard Cranch, Aug.
22, 1785, in AFC, 6:294.
29 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 129.
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John Adams had any faith in American virtue after 1781, it was 
gone by 1788.3®
Shays's Rebellion was one more symptom of American 
decline. "To talk of liberty in such a state of things!” Adams 
exploded. "Is not a Shattuck or a Shays as great a tyrant, 
when he would pluck up law and justice by the roots, as a 
[Governor Francis] Bernard or a [Governor Thomas] Hutchinson, 
when he would overturn them partially?"3* Adams's political 
intimates warned him of moral decay at home. "I fear we are 
already too far advanced in every species of Luxury to 
Recede," Mercy Otis Warren wrote.32 on the tenth anniversary 
of independence Adams himself wrote that the United States had 
passed from their youth to an early decline. Adams observed 
that the United States had failed to carry out their end of 
the 1783 peace treaty or made any move to defend themselves 
against British commercial attacks. ”0ur Country is grown, or 
at least it has been dishonest," Adams lamented to a family 
friend. "She has broke her faith with Nations & with her own 
Citizens.”33
Adams's frustrations in London brought him to a final
30 Howe, Political Thought of JA, 106-107, 125-126, 130-131, 
152-153.
31 Ibid., 133-134; John Adams to Benjamin Hichbom, Jan. 27, 
1787, in WJA, 9:551.
32 Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams, April 27, 1785, in 
Warren-Adams Letters, 2:252.
33 John Adams to Cotton Tufts, July 4, 1786, Adams Family 
Papers, Letters Received and other Loose Papers, reel 386.
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disillusion regarding the virtue of the American people. Adams 
believed that the United States could not have declined from 
the height of virtue to the depths of depravity in only ten 
years. Therefore, the Americans could not have been especially 
virtuous to begin with. As Adams had suspected in 1776, the 
war created virtues the Americans would not always possess. 
Whatever Americans were, Adams concluded, they were not 
Spartans, and perhaps that was for the better. "It is most 
certain that our Countrymen, are not and never were, Spartans 
in their Contempt of Wealth, and I will go farther and say 
they ought not to be," Adams wrote to James Warren. "Such a 
Trait in their character would render them lazy Drones, unfit 
for the Agriculture Manufactures Fisheries, and Commerce, and 
Population of their Country; and fit only for War."34 This 
admission resolved the contradiction of holding a political 
belief that feared commerce and pursuing a foreign policy that 
encouraged it. Adams was fully capable of portraying the 
United States as a simple agrarian nation to Europeans who 
might be threatened by a commercial and manufacturing nation. 
"Agriculture ever Was, and ever will be the dominant interest 
in America," Adams wrote to a Dutch sympathizer in 1780.35
34 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 71-72; Wood, Creation, 104; John 
Adams to James Warren, July 4, 1786, in Warren-Adams 
Letters, 2:277.
35 John Adams to Hendrik Calkoen, Oct. 27, 1780, in WJA, 
7:309. See also to John Luzac, Sept. 15, 1780, ibid., 7:255, 
and John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, July 26, 1780, in 
C.F. Adams, Life of JA, 1:460.
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Adams needed look no further than his native New England and 
its diversified economy to see the future course of economic 
development. "Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce with one 
another will soon make us flourish,” Adams wrote in 1786.3® In 
the mid-1780s Adams moved the "Spirit of Commerce" from the 
fringe of his political philosophy, as a side effect of 
liberty mitigated by a balanced constitution, to the center, 
as the mainspring of human action, to be channelled for the 
good of all in a balanced government. Luxury was a part of the 
American future, and American thinkers had to fit it into 
their systems of republican government. "It is in vain, then 
to amuse ourselves with the thought of annihilating commerce, 
unless as philosophical speculations," Adams wrote to John 
Jay. "We are to consider men and things as practical 
statesmen, and to consider who our constituents are and what 
they expect of us.”37
Adams's three-volume work, A Defence of the Constitutions 
of Government of the United States of America, appeared in 
1787 and 1788 and represents his attempt to come to terms with 
a republic not founded on virtue. Adams intended to defend 
balanced government in response to the French philosopher Anne 
Robert Turgot, who attacked the Americans for copying British
3® John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of 
British North America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1980), 92; John Adams to Rufus King, 
June 14, 1786, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 113.
37 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 97-100; Wood, Creation, 569-574; 
John Adams to John Jay, Dec. 6, 1785, in WJA, 8:357.
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forms too closely. Adams went beyond this goal, moving into an 
analysis of human motivation as well.38 J. G. A. Pocock has 
called Adams's Defence of the Constitutions the last major 
work of classical republicanism.38 From the beginning, 
however, Adams noticed the gap between the classical and 
modern worlds. "The inventions in the mechanic arts, the 
discoveries in natural philosophy, navigation and commerce, 
and the advancement of civilization and humanity," Adams 
wrote, "have occasioned changes in the condition of the world, 
and the human character, which would have astonished the most 
refined nations of antiquity.” 48 "The love of poverty is a 
fictitious virtue, that never existed," Adams wrote later in 
the work, adding that, "frugality . . .  is admired and 
esteemed more than beloved."41- A free people was inevitably 
drawn to luxury. "In a country like America, where the means 
and opportunities for luxury are so easy and so plenty," Adams 
wrote, "it would be madness not to expect it, be prepared for 
it, and provide against the dangers of it in the 
constitution."42 With a balanced constitution at home, Adams 
could fully accept a diplomacy centered on commerce.
38 Anne Robert Turgot to Richard Price, March 22, 1778, in 
WJA, 4:278-281.
38 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 526.
40 "Defence of the Constitutions," Vol. 1, in WJA, 4:283.
41 "Defence," Vol. 2 and Vol. 3, ibid., 5:289, 6:209.
42 "Defence," Vol. 3, ibid., 6:95-96.
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The love of distinction was another theme in Adams's 
book. "Every man hates to have a superior, but no man is 
willing to have an equal,” Adams wrote, "every man desires to 
be superior to all others."43 Natural inequalities in wealth, 
ability, appearance, intelligence and the like, led some to 
seek social or legal distinction. Americans were as likely to 
seek honors and awards as Europeans. "Are there not 
distinctions as earnestly desired and sought, as titles, 
garters, and ribbons are in any nation in Europe," Adams 
asked. "We may look as wise, and moralize as gravely as we 
will; we may call this desire of distinction childish and 
silly," Adams wrote, "but we cannot alter the nature of man; 
human nature is thus childish and silly."44
"It is weakness, rather than wickedness, which renders 
men unfit to be entrusted with unlimited power," Adams argued, 
and this belief led Adams to reject Turgot's model of a 
government in a single assembly, and argue for a balanced 
government.45 In a republic governed by a single assembly, 
aristocrats or those who aimed at aristocracy would either 
destroy or be destroyed by the commons. The result would be, 
"no order, no safety, no liberty, because no government of 
law."45 Similarly, a single popular assembly was incompetent
43 "Defence," Vol. 3, ibid., 6:209.
44 "Defence," Vol. 1 and Vol. 3, ibid., 4:391-392, 6:488.
45 "Defence," Vol. 1, ibid., 4:406.
46 "Defence," Vol. 2, ibid., 5:288-289.
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to exercise executive power. "When a popular assembly or a 
senate have the management of the executive power, disputes 
forever arise concerning every step in foreign affairs, and 
discords and factions have full play."47 A balanced 
constitution was the only solution. "A constitution formed 
upon the nature of man, and providing against his discontented 
temper instead of trusting to what is not in him (his 
moderation and contentment in power) may preserve union, 
harmony, and tranquility, better than any despotism," Adams 
argued.4®
In surveying the historical wreckage of republican 
governments, Adams found two that worked; Great Britain and 
the United States. Adams's definition of a republic was fairly 
loose but typical. "A limited monarchy therefore, especially 
when limited by two independent branches, an aristocratical 
and a democratical power in the constitution, may with strict 
propriety be called by that name [republic]." Adams explained 
in 1814 that he used the word "monarch" in the strict sense of 
"one who rules." Montesquieu had used the same definition.4® 
With a clear conscience, Adams could argue that the British 
constitution was, "both for the adjustment of the balance and 
the prevention of its vibrations, the most stupendous fabric
47 "Defence," Vol. 2, ibid., 5:69.
48 "Defence," Vol. 2, ibid., 5:89.
49 "Defence," Vol. 2, ibid., 4:296; John Adams to John
Taylor of Caroline, Letter XIII, 1814, in ibid, 6:173; 
Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 1:156.
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of human invention; and that the Americans ought to be 
applauded instead of censured for imitating it as far as they 
have done." Adams went on to argue that the British 
constitution "has still preserved the power of the people by 
the equilibrium we are contending for, by the trial by jury, 
and by constantly refusing a standing army.”50 That is, Great 
Britain had prevented the tools of foreign policy from turning 
against domestic liberty. Of course, the American version of 
the balanced government differed from the British, especially 
regarding elected senates and executives. "Here they differ 
from the English constitution, and with great propriety," 
Adams wrote, adding that sovereignty "must reside in the whole 
body of the people." 5* "In America, there are different 
orders of officers, but none of men," Adams observed.52
The outward form of Adams' s republicanism, as outlined in 
Defence of the Constitutions was not new. Adams had classified 
Great Britain as a republic in the "Novanglus" letters in 
1775, and his conception of balanced government was central to 
"Thoughts on Government" in 1776 and the Massachusetts 
Constitution in 1780. Adams had previously discussed the use 
of medals and rewards to encourage virtue. The true change in
50 "Defence," Vol. 1, in WJA, 4:358, 381-382.
51 "Defence," Vol. 1, ibid., 4:359. Gordon Wood argues that 
"Adams could not understand that in America by 1787 the 
magistracy and senators had become somehow as representative 
of the people as the houses of representatives," Creation, 
586.
52 -Defence," Vol. 1, in WJA, 4:380.
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Adams's thought was in his view of the American people. Adams 
never had absolute faith in American virtue, but by 1787 his 
view of the American people had darkened. He concluded, based 
on the political and diplomatic failures of the 1780s that the 
Americans lacked classical republican virtue, and he shaped 
his conception of republicanism accordingly. In 1787 Adams 
formed a theory of republicanism around the reality of a non- 
Spartan American people. In doing so, he replaced classical 
virtue with the "Spirit of Commerce" he had attacked in
C  O
1776. ° "The best republics will be virtuous, and have been 
so; but we may hazard a conjecture that the virtues have been 
the effect of a well-ordered constitution, rather than the 
cause," Adams wrote near the conclusion of his work. "And 
perhaps it would be impossible to prove that a republic cannot 
exist even among highwaymen, by setting one rogue to watch 
another; and the knaves themselves may in time be made honest 
men by the struggle."54 When John Adams decided that virtue 
was not needed to found a republic, he left the classical 
world behind. The proper constitution may lead people into 
virtuous behavior, but one could not take classical virtue for 
granted. Adams scaled virtue down to mean support for balanced 
government.55
Adams did not discuss diplomacy in Defence of the
55 Howe, Political Thought of JA, 147.
54 "Defence," Vol. 3 in WJA, 6:219.
55 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 188-199.
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Constitutions. However, it is clear that Adams's mission to 
Great Britain played a significant role in his thinking. Adams 
had seen that nations, like men, lust after distinction, and 
are governed as much by pride as by interest, by emotion as by 
reason. His descriptions of human characteristics in Defence 
of the Constitutions and of British actions in his dispatches 
to Jay are strikingly similar. Adams had long accepted the 
idea that the clash of interests could create a common good 
where none existed as the organizing principle of diplomacy; 
it was a key assumption of the Model Treaty. Adams applied the 
principle as vigorously to domestic constitutions only later. 
The balance of power that controlled men, and channelled their 
energies, could also be used to control nations. Adams already 
believed that the international system set one rogue to watch 
another, with little hope of complete success. By 1787, 
diplomatic experience helped bring his political thought to 
the same conclusions.
Adams received a copy of the proposed federal 
Constitution in November 1787, and pronounced it "admirably 
calculated to preserve the union, to increase Affection, and 
to bring us all to the same mode of thinking.” Although Adams 
questioned the senate's involvement in executive power and the 
lack of a bill of rights, he welcomed ratification.5** Adams 
wrote that the federal Constitution allowed him to conclude A
John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Nov. 10, 1787, in Adams- 
Jefferson Letters, 210.
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Defence of the Constitutions, "with unexpected dignity."-*7 in 
a more pessimistic moment, Adams suspected that the new 
Constitution was, "an attempt to divide a sovereignty; a fresh 
essay at imperium in imperio, which would prevent us for a 
time from drawing our swords," but would ultimately fail.-’® 
For the time being at least, the Constitution quelled any 
internal threats to republican government in the United 
States.
Adams took office as vice president in 1789, and soon 
found himself ill at ease presiding over the Senate. "I feel 
a great difficulty how to act," Adams told the Senate on April 
25. "I am Vice President, in this I am nothing, but may be 
everything, but I am President also of the Senate."-*9 Adams 
devoted his first month in office to the debate over the 
proper title for the president. Adams's preference for a 
royal-sounding title left him open to the charge of 
monarchism, but in reality Adams hoped to use titles to 
harness the desire for distinction in support of republican 
government and to gain the respect of other nations.**®
57 "Defence," Vol. 3, in WJA, 6:219.
58 John Adams to Richard Price, April 19, 1790, ibid.,
9:564; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 98-99; Wood, 
Creation, 567-569, 581.
59 William Maclay, diary entry, April 25, 1789, in Kenneth 
R. Bowling and Helen E. Veit, eds. The Diary of William 
Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 6.
60 James H. Hutson, John Adams' Title Campaign." New England
Quarterly, Vol. 41 no. 1 (March 1968), 35-37.
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In Adams's view, republican government suffered from two 
difficulties; finding disinterested leaders and ensuring that 
those leaders would be respected abroad. Ideally, republican 
government would attract men who would serve solely from a 
sense of duty. By 1785, Adams believed that "although there 
are disinterested men, there are not enough in any age or any 
country to fill all the necessary offices.Furthermore, 
republican simplicity was lost on a diplomatic world of titled 
aristocrats. Adams learned this lesson doing battle with 
Vergennes. "It is etiquette that governs the World," Adams 
wrote to Benjamin Lincoln in 1789.62
"The President [of the Senate] rose in the Chair & 
repeated twice , with more Joy in his face than I had ever 
seen him assume before," Senator William Maclay of 
Pennsylvania observed on May 7, "he hoped the Government would 
be supported with dignity and Splendor." The next day Adams 
"repeatedly helped the speakers for Titles."63 On May 9, a 
Senate committee settled on "His Highness, the President of 
the United States, and Protector of Their Liberties" as the 
president's title. The Senate postponed consideration of the 
report on May 11. The House of Representatives refused to 
consider any titles, and within a few days the title campaign
6* John Adams to John Jebb, Aug. 21, 1785, in WJA, 9:535.
62 John Adams to Benjamin Lincoln, May 26, 1789, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 115.
63 William Maclay, diary entry, May 7 and 8, 1789, in Diary 
of Maclay, 27-28.
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ended in defeat.®4
For Adams, a suitable title for the president would solve 
the problems of disinterestedness and foreign respect. "Has 
the national Govt at this moment attractions enough to make a 
seat in it, an Object of desire, to the Men of greatest 
Fortune, Talents, Birth or Virtue?" Adams asked William Tudor. 
"If the People would give Titles or marks of Distinction, this 
would go a great Way."®5 A proper title would draw men to 
office without resorting to the promise of material gain that 
characterized the Walpolean system. A title would also place 
the American president on an equal footing with European heads 
of state. Adams believed that any European who read the 
federal Constitution would correctly conclude that the 
president possessed the powers of a limited monarch. As such, 
the title of "Majesty" was the minimum title needed to 
demonstrate national dignity.®® That Adams was willing to 
adopt European diplomatic practice, such as titles, marked the 
end of any idea Adams had of a republican style of diplomacy.
Not long after Adams took office as vice-president, the 
United States faced an external problem that bore directly on 
the nature of republican government, the French Revolution. On 
May 4, 1789, the Estates-General met for the first time in 175
64 Hutson, "Title Campaign," 32-33.
®5 John Adams to William Tudor, June 14, 1789, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 115.
®® John Adams to William Tudor, June 28, 1789, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 115.
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years, in an attempt to rebuild French finances. The Third 
Estate proposed that the three estates, commons, nobles and 
the clergy, meet together, giving the Third Estate the 
numerical advantage. The nobles responded by locking the Third 
Estate out of Versailles, forcing the Third Estate to meet in 
the tennis court and proclaim themselves the National Assembly 
of France. Revolt spread to the people at large, and on July 
14 the Paris mob stormed the Bastille in a show of defiance to 
royal authority. On August 4, the National Assembly abolished 
the last vestiges of feudalism and cut ecclesiastical ties 
with Rome. On August 26 the National Assembly issued its 
"Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen," which stated, 
among other things, that "men are born and remain free and 
equal in their rights. ”67
Most Americans were initially sympathetic to the French 
Revolution. Vice-President Adams was not among them. He took 
one look at the National Assembly —  a government consisting 
of a unicameral legislature —  and concluded that the 
revolution was doomed to failure. "My opinion of the French 
Revolution has never varied from the first assembly of the 
Notables to this day," Adams wrote in 1805. "I always dreaded 
it and never had any faith in its success or ability."68
67 Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 2 
vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959- 
1964), 1:479-487.
68 Edward Handler, America and Europe in the Political 
Thought of John Adams (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1964), 4-5; John Adams to Benjamin Rush, Sept. 30,
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Senator William Maclay noted that Adams despised all of the 
pamphlets written on the French Revolution, except for Edmund 
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, "and this 
same Mr. Burke despises the French Revolution.”®9
Adams had occasion to comment on the French Revolution in 
his last theoretical work on politics, Discourses on Davila, 
published in 1790 and 1791. It began as a critique of Henrico 
Davila's History of the Civil Wars of France but quickly 
became an exposition of Adams's two favorite political topics, 
the human desire for distinction and the need for balanced 
government to control it. "There is in human nature, it is 
true, simple Benevolence, or an affection for the good of 
others," Adams wrote, but alone it is not a balance for the 
selfish affections."70 "As no appetite in human nature is more 
universal than that for honor, and real merit is confined to 
a very few," Adams continued, "the numbers who thirst for 
respect are all out of proportion to those who seek it only 
for merit."7* Nations were no different from individuals. "As 
long as there is patriotism, there will be national emulation, 
vanity and pride," Adams wrote, making no distinctions between 
republics and monarchies. " It is national pride which commonly
1805, in Old Family Letters, 82.
69William Maclay, diary entry, April 27, 1790, Diary of 
Maclay, 254.
70 "Discourses on Davila," in WJA, 6:324.
71 Ibid., 250.
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stimulates kings and ministers."7^
Having restated the basic tenets of his political 
philosophy, Adams went on to consider the progress of the 
French Revolution. "We are told that our friends the National 
Assembly of France have abolished all distinctions," he wrote. 
"But be not deceived, my dear countrymen. Impossibilities 
cannot be performed."7-* a government in a single assembly was 
doomed to end in tyranny, Adams argued, and he praised 
Americans for establishing a balanced government instead of 
resorting to "whimsical and fantastical projects."74 "If the 
people have not the understanding and public virtue enough, 
and will not be persuaded of the necessity of supporting an 
independent executive authority, an independent senate, and an 
independent judiciary power, as well as an independent house 
of representatives," Adams concluded, "all pretensions to 
balance are lost, and with them all hopes of security to our 
dearest, and all hopes of liberty."75
The French Revolution soon became a more immediate 
influence in American politics. The Girondins, young and 
idealistic republicans, came to dominate the National 
Convention, and abolished the monarchy on September 22, 1792. 
The National Convention executed Louis XVI on January 21,
72 Ibid., 257.
73 Ibid., 270.
74 Ibid., 273,
75 Ibid., 399.
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1793, as punishment for his attempted flight to Austria. On 
February 1, 1793, France declared war on Great Britain. The 
Girondins assumed they would have American support based on 
ideological sympathy and the 1778 treaties. On February 20, 
1793, Edmond Genet set sail as the new republic's first 
minister to the United States. Genet's main goal was to bring 
the United States into the war against Great Britain, and he 
tried to stir up public support as a counter to the official 
neutrality of the Washington administration.76
Adams was not among Genet's admirers. "A declamatory 
Style, a flittering, fluttery Imagination, an Ardour in his 
Temper, and a civil Deportment are all the Accomplishments or 
Qualifications I can find for his place," Adams wrote his 
wife.77 More important, Adams approved of Washington's 
Proclamation of Neutrality and resisted any attempt to bring 
the United States into the war. Having renounced any 
ideological community with France in Discourses on Davila, 
Adams went on to deny any strategic connection. "A Neutrality 
absolute total neutrality is our only hope," Adams wrote to 
Tench Coxe. Circumstances absolved the United States of its 
obligations to defend the French West Indies. One could find
76 R.R. Palmer, Age of Democratic Revolution, 2:36-44; Harry 
Ammon, The Genet Mission (New York: w.w. Norton and Company, 
1973), 12-31, 44-45; Albert Hall Bowman, The Struggle for 
Neutrality: Franco-American Revolution during the Federalist 
Era (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975), 41-44.
77 John Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 20, 1793, Adams Family 
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 376.
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justification in Vattel, but "reading is not necessary to 
instruct us what to do."^®
By 1793 John Adams's disillusionment was complete. He 
scaled public virtue down to mean no more than adherence to a 
balanced government at home and a strict neutrality abroad as 
the only way to preserve republican government. In neither 
case did Adams presume that the United States could reform the 
rest of the world through its actions. Adams embraced a 
republican realpolitik, first sketched out by English 
Opposition writers, based on naval power and political 
separation from Europe that would preserve the physical 
survival and republican constitution of the nation. The Wars 
of the French Revolution made neutrality all the more critical 
to the survival of the republic. This view was confirmed by 
Adams's long experience in diplomacy and formed the bedrock of 
his presidency.
John Adams to Tench Coxe, April 25, 1793, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 116.
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CHAPTER 4: THE BOLINGBROKEAN MOMENT
When John Adams became the second president of the United 
States in 1797, he had already spent more than thirty years in 
public life in a variety of roles. However, he had never 
served as a chief executive, and for him the president's role 
was a matter of theory rather than practice. Bolingbroke, 
especially his Idea of a Patriot King, served as Adams's 
guide. "I have read him [Bolingbroke], more than fifty years 
ago, and more than five times in my Life, and once within five 
Years past," Adams wrote in 1813.* Adams fully agreed that the 
executive should "espouse no party," and "govern like common 
father of his people."2 Adams's debt to Bolingbroke on the 
desirability of presidential non-partisanship is generally 
ackowledged.3 However, Adams expanded Bolingbroke's
1 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 25, 1813, in Adams- 
Jefferson Letters, 410.
2 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 45-46.
3 Shaw, Character of JA, 247-248; Ralph Ketcham, Presidents 
above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789-1829 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 94- 
97; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of 
Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 536-537; Alexander 
DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the 
Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801 (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1966), 4-6; Bruce Minhoff, "John Adams
and the Presidency," in Thomas E. Cronin, ed., Inventing
124
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teachings, reinforced by Adams's practical experience in 
foreign policy, to encompass a Bolingbrokean sense of foreign 
policy. John Adams's conduct of the Quasi-War was a successful 
attempt to apply Opposition Whig thought to diplomatic 
practice, in essence a Bolingbrokean moment. During the Quasi- 
War with France, Adams pursued a policy of strict neutrality 
combined with vigorous defense of American commerce, both 
enforced by the navy and executed by a president who stood 
above party. Such a policy, Adams believed, was the only way 
to preserve the republic.4
Adams, in recording the events of his inauguration day, 
noted the coming difficulties, and Washington's happiness at 
being rid of them. "He seemed to me to enjoy a Tryumph over 
me," Adams wrote his wife. "Methought I heard him think Ay! I 
am fairly out and you are fairly in! See which of Us will be 
happiest."5 One source of difficulty was the French reaction 
to the Jay Treaty. When the British seized American ships 
trading with the French West Indies under the Orders-in- 
Council of November 6, 1793, and January 8, 1794, Washington 
had appointed Jay as a special envoy to stave off Republican- 
sponsored bills in the House of Representatives threatening 
commercial warfare, which Washington believed would bring
American Presidency (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1989), 304.
4 John Adams to James Lloyd, March 29, 1815, in WJA, 10:147.
5 John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 5, 1797, Adams Family 
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 383.
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war.** Even though Adams believed "the British have treated us 
very ill," Adams agreed with Washington that war would be 
fatal to the republic. Adams warned Jefferson that "Another 
War would add two or three Millions to our Debt, raise up a 
many-headed and many bellied Monster of an Army to tyrannize 
over Us, totally disadjust our present government and 
accelerate the Advent of Monarchy and Aristocracy by at least 
fifty years." Adams cheered Jay's appointment, writing to his 
wife that "Mr. Jay is to immortalize himself over again by 
keeping peace."^
Jay concluded the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and 
Navigation that bore his name on November 19, 1794. Jay had to 
abandon, at least temporarily, the doctrine that free ships 
make free goods. However, the treaty did secure commerce for 
twelve years, and preserved the peace. The Senate ratified the 
treaty in June 1795. In early 1796 Republicans in the House of 
Representatives tried to defeat the treaty by refusing to 
approve the appropriations needed to carry it out.8 Adams
6 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 278-287, 299-301.
 ^John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 22 and May 5, 1794, 
Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and other Loose 
Papers, reel 377; John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, May 11, 
1794, in Adams-Jefferson Letters, 255.
8 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 330-331; Elkins and 
McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 410-413; Jerald A. Combs, The 
Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 147-153, 
180-183; Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics 
and Diplomacy under George Washington (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1958), 107-110; Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's 
Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy, rev. ed. (New
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never doubted that the House of Representatives would approve 
the appropriations. "We scold at Treaties for the Sake of 
Mauling a Minister," he wrote to John Quincy Adams, "but 
acknowledge them to be obligating on the national faith." John 
Adams's attitude in 1796 was the same as it had been in 1778; 
once the treaty was signed and ratified, debate was over. The 
alternative was war, "and if the nation solemnly determines 
upon War and Confusion, they ought not charge it to the 
Government."9
The House of Representatives barely approved the 
appropriations on April 30, 1796. A settlement with Great 
Britain, however temporary, naturally brought conflict with 
France. French Foreign Minister Charles Delacroix advised 
Pierre Adet, the French minister to the united States, to stir 
up anti-British feeling and bring the United States into war 
on the French side. Delacroix informed James Monroe, the 
American minister to France, that France considered the 
alliance ended the moment the Senate ratified the Jay Treaty. 
Threats turned into action on July 2, 1796, when the Directory 
decreed that France would treat American ships the same way 
Great Britain did, subjecting American commerce with Great
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 358-359.
9 John Adams to John Quincy Adams, March 25, 1796; John 
Adams to Abigail Adams, April 16, 1796, Adams Family Papers, 
Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 381.
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Britain to French capture.10
A second source of difficulty was the cabinet that Adams 
inherited from Washington. The political giants who served in 
the first cabinet were gone by 1797, replaced by Timothy 
Pickering as secretary of state, James McHenry as secretary of 
war, Oliver Wolcott as secretary of the treasury, and Charles 
Lee as attorney-general. Adams retained all of these men, 
partly because there was no precedent for the cabinet to 
resign upon a change of administration, and partly because of 
the difficulty in finding men willing to serve. To varying 
degrees, Pickering, Wolcott and McHenry were politically
closer to Hamilton than Adams, and consulted with the former 
secretary of the treasury on public affairs. Pickering was too 
stubborn and independent to be anyone's subordinate, and
looked to Hamilton as a kindred spirit rather than as a 
superior. Wolcott had served as Hamilton's deputy in the 
treasury department, and was his closest ally. McHenry was
completely out of his depth as secretary of war, and relied on
Hamilton for answers to presidential queries.11
"Pickering and all his colleagues are as attached to me
10 Combs, Jay Treaty, 186-188; Bowman, Struggle for 
Neutrality, 237-244.
11 C.F. Adams, Life of JA, 2:214-216; Stephen G. Kurtz, The 
Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 238, 
269-280; Leonard D. White, The Federalists: An 
Administrative History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
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as I desire," Adams wrote to Elbridge Gerry. "I have no 
jealousies from that quarter."12 Adams believed he could 
afford to retain a cabinet that he did not appoint for the 
simple reason that he was the president, and as such would 
make the final decision on policy matters. "Here, according to 
the practice, if not the Constitution, the ministers are 
responsible for nothing, the President for every thing," Adams 
later wrote in the Boston Patriot.^  Adams no doubt believed 
that the cabinet members would either accept his decisions or 
resign, as had been the case under Washington. Unfortunately 
for Adams, Pickering considered himself independent of the 
president, and would oppose the president if he deemed it 
desirable. This difference over the role of the cabinet lay at 
the heart of Adams's difficulties.14
Throughout his administration, Adams followed a policy of 
strict neutrality toward Great Britain and France. He later 
wrote to Thomas Truxton that "my system has been, for nine and 
twenty years at least, to do justice and maintain friendship 
with all nations as long as we possibly could, and have
12 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Feb. 13, 1797, in WJA,
8:523.
1  ^Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 539; Letter X to 
the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:270.
14 Gerard Clarfield, Timothy Pickering and American 
Diplomacy, 1795-1800 (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1969), 90-92; Peter Shaw is incorrect in seeing 
Adams's retention of the cabinet "as setting a self- 
destructive pattern of abrogating power," Character of JA, 
255.
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alliances with none if we could avoid it.” To maintain a 
neutral course, Adams needed to avoid war with France, which 
he hoped to accomplish through negotiation and preparation for 
war.*-* Alexander Hamilton generally agreed with Adams's 
policies at the start of the Quasi-War, and supported the idea 
of sending a special bi-partisan and sectionally balanced 
commission to France. "I would appoint a commission 
extraordinary to consist of M. Jefferson, or Mr. Madison, 
together with Mr. Cabot & Mr. Pinckney," Hamilton wrote to 
Pickering.16
Adams had not forgotten that Hamilton had tried to sneak 
vice-presidential candidate Thomas Pinckney ahead of Adams in 
the 1796 election, and he described Hamilton as ”a proud, 
conceited, aspiring mortal, always pretending to morality.”*7 
However, Adams had reached the same conclusion regarding a 
peace commission. He met with Thomas Jefferson on March 3, and 
asked the vice-president-elect if he would consider joining
*■* Ralph Adams Brown, The Presidency of John Adams 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), 38-41; John 
Adams to Thomas Truxton, Dec. 13, 1803, Adams Family Papers, 
Letterbook, reel 118.
16 William Stinchcombe, The XYZ Affair (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1980), 23; Alexander Hamilton to Timothy 
Pickering, March 22, 1797, in Alexander Hamilton, The Papers 
of Alexander Hamilton, 27 vols. Harold C. Syrett, ed. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1979), 20:545-546. See 
also Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Jan. 25-31, 
1797; to Theodore Sedgwick, Feb. 26, 1797; to James McHenry, 
March 1797; and to William L. Smith, April 5, 1797, in 
Hamilton, Papers, 20:480, 522, 571, 575.
17 John Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 9, 1797, Adams Family 
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 383.
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Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, whom the French had rejected as 
Monroe's replacement, on a peace commission. Jefferson 
refused, arguing that it was inappropriate for the vice- 
president to serve as minister, and Adams agreed. Adams then 
suggested a commission of Pinckney and James Madison or 
Elbridge Gerry. Jefferson agreed to ask Madison but did not 
expect him to accept, and when Adams suggested Madison to the 
cabinet the members unanimously opposed the appointment. On 
March 6, Jefferson told Adams that Madison would not serve. 
Adams then suggested Gerry as an independent member of the 
commission. The cabinet preferred Massachusetts Federalist 
Francis Dana. Adams relented, at least temporarily, and in May 
named Pinckney, Dana, and General John Marshall of Virginia as 
the peace commission. Adams knew that Dana hated ocean travel, 
and "was always apprehensive he would decline.'’ In June, when 
Dana declined the appointment, Adams replaced him with 
Gerry.18
On March 25, Adams called for a special session of
18 This account is based on a variety of sources, including 
Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 228-229; and DeConde, Quasi-War, 
13-28. Adams described his meeting with Jefferson in John 
Adams to Elbridge Gerry, April 6, 1797 and Letter XIII to 
the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 8:538, 9:286-287; 
Jefferson's version is in the ’Anas," in Jefferson, 
Writings, 1:334-336. McHenry later recalled that he was the 
only member to criticize Gerry, in James McHenry to Timothy 
Pickering, Feb. 23, 1811 in Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and 
Letters of George Cabot (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1877), 204-205. Adams discussed Dana in John Adams to 
Elbridge Gerry, June 20, 1797, in WJA, 8:546. John Marshall 
appears second to James Madison on a list of proposed 
envoys in John Adams's hand, Adams Family Papers, Letters 
Received and other Loose Papers, reel 386.
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Congress to meet on May 15 to discuss defense measures. In the 
intervening period Adams received word of the French decree on 
March 2, 1797, declaring enemy goods on American ships to be 
lawful prizes, and condemning American ships not carrying a 
role d'equipage, the proper crew manifest. France intended to 
inflict as much damage as possible on American shipping 
without a formal war.*9 As the French threat came from the 
sea, Adams advocated building a navy, combining his reading of 
Opposition Whig thought with his own experience. "The trident 
of Neptune is the scepter of the world," he wrote to Thomas 
Truxton. In an unused fragment of his speech to the special 
session, Adams argued that, "it is a maxim among maritime 
people that with wood, iron, and hemp and ships to employ them 
any nation may do itself justice." The United States was a 
natural seapower, and its commerce demanded protection.2® By 
"commerce", Adams always meant the carrying trade as well as 
agricultural exports. "Commerce has made this Country what it 
is," Adams wrote in a draft of his first annual message.21
19 R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 39-40; Bowman, Struggle 
for Neutrality, 276-277.
2® John Adams to Thomas Truxton, Nov. 30, 1802, in Dudley W. 
Knox, ed. Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between 
the United States and France, 1 vols. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1935-1938), 5:174-175; Draft of 
speech of May 16, 1797, Adams Family Papers, Letters 
Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 387; Frederic H.
Haynes, "John Adams and American Sea Power." American 
Neptune, Vol. 25 no. 1 (January 1965), 38-43.
2* Speech fragment, November 22, 1797, Adams Family Papers, 
Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 387.
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Aside from being politically dangerous, an army was of no use, 
as the French could not mount a land invasion. "Where is it 
possible to send thirty thousand Men here & we are double the 
number we were in 1775," Adams explained to Elbridge Gerry. 
"We have four times the military skill and eight times the 
munitions of war. What would 30,000 men do h e r e ? " 2 2
Adams addressed the special session an May 16, outlining 
the diplomatic situation and his policy. Adams blamed the 
French for the poor relations between the United States and 
France, citing the French rejection of Pinckney as minister 
and French attempts to influence the presidential election. 
"They have inflicted a wound in the American breast," Adams 
told Congress. "It is my sincere desire, however, that it may 
be healed." Adams announced the new mission but also advised 
defensive preparations. "A naval power, next to the militia, 
is the most natural defence of the United States," Adams 
argued, echoing Bolingbroke.23 Reaction to Adams's speech was 
predictable. Republicans blamed Adams for the crisis and 
believed the speech was a call for war. Federalists were 
generally pleased. In June, William L. Smith of South Carolina 
submitted a program along Adams's lines, increasing the navy 
and providing for the arming of 80,000 militia, which Congress 
approved. In July, Congress voted to build twelve new frigates
22 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry. May 3, 1797, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 117.
23 Speech of May 16, 1797, in WJA, 9:113-115.
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and improve coastal fortifications but defeated a motion to 
create a 15,000-man army.24
Congress and the president left Philadelphia on July 19, 
1797, in order to escape the summer heat and a yellow fever 
epidemic. Marshall sailed from Philadelphia the next day, and 
Gerry sailed from Boston on July 23. Before the envoys sailed, 
France underwent a policy shift, when the Directory replaced 
the anti-American Foreign Minister Charles Delacroix with 
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord. Talleyrand had little 
influence on European policy, but was the chief architect of 
the Directory's American policy.25
Despite the changes, Adams expected nothing from the 
mission. "It will be spun out into an immeasurable length, 
unless quickened by an embargo," Adams complained to Oliver 
Wolcott. "Talleyrand, I should suppose, could not be for war 
with this country," Adams wrote to Pickering. "A continued 
appearance of umbrage, and continued depredations on a weak 
defenceless commerce, will be much more convenient for their 
views."26 Matters were further complicated with the coup of 18 
Fructidor (September 4, 1797), in which the anti-American Jean 
Francois Reubell took control of foreign policy. John Marshall 
advised his government to take no solace from the political
24 Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 234-235; DeConde, Quasi-War, 26- 
31; R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 42-45.
25 DeConde, Quasi-War, 35; Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 32-35.
26 John Adams to Oliver Wolcott, Oct. 27, 1797; John Adams 
to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 31, 1797, in WJA, 8:558-559.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
instability in France. "The internal commotions of France 
produce no external weakness, no diminution of exertion 
against her enemies," Marshall informed Pickering.27
Marshall, Pinckney and Gerry met with each other on 
October 6, and called on Talleyrand two days later. Talleyrand 
asked the Americans to wait for official reception until he 
finished his report to the Directory. Official reception never 
came. Talleyrand sent four of his agents, Nicholas Hubbard, 
Jean Hottinguer, Pierre Bellamy and Lucien Hauteval, labeled 
W, X, Y and Z in the American dispatches, to negotiate. On 
October 18, Hottinguer presented Talleyrand's price for 
negotiation: an apology for Adams's speech of May 16, American 
assumption of American shipping claims against France, help in 
floating a loan in the Dutch money market and a £50,000 bribe 
for Talleyrand. The only other option, Hottinguer later 
argued, was war, which would end in American defeat.28 
Napoleon Bonaparte's victories in Italy buoyed the French 
spirit. In the Treaty of Campo Formio France gave Venice to 
Austria as part of a peace settlement, and Bellamy suggested 
that the United States would meet a similar fate if it allied
27 Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 310-314; John Marshall 
to Timothy Pickering, Sept. 9, 1797, in John Marshall, The 
Papers of John Marshall, 8 vols. to date. Herbert A.
Johnson, et al., eds. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1974- ), 3:134.
28 Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 54-57; Marshall's journal, Oct. 
22, 1797, and American Envoys to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 22, 
1797, in Marshall, Papers, 3:173, 255-267.
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with Great Britain against France.29
Over the next five months, negotiations proceeded no 
further. "From our first arrival there has been a continuing 
effort to operate on our fears," Marshall wrote in his 
journal. "We have been threatened with a variety of ills, and 
among others with being ordered immediately to quit France."30 
French tactics began to work on Gerry, who was willing to 
discuss making a loan at the end of the war. Talleyrand, 
seeing his opportunity, asked for one "impartial” envoy, 
namely Gerry, to remain in Paris, and for the other two to 
leave. Marshall was more than happy to comply, and he and 
Pinckney left Paris in April of 1798. Gerry remained behind, 
believing that only he stood between war and peace.2*
"We are waiting with great Patience for News from Paris," 
John Adams wrote to John Quincy Adams on March 1, 1798. "We 
have not received a Line from our Envoys since their arrival 
in that City."32 The first group of dispatches, including
29 Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 58-59, Oct. 30 meeting with 
Talleyrand described in American Envoys to Timothy 
Pickering, Nov. 8, 1797, in Marshall, Papers, 3:284.
30 Marshall's journal, Feb. 4, 1797, in Marshall, Papers, 
3:195-196.
31 Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 109-113; Marshall's journal, 
March 14, 1798, in Marshall, Papers, 3:229-231; George Athan 
Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and Republican 
Statesman (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976), 
274-275.
32 John Adams to John Quincy Adams, March 1, 1798, Adams 
Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 
386.
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documents dated as recently as January 8, 1798, arrived soon 
after. Adams was willing to accept the etiquette of European 
diplomacy, but not outright extortion. The president was 
surprised and upset that the envoys had even talked to 
Talleyrand's agents. "Pinckney's answer to X, should have 
been We will not Say one Word in Answer to Propositions till 
We are reed, and meet a Minister on equal ground," Adams wrote 
in his personal notes.33 Convinced that the mission had 
failed, Adams addressed Congress on March 19 in order to set 
policy. Adams did not ask for a declaration of war, but did 
ask for increased defensive preparations. Despite French 
insolence and vague talk of invasion, the main French threat 
came from the sea, and that was where Adams intended to meet 
it. Adams asked Congress to increase the navy, improve coastal 
fortifications, and allow merchant ships to arm. "In all your 
proceedings, it will be important to manifest a zeal, vigor, 
and concert, in defence of the national rights proportional to 
the danger with which they are threatened," Adams told 
Congress.34 Republicans in Congress suspected that the crisis 
was a Federalist invention, and on March 30 Representative 
William Branch Giles of Virginia demanded the president submit 
the XYZ papers to Congress. The Federalists joined in, and
33 R. A. Brown, Presideacy of JA, 48-49; Paper in John 
Adams's hand titled "Remarks/ No. 1 Oct. 22, 1797," Adams 
Family Papers, Letters Received and other Loose Papers, reel 
386. The date refers to the date of the first dispatch 
describing the meeting with Hottinguer.
34 Speech of March 19, 1798, in WJA, 9:156-157.
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approved the demand on April 2. Adams immediately released the 
papers, embarrassing the Republicans and creating a backlash 
against both the French and the Republicans.35
President Adams himself contributed to the backlash, 
spending most of the spring and summer denouncing French 
action in his public addresses. "There is nothing in the 
conduct of our enemies more remarkable than their total 
contempt for the people," Adams wrote to the inhabitants of 
Burlington County, New Jersey, "and of all real republican 
governments, while they screen themselves under some of their 
names and forms."38 "As to the French, I know of no government 
ancient or modern that ever betrayed so universal and decided 
a contempt of the people of all nations, as the present rulers 
of France," Adams wrote to the Cincinnati of South Carolina.37 
Despite his rhetoric, Adams refused to rule out a peaceful 
settlement. "I will never send another mission to France 
without assurances that they will be received, respected and 
honored as the representatives of a great, free, powerful and 
independent nation," Adams told Congress on June 2l.38
In the meantime, Adams hoped to build up the navy. The 
president was, of course, a lifelong advocate of a navy,
35 R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 50-52.
38 John Adams to the Inhabitants of Burlington County, New 
Jersey, May 8, 1798, in WJA, 9:191.
37 John Adams to the Cincinnati of South Carolina, Sept. 17, 
1798, ibid., 9:232-233.
38 Message of June 21, 1798, ibid., 9:159.
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believing it to be "the most powerful, the safest and the 
cheapest National defence for this Country."39 Like 
Bolingbroke, Adams believed that a navy paid for itself by 
protecting commerce and could not endanger domestic liberties. 
"To arms then, my young friends, —  to arms, especially by 
sea," Adams wrote in response to an address from the young men 
of Boston.*0 On April 27 Congress authorized the president to 
obtain twelve 24-gun ships. On April 30, Adams signed the bill 
creating the Department of the Navy. He nominated George Cabot 
of Massachusetts, who declined. Adams then offered the post to 
Maryland merchant Benjamin Stoddert, whom the Senate confirmed 
on May 21. The navy's first task was to sweep the Atlantic 
coast of French privateers. The 24-gun ship Ganges and the 36- 
gun frigate Constellation largely completed this task by 
November 1798. Through most of 1798, however, the navy relied 
on ten- to sixteen- gun revenue cutters for defense.4 -^
"My hobby-horse was a navy; Alexander Hamilton's an 
army," Adams recalled in retirement. "I had no idea that 
France, involved as she was in Europe, could send any 
formidable invasion to America."*^ Like Bolingbroke, Adams
39 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 15, 1822, in Adams - 
Jefferson Letters, 585.
40 John Adams to the Young Men of Boston, May 22, 1798, in 
WJA, 9:154.
4* DeConde, Quasi-War, 90-91; Michael A. Palmer, Stoddert's 
War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 
1798-1801 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1987), 7-10, 18-19, 52-53.
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preferred to fight a limited naval war, over maritime issues, 
and avoid foreign entanglements. Hamilton, playing Marlborough 
to Adams's Bolingbroke, advocated a continental land war. 
Hamilton did agree that the navy should be increased, but he 
also advocated creating a 20,000-man standing army and a 
30,000-man provisional army, which Adams did not approve. 
Hamilton assumed that a conflict with France would bring a 
conflict with Spain and would provide an opportunity for the 
United States to conquer Louisiana. Throughout the first half 
of 1798, Hamilton was in steady contact with the Venezuelan 
revolutionary Francisco de Miranda, who had met with Prime 
Minister Pitt and hoped for Anglo-American cooperation against 
Spain.43 Adams greeted Miranda's plans with silence and later 
wrote that Hamilton's designs on Spanish territory, requiring 
a large army and an alliance with Great Britain were "in 
direct opposition to my system, and wholly subversive of it.” 
Adams blamed French revolutionary excesses in part on French 
military aggression against other nations. "Could Mr. Pitt and 
Mr. Miranda believe me so fascinated, charmed, enchanted with 
what had happened in France,” Adams asked James Lloyd, "as to 
be desirous of engaging myself and my country in most 
hazardous and expensive and bloody experiments to excite
4  ^John Adams to James Lloyd, Feb. 21, 1815, in WJA, 10:127.
43 Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 293-294; DeConde, Quasi-War, 
116-118; Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1953), 145-150, 172-180.
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similar horrors in South America?"44
Congress took up defensive measures in the summer of 1798 
and favored Hamilton's program, although also approving the 
president's naval program. Federalists in the House of 
Representatives came close to a declaration of war, when Peleg 
Sprague of New Hampshire proposed attacking all French 
commerce. This motion failed on June 30, and a similar motion 
failed on July 2. The House modified this act to permit the 
seizure of armed French vessels anywhere in the world, which 
Congress and the president approved. On July 16, Congress 
authorized the president to recruit a 50,000-man provisional 
army, which he had not asked for and did not want.45
Nor did Adams ever intend to ask for a declaration of 
war. He believed that the naval campaign was a sufficient 
response until French policy changed, one way or the other. 
"Congress has already in my Judgement as well as in the 
opinion of the judges at Phyladelphia declared War, within the 
meaning of the Constitution, against that Republic, under 
certain restrictions and Limitations,” Adams later explained 
to John Marshall, referring to the naval actions authorized in 
July 1798.46 Adams intended to conduct the limited war
44 John Adams to James Lloyd, March 29, 1815, in WJA,
10:147, 149.
45 R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 58; DeConde, Quasi-War, 
96-107; Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 321-324.
46 Ferling, JA: A Life, 355-356; John Adams to John 
Marshall, Sept. 4, 1800, in Marshall, Papers, 4:255. In the 
case of Bas v. Tingy, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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authorized by Congress at sea, and for that a large army was 
useless. 47
The Federalist program had a domestic component as well. 
Both Federalists and Republicans tended to see political 
opposition as something close to treason. Fearful of 
Republican sympathy for the French Revolution, the Federalists 
moved to quiet opposition.48 The Alien and Sedition Acts 
included the Naturalization Act, designed to limit the 
political influence of immigrants who tended to augment 
Republican ranks by extending the waiting period for 
citizenship from five to fourteen years. The Alien Enemies Act 
allowed the president to expel aliens from hostile nations as 
he saw fit, and the Alien Friends Act allowed him to expel 
aliens from friendly nations he deemed dangerous. Finally, the 
Sedition Act punished "false, scandalous and malicious" 
statements against the president. Congress, or officers of the
that the naval legislation of July 1798 constituted a 
limited declaration of war against France. James Scott 
Brown, ed. The Controversy over Neutral Rights between the 
United States and France 1797-1800: A Collection of American 
State Papers and Judicial Decisions (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1917), 106-115.
47 Reginald C. Stuart, War in American Thought: From the 
Revolution to the Monroe Doctrine (Kent, Ohio: Kent State 
University Press, 1982), 88; William J. Murphy, Jr. notes 
that utility outweighed ideology in Adams's thinking on the 
army, in "John Adams: The Politics of the Additional Army." 
New England Quarterly, Vol. 52 no. 2 (June 1979), 246.
48 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 215-218; John R. Howe, Jr., 
"Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 
1790s." American Quarterly, Vol. 19 no. 2 (Summer 1967),
150.
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government in general.4  ^Adams attempted to shift the blame 
for the enactments to Hamilton. "Nor did I adopt his idea of 
an alien and sedition law," Adams wrote in 1809. "I 
recommended no such thing in my speech." However, even if 
Adams did not specifically ask for such legislation, he did 
not veto it.5®
Congressional support for a large army and the Alien and 
Sedition Acts showed that Adams did not have the loyalty of 
his own party. The issue of who would command that army proved 
to Adams that his cabinet was disloyal. George Washington was 
the obvious choice, and Adams nominated the former president 
on July 4. Washington accepted, but on the condition that he 
be allowed to choose his major-generals and that he not be 
called to active duty unless Congress declared war. Until that 
time, the inspector-general would command the army. Washington 
leaned toward either Henry Knox or Charles Cotesworth Pinckney 
as his deputy. However, Pickering, Wolcott and McHenry lobbied 
heavily for Hamilton.5  ^ Pickering wrote to Washington in an 
anxious, almost conspiratorial tone, telling him that "the
4  ^James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and 
Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1956), 22-34, 47-48, 51-52, 94-95.
5® Letter XIII to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:291; 
Ferling, JA: A Life, 366; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of 
Federalism, 588.
51 DeConde, Quasi-War, 96-97; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 234- 
237; Douglas Southall Freeman, The Life of George 
Washington, 7 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1948-1957), 7:518-523.
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appointment of Colo. Hamilton, in the manner suggested appears 
to me to be of such vast importance to the welfare of the 
country, that I am willing to risque any consequences of my 
frank and honest endeavours to secure it."52
Washington chose Hamilton as his deputy. But Adams, who 
did not trust Hamilton with the command of an army, insisted 
that Knox was legally entitled to the inspector-generalship.55 
What followed was a comedy of error. Washington did not know 
why Adams opposed Hamilton's appointment, and Adams never 
explained himself to Washington. "General Knox is legally 
entitled to rank next to General Washington and no other 
arrangement will give satisfaction," Adams informed McHenry. 
Adams openly resented the cabinet's interference, complaining 
to McHenry that "there has been too much intrigue in this 
business with General Washington and me."54 Washington grew 
tired of the conflict, and on September 25 he wrote to Adams 
threatening to resign if the president did not comply with 
their agreement.55 When John Adams received this letter, he
52 Timothy Pickering to George Washington, July 6, 1798, 
Timothy Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, 
reel 9.
55 DeConde, Quasi-War, 97-98.
54 John Adams to James McHenry, Aug. 14 and 29, 1798, in 
WJA, 8:580, 587-588.
55 George Washington to John Adams, Sept. 25, 1798; see also 
George Washington to James McHenry, Sept. 16, 1798, in 
George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, 39 
vols. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1931-1944), 36: 456, 447.
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knew he had lost. He could not afford an open rift with the 
hero of the revolution. On October 9, Adams wrote to 
Washington, telling him that he would date the commissions of 
Knox, Pinckney and Hamilton on the same day, and Washington 
could settle the matter as he saw fit.^®
A man Adams did not trust was in effective command of an 
army Adams did not want. At the same time Adams was forced to 
surrender on the question of the major-generals, he began to 
receive information indicating that the army was, as he 
believed all along, unnecessary. There were three sources of 
diplomatic information that Adams trusted most. The first was 
his son, John Quincy Adams, the American minister to Prussia. 
The second was Elbridge Gerry, Adams's personal friend and one 
of the few "1775 men" still active in public affairs.-57 The 
third was William Vans Murray, the American minister to the 
Netherlands. Murray, a Maryland Federalist, was a strong 
supporter of John Adams and a close friend of John Quincy 
Adams.-5® Dispatches from these men, along with the president's 
own analysis of the military situation, brought about the 
shift from a war footing to appointment of a second peace 
mission.
56 John Adams to George Washington, Oct. 9, 1798, in WJA, 
8:600-601.
®7 Dauer, Adams Federalists, 89; John Adams to Elbridge 
Gerry, Feb. 13, 1797, in WJA, 8:525.
5® Peter P. Hill, William Vans Murray, Federalist Diplomat
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 1-45.
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John Quincy Adams spent much of his time observing French 
actions and reported in early 1798 that France was approaching 
the limits of its military capacity. France was preparing an 
invasion of Great Britain, but preparations "are made with so 
much ostentation, that I have some doubts of their being 
serious." "The preparations for the french expedition to 
England continue," Adams wrote to his father in May, "though 
the length of time which they have taken and their not having 
formed any junction of forces, an opinion has lately been 
spreading, that it would eventually be abandoned."59 Adams 
believed that if the United States resisted French action, 
"the terrible Republic can hurt us little by sea." Adams 
applauded the American reaction to the XYZ Affair, noting that 
the French "are alarmed at the spirit which the publication 
raised in our country."66 "The spirited & decisive measures on 
our part have brought down the tone of Talleyrand to a degree 
of modesty, which he has rarely discovered," Adams wrote to 
Rufus King, the American minister to Great Britain.61 Adams 
believed the United States had gained the respect of Europe 
and reported to Pickering that the king of Prussia believed
59 John Quincy Adams to William L. Smith, Jan. 10, 1798:
John Quincy Adams to John Adams, May 8, 1798, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reels 130 and 133.
66 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, March 6 and 
June 19, 1798, in John Quincy Adams, The Writings of John 
Quincy Adams, 7 vols. Worthington C. Ford, ed. (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1913-1917), 2:266, 310.
61 John Quincy Adams to Rufus King, Aug. 10, 1798, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 133.
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that, "the whole conduct of the American government was such 
as must command the esteem and ought to obtain the friendship 
of all other nations."62
Elbridge Gerry did not similarly approve of American 
actions. He had remained in Paris after Marshall and Pinckney 
left, for fear that his departure would bring war. Gerry 
continued to meet with Talleyrand, who told Gerry that peace 
could still be achieved, but also warned him not to leave. 
Pickering finally ordered Gerry home in July. Gerry arrived at 
Boston on October 1 and went almost immediately to Quincy to 
meet with the president. Gerry had convinced himself that he 
had prevented war, and hoped to convince the president of the 
same thing.62 In later years John Adams credited Gerry for 
providing the evidence that France was willing to meet the 
conditions Adams set in his speech of June 21, 1798.6^
Adams may have exaggerated Gerry's immediate influence. 
In an effort to buy time, Talleyrand may have told Gerry 
exactly what the envoy wanted to hear, knowing that Gerry 
would immediately report to the president.65 Adams had more 
official information from William Vans Murray. In July 1798, 
Talleyrand ordered Louis Pichon, the French minister to the
62 John Quincy Adams to Timothy Pickering, Aug. 22, 1798, in 
ftTJQA, 2:354.
62 Billias, Gerry, 285-286, 294-295; DeConde, Quasi-War, 
146-147; Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 340-344.
6  ^Letter III to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:246.
65 DeConde downplays Gerry's influence in Quasi-War, 161.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148
Netherlands, to begin informal negotiations with Murray. 
Murray wrote to Adams on July 17, describing his interview 
with Pichon. Murray believed that France was afraid of full- 
scale war with the United States. Murray's letters to Adams 
arrived at Pickering's office on October 2. Pickering sent the 
letters on to Quincy the next day, and they arrived on October 
9.66 Adams responded that the letters "made a great impression 
on me."6  ^On October 20, Adams wrote to Pickering, asking his 
opinion on whether the president should request a declaration 
of war, or appoint a new minister to France.6® In any case, 
Murray's letters convinced Adams that there would be no 
invasion and offered a vindication of Adams's version of 
republican diplomacy. "If this nation sees a great army to 
maintain, without an enemy to fight, there may arise an 
enthusiasm that seems little forseen," Adams warned McHenry. 
"At present there is no more prospect of seeing a French army 
here, than there is in Heaven."69
Adams also received information from an unexpected and 
unwelcome source. George Logan, a Pennsylvania Republican whom
66 DeConde, Quasi-War, 147-148, 162-163; William Vans Murray 
to John Adams, July 1 and 17, 1798, in WJA, 8:677-680, 680- 
682; Timothy Pickering to John Adams, Oct. 3, 1798, Adams 
Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 
391.
6  ^John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 29, 1798, in WJA, 
8:614-615.
6® John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 20, 1798, ibid., 
8:609.
69 John Adams to James McHenry, Oct. 22, 1798, ibid., 8:613.
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John Quincy Adams described as a "Philadelphia Jacobin," had 
left for France on a private peace mission in June 1798 and 
had met with Talleyrand and the Directory in August.70 The 
president did not expect Logan's mission to help and openly 
wondered if such a mission was constitutional.7* Logan 
returned to the United States in November and reported to 
Adams on November 26 that France would receive any minister he 
sent. Adams suspected that Logan's mission was an 
electioneering trick, and the only concrete result was the 
Logan Act of January 30, 1799, which prohibited such private 
diplomacy.7 2
Adams no doubt paid more attention to the military 
situation than to Logan's report. By the fall of 1798, the 
United States navy was fully deployed, with between ten and 
fifteen ships on station. American action, along with 
independent British action in the West Indies, reduced 
American losses to the French. Navy Secretary Stoddert 
believed the best policy was "to lay the foundation now, for 
an increase of the navy to that size, which shall be
70 DeConde, Quasi-War, 155-156; John Quincy Adams to William 
Vans Murray, Aug. 11, 1798, in WJQA, 2:347.
71 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, Aug. 14, 1798, 
in WJQA, 2:349; John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Nov. 2,
1798, in WJA, 8:615.
72 DeConde, Quasi-War, 165-166, 172; Frederick B. Tolies, 
George Logan of Philadelphia (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1953), 179-180; John Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 10,
1799, Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose 
Papers, reel 393.
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sufficient both for the defense of our coasts, and the 
protection of our trade."7  ^British victories also worked in 
the United States' favor. On August 1, 1798, Admiral Horatio 
Nelson destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile, 
stranding Napoleon Bonaparte's army in Egypt and curtailing 
French naval action in the Atlantic. Adams celebrated the 
"magnificent victory of Nelson," writing Francis Dana that the 
victory was "without a precedent or parallel."7  ^ "The English 
have exhibited an amazing Example of Skill and Intrepidity, 
Performance and Firmness at Sea," Adams later wrote his wife. 
"We are a Chip off that Block."75
By December 1798, Adams clearly believed that the French 
would not, and could not, escalate the war. Whether or not 
they would make peace was an entirely different matter. 
Despite the various hints that France wanted to reach a 
settlement, there was still no official word, at least that 
would satisfy the conditions set forth in Adams's message of 
June 21, 1798. Adams therefore announced no policy changes in 
his annual message to Congress on December 8, 1798. He
observed that the French laws subjecting neutral ships
75 M. Palmer, Stoddert's War, 72-81; Benjamin Stoddert to 
John Adams, Nov. 23, 1798, in George Gibbs, ed. Memoirs of 
the Administrations of Washington and John Adams, 2 vols. 
(New York: 1846), 2:116.
74 DeConde, Quasi-War, 161; John Adams to Francis Dana, Dec. 
3, 1798, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 117.
75 John Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 1, 1799, Adams Family 
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 393.
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carrying enemy goods to capture were still in operation, and 
that such legislation was, "an unequivocal act of war on the 
commerce of the nations it attacks.” "Hitherto, therefore," 
Adams continued, "nothing is discoverable in the conduct of 
France which ought to change or relax our measures of 
defence." Adams reminded Congress that "an efficient 
preparation for war can alone insure peace." "It is peace that 
we have uniformly and perserveringly cultivated," he told 
Congress, "and harmony between us and France may be restored 
at her option." However, he would not send another minister, 
"without more determinate assurances."76
Such assurances came in William Vans Murray's letters. 
Murray continued to meet with Pichon, who delivered messages 
from Talleyrand. On August 20, Murray reported that the French 
would agree to a Dutch mediation. It was a meaningless offer, 
as the Netherlands was a French protectorate, but it at least 
indicated that American actions were having an effect on 
French policy. Talleyrand wrote to Pichon on August 28, 
arguing that American prosperity "is more at the expense of 
Great Britain than us." Pichon passed this letter on to Murray 
on September 6. On October 7, Murray received a copy of a 
letter Talleyrand wrote on September 28, in which Talleyrand 
promised that any minister Adams sent would be properly 
received. Murray thought Talleyrand's method unorthodox but 
believed that the letter satisfied Adams's conditions, and
76 Speech of Dec. 8, 1798, in WJA, 9:129-130.
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sent it to the president. Adams received Murray's letters in 
January and February 1799.77 Probably on the basis of these 
letters, Adams ordered Pickering to draft a treaty to be 
proposed to France.78 Adams had sufficient information from 
"regular diplomatic sources" to make his decision. On February 
1, 1799, George Washington forwarded a letter to him from the 
poet Joel Barlow, who argued that France wanted peace with the 
United States. Washington added that he would support any 
honorable peace that Adams made. Adams gave no weight to 
Barlow's letter, but Washington's letter seemed to offer
political cover for a new mission. On February 18, 1799, Adams 
nominated William Vans Murray as minister to France.78
"I desire no other inscription over my gravestone than:
' Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the 
responsibility of the peace with France in the year 1800,'" 
Adams wrote in 1815.88 Adams had seen that the military fervor 
of 1798 was dead by 1799, and that his administration's
actions had brought France back to the bargaining table. Adams 
believed that his diplomacy allowed him to remove the army as
77 DeConde, Quasi-War, 151-152, 159-160, 178-179; William 
Vans Murray to John Adams, Aug. 20 and Oct. 7, 1798, in WJA, 
8:688, 688-690; Letter VII to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in 
WJA, 9:262.
78 John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Jan. 15, 1799, ibid., 
8:621.
79 DeConde, Quasi-War, 178-179; Letter I to the Boston
Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:241-242; George Washington to John
Adams, Feb. 1, 1799, in Washington, Writings, 37:119-120.
80 John Adams to James Lloyd, Jan. 1815, in WJA, 10:113.
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a domestic threat to republican government. "I never think of 
our means without shuddering,” Adams wrote to McHenry on July 
27, 1799. "All the declamations, as well as demonstrations, of 
Trenchard and Gordon, Bolingbroke, Barnard and Walpole, Hume, 
Burgh and Burke rush in upon my memory and frighten me out of 
my wits." Opposition writers had always warned of the danger 
of debts and armies, and Walpole learned in the late 1720s 
that the government could not maintain a war footing 
indefinitely.8*
Although Adams did not nominate Murray solely for 
political gain, it is clear that Adams believed, in Albert 
Hall Bowman's words, "good policy was good politics."82 jn 
execution, Adams' s policy married his Bolingbrokean conception 
of the presidency, as a leader acting alone for the general 
good, to Bolingbrokean conception of the proper goals and 
methods of foreign policy. 88 In substance, the Murray 
nomination reflected Adams's long experience in diplomacy and 
his acceptance that American diplomats in Europe must act 
according to European rules. He accepted Talleyrand's use of 
Murray and Pichon as standard diplomatic practice. It is 
unlikely that the John Adams of 1778 would have approved of
8* John Adams to James McHenry, July 27, 1799, ibid., 9:4-5.
82 Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 368; Kohn, Eagle and
Sword, 258-259; Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 308-309, 335-336.
88 Ketcham, Presidents above Party, 99.
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such a roundabout approach.84
Adams did not consult Pickering, and Pickering let his 
imagination run wild as to the reason Adams nominated Murray. 
"That capital error of Mr. Adams, in instituting the mission 
to France in 1799, I have long thought originated with Mr. 
Jefferson, or his agents," Pickering wrote in 1815.®^ "But for 
this," Pickering wrote in 1823, "the system of administration 
which had been established under Washington, and until then 
continued under Adams, would have remained."®** Pickering 
viewed Washington's system as using close relations with Great 
Britain as bulwark against French radicalism. Adams did not, 
and he acted to preserve, "a system of eternal neutrality, if 
possible, in all the wars of Europe," which he believed was 
the only proper policy for a republic, and was Adams's system 
long before it was Washington's.®7
"You will be shocked, as we all were, by the President's 
nomination of Mr. Murray minister plenipotentiary to negotiate
84 Stephen G. Kurtz, "The French Mission of 1799-1800: 
Concluding Chapter in the Statecraft of John Adams." 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 80 no. 4 (December 1965), 
598.
®-* Timothy Pickering to John Lowell, Jan. 24, 1815, in Henry 
Adams, ed. Documents relating to New-England Federalism, 
1800-1815 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1877), 426.
88 Timothy Pickering, A Review of the Correspondence between 
the Hon. John Adams, late President of the United States, 
and the Late William Cunningham, Esq., Beginning in 1803 and 
Ending in 1812 (Salem, Mass.: Cushing and Appleton, 1823), 
108.
87 Letter II to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:242; 
Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 367-368.
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a treaty with the French Republic," Pickering wrote to George 
Cabot. "I beg you to believe it is the sole act of the 
President." "We shall recover from the shock of Murray's 
nomination; no preparation for war is lessened," Pickering 
assured Rufus King.®® Pickering's sentiments were typical of 
the pro-war wing of the Federalist party. Five Federalist 
senators —  Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, James Ross and 
William Bingham of Pennsylvania, Jacob Reed of South Carolina 
and Richard Stockton of New Jersey —  met with Adams on 
February 23, hoping to talk him out of the peace mission. When 
Adams refused, the senators asked for a commission rather than 
a single envoy, to which Adams reluctantly agreed. Two days 
after the meeting, Adams named Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth 
and Patrick Henry, both Federalists, as Murray's colleagues.®9 
The cabinet met at the president's house on March 10 to 
draft instructions. The president and cabinet unanimously 
agreed on three requirements for a treaty. First, France 
should indemnify American citizens for spoliation claims. 
Second, France should compensate shipowners for ships seized 
for lack of a r&le d'equipage. Third, the United States would 
offer no guarantee for French territory. As the cabinet
88 Timothy Pickering to George Cabot, Feb. 21, 1799, in 
Lodge, Life of Cabot; Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, March 
6, 1799, in King, Correspondence, 2:549.
89 Letter IV to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 8:248-250; 
DeConde, Quasi-War, 185; Richard E. Welch, Jr., Theodore 
Sedgwick, Federalist: A Political Portrait (Middleton,
Conn.: Wesleyan university Press, 1965), 187-189.
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drafted instructions, Patrick Henry declined his appointment, 
and Adams named Governor William R. Davie of North Carolina as 
his replacement.90
Congress adjourned in mid-March, and Adams left for 
Quincy soon after, without having ordered the new envoys to 
sail. The delay was not an accident but was tied directly to 
American sea power in the Caribbean, as Opposition thought and 
Adams's own diplomatic experience dictated that it should be. 
In March 1799, twenty American ships were on station in the 
Caribbean, but most were due to rotate out for repairs. By 
June, only five ships remained, none with more than 24 guns. 
Adams pursued a twin policy of preparation and negotiation and 
would not launch a new mission without sufficient sea power to 
defend American shipping in the event of failure. In the 
meantime, Adams could read dispatches and issue orders as 
easily from Quincy as from Philadelphia.91
Pickering did his best to have the mission cancelled. 
Adams later recalled that Pickering "opposed, obstinated, and 
embarrassed me to the utmost of his power."92 On June 18 (30 
Prarial on the French calendar) most of the Directory fell
Q 0 Account of March 10, 1799, meeting in Pickering Papers, 
reel 10; DeConde, Quasi-War, 186-187.
91 Brown, Presidency of JA, 102-107; Kurtz, "French 
Mission," 555; M. Palmer, Stoddert's War, 108-109.
92 John Adams to William Cunningham, Nov. 7, 1808, in 
William Cunningham, Correspondence between the Hon. John 
Adams, late President of the United States, and the Late 
William Cunningham, Esq., Beginning in 1803 and Ending in 
1812 (Boston: E.M. Cunningham, 1823), 46.
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from power. Several weeks later Talleyrand resigned and was 
replaced by his ally, Karl Reinhard.93 Pickering believed the 
coup to be a sufficient reason to suspend the mission, as "the 
men lately in power, who gave the assurances you required, 
relative to the mission, being ousted in a manner indicative 
of a revolution in the public mind."94
Adams advised Pickering to maintain defensive 
preparations but to make no changes in policy. Adams did not 
intend to provoke a war. "If the spirit of exterminating 
vengeance ever arises," Adams wrote to Pickering, "it shall be 
conjured up by them, not me."9^ However, Adams did not wish 
to send the mission prematurely. "I have no reason or motive 
to precipitate the mission," Adams wrote to Stoddert on 
September 4. On September 16, Adams wrote Pickering that it 
would be better to wait until after hurricane season to send 
the envoys.9  ^ By September, American naval strength was 
restored in the Caribbean. In October, Adams arrived at 
Trenton, where the government had moved after a yellow fever 
epidemic in Philadelphia. On October 16, Adams ordered
93 Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 384-387.
94 Timothy Pickering to John Adams, Sept. 11, 1799, Adams 
Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 
396.
95 John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Aug. 6, 1799, in WJA, 
9:11.
9t* John Adams to Benjamin Stoddert, Sept. 4, 1799; John 
Adams to Timothy Pickering, Sept. 16, 1799, ibid., 9:20, 30.
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Ellsworth and Davie to sail, and the envoys left for Europe on 
November 3.9 7
Ellsworth and Davie arrived in Lisbon on November 27 and 
spent several weeks gathering intelligence before proceeding 
to Paris. When the envoys arrived on March 2, 1800, they found 
a different government from the one they had intended to meet. 
Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory on 18 Brumaire 
(November 9, 1799), establishing himself as First Consul.
Bonaparte had his reasons for settling with the United States. 
He wanted better relations with the neutral powers of northern 
Europe, and a settlement with the United States would improve 
his image. To establish the groundwork, Bonaparte repealed the 
law of January 18, 1798, which subjected American vessels to 
capture. On February 9, 1800, Bonaparte declared two weeks of 
mourning in honor of George Washington, who had died on 
December 14, 1799. Bonaparte appointed Talleyrand as his
foreign minister, but turned negotiations over to a three-man 
commission of Joseph Bonaparte, Pierre Louis Roederer, and 
Charles Pierre Claret Fleurieu.98
For six months negotiations made no progress. The 
Americans insisted on indemnities for shipping losses and an 
end to the 1778 treaties. The French argued that the 1778 
treaties were still in force and refused to pay indemnities.
97 DeConde, Quasi-War, 219-222; M. Palmer, Stoddert 's War, 
241.
98 DeConde, Quasi-War, 223-231.
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On September 11, Pierre Roederer observed that to the 
Americans, the most important goal was to end the 1778 
alliance and the guarantee of French territory. The French 
were willing to grant this concession but only at the price of 
giving up the indemnities. On September 13, the American 
envoys agreed to postpone discussion of the indemnities and 
the 1778 treaties and simply restore normal relations. In the 
meantime, the 1778 treaties would be suspended. The two sides 
completed a draft on September 27 and signed the Provisional
Treaty of Amity and Commerce on October 1. Bonaparte asked
that the agreement be downgraded to a convention, signed in 
the name of the Premier Consul of the French Republic and the 
President of the United States. The Convention of
Mortefontaine, named after Joseph Bonaparte's estate, was 
signed on October 3, 1800.99 The treaty did not exactly
conform to the instructions, but as Murray explained to the 
secretary of state, "it was our duty & for the honor & 
interest of the government & people of the United States, that 
we should agree to that treaty, rather than make none."100
The treaty was concluded too late to affect the
presidential election of 1800. The Republicans, in support of 
Thomas Jefferson, used the Alien and Sedition Acts to good 
political advantage. On May 1, the Republicans secured all of
99 Ibid., 237-257.
100 William Vans Murray to John Marshall, Oct. 1, 1800, in 
Marshall, Papers, 4:310.
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New York's twelve electoral votes. Adams learned of the 
results on May 3 and acted to distance himself from the 
Hamilton program. Adams cut off Hamilton's influence over 
military policy by demanding and receiving McHenry's 
resignation, replacing him with moderate Massachusetts 
Federalist Samuel Dexter. On May 10 Adams asked Pickering to 
resign. Pickering refused, and on May 12, 1800 he became the 
first cabinet member ever to be fired.101 Adams appointed John 
Marshall as Pickering's replacement. This may have been 
Adams's attempt to distance himself from the domestic program, 
which fell under the secretary of state's jurisdiction. 
Marshall opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts, writing that 
they would do more harm than good.102 By 1800, Marshall was 
exactly the type of Federalist John Adams wanted in his 
cabinet.103
The cabinet purge angered Hamilton to the point where he 
almost preferred to elect Jefferson than to re-elect Adams. 
"If we must have an enemy at the head of the Government, let 
it be one whom we can oppose," Hamilton wrote to Theodore
101 DeConde, Quasi-War, 269-272; Ferling, JA: A Life, 393- 
394; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 264; White, Federalists, 252.
102 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 729-730; John 
Marshall to "A Freeholder," Sept. 20, 1798, in Marshall, 
Papers, 3:505.
103 Kurtz also makes this connection in Presidency of JA, 
358-359.
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Sedgwick.10  ^Hamilton's true object was to swing the election 
to Adams's running mate, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. 
Throughout the summer, Hamilton distributed a private letter 
to Federalist leaders, cataloguing Adams's supposed faults. 
Republican resurgence and a Federalist split combined to deny 
Adams a second term. On December 3, South Carolina gave its 
eight votes to Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, putting the 
two Republicans in a first place tie.*®5
On December 11, Davie arrived in the United States with 
a copy of the Convention of Mortefontaine. Adams sent it to 
the Senate five days later. The convention stalled in the 
Federalist-controlled Senate, and was rejected 16-14 on 
January 23, 1801. Political pressure from merchants led the 
Senate to reconsider. The Senate expunged Article II, which 
stated that the 1778 treaties were suspended, and finally 
approved the convention 22-9 on February 3, 1801, bringing the 
Quasi-War to a formal end a month before Adams left office.106
To a keen student of British political history such as
Adams, the end of the administration looked familiar. "We
federalists are much in the situation of the party of 
Bolingbroke and Harley, after the treaty of Utrecht,
10  ^Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick, May 10, 1800, 
in Hamilton, Papers, 24:475.
105 DeConde, Quasi-War, 277-285.
106 DeConde, Quasi-War, 288-292; Richard C. Rohrs, "The 
Federalist Party and the Convention of 1800." Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 12 no. 3 (Summer 1988), 250-251.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
completely and totally routed and defeated," Adams wrote to 
Benjamin Stoddert a few weeks after leaving office.107 Adams 
advised his youngest son to read The Idea of a Patriot King to 
see another instance where one party sought a war with France, 
"for the pretext to raise a regular army . . . for the purpose 
of Patronage and Influence."108 As the Bolingbrokean moment 
ended, Adams could himself take some solace in a passage from 
The Idea of a Patriot King. "It is true that a prince, who 
gives just reasons to expect that his reign will be that of a 
Patriot King, may not always meet, and from all persons, such 
returns as such expectations deserve," Bolingbroke wrote, "but 
they must not hinder either the prince from continuing to give 
them, or the people from continuing to acknowledge them."109 
John Adams believed he had acted the part of a patriot 
president; the people, however, had not acknowledged it.
John Adams left office believing he had kept the 
republic. "I shall leave the State with its coffers full, and 
the fair prospect of a peace with all the world smiling in its 
face," Adams remarked in his final months in office. 110 Adams 
concluded that peace and neutrality depended on naval
107 John Adams to Benjamin Stoddert, March 31, 1801, in WJA, 
9:582.
108 John Adams to Thomas Boy Is ton Adams, Jan. 15, 1801,
Adams Family Collection, Library of Congress.
109 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 26.
110 John Adams to Francis A. Vanderkemp, Dec. 28, 1800, in 
WJA, 9:577.
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preparation. "We cannot, without committing a dangerous 
imprudence, abandon those measures of self-protection, which 
are adapted to our situation,” Adams told Congress in his last 
annual message.111 As Adams left public office, he abandoned 
any hope that foreign policy based on the more idealistic 
elements of republican ideology could reform the world; for 
example, the small-navy principle that free ships make free 
goods had become part of republican ideology. If all nations 
adopted this principle, theoretically all naval wars would 
come to an end. "However desirable this may be to Humanity, 
how much soever Phylosophy may approve of it, and Christianity 
desire it," Adams wrote to John Marshall, "I am clearly 
convinced that it will never take place." The United States 
could not rely on the good will of other nations, the justice 
of its policies or the nature of its government, but only on 
the strength of its navy.11  ^ In the end, Adams abandoned the 
grandiose hopes (but not the ideals) of the Model Treaty for 
the more dependable republican realpolitik described by 
Bolingbroke and confirmed by Adams's own diplomatic 
experience. Adams left office convinced he had found a way to 
act within an international balance of power compatible with 
the preservation of republican government at home.
111 Speech of Nov. 22, 1800, ibid., 9:145.
11  ^John Adams to John Marshall, Oct. 3, 1800, in Marshall, 
Papers, 4:313.
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CHAPTER 5: EXTENDING THE SPHERE
Like John Adams, James Madison grew up in a time and 
place dominated by diplomatic issues. Among Madison's earliest 
childhood memories were General Braddock's defeat on the road 
to Fort Duquesne in 1755 and constant fear of Indian attack. 
More important, as a westerner he looked toward the 
Mississippi valley. As Ralph Ketcham writes, "James Madison 
lived his life, private and public, in the presence of this 
vast struggle for world power.”1 As a Virginian, Madison came 
to political maturity at a time when the factors of Scottish 
mercantile houses dominated the tobacco trade.^ In Madison's 
mind, the great issues of trade with Great Britain and control 
of the Mississippi River linked foreign policy and republican 
government in America. The survival of the American republic 
depended on a republican political economy, which depended on 
diplomatic success, which Madison defined as an equitable 
trade relationship with Great Britain and free use of the
1 Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1971), 3; Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 
vols. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941-1961), 
1:45-49.
 ^T.H. Breen, Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great 
Tidewater Planters on the Eve of the Revolution (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 38-39.
164
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
Mississippi River. Diplomatic success in turn depended on a 
durable republican government which could secure those
interests by means compatible with a government limited power, 
specifically through the use of American trade.
Madison received much of his political education under 
the influence of John Witherspoon at the College of New 
Jersey. Witherspoon derived many of his lectures from
Aristotle, and added works of the Enlightenment, including the 
emerging republican canon: John Locke, James Harrington, Baron 
de Montesquieu and Algernon Sidney. Witherspoon also belonged 
to the Scottish Common Sense school and lectured on the 
emerging law of nations, especially the works of David Hume,
Emmerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. The
heavy Scottish influence, along with the economic 
circumstances of Madison's Virginia, probably account for the 
role of political economy in Madison's thought and in turn for 
his policies regarding trade and the Mississippi.3
Throughout his career, Madison sought to reconcile 
republican thought with political and diplomatic practice. He 
did not always succeed as, for example, when he lost a race 
for a state senate seat in 1777. Traditionally, Virginia 
freeholders gathered in the county court house and voted 
orally. Candidates were expected to "treat" the voters, 
keeping an open house and offering hospitality to all,
3 Brant, JM, 1:76; Ketcham, JM, 42-50; Henry F. May, The 
Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1976), 62-65.
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supporters and opponents, to avoid the appearance of 
corruption. Madison refused to treat, on the ground that 
treating was incompatible with republicanism. "The consequence 
was that the election went against him," Madison later 
recalled, "his abstinence being represented as the effect of 
pride or parsimony.”4
The independent yeoman farmer, whom Madison had refused 
to corrupt in 1777, lay at the center of Madison's political 
system and by extension his diplomacy. Madison's faith in the 
virtue of the American people never fell as far as John 
Adams's, because Madison, unlike Adams, never held out a 
classical model for virtue. Madison's model of yeoman virtue 
depended more on the plowshare than the sword. Furthermore, 
Madison's relationship with Jefferson served as a moderating 
influence on Madison's own suspicions of human nature. 
Jefferson had no such effect on Adams.5
Madison generally concurred with Jefferson on issues of 
political economy. Free trade, liberated from colonial 
shackles, would preserve a republican political economy by 
promoting agriculture and discouraging domestic manufactures.
4 Charles S. Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders: Political 
Practices in Washington's Virginia (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1952), 19-26, 51-58; Douglass 
Adair, ed. "James Madison's Autobiography." William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 2 no. 2 (April 1945), 199-200.
5 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1948-1981), 2:169; Ralph Ketcham, 
"James Madison and the Nature of Man," Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol. 19 no. 1 (January 1958), 63-67.
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"The general policy of America is at present pointed at the 
encouragement of Agriculture, and the importation of the 
objects of consumption. The wid[er] therefore our ports be 
opened and the more extensive the priviliges of all 
competitors in our Commerce the more likely we shall be to buy 
at cheap & sell at profitable rat[es]," he wrote to Edmund 
Randolph in 1783. "But in proportion as our lands become 
settled, and spare hands for manufactures & navigation 
multiply, it may become our policy to favor these objects."® 
In the late 1780s, Madison opposed protective tariffs and 
discounted the idea that a lack of domestic manufactures would 
leave the united States dependent on other nations. Madison 
believed that European desire for American agricultural 
products would overcome all obstacles to trade, including war. 
"Neutral nations, whose rights are becoming every day more & 
more extensive," Madison wrote, "would not now suffer 
themselves to be shut out of our ports."7
Madison believed the United States could manipulate the 
European balance of power to their own advantage. Trade gave 
the United States a strategic invulnerability that would 
remove the need for a dangerous and unrepublican military
6 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, May 20, 1783, in James 
Madison, The Papers of James Madison, 17 vols. date. William 
T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal, et al., eds.
(Chicago and Charlottesville: University of Chicago Press 
and University Press of Virginia, 1959- ), 7:59-60.
7 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Jan. 9, 1787, ibid., 
9:244-245.
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establishment. His view was not dissimilar to that of John 
Adams in drafting the Model Treaty, but while Adams gave up on 
economic coercion in the 1780s, Madison never did. Madison 
unwittingly staked the survival of republican government on 
the actions of other nations. Madison's system demanded that 
European nations see their interests as he saw them, in 
equitable trade arrangements and recognizing an American claim 
to navigate the Mississippi. Madison's great fear was not that 
European nations would act other than as he supposed they 
would but that diplomats from the eastern states would sell 
out Virginia's interests in favor of their own section.
For Madison, navigation of the Mississippi was vital to 
American independence and the preservation of republican 
government. When Madison entered the Continental Congress in 
1779, he became one of the more vocal defenders of American 
claims on the Mississippi. He argued that under natural law, 
usage and mutual benefit gave the United States a natural 
claim to the right to navigate the entire course of the 
Mississippi.® In a long letter to John Jay concerning Jay's 
instructions as minister to Spain, Madison listed five reasons 
why the United States should insist on its rights on the 
Mississippi: the Mississippi formed a natural boundary, the 
United States could not prevent western settlement, the 
territory east of the Mississippi fell within the colonial 
charters, the territory already included American citizens,
8 Brant, JM, 1:82; Ketcham, JM, 96-98.
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and the United States needed the river more than Spain did. 
"An innocent passage (says Vattel) is due to all nations with 
whom a state is at peace," Madison continued, "and this duty 
comprehends troops equally with individuals."9 The Virginia 
delegates in Congress advised Governor Jefferson to instruct 
the delegation not to give up the right to the Mississippi in 
exchange for a Spanish alliance unless absolutely necessary.1® 
In defending the American claim to the Mississippi, 
Madison acted, in Lance Banning's term, as a "Virginia 
Continentalist." He sought the Mississippi as a Virginia 
interest but also as an interest of the whole nation.11 In 
November 1780 Madison attacked the notion that the United 
States should give up the Mississippi to gain peace and 
implicitly criticized the idea that the Mississippi and the 
fisheries were equivalent interests. "Obsticles enough will be 
thrown in the way of peace, if [it] is to be bid for at the 
expense of particular members of the union," Madison wrote. 
"The Eastern States must on the first suggestion take alarm 
for their fisheries. If they will not support the other states 
in their rights, they cannot expect to be supported themselves
9 James Madison to John Jay, Oct. 17, 1780, in PJM, 2:130- 
132.
10 Virginia Delegates to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 13, 1780, 
ibid., 2:242.
11 Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison 
& the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1995), 42. See also McDonald,
Nows Ordo Seclorum, 204-205.
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when theirs come into question.1,12 Unlike John Adams, Madison 
believed a navy and a large merchant marine were incompatible 
with republican government. Madison therefore considered the 
fisheries merely the special interest of New England, rather 
than a national interest. Madison advocated southern 
participation in a navy only as a hedge against disunion, 
which would leave a well-armed North to prey on a rich and 
defenseless southern commerce.15
Military disaster in the South generally and particularly 
in Virginia moderated Virginia's demands. The American 
surrender at Charleston and defeat at Waxhaw in May 1780 wiped 
out most of the Virginia Continentals. British advance agents 
appeared in Virginia in the spring of 1780 and some 2200 
British troops landed in October. On January 5, 1781, British 
troops seized Richmond, barely missing the fleeing state 
government.^ The Reverend James Madison notified his namesake 
and cousin of the disaster on January 18, writing, "by this 
time I suppose you have heard thro' many Channels of ye. Loss 
of our Capitol, & ye. Disgrace of Virginia."15 On February 1, 
1781, Madison moved in Congress that the United States give up
^  James Madison to Joseph Jones, Nov. 25, 1780, in PJM, 
2:203.
15 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, Feb. 25, 1783, ibid., 
6:287.
^  Selby, Revolution in Virginia, 213-224.
15 The Rev. James Madison to James Madison, Jan. 18, 1781, 
in PJM, 2:293.
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the right to navigate the lower Mississippi, where it flowed 
between Spanish banks, if that concession would secure a 
Spanish alliance.16
Fear of defeat and that Adams would prolong the war over 
the fisheries led Madison to support the instructions of June 
15, 1781 that revoked Adams's peace commission. Madison
himself sponsored the motion of July 12, 1781, to strip Adams 
of his power to negotiate a commercial treaty with Great
1 7Britain. To Madison, the new instructions were a concession 
to military necessity. "It is impossible to expect that France 
should maintain the war by her own treasury," the Virginia 
delegation informed Governor Thomas Nelson in October 1781.1® 
More than a year later Madison continued to defend the 
instructions of June 15, 1781. On July 24, 1782, Madison
opposed a motion to reconsider those instructions. On August 
8 Madison conceded that the instructions were, "a sacrifice of 
national dignity,” but defended them as "a sacrifice of 
dignity to policy." "The situation of our affairs and 
circumstances of that time rendered this sacrifice necessary." 
Madison dismissed any suspicions of France, arguing that "our 
interests are as safe in her hands now as they were before or
16 Motion on the Navigation of the Mississippi, Feb. 1,
1781, ibid., 2:302-303.
17 Stinchcombe, French Alliance, 174; Ketcham, JM, 93-94; 
Brant, JM, 2:137-144; Motion on John Adams's Commission and 
Instructions, July 12, 1781, in PJM, 3:188.
1® Virginia Delegates to Thomas Nelson, Oct. 9, 1781, ibid., 
3:281.
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as if the ministers were left wholly to their own 
discretion.1,19
When the provisional treaty of peace arrived before 
Congress, Madison objected to the commissioners's blatant 
violation of their instructions. He suspected the worst of 
Adams, noting that Adams's dispatches from Europe were mainly 
"a display of his vanity, his prejudice against the French 
Court & his venom against Doctr. Franklin."20 jn debating the 
treaty Madison noted that "many of the most judicious members" 
objected to the fact that the commissioners had not consulted 
the French. The separate article, written by Jay, that 
promised the British more territory in West Florida if they 
held it at the end of the war "was most offensive."2* "In this 
business Jay has taken the lead ... Adams has followed with 
cordiality. Franklin has been dragged into it," Madison 
explained to Edmund Randolph.22 on the floor of Congress, 
Madison expressed surprise that the commissioners should blame 
their problems on the instructions of June 15, 1781.23
With the conclusion of the war, the United States hoped
1 Q Comments on Instructions to Peace Commissioners, July 24 
and Aug. 8, 1782, ibid., 4:437, 5:33-34.
20 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 11, 1783 
(partially in code), ibid., 6:221.
21 Notes on Debates, March 12-15, 1783, ibid., 6:328.
22 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, March 18, 1783 
(partially in code), ibid., 6:355.
23 Notes on Debates, March 19, 1781, ibid., 6:363-364.
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to resume trade with Great Britain as quickly as possible, but 
on a more equal level than in the colonial era. On May 6, 
1783, Secretary Livingston submitted a draft treaty that re­
established direct trade between the United States and the 
British West Indies, and allowed the United States into the 
carrying trade between the British West Indies and Europe. In 
exchange British merchants were allowed to trade in the United 
States on an equal footing with Americans. Madison believed 
the price for the West Indian trade was too high, warning 
Jefferson that the result would be a relapse into a state of 
dependency to Great Britain and revival of the "scotch 
monopoly." in the absence of a central government capable of 
making a better agreement, Madison suggested that the southern 
states encourage their own shipping. "The monopoly which 
formerly tyrannized over it [Virginia's commerce] has left 
wounds which are not yet healed," Madison wrote to Edmund 
Randolph on May 20, 1783. Four days later Randolph replied to 
Madison, "our ports are fully open to British ships: and I am 
sorry to see a general ardor after those commodities which 
public acts have so lately proscribed."24 Two years later 
Madison complained to James Monroe that "our trade was never 
more completely monopolized by G.B. when it was under the 
direction of the British Parliament than it is at this
24 Setser, Commercial Reciprocity, 65-67; James Madison to 
Thomas Jefferson, May 13, 1783; James Madison to Edmund 
Randolph, May 20, 1783; Edmund Randolph to James Madison, 
May 24, 1783, in PJM, 7:39, 61, 73.
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moment."25
The "scotch monopoly” that Madison referred to was the 
Scottish factor system and Scottish control of the Virginia 
tobacco trade. The 1707 Act of Union between England and 
Scotland admitted Scottish merchants into the colonial trade. 
As Virginians moved into the piedmont, resident factors of 
Scottish mercantile houses followed them, selling goods on 
credit based on the next year's tobacco crop. Large tidewater 
planters dealt directly with Glasgow and Edinburgh. The net 
effect was that all planters, large and small, were deeply in 
debt, amounting to two million pounds sterling by the eve of 
the revolution. The end of a brief export boom in 1772 led to 
the collapse of banks in Scotland and London, which in turn 
caused a contraction of credit. The credit collapse, combined 
with a glut on the tobacco market, drove Virginians deeper 
into debt. The crash of 1772 re-emphasized the dangers of debt 
and luxury, which according to Whig thought undermined the 
personal independence required for political virtue.2^
Madison did not wish to restrict trade but rather to 
remove it from a neo-colonial state. Madison's system required
25 James Madison to James Monroe, June 21, 1785, ibid., 
8:307.
2® Breen, Tobacco Culture, 38-39, 89-95; Selby, Revolution 
in Virginia, 27-30; Emory G. Evans, "Private Indebtedness 
and the Revolution in Virginia, 1776 to 1796," William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3rd series. Vol. 28 no. 3 (July 1971), 349; 
Jacob M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas 
Trade: The view from the Chesapeake, 1700-1776 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 135-137.
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that the British and other nations bid for American trade. In 
the absence of national commercial regulations, Madison 
believed that Virginia would have to act on its own. On June 
8, 1784, the Virginia House of Delegates took up the "Bill 
Restricting Foreign Vessels to Certain Virginia Ports,” better 
known as the Port Bill. "Whereas the Trade and Commerce 
carried on between the Citizens of this Common Wealth and 
forreign Merchants would be placed on a more equal foundation, 
and expedition & dispatch thereby the better promoted if the 
Vessels of forreign Merchants trading to this State be 
restricted to certain Ports," the bill began. The bill stated 
that all ships other than Virginian would be restricted to 
Norfolk, Alexandria, York, Tappahannock, and Bermuda 
H u n d r e d . "We made a warm struggle for the establishmt. of 
Norfolk & Alexandria as our only ports," Madison informed 
Jefferson, "but we were forced to add York, Tappahannock & 
Bermuda Hundred in order to gain anything & to restrain to 
these ports foreigners only."^®
Madison hoped to end the British monopoly that subverted 
a republican political economy by inviting in competitors and 
by denying British merchants direct access to the planters, in
^7 Bill restricting Foreign Vessels to Certain Virginia 
ports, June 8, 1784, in PJM, 8:64-65; Drew R. McCoy, "The 
Virginia Port Bill of 1784," The Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography, Vol. 88 no. 3 (July 1975), 291-292.
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 3, 1784, in PJM, 
8:93.
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the hope of replacing British middlemen with Virginians.29 
Madison "meant to reduce the trade of G.B. to an equality with 
that of other nations" and would not discriminate against 
merchants from other states. Only then could Virginia turn its 
supposed economic advantages over Europe into an effective 
diplomatic tool.39 Madison preferred free trade, but that did 
not mean unregulated trade. He believed that before free trade 
could be established the United States had to be out of debt, 
and all other nations had to adopt a free system. 3-*- He did not 
make the encouragement of Virginia shipping a priority. 
Madison wrote to James Monroe that if the southern states "are 
not their own carriers I shod, suppose it no mark either of 
folly or of incivility to give our custom to our brethren [in 
the eastern states] rather than to those who have not yet 
entitled themselves to the name of friends."32 Revisions of 
the Port Bill in 1786 and 1788 expanded the number of ports of
29 Richard S. Chew III, "A New Hope for the Republic" 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, College of William and Mary,
1992), 16-17.
30 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 20, 1784, in PJM, 
8:102-103.
3  ^James Madison to James Monroe, Aug. 7, 1785, ibid., 
8:333-335.
32 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 16, 1781; James 
Madison to Edmund Randolph, Feb. 25, 1783; James Madison to 
James Monroe, Aug. 7, 1785, in PJM, 3:72, 6:287, 8:335; Drew 
McCoy has called the Port Bill "a classic mercantilist 
measure in that it specifically encouraged the development 
of a native (i.e. Virginian) seamen." "Port Bill," 293. 
Richard Chew is closer to the mark in arguing that 
encouragement of seamen was a minor part of the bill, "New 
Hope," 51-52.
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entry for foreign and domestic shipping, essentially defeating 
the purpose of the original bill. Virginia's ratification of 
the Constitution in 1788 made the Port Bill 
unconstitutional.3 3
Peace did not make the achievement of Madison's second 
goal, securing the right to navigate the Mississippi, any 
easier. In fact, Congress's inability to act may have made 
Spain more intransigent. In the summer of 1785, Spain sent Don 
Diego de Gardoqui to the United States to negotiate with 
Secretary Jay. The Count de Floridablanca, the Spanish foreign 
minister, forbade Gardoqui from making any concessions on 
Spain's claim of absolute control over the navigation of the 
lower Mississippi. However, Gardoqui could offer commercial 
concessions, including most-favored-nation status, and was 
willing to give up Spanish claims to territory north of 31 
degrees north. Gardoqui even offered Spanish naval protection 
against the Barbary pirates. Jay, almost desperate to find a 
way out of the commercial depression, was anxious to bargain. 
By 1786 Jay was prepared to compromise on the Mississippi, 
which he had refused to do five years before. Jay would not 
give up the right to the lower Mississippi, but would agree to 
forbear the use for 25 years, enough time for the west to fill 
up with Americans. On August 3, Jay asked Congress to approve 
his actions, putting the choice as one between accommodation,
33 McCoy, "Port: Bill," 299-303.
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war or disgrace.3^
In the West, settlement continued with or without an 
agreement with Spain. In the early 1780s, Virginians and non- 
Virginians alike poured into Kentucky. By 1784, all political 
groups within Kentucky agreed on separation from Virginia, in 
order to escape Virginia taxation and better organize defense 
against Indian attacks. Virginia leaders generally approved, 
but set conditions insuring that Kentucky would pay its share 
of the Virginia public debt. The Jay-Gardoqui negotiations 
complicated matters, leading some Kentuckians to favor 
independence from the United States as well as Virginia. 
General James Wilkinson secretly met with Spanish officials 
and urged them to hold the line against the United States, 
promising that Spain could reach an agreement with an 
independent Kentucky.35
To Madison, the use of the Mississippi was central to the 
preservation of the republic. Free access to the Mississippi 
would promote the settlement of the west, which in turn would 
prevent the development of American manufactures, while
3  ^Marks, Independence on Trial, 25-32.
35 Norman K. Risjord, Chesapeake Politics 1781-1800 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 235-238; Patricia 
Watlington, The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky Politics, 1779- 
1792 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1972), 89-93; Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty: 
America's Advantage from Europe's Distress, rev. ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 118-124.
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producing a large market for foreign manufactures.38 In May of 
1786, James Monroe informed Madison of the progress of the 
Jay-Gardoqui negotiations, warning that Jay might agree to the 
closure of the lower Mississippi. Madison replied that it was 
a "dishonorable policy" to sell the "affection of our 
ultramontane brethren" in a treaty with a nation, "whose 
government religion & manners unfit them, of all the nations 
in Christiandom for a coalition with this country.”37 Monroe 
had worse news in August. "It is manifest here that Jay & his 
party in Congress are determin'd to pursue this business as 
far as possible," Monroe wrote, "either as the means of 
throwing the western people & territory without the Govt, of 
the U.S. and keeping the weight of population & govt, here, or 
dismembering the govt, itself, for the purpose of a separate 
confederacy."38 In response to the negotiations, Madison 
submitted a resolution to the House of Delegates, claiming a 
natural right to the Mississippi and calling on the Virginia 
delegates in Congress to reject any attempt to surrender it. 
Madison returned to the Continental Congress in January 1787 
and on April 18 proposed that negotiations with Spain be moved
36 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 20, 1784, in PJM, 
8:107.
37 James Monroe to James Madison, May 31, 1786; James 
Madison to James Monroe, June 21, 1786 (partially in code), 
ibid., 9:68-69, 82.
38 James Monroe to James Madison, Aug. 14, 1786, ibid., 
9:104.
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to Madrid and entrusted to Thomas Jefferson.39
The Mississippi question led Madison to rethink the 
nature of the union. On March 20, 1785, Madison wrote a letter 
to the Marquis de Lafayette concerning the Mississippi which 
reveals Madison's thinking on the problem, and stands at the 
beginning of a line of argument he would complete in 
Federalist #10. As usual, Madison asserted a natural right to 
the Mississippi. "If the United States were to become parties 
to the occlusion of the Mississippi they would be guilty of 
treason against the very laws under which they obtained and 
hold their national existence." Furthermore, Spain had its 
policy backward. If Spain wanted peace, it should allow the 
Americans to cultivate their lands and use the Mississippi. 
Otherwise, the Americans who would have gone west would go to 
sea, where they could do Spain the most harm. "As these 
[settlements] become extended the members of the Confederacy 
must be multiplied, and along with them the wills which are to 
drive the machine. And as the wills multiply so will chances 
against a dangerous union of them," Madison explained. "We 
experience every day the difficulty of drawing thirteen states 
into the same plans. Let the number be doubled & so will the 
difficulty. In the multiplicity of our Counsellors, Spain may 
be told, lies her security," Madison wrote, no doubt thinking
39 Resolution Reaffirming American Rights to Navigate the 
Mississippi, Nov. 29, 1786; Resolution to Transfer 
Negotiations with Spain to Madrid, April 18, 1787, ibid,, 
9:182-183, 388.
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of Kentucky as he did.40 Here is an early indication of 
Madison's thinking on faction. "Extending the sphere," that 
is, increasing the number of interests in society, was of no 
use unless the government was capable of absorbing the 
extension. If such competence was the test of republican 
government, it was a test the confederation was failing.4* 
Whereas Adams's writings on the failure of the 1780s 
turned on the virtue of the people as reflected in the state 
governments, Madison's turned on the power of the states 
relative to the union. The American people, in Madison's view, 
had sufficient yeoman virtue (if not classical virtue) to 
sustain the republic. The weakness of the government 
threatened to force the United States prematurely into large- 
scale domestic shipping and manufactures. The problems of the 
United States could only be saved by a stronger national 
government. State solutions, such as the Port Bill, were no 
longer sufficient, if they ever were. "The states are every 
day giving proofs that separate regulations are more likely to 
set them by the ears than to attain the common object," 
Madison wrote to Jefferson. "When Massts. set on foot a 
retaliation of the policy of G.B. Connecticut declared her
40 James Madison to the Marquis de Lafayette, March 20, 
1785, ibid., 8:251-252.
41 Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interests: 
Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 60-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
ports free."4^
For answers, Madison looked to history. Between April and 
June of 1786, Madison composed his "Notes on Ancient and 
Modem Confederacies," intended for his private use. After 
surveying the history of confederacies, Madison came to one 
inescapable conclusion —  all confederacies fail. Furthermore, 
the failure of a confederation was often the result of a 
failure in diplomacy. The Achaean League fell when "the Romans 
seduced the members of the League by representing that it 
violated their sovereignty."43 Madison devoted the longest 
section to a discussion of the United Netherlands, which 
seemed to offer the most lessons for the United States. The 
Netherlands' problems included a jealousy among the provinces 
and an extreme difficulty in getting anything accomplished. 
The United States had experienced both. Madison also noted 
that "Grotius has sd. that the hatred for his Countrymen agst 
the H. of Austria kept them being destroyed by the vices of 
their Constitution." Madison no doubt was thinking that war 
with Great Britain had overshadowed the defects of the 
Articles of Confederation. Peace had made those defects all 
the more obvious.44
Madison attended the Annapolis Convention in September
42 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 18, 1786, in 
PJM, 8:502.
43 "Notes on Ancient and Modem Confederacies," April-June, 
1786, ibid., 9:8.
44 Ibid., 9:16-17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
1786, one of only twelve delegates to appear. The convention 
only issued a call for another convention to meet at 
Philadelphia in May 1787, which the Virginia legislature 
unanimously approved.45 Despite this small progress toward 
finding a solution, the union seemed closer to collapse. "We 
hear that great commotions are prevailing in Massts." James 
Madison informed his father. Shays's Rebellion did not 
suddenly convince anyone that the confederation was in 
trouble, but to Madison and other nationalists it was a symbol 
of all that had gone wrong.45 Madison's mood seemed to worsen 
as the Philadelphia convention drew nearer. "Indeed the 
present System neither has nor deserves advocates; and if some 
strong props are not applied will quickly tumble to the 
ground," Madison complained to Edmund Pendleton. "The bulk of 
the people will probably prefer the lesser evil of a partition 
of the Union into three or more practicable and energetic 
Governments," Madison continued.47
However, partitioning the union would only invite foreign 
interference and endanger republicanism. For Madison, the only 
acceptable solution was to create a balanced national
45 Ketcham, JM, 185; James Madison to George Washington,
Nov. 8, 1786, in PJM, 9:166.
45 James Madison to James Madison, Sr., Nov. 1, 1786, in 
PJM, 9:154; David P. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making 
of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1980), 123.
47 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Feb. 24, 1787, in PJM, 
9:294-295.
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government. Madison explained to Washington that the 
government under the confederation lacked executive and 
judiciary branches, and the power to protect the states 
against each other or against internal enemies.48 Unlike 
Adams, Madison focused on the balance of power between the 
states and the central government. "I hold it for a 
fundamental point that an individual independence of the 
States, is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of an 
aggregate sovereignty," Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph. "I 
think at the same time that a consolidation of the States into 
one simple republic is not less unattainable than it would be 
inexpedient."48 Madison suggested two remedies to Jefferson, 
proportional representation and a veto over state laws. Both 
would free the central government from dependence on the 
states, and prevent the states from "thwarting and molesting 
each other, and even from oppressing the minority within 
themselves by paper money and other unrighteous measures which 
favor the interest of the majority."50
In April 1787, Madison prepared a memorandum entitled,
48 James Madison to George Washington, April 16, 1787, 
ibid., 9:383-385.
48 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787, ibid., 
9:369.
50 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 19, 1787, in 
ibid, 9:318-319; Charles F. Hobson argues that the negative 
on state laws was central to Madison's solution to the 
republican crisis. "The Negative on State Laws: James 
Madison, the Constitution and the Crisis of Republican 
Government," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 36 
no. 2 (April 1979), 218, 221-223.
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"The vices of the Political System of the United States," 
which he used in his speeches and copied for other members of 
the Constitutional Convention. Madison blamed most of the 
United States problems on the unchecked power of the states. 
The states had prevented the United States from meeting its 
obligations by failing to meet their tax quotas, and by 
passing laws preventing the execution of the peace treaty of 
1783. The states had trampled on the rights of their own 
citizens and of each other.51 People and elected officials 
acted out of private interest rather than the public good. 
Madison recognized that a division into various interest 
groups was inevitable and could not be stopped by religious or 
personal influence.52 The only solution was to increase the 
number of interests that the central government acted upon, or 
rather to increase the scope of the government to contain the 
interests that already existed. "If an enlargement of the 
sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it 
is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is 
less predominant in this case with the majority," Madison 
wrote, "but because a common interest or passion is less apt 
to be felt and the requisite combinations become less easy to 
be formed by a great than a small number. The Society becomes 
broken into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits, of
51 "Vices of the Political System of the United States," 
April-June, 1787, in PJM, 9:348-355.
52 Ibid., 9:353-355.
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passions, which check each other."53 Like Adams, Madison 
seemed willing to substitute a balance for virtue. Madison was 
no doubt influenced by David Hume's 1752 essay, "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth." Hume also recognized the inevitability 
of faction and opposing interest, and proposed that the people 
be divided into as many smaller divisions as possible. 
However, Madison's and Hume's solutions were slightly 
different. Hume hoped to reorganize Parliament for more equal 
representation, but he could assume the existence of a 
national government. Madison had to create one.54
Madison arrived in Philadelphia on May 3, and after 
nearly two weeks of anxious waiting, the Constitutional 
Convention met in Independence Hall on May 14. In his 
"Character Sketches" Georgia delegate William Pierce wrote 
that "in the management of every great question," Madison, 
"took the lead in the Convention, and tho' he cannot be called 
an Orator he is a most agreeable, eloquent, and convincing 
Speaker."55 Madison set the convention's agenda from the 
beginning. He drew up a set of proposals that became the
53 Ibid., 356-357.
54 Ketcham, JM, 186-187; David Hume, "The Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth," [1752], in David Hume, Moral and Political 
Philosophy. Henry D. Aiken, ed. (New York: Hafner Publishing 
Company, 1948), 380-383. Douglass Adair was the first to 
point out the connection between Hume and Federalist #10.
See "'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David 
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," in Fame and 
the Founding Fathers, 93-106.
55 Ketcham, JM, 190-192; William Pierce, "Character 
Sketches," in Farrand, Records, 3:94.
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Virginia Plan, which Edmund Randolph submitted to the 
convention on May 29. The fifteen-point plan maintained the 
fiction that the delegates intended to have the Articles of 
Confederation "corrected & enlarged," and then moved on to 
propose an entirely new government. The Virginia Plan called 
for a bicameral legislature, with the lower house elected by 
the people and the upper house by the lower house, and each 
branch elected in proportion to each state's population. Each 
branch could originate legislation and veto state laws. The 
national legislature would choose an executive who would act 
with a national judiciary as a council of revision. The new 
government would provide for the admission of new states and 
guarantee republican government in each state. The plan 
provided for amendments, required an oath of loyalty to the 
union, and would be submitted to the states for ratification. 
Until the new government took effect, the Continental Congress 
would continue to function as the central government.56
For a while, the convention seemed to fall in with 
Madison's hopes. On May 30 the Committee of the Whole voted to 
postpone discussion of the Virginia Plan in order to consider 
the nature of the union, and whether a federal union or a 
national government was needed. To Madison this issue was old
56 "Virginia Plan," in PJM, 10:15-17; Madison's notes for 
May 29 in Farrand, Records, 1:18-23; Forrest McDonald has 
argued that Madison's reputation as an influential member of 
the Convention is inflated. While the final Constitution did 
bear little resemblance to the Virginia Plan, much of the 
debate was essentially a reaction to the Virginia Plan. 
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 205-209.
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ground, and he argued that a national government was needed to 
prevent dependence on the states.57 The next day the 
convention took up Randolph's proposal for a bicameral 
legislature, with the lower house elected by the people. 
Madison argued that "the great fabric to be raised would be 
more stable and durable if it should rest on the solid 
foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand 
merely on the pillars of the Legislatures." Both measures 
passed.5® Within two weeks, Madison set the Convention on a 
path to create a national government. Despite two later 
defeats for Madison, the vote against the negative on state 
laws (June 8) and the vote for representation by state in the 
Senate (July 16), the debate was largely over the powers of a 
national government, rather than over a choice between a 
national government and a loose confederation.59
The foreign policy questions of the convention centered 
on the power to make war and the power to regulate commerce 
and reflected the Opposition Whig fear that war augmented 
executive power. The debate over war powers directly involved 
the relationship between the executive and the legislature. On 
June 1 the Committee of the whole began discussion of the
57 Madison's notes, May 30, in Farrand, Records, 1:33, 37.
58 Madison's notes, May 31; journal, May 31, ibid., 1:49-50, 
47-48.
59 Madison's notes, June 8; journal, July 16, ibid., 1:164- 
168, 2:13; Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of 
the united States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913), 
96-105.
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composition and powers of the executive. Charles Pinckey of 
South Carolina "was for a vigorous Executive," but feared that 
its powers "might extend to peace & war &c which would render 
the Executive a Monarchy." Roger Sherman of Connecticut added 
that he "considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more 
than an instrument for carrying the will of the Legislature 
into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed 
by and accountable to the Legislature only."60 Madison, along 
with James Wilson of Pennsylvania, argued that the executive 
powers "do not include the Rights of war & peace &c."61 On 
June 4, the convention approved a single executive with a 
partial veto over legislation. The next day the convention 
rejected the idea of legislative appointment.62
Madison, like many Americans of the revolutionary era 
shared the Opposition Whig fear of executive power, which 
influenced his thinking on the war powers of the new 
government. "In time of actual war, the great discretionary 
powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate," 
Madison told the convention on June 29. "Constant apprehension 
of War has the same tendency to render the head too large for 
the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown 
Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty." 
Madison concluded with the classic Whig thesis, that the
60 Madison's notes, June 1, in Farrand, Records, 1:64-65.
6  ^Rufus King's notes, June 1, ibid., 1:70.
62 Journal, June 4-5, ibid., 1:93-94, 116.
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"means of defence agst. foreign danger have always been the 
instruments of tyranny at home."63 In Great Britain, the power 
to make war, that is, to decide on war and to wage it, rested 
with the king, although Parliament gained greater influence 
over foreign policy during the eighteenth century. On August 
17, Madison and Gerry divided the two aspects of the war 
power, giving Congress the decision, in the power to declare 
war and giving the executive the power to repel sudden 
attacks. The motion passed 7-2.64
The debate over commercial regulations threatened to stir 
up sectional conflict. Madison opposed a prohibition on export 
duties, arguing that one day they might be necessary to raise 
revenue or to force "equitable regulations from other 
nations." However, a solid bloc of southern states and two 
shipping states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, voted to 
prohibit export duties.66 The debates also developed how the 
new government could contain sectional disputes. General 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina captured the
spirit of mutual concessions best when he told the convention
that it was not in the southern interest to have any 
regulation of commerce, but northern concessions on the slave 
trade demanded a generous response. The rich but weak southern 
states needed the support of the northern, and to get it,
63 Madison's notes, June 29, ibid., 1:465.
64 Madison's notes, Aug. 17, ibid., 2:318-319.
66 Madison's notes, Aug. 21, ibid., 2:361-364.
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Pinckney was willing to give Congress complete control of 
commercial policy.66 Madison also noted that a navigation act 
would harm the South by raising shipping rates, but 
congressional power to regulate commerce would remove a major 
source of interstate conflict.67 In a sense, the debate over 
commercial regulation showed how each section was willing to 
use the other. The South was willing to allow national 
commercial regulation as long as population growth seemed to 
favor the South. The North was willing to protect staple 
exports for the possibility of protecting shipping and 
manufacturing. The point of the new government was that it 
could protect the interests of all sections.68
The convention spent the last few weeks on the exact 
wording of the Constitution, which the convention unanimously 
approved on September 17.68 Madison intended the Constitution 
to solve several problems. First, it would create a government 
that would protect national interests. Second, it could 
achieve the two foreign policy goals Madison believed vital to 
the survival of republican government. The constitution would 
form a government strong enough to keep open the Mississippi 
thereby keeping the West in the union, preventing European 
interference in American politics, and preserving a republican
66 Madison's notes, Aug. 29, Ibid., 2:449-450.
67 Madison's notes, Aug. 29, ibid., 2:451-452.
68 Matson and Onuf, Union of Interests, 119.
68 Journal, Sept. 17, in Farrand, Records, 2:641.
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political economy. The new government could also more fully 
regulate commerce and pass laws designed to force Great 
Britain into a more equitable trade relationship. By 
preserving an outlet for western products through the
Mississippi, and creating a freer trade system on the
Atlantic, the United States could preserve and exploit its 
agriculture as a diplomatic tool. Therefore, Madison believed 
that the Constitution prevented the United States from being 
driven into domestic manufactures. It would create a
government that would protect sectional as well as national 
interests.70 Moreover, Madison helped create what Gordon Wood 
calls, "a new and original sort of republican government," one 
that did not require virtue for its success.7  ^ However, 
Madison's defeats on state representation in Congress and the 
negative on state laws made him pessimistic. "I hazard an 
opinion that the plan should it be adopted will neither 
effectively answer its national objects nor prevent the local 
mischiefs which every where excite disgusts agst. the state 
governments," Madison wrote to Jefferson.72
Madison further explained his views on the new
Constitution in a letter to Thomas Jefferson on October 24,
70 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 121-124, 131-134; Forrest 
McDonald correctly points out that Madison's nationalism was 
always tempered by his concern for Virginia's interests, 
Novus Ordo Seclorum, 204-205.
7* Wood, Creation, 475.
72 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Sept. 6, 1787 (partly 
in code), in PJM, 10:163-164.
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1787. Early on, the convention abandoned the idea of a 
confederation and "embraced the alternative of a Government 
which instead of operating on the States, should operate 
without their intervention on the individuals composing them." 
The convention had four goals; to provide for an executive and 
a stable legislature, to draw a line between federal and state 
power, to safeguard sectional interests, and to settle 
disputes between the large and small states.73 The delineation 
of federal and state power was the most difficult. The only 
solution was a federal negative on state laws. "Without such 
a check in the whole over the parts, our system involves the 
evil of imperia in imperio," Madison argued. "If a compleat 
supremacy some where is not necessary in every Society, a 
controuling power at least is so."74 The negative was also 
necessary for the protection of individual rights. For proof, 
Madison turned to his now-familiar analysis of faction. All 
civilized societies developed various interests in religion, 
politics and economics. In such a state, simple majority rule 
would easily become tyranny. Such an "extended sphere" 
required a more complex government that could prevent 
interests from combining to oppress the minority.75 "Divide et
73 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid., 
10:207-208.
74 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid., 
10:209.
75 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid., 
10:212-214.
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imperia, the reprobated axiom of tyranny," Madison argued, "is 
under certain qualifications, the only policy by which a 
republic can be administered on just principles.”76 Madison 
had never based his republicanism on a classical model of 
citizenship. In 1787 he also reversed the classical idea that 
a republic had to be small and homogeneous. Madison, like 
Adams, reached the conclusion that balance could be 
substituted for classical virtue as the theoretical basis for 
the American republic.
Whatever its flaws, Madison believed the Constitution was 
"the best that could be obtained from the jarring interests of 
States, and the miscellaneous opinions of Politicians."77 "It 
is not necessary that the former should be perfect," Madison 
wrote in Federalist #38, comparing the proposed new government 
to the old, "it is sufficient that the latter is more 
imperfect."78 Ratification was by no means assured, and 
Madison's own early tally showed New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey and Maryland for ratification, with 
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and Virginia badly split.78 Madison
76 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid., 
10:215.
77 James Madison to Philip Mazzei, Oct. 8, 1788, ibid., 
11:278.
78 James Madison, Federalist #38, in Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist. Jacob E. Cooke, 
ed. (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961),
246.
79 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, in PJM, 
10:216-217.
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helped gain ratification in two ways; as coauthor of The 
Federalist and as a member of the Virginia ratifying 
convention. In October of 1787, Madison met with Alexander 
Hamilton and John Jay to collaborate on The Federalist, 
written under the pseudonym "Publius." Jay fell ill in 
November, leaving Hamilton and Madison to write most of the 
essays. The result, as Irving Brant put it, was to "admit a 
larger proportion of Madison's philosophy into a commentary 
destined to become a political guidebook."88
Madison's first effort, Federalist #10, appeared on 
November 22, 1787. It is generally seen as the most important 
among the essays, and is the most prone to conflicting 
interpretations. William Appleman Williams, for example, has 
argued that Madison used the term "extend the sphere," in the 
literal sense of physical expansion, and that continental 
expansion was the only way to preserve republican 
government.8* Portraying Federalist #10 as a forward-looking 
document takes it out of its political context. Federalist #10 
can be read as a summation of the influence of the Mississippi 
question on Madison's thinking, specifically forcing Madison 
to explain how an extended republic would work. It was a 
defense of past expansion rather than a call for future
80 Brant, JM, 3:171; Ketcham, JM, 239.
81 William Appleman Williams, "The Age of Mercantilism: An 
Interpretation of the American Political Economy, 1763- 
1828," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 15 no. 4 
(October 1958), 424-426.
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expansion.
Madison began with what had become his standard analysis 
of faction. "By a faction I understand a number of citizens 
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, 
who are united and activated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of the other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community," Madison explained.82 Madison learned from the 
Scottish common sense school that factionalism was an 
inevitable and unchanging feature of human behavior. Factions 
sprang from any number of causes, including "a zeal for 
different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government 
and many other points, as well of speculation as of 
practice."82 "But the most common and durable source of 
factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of 
property," Madison wrote, guaranteeing that civilized society 
contained a multitude of different interests. "The regulation 
of these various and interfering interests forms the principle 
task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party 
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operation of the
82 Federalist #10, Nov. 22, 1787, in The Federalist, 57.
82 Federalist #10, ibid., 58-59; Douglass Adair "'That 
Politics May be Reduced to a Science:' David Hume, James 
Madison and the Tenth Federalist," in Fame and the Founding
Fathers, 95-97; Gordon S. Wood, "Interests and 
Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution," in 
Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein and Edward C. Carter II, eds. 
Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and 
American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1987), 71-74.
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Government."84
Next, Madison moved on to the advantage of a republic 
over a democracy. Arguing against Montesquieu's theory that a 
republic could exist only in a small territory, Madison wrote 
that the chief advantage of a republic was "the greater number 
of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the 
latter may be extended.1*®5 in a simple democracy, which would 
necessarily be a smaller society, it would be easier to form 
a majority that could control the government. "Extend the 
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and 
interests," Madison wrote, "you make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of the other citizens."®5 "The influence of factious 
leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but 
they will be unable to spread a general conflagration through 
the other States" Madison concluded, "a religious sect, may 
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the 
Confederacy, but the variety of sects dispersed over the 
entire face of it, must secure the national Councils against 
any danger from that source."87 The threats of division that 
accompanied the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations forced Madison to
84 Federalist #10, in The Federalist, 59.
85 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 1:120; Federalist #10, 
in The Federalist, 62.
86 Federalist #10, ibid., 63-64.
87 Federalist #10, ibid., 64-65.
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explain how a republic could exist over a territory that some 
already considered too large. The only way was to split the 
thirteen state interests into a myriad of individual interests 
by creating a government that acted directly on those 
individual interests, and contained them within a balanced 
structure.
Two later Federalist essays shed further light on 
Madison's thinking in Federalist #10. Madison returned to the 
size of the republic in Federalist #14, and argued that the 
natural limit of the republic was the furthest distance a 
representative could travel. The thirteen original states 
clearly fell within those limits. The average distance from 
the Atlantic to the Mississippi was 750 miles which still fell 
within the natural boundaries of a republic.88 Madison 
revisited the problem of faction in Federalist #51, 
specifically addressing the issue of religious freedom. 
Madison compared political to religious liberty, arguing that 
"the degree of security in both cases will depend on the 
number of interests and sects." The number of interests and 
sects, in turn, "may be presumed to depend on the extent of 
country and number of people comprehended under the same 
government.”89 Although Madison wrote that economic factions 
were the most "common and durable," it seems clear that he 
regarded political and religious conflicts as the more
88 Federalist #14, Nov. 30, 1787, ibid., 85-86.
89 Federalist #51, Feb. 6, 1788, ibid., 351-352
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immediately dangerous, as shown in the Virginia politics of 
the 1780s. Madison certainly did not rule out future 
expansion. However, Federalist #10 did not demand it. Madison 
wrote primarily to defend expansion that had already taken 
place.90
Madison devoted much of his effort to explaining the two 
chief balances of the Constitution —  between the branches of 
government and the between the states and the central 
government. "The novelty of the undertaking immediately 
strikes us," Madison wrote in Federalist #37.9  ^ "Experience 
has instructed us that no skill in the science of Government 
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient 
certainty its three great provinces, the Legislative, 
Executive and Judiciary," Madison wrote, "or even the 
privileges, and powers of the different Legislative branches." 
The "interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller states" 
only complicated matters.92 Part of the problem was that in 
republics, the lower house of the legislature tended to 
dominate affairs, which Madison noted in Federalist #48 and 
Federalist #49.93 Madison defended an independent, single 
executive and a bicameral legislature on these grounds. "In
90 Paul Rahe advances a similar argument in Republics 
Ancient and Modern, 586-591.
91 Federalist #37, Jan. 11, 1788, in The Federalist, 233.
92 Federalist #37, ibid., 235, 237.
93 Federalist #48, Feb. 1, 1788 and Federalist #49, Feb. 2, 
1788, ibid., 333-334, 341.
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republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, 
predominates,” Madison wrote in Federalist #51. "The remedy 
for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into 
different branches; and to render them by different elections, 
and different principles of action." The relative "weakness of 
the executive may require on the other hand, that it be 
fortified. "94
The balance between the states and the central government 
was more difficult, perhaps because Madison himself was slow 
in accepting any state role in the central government.95 
Madison used the first half of Federalist #39 to argue that 
the Constitution did form a republican government, and the 
second half to outline its national and federal aspects. "But 
if the Government be national with regard to the operation of 
its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it 
in relation to the extent of its powers," Madison argued. "The 
proposed Constitution therefore is in strictness neither a 
national nor a federal constitution, but a composition of 
both."9® Madison used Federalist #40 to ease the shock of the 
new government, arguing that the principles of the 
Constitution were merely "the expansion of principles which
94 Federalist #51, ibid., 350.
95 Lance Banning, "The Practicable Sphere of a Republic: 
James Madison, the Constitutional Convention, and the 
Emergence of Revolutionary Federalism," in Beeman, et al., 
eds. Beyond Confederation, 186-187.
96 Federalist #39, Jan. 16, 1788, in The Federalist, 256- 
257.
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are found in the Articles of Confederation,” and that the new 
government was, as stated in the Virginia Plan, an 
"enlargement" of the old.97 Madison hoped to allay fears of 
the central government. "The powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined," 
Madison wrote in Federalist #45. "Those which are to remain in 
the State Governments are numerous and indefinite."9® 
Responding to accusations that the Constitution would wipe out 
the state governments, Madison wrote in Federalist #46 that 
the state and federal governments were merely "different 
agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different 
powers and designated for different purposes."99
Madison did not focus on the foreign policy implications 
of the Constitution in The Federalist, but did agree with John 
Jay that the new government would solve the nation's 
diplomatic problems. Madison touched on the subject, and his 
writings give an insight to his thinking on future diplomatic 
problems. Federalist #41 is the key to Madison's conception of 
a republican foreign policy. Like the English Opposition 
writers, Madison believed a large peacetime military 
establishment was incompatible with liberty at home. Madison 
wrote that "the liberties of Rome proved the first victim of 
her military triumphs, and that the liberties of Europe, as
97 Federalist #40, Jan. 18, 1788, ibid., 262-263.
98 Federalist #45, Jan. 26, 1788, ibid., 313.
99 Federalist #46, Jan. 29, 1788, ibid., 315.
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far as they ever existed, have with few exceptions been the 
price of her military establishments."^-00 Madison believed 
that the proper form of government, such as the Constitution 
provided, combined with a physical separation from Europe 
provided all the protection necessary against foreign 
invasion, and eliminated the need for a large military. 
"America united with a handful of troops, or without a single 
soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign 
ambition, than America disunited, with an hundred thousand 
veterans ready for combat," Madison wrote. Furthermore, the 
union "will be the only source of our maritime strength. "*■01 
Madison's public enthusiasm for a navy fluctuated 
depending on his audience. As he wrote The Federalist to sway 
New York, he played up the naval angle more than usual. In 
addition, Madison doubtless realized that within a few days 
his essay would appear in the Boston newspapers, where the 
Massachusetts convention was at that moment considering 
ratification.*02 The bedrock of Madison's diplomacy was not a 
navy, but a strong union that would prevent foreign powers 
from playing one state off another, and effectively regulate 
commerce. That way, the United States could avoid the fate of 
continental Europe.
In considering the powers of the House of
100 Federalist #41, Jan. 18, 1788, ibid., 271.
101 Federalist #41, ibid., 271-272, 274-275.
102 Federalist #41, ibid., 275.
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Representatives, Madison wrote in Federalist #53 that, 
although the House did not directly participate in foreign 
negotiations, ''from the necessary connection between the 
several branches of public affairs, those particular branches 
will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of 
legislation, and will sometimes demand particular legislative 
sanction and c o o p e r a t i o n . " * ^  Madison did not elaborate on 
this point, but Madison's actions in the 1790s suggest that 
the "ordinary course of legislation" most likely included 
commercial regulations and war.
There was still the matter of Virginia's ratification. 
Madison returned to Virginia from Philadelphia in March 1788 
and was promptly chosen to represent Virginia in the ratifying 
convention. He arrived in Richmond on June 2.*04 Patrick Henry 
led the antifederalist assault, attacking the Constitution, in 
an apocalyptic tone, for giving up Virginia's power and 
security, and for abandoning a government that had led the 
United States to independence.105 Madison responded that 
Virginia's liberty was safe under the Constitution and that a 
strong central government was the defense against foreign
103 Federalist #53, ibid., 364.
104 Ketcham, JM, 250-253.
105 Patrick Henry, speech of June 5, 1788, in John P. 
Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saledino, eds. The Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Virginia, 3 
vols. (Madisons State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1988- 
1993), 2:593.
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d a n g e r . 6 After three weeks of debate, Virginia approved the 
Constitution on June 25, 1788, becoming the tenth state to do 
so.107
Students of political thought have noted that John Adams 
and James Madison shared a commitment to balanced 
government.I®® They also shared at least a grudging acceptance 
of the modern world. These similarities, however, mask a large 
gap between the two. Both were prepared to abandon the need 
for classical martial virtue as the theoretical basis of the 
republic. However, Madison did cling to the belief that 
republican foreign policy could manipulate the conduct of 
other nations, whereas Adams did not. The Constitution was for 
Madison an instrument designed to harness the commercial power 
he believed would shield the republic from European politics 
and secure diplomatic goals without recourse to a military. 
Madison did not share Adams's vision of a republican 
realpolitik; instead, Madison embraced a commercial diplomacy 
that represented a hybrid of Opposition fear of military power 
with his vision of a republican political economy.
James Madison, speech of June 9, 1788, in PJM, 11:82.
107 Ketcham, JM, 263-264.
108 Both Charles Beard and Robert Brown credit Adams and 
Madison jointly for the ideas behind the Constitution. 
Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1913), 314; Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the 
Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution" (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1956), 189.
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CHAPTER 6: ENGINES OF THE EXECUTIVE
"The Country persuasion was an ideology of suspicion and 
resistance, tough and serviceable for purposes of revolution, 
though less of an asset when it came to nation-building," 
Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick wrote in The Age of 
Federalism. James Madison disagreed, believing that English 
Opposition thought was the key to American nation-building and 
its outward expression, the making of foreign policy.1 Unlike 
John Adams, James Madison saw an independent legislature as 
the prime mover in foreign affairs. Madison did not trust the 
executive with sole control over the war power, concluding 
that such a grant of power was too similar to monarchical 
practice.^ Madison interpreted the events of the 1790s within 
the framework of English Opposition thought. Madison believed 
that republicanism was under assault from two fronts; at home, 
from Alexander Hamilton's fiscal plans, which threatened to 
undermine agrarianism and a republican political economy, and 
abroad, from a Federalist diplomacy controlled by the
1 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 24.
2 Ketcham, Presidents Above Party, 116-119. Ketcham argues 
that Madison also accepted the "Patriot King" as the model 
for the executive. However, Madison hoped for an independent 
president that would carry out rather than initiate policy.
20^
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executive that favored British monarchy over French 
republicanism.
As a member of the House of Representatives, Madison 
immediately planned to use the new government to raise a 
public revenue and free American trade from British 
domination. He introduced a proposal on April 8, 1789, to
revive the impost of April 18, 1783. He proposed higher duties 
on such items as rum, wine, molasses, sugar, coffee and tea 
and called for staggered duties on tonnage. Madison proposed 
that American-built and owned ships pay the lowest tonnage 
duties, followed by ships from nations in a commercial treaty 
with the United States (specifically French ships). Ships from 
other nations (especially Great Britain) would pay the highest 
duties.3 Madison had learned from the French Physiocrats and 
the Scottish Common Sense school to oppose commercial 
restrictions in principle, telling the House of 
Representatives that, "if industry and labor are left to take 
their own course they will be directed to those objects which 
are the most productive, and this is a more certain and direct 
manner than the wisdom of the most enlightened legislature 
could point out.” However, American ships would disappear from 
the sea if the United States kept its ports open while other 
nations maintained closed systems.4 Furthermore, the United
3 Ketcham, JM, 280-282; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of 
Federalism, 69-74; Speech of April 8, 1789, in PJM, 12:65- 
66.
4 Speech of April 9, 1789, in PJM, 12:71-72.
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States could not afford free trade as long as American trade 
to foreign ports was "restrained to an artificial channel."6
Madison's plan for commercial discrimination and his 
entire system of republican diplomacy through the War of 1812, 
rested on his almost unshakable faith in the power of American 
commerce, specifically the export of agricultural goods, to 
break down the British mercantile system. Economic power as 
tool of diplomacy avoided the use of a military and would 
prevent the means of diplomacy from turning against domestic 
liberty. "It would be proper to consider the means of 
encouraging the great staple of America, I mean agriculture," 
Madison told the House of Representatives on April 9, 1789, 
"other nations can and do rival us [in manufactures] but we 
may be said to have a monopoly in agriculture."6 "The produce 
of this country is more necessary to the rest of the world 
than that of other countries is to America," Madison added on 
April 25.7 Great Britain needed the United States as an export 
market; and the British West Indies were virtual economic 
hostages to America. "The supplies of the United States are 
necessary to their existence, and their market to the value of 
her islands," Madison explained to Jefferson. Trade also gave 
the united States a military advantage. "In time of war, which
5 Speech of April 21, 1789, ibid., 12:100.
6 Speech of April 9, 1789, ibid., 12:71; Rahe, Republics 
Ancient and Modern, 733.
7 Speech of April 25, 1789, in PJM, 12:112.
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is generally decided in the West Indies, friendly offices not 
violating the duties of neutrality," Madison continued, "might 
effectually turn the scale in favor of an adversary."® "As to 
the British West-Indies, it had been fully shewn, that they 
could neither prosper nor subsist without the market of the 
United States," Madison argued a year later, "they were fed 
from our granaries."®
Madison's main goal was to break the British stranglehold 
on American trade by encouraging other nations to compete to 
buy American exports and sell the United States their 
manufactured goods and shipping services. Commercial 
discrimination would preserve republicanism by preventing the 
development of domestic manufacturing industries and a large- 
scale shipping industry existing independently of agricultural 
production. Also, commercial diplomacy would secure American 
diplomatic goals without war, which Madison believed was 
republicanism's greatest enemy.Unfortunately for Madison, 
the New England congressmen opposed Madison's proposals, 
forcing Madison to shift his argument to appease them, 
emphasizing results which he believed New Englanders would
8 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 30, 1789, ibid., 
12:269-270; Combs, Jay Treaty, 78-79.
9 Speech of May 4, 1790, in PJM, 13:218.
10 Drew McCoy argues that Madison, in addition to breaking 
the British hold on American trade, did hope to develop a 
domestic shipping. However, McCoy has ignored Madison's view 
of sailors in "Republican Distribution of Citizens." McCoy, 
Elusive Republic, 137-145.
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favor.11 Madison told the House of Representatives on April 
21, 1789, that his proposals were needed "to form a school for 
seamen, to lay the foundation for a navy."12 "I am a friend to 
the navigation of America, and shall be always ready to go as 
great lengths in favor of that interest as any gentlemen on 
this floor," Madison declared on May 4.13 Speaking on trade 
regulations a year later, Madison argued that if the British 
maintained their trade practices "our own navigation and 
manufactures would in the meantime be encouraged."14
Madison certainly believed that shipping and manufactures 
could increase as a result of commercial discrimination, but 
he left the New Englanders with the false impression that he 
himself favored those ends. Madison hoped and believed that 
Great Britain would alter its navigation system first. 
Throughout the 1780s, Madison argued against encouraging 
manufactures as being incompatible with a republican political 
economy. In his 1792 essay, "Fashion," Madison used the plight 
of Great Britain's shoe buckle manufacturers, left destitute 
by the increased use of laces, as a cautionary tale. "The 
condition of those who receive employment and bread from the 
precarious source of fashion and superfluity, is a lesson to
11 Paul A. Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, 1789- 
1850 (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1983), 
11-17.
12 Speech of April 21, 1789, in PJM, 12:101-102.
13 Speech of May 4, 1789, ibid., 12:126.
14 Speech of June 25, 1790, ibid., 13:256.
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nations as well as individuals," Madison wrote. "In proportion 
as a nation consists of that description of citizens, and 
depends on external commerce, it is dependent on the 
consumption and caprice of other nations." Madison agreed with 
Thomas Paine that food never went out of style.*®
Neither did Madison view shipping as an unquestioned 
good. In his March 3, 1792, National Gazette article,
"Republican Distribution of Citizens," Madison wrote that the 
"life of the husbandman is pre-eminently suited to the comfort 
and happiness of the individual." On the other hand, "the 
condition to which the blessings of life are most denied is 
that of the sailor." "How unfortunate, that in the 
intercourse, by which nations are enlightened and refined, and 
the means of safety extended," Madison continued, "the 
immediate agents should be distinguished by the harshest 
condition of humanity."*® It seems unlikely that Madison would 
have actively supported the expansion of a class he clearly 
believed to be unfit for republican government. Madison saw 
shipping as beneficial only if it were kept subordinate to 
agriculture. He did not seek to create an American shipping 
monopoly or, in contrast to his New England colleagues, 
encourage the carrying trade as a separate endeavor. Madison 
believed that commercial discrimination would promote American
15 "Fashion," March 20, 1792, ibid., 14:258.
*® "Republican Distribution of Citizens," March 3, 1792, 
ibid., 14:245.
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shipping to the point of breaking the British hold on the 
American economy without creating a domestic rival to 
agriculture.17
Madison's diplomacy was realistic in that it rested on an 
accurate assessment of West Indian economics. The United 
States provided 90 percent of the flour and meal consumed in 
the British West Indies, as well as two-thirds of the grain 
and half of the salt meat and dried fish. The United States 
was Great Britain's largest export customer, importing 90 
percent of its manufactured goods from Britain.18 However, 
West Indian economics did not dictate British policy. The 
navigation system was politically popular at home and did no 
economic damage. Furthermore, no other nation produced the 
manufactured goods that Americans wanted. Therefore, 
commercial diplomacy was unable to bend British policy to 
American wishes. "For What Advantage Can they expect to derive 
from a Treaty that they are not already possessed of?" one 
merchant complained to Madison.19
Madison was not the only statesman concerned with public 
finance. As secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton bore
17 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 156-158. McCoy does not mention 
Madison's passage on sailors in his discussion of the 
National Gazette essays.
18 Combs, Jay Treaty, 25-28; Bradford Perkins, The First 
Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), 12-14.
19 Combs, Jay Treaty, 87-89; Thomas Pleasants, Jr. to James 
Madison, July 10, 1790, in PJM, 13:271.
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primary responsibility for putting the nation's fiscal affairs 
in order. Like Madison, Hamilton assumed a high volume of 
trade with Great Britain, but unlike Madison, Hamilton 
believed that restoring public credit was more important than 
forcing trade concessions. Revenue from imports and excise 
taxes could fund the entire national debt. On January 9, 1790, 
Hamilton submitted his Report on Public Credit to Congress. He 
proposed creating a sinking fund that would pay off the $52 
million national debt and allow the assumption of the $25 
million in state debts as part of the national debts, with 
public credit restored, Hamilton hoped to develop American 
fiscal and manufacturing power. On December 14, 1790, he
proposed the creation of the Bank of the United States, which 
would provide a medium of exchange. Finally, on December 5, 
1791, Hamilton submitted his Report on Manufactures, calling 
for protective tariffs and other measures designed to 
encourage the development of American manufacturing.20
To Madison, Hamilton's fiscal plans represented nothing 
short of an attempt to impose a Walpolean system on the United 
States, which in Madison's opinion would inevitably lead to 
corruption and tyranny. In addition, Madison saw a threat to 
Virginia's interests from northern states replacing the pre-
20 Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979), 149, 168-171, 192-194, 
232-236; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 123-131.
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war obstacles Britain posed to managing Virginia's credit.2* 
Madison objected to the assumption of state debts on the
grounds that, using its great holdings in western lands,
Virginia had already paid its public debt and that, by
increasing the national debt, assumption forced Virginia to 
pay toward the other states' debts. More important, Madison 
believed that debt itself was a political evil. "I am of the 
opinion also that the measure is not politic," Madison told 
the House of Representatives on April 22, 1790, "because, if, 
the public debt is a public evil, an assumption of the state 
debts will enormously increase, and, perhaps, perpetuate it." 
Madison moved on to his practical objections later in the same 
speech, noting that Virginians already suffered from a huge 
private debt. "If, sir, the state debts should be assumed, 
Massachusetts will then get rid of her embarrassments," 
Madison argued, "but what would be the situation of
Virginia?"22 Hamilton's supporters dismissed such objections 
as the special pleading of local interests. Madison "is so 
much a Virginian; so afraid that the mob will cry out, crucify 
him; [he] sees Patrick Henry's shade at his bedside every 
night," Fisher Ames of Massachusetts observed.23 Madison was
21 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 152-155; Ketcham, JM, 312-315; 
Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 146-150; Richard R. 
Beeman, The Old Dominion and the New Nation, 1788-1801 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972), 67-71.
22 Speech of April 22, 1790, in PJM, 13:167, 171.
23 Fisher Ames to William Tudor, March 8, 1790, in Fisher 
Ames, Works of Fisher Ames, 2 vols. W.B. Allen, ed.
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willing to trade one local interest for another, and agreed to 
support assumption in exchange for the promise that the 
capital would eventually be moved to a site on the Potomac.24
Madison saw Hamilton's proposals for a bank and for 
American manufactures as additional threats to republicanism. 
"The construction of the constitution which have been 
maintained on the occasion [of introducing the proposal for a 
bank]," Madison argued, "go to the subversion of every power 
whatever in the several States."2"’ "if Congress can do 
whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will 
promote the general welfare, the Government is no longer a 
limited one possessing enumerated powers," Madison complained 
privately to Edmund Pendleton, "but an indefinite one subject 
to particular exceptions."2® Madison attacked Hamilton's 
reports on the bank and manufactures publicly in a series of 
articles in the National Gazette. He criticized Hamilton's 
attempts to increase the power of the central government under 
the topic "Consolidation." "Let it be the patriotic study of 
all to maintain the various authorities established by our 
complicated system, each in its own respective constitutional
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1983), 1:729.
24 Ketcham, JM, 307-310.
25 Speech of Feb. 2, 1791, in PJM, 13:386.
26 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Jan. 21, 1792, ibid., 
14:195.
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sphere," Madison wrote.27 Madison specifically attacked the 
Report on Manufactures under "Fashion," arguing that "the 
mutability of fashion" made manufacturing an unsuitable and 
unrepublican occupation for Americans.28 in "The union. Who 
are its Real Friends?" Madison denounced the Hamiltonian 
program as a whole. "In a word," he wrote, "those are real 
friends to the Union who are friends to that republican policy 
throughout, which is the only cement for the Union of a 
republican people in opposition to a spirit of usurpation and 
monarchy."29 Hamilton's reports, and Madison's opposition to 
them, opened up the divisions that created the first party 
system. "Virginia moves in a solid column, and the discipline 
of party is as severe as the Prussian. Deserters are not 
spared," Fisher Ames observed in January of 1793. "Madison is 
become a desperate party leader, and I am not sure of his 
stopping at any ordinary point of extremity."30
It was the question of foreign policy, shaped by the wars 
of the French Revolution, that locked the division between 
Federalist and Republican parties into place. In the 
beginning, the French Revolution did not affect the United 
States, except as a matter of speculation. Most Americans,
27 "Consolidation," Dec. 3, 1791, ibid., 14:139.
28 "Fashion," March 20, 1792, ibid., 14:259.
29 «The Union. Who are its Real Friends?" March 31, 1792, in 
ibid., 14:275.
30 Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, Jan. 1793, in Ames, Works, 
2:960.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216
including Madison, were sympathetic, hoping France would join 
the United States in the family of republics. The National 
Assembly in turn looked to the United States for guidance. "It 
is impossible to desire better dispositions toward us, than 
prevail in this assembly," Jefferson reported from Paris. "Our 
proceedings have been viewed as a model for them on every 
occasion; and tho' in the heat of debate men are generally 
disposed to contradict every authority urged by their 
opponents, ours has been treated like that of the bible, open 
to explanation but not to question."31
Four years later revolution turned to Anglo-French war, 
which Edmond Genet symbolically brought to the United States. 
American reaction hardened and sharpened the divisions that 
had emerged over Hamilton's reports.32 Hoping to have policy 
set before Genet arrived, Washington asked Hamilton and 
Jefferson for their opinions, and received diametrically 
opposed answers. Hamilton believed that the 1778 treaties died 
with Louis XVI, and recommended that Washington suspend them. 
Jefferson believed the treaties were still in force. 
Washington did not want to repudiate the treaties outright, 
but he did not have any intention of adhering to the articles
31 Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 158-159; Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison, Aug. 28, 1790, in Jefferson, 
Papers, 15:366.
32 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 273-275; Richard 
Buel, Jr. Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American 
Politics, 1789-1815 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1972), 52.
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pledging American defense of the French West Indies. Hamilton 
gained only a tactical advantage when Washington issued the 
Proclamation of Neutrality on April 22, 1793.33 The president 
did not use the word "neutrality" in the brief statement, but 
rather said that "the duty and interest of the United States 
require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt 
and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the 
belligerent powers."34 Jefferson complained that Hamilton 
wanted to nullify the French treaty based on what Jefferson 
called "an ill-understood scrap of Vattel," which appeared to 
support the idea that a change in government voided treaties 
concluded by the previous government. Madison responded that 
"the attempt to shuffle off the Treaty altogether by quibbling 
on Vattel is equally contemptible for the meanness & folly of 
it."35
Citizen Genet did not want American neutrality but 
American help, and he was prepared to use any means to obtain 
it. He landed at Charleston, South Carolina, on April 8 and 
began stirring up crowds and handing out blank military 
commissions. He slowly worked his way north, arriving in
33 McDonald, Hamilton, 265-266; Bowman, Struggle for 
Neutrality, 52-54; Combs, Jay Treaty, 109-113; Alexander 
DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under 
George Washington (Durham, N.C.s Duke University Press, 
1958), 151-153, 205-206.
34 Richardson, Messages and Papers, 1:156.
35 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 28, 1793; James 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 8, 1793, in PJM, 15:10, 13.
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Philadelphia in May, where he continued to encourage pro- 
French sentiment. Worse still, he commissioned Americans as 
French privateers aboard the Petite Democrate. This action 
forced Jefferson to ask for his recall in August.36
Hamilton himself led the Federalist charge against Genet 
and for the Proclamation of Neutrality in the newspapers, 
writing as "Pacificus" in the Gazette of the United States in 
the summer of 1793. In "Pacificus" #1, Hamilton defended the 
president's right to issue the Proclamation of Neutrality on 
the basis of the president's power to negotiate and execute 
treaties. He called the president the "organ of intercourse" 
with foreign nations, and therefore the branch of government 
with the right to interpret treaties.3  ^ In the course of his 
argument, Hamilton gave the president the right of initiative 
in foreign relations. He moved on to the specifics of the 
Franco-American relations in "Pacificus" #2. The military 
treaty of 1778, Hamilton argued, was purely defensive. The 
French decree of November 19, 1792, which called for a general 
revolt against all monarchies and promised French aid, proved 
that the current war was offensive on the French part.3® 
Hamilton discounted the idea that the United States owed 
France military and commercial help out of gratitude. Such a
36 Ammon, Genet Mission, 44-45, 65-73, 86-91, 108-110.
3  ^ "Pacificus" #1, June 29, 1793, in Hamilton, Papers,
15:38, 40, 43.
38 "Pacificus" #2, July 3, 1793, ibid., 15:56, 59-60.
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policy, he argued, "will have a natural tendency to lead us 
aside from our own true interest, and to make us the dupes of 
foreign influence."39
Republicans saw Federalist policy as further evidence of 
monarchism and as the diplomatic consequence of Hamilton' s 
fiscal policies. Jefferson read Hamilton's essays in that 
light and urged Madison to "take up your pen, select the most 
striking heresies, and cut him to pieces in the face of the 
public."40 Madison was a strong opponent of Washington's 
policy toward France, both on constitutional and policy 
grounds.4* He denied the president had the authority to 
declare neutrality without congressional approval. The 
president could not go further than a statement that the 
United States was at war or peace. "The right to decide the 
question [of peace or war] . . .," Madison wrote to Jefferson, 
"seems to me to be essentially & exclusively involved in the 
right of the Legislature, of declaring war in a time of peace, 
and in the P[resident]. & S[enate]. of making peace in time of 
war."4^
Madison responded to Hamilton in the Gazette of the
39 "Pacificus" #3, July 17, 1793, ibid., 15:106.
40 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, July 7, 1793, in PJM, 
15:43; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 209-212.
41 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 8, 1793, in PJM, 
15:13.
4  ^James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 13, 1793, ibid., 
15:29.
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United States, writing as "Helvidius." These essays, although 
somewhat labored and legalistic in tone, come close to being 
a definitive treatise on the republican theory of foreign 
relations. The Constitution left the question of control of 
foreign policy vague. Madison, who clearly favored a prominent 
role for the legislature in the convention and in the 
Federalist, resolved that question in favor of the 
legislature. As Madison pointed out in Federalist #41, the 
United States was physically removed from European politics. 
Therefore, the president's power to repel sudden attacks would 
not figure into the power to conduct foreign policy. He sought 
to reverse the British formula of diplomatic initiative. In 
Great Britain, the war power belonged to the king. Parliament 
only entered the discussion at the end of the process, voting 
up or down, just in the sense of expressing public opinion on 
policy decisions that were already made. Madison placed the 
power to decide on war with Congress and then expanded the war 
power to include all matters that could affect the decision 
between war and peace, that is, every aspect of foreign 
policy. Madison's formulation placed Congress at the beginning 
of the policy process, reducing the president's role to 
administration rather than formation of policy. Madison also 
linked legislative control to a reliance on international 
law.43 Madison had not expected the rise of the executive. "I
43 Lang, Foreign Policy, 133-135; Edward Keynes, Undeclared 
War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 33; Samuel
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see, and politically feel that will be the weak branch of the 
Government,” Madison wrote in 1789. Events had since proven 
otherwise.44
In his first "Helvidius" essay, Madison argued that a 
declaration of war was a law, and as such was the province of 
the legislature. "It is," Madison wrote, "one of the most 
deliberative acts that can be performed, and when performed, 
has the effect of repealling all the laws operating in a state 
of peace, so far as they are inconsistent with a state of 
war." According to the Constitution, Madison continued, this 
power rested with Congress. Madison discounted the 
presidential power over the military as having no bearing on 
the questions of foreign policy. "Those who are to conduct a 
war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, 
whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or 
concluded. ”45 In his second essay, Madison followed this theme 
to its logical conclusion. Not only did Congress have the 
right to declare war, but also "to judge the causes of war," 
which implied that Congress, and not the president, should 
lead in making foreign policy. "The executive has no other 
discretion than to convene and give information to the 
legislature on occasions that may demand it," Madison wrote,
Flagg Bemis has noted that "international law itself was in 
a state of flux." Bemis, Jay's Treaty, 185.
44 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, May 31, 1789, in PJM, 
13:190.
45 "Helvidius" #1, Aug. 24, 1793, ibid., 15:69-71.
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"and whilst this discretion is duly exercised the trust of the 
executive is satisfied, and that department is not responsible 
for the consequences."46
Madison directly attacked Hamilton's views regarding the 
French treaties in his third essay. Citing such authorities as 
Vattel and Burlamaqui in his defense, Madison argued that the 
1778 treaties remained in force despite the change in the 
French government.47 Madison returned to the issues of 
legislative and executive power in his final two essays. "In 
no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in 
the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the 
legislature, and not to the executive department," Madison 
wrote in "Helvidius" #4. He repeated the argument "that the 
executive has no right, in any case to decide the question, to 
decide whether there is or is not cause for declaring war." 
Madison also repeated a central tenet of Whig ideology when he 
wrote that "the executive is the department of power most 
distinguished by its propensity to war."48 Madison attacked 
the Proclamation of Neutrality in his final essay. "In 
exercising the Constitutional power of deciding a question of 
war, the Legislature ought to be as free to decide, according 
to its own sense of the public good, on one side or the other 
side," Madison wrote. Washington's proclamation, Madison
46 "Helvidius" #2, Aug 31, 1793, ibid., 15:82, 86.
47 "Helvidius" #3, Sept. 7, 1793, ibid., 15:98-99.
48 "Helvidius" #4, Sept. 14, 1793, ibid., 15:108-109.
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continued, was improper in that light.49
However much Madison disagreed with Washington's 
policies, neither he nor his fellow Republicans could abide
Genet's conduct. "Your acct. of G is dreadful," Madison
wrote to Jefferson in July of 1793. Two months later, Madison 
wrote James Monroe that Genet's "conduct has been that of a 
madman." Jefferson himself concluded that Genet "will sink the 
republican interest if they do not abandon Aim."50 In the end, 
Genet's country abandoned him as well. On June 2, 1793, the 
Jacobins, led by Maximilien Robespierre, took control of the 
Convention. Beginning in the fall the new government sent its 
opponents, including Genet's political patrons, to the 
guillotine. The Jacobins feared that Genet had alienated the 
United States, and on November 17 Robespierre denounced Genet 
and generally accused the Girondins of treason. Jean Fauchet 
arrived at Philadelphia as the new French minister on February 
21, 1794. Genet, knowing the guillotine awaited him in Paris, 
retired to permanent exile in New York.51
Despite Genet and despite the Terror, Republicans 
retained a basic sympathy for what they believed to be the 
republican ideals of the French Revolution. "Genet is a madman
49 "Helvidius" #5, Sept. 18, 1793, ibid., 15:116.
50 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 18, 1793; James 
Madison to James Monroe, Sept. 15, 1793; Thomas Jefferson to 
James Madison, Aug. 15, 1793, ibid., 15:45, 110-111, 50; 
Ketcham, JM, 343-344.
51 Ammon, Genet Mission, 112, 155-159, 171.
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but do not let us quarrel with his nation," George Nicholas 
wrote to James Madison.52 Jefferson himself hoped for a French 
landing in Great Britain, writing that, "I should be tempted 
to leave my clover for awhile, to go and hail the dawn of 
liberty & republicanism in that island."53 Conversely, the 
Republicans hated Great Britain, and Great Britain provided a 
reason in the Orders-in-Council of June 8 and November 6, 
1793, and January 8, 1794. Long before Congress received word 
of the November 6 Order, Madison had decided on the proper 
policy toward Great Britain. Indeed, it was the same policy 
that he had advocated in 1789. On January 3, 1794, Madison 
introduced resolutions recommending commercial discrimination 
against Great Britain, using the same arguments he had used 
five years before. "We stand with respect to the nation 
exporting those luxuries in the relation of an opulent 
individual to the labor in producing the superfluities, for 
his accommodation," Madison told the House of Representatives, 
"the former can do without those luxuries, the consumption of 
which gives bread to the latter."54 Madison discounted the 
possibility of war, arguing that "every consideration of
52 George Nicholas to James Madison, Feb. 9, 1794, in PJM, 
15:256.
53 Thomas Jefferson to William Branch Giles, April 27, 1795, 
in Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 12 
vols. Paul Leicester Ford, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1904-1905), 8:172.
54 Speech of Jan. 3, 1794, in PJM, 15:169.
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interest must prevent it."55 On March 25, the House of 
Representatives moved to stronger measures, taking up a 
sequestration of British debts and a non-importation act. The 
Committee of the Whole approved non-importation on April 15.55 
Madison complained that the appointment of John Jay as envoy 
extraordinary "has had the effect of impeding all legislative 
measures for extorting redress from G.B."57
Madison opposed the Jay Treaty from the beginning, but as 
a member of the House of Representatives, there was little he 
could do beyond public criticism. By signing the treaty the 
United States "relapsed into some dependence" on Great 
Britain, Madison argued in his pamphlet "Political 
Observations."5® Madison continued to oppose the treaty after 
its ratification in June of 1795. He summed up Republican 
anger in a draft petition, writing that the treaty "is in its 
present form unworthy the voluntary acceptance of an 
Independent people, and is not dictated to them by the 
circumstances in which providence has kindly placed them."59
Madison attacked the treaty both as bad policy and as a 
violation of the Constitution. He drafted a petition to the
55 Speech of Jan. 23, 1794, ibid., 15:206.
56 Combs, Jay Treaty, 121-122.
57 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 11, 1794, in PJM, 
15:327.
58 "Political Observations," April 20, 1795, ibid., 15:516.
59 Draft of a Petition, Sept. 1795, ibid., 16:75-76.
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Virginia General Assembly in which he argued that the treaty 
interfered with Congress's power to regulate commerce.60 When 
the House of Representatives convened in December, Madison 
observed to James Monroe that there was, "a clear majority who 
disapprove the treaty but it will dwindle under the influence 
of causes well known to you.”6* Hoping to soften opposition, 
Washington submitted Pinckney's Treaty with Spain, which 
secured the right of deposit at New Orleans, to the Senate at 
the same time the House took up the appropriations needed to 
carry out the Jay Treaty. In the House, the Federalists played 
on the fear of war if the United States did not approve the 
appropriations.62
In March 1796, Madison began to attack the treaty's 
constitutionality. The congressional power over appropriations 
placed the treaty before the House of Representatives, but 
Madison continued to base his arguments on the congressional 
war power. He joined in the demand that Washington deliver all 
of the papers connected with the treaty, and when the 
president refused, Madison complained that Washington had 
interfered with Congress's right to ask for such
60 Petition to the General Assembly, Oct. 12, 1795, ibid., 
16:102.
61 James Madison to James Monroe, Dec. 20, 1795 (partly in 
code), ibid., 16:170.
62 Combs, Jay Treaty, 180-183; DeConde, Entangling 
Alliances, 133; Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, 267-281.
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information.65 Madison believed that the Jay Treaty made the 
treaty making power of the Senate and president superior to 
the war powers of Congress. The Constitution, he asserted, 
made the treaty power subordinate to the war power. The Jay 
Treaty was essentially an alliance with a power at war, 
Madison argued, and the treaty could drag the United States 
into the war without congressional approval. The United States 
could send troops around the world, or keep a standing army at 
home in peacetime, all as a result of the abuse of the treaty 
making power. "Under this aspect," Madison argued, the Treaty 
power would be tremendous indeed."64 Madison attacked the 
provisions of the treaty in April. The treaty endangered 
American interests in the northwest by allowing the British to 
take part in the Indian trade, and completely reversed 
American policy by acceding to the British interpretation of 
neutral rights, and rejecting, "free ships, free goods." In 
the end Madison urged the House of Representatives to reject 
the appropriations needed to implement the treaty.65
Madison met his match in Federalist Fisher Ames of 
Massachusetts. On April 28, 1796, Ames rose in defense of the 
Jay Treaty. In a lengthy speech, Ames declared that rejection 
of the appropriations meant war with Great Britain and then
65 Speech of March 7 and April 6, 1796, in PJM, 16:254, 292- 
293.
64 Speech of March 10, 1796, ibid., 16;258-259.
65 Speech of April 15, 1796, ibid., 16:316-325.
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listed every imaginable calamity that would come as a result. 
"If, however/ the vote should pass to reject/ and a spirit 
should rise, as it will with the public disorder, to make 
confusion worse confounded/” Ames told the House, "even I, 
slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may outlive 
the government and Constitution of my country.”66 The 
Committee of the Whole voted 50-49 in favor of implementation 
on April 29. The next day the House passed the appropriations 
51-48.67
Madison was not surprised that settlement with Great 
Britain brought conflict with France; nor did he have much 
confidence that John Adams could resolve it successfully. 
Madison wrote Jefferson that "an awful scene appears to be 
opening upon us." Jefferson expressed some optimism that war 
could be avoided. "I do not believe Mr. A. wishes war with 
France," he wrote Madison, "nor do I believe he will truckle 
to England as servilely as has been done." Madison, however, 
expected that war would be "the fruit of the British 
Treaty.”66
Madison retired from the House of Representatives in 
March 1797, and from his home watched events with an
66 Speech of April 28, 1796, in Ames, Works, 2:1182.
67 Combs, Jay Treaty, 186-188.
66 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Jan. 22, 1797; Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison, Jan. 22, 1797; James Madison to 
James Madison, Sr., March 12, 1797, in PJM, 16:471, 474, 
500-501.
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increasing sense of doom. Since the late 1780s, Madison 
believed that Adams was at heart a monarchist, and viewed 
Adams's diplomacy accordingly. Madison fully expected that 
Adams would "go indirectly to war, by using the frigates as 
convoys and arming private vessels of which the owners & 
mariners will often be British subjects under American 
colours." Madison compared Adams unfavorably to Washington, 
with Adams "taking as great pains to get into war, as 
[Washington] took to keep out of it."®9
The aftermath of the XYZ Affair, particularly Adams's 
speech of March 19, 1798, only heightened Madison's fears. The 
speech was a product of the president's well-known "violent 
passions," and further proof of the Whig doctrine that, "the 
Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war & most prone 
to it." With the president and the Senate in complete control 
of foreign policy, "it is evident that the people are cheated 
out of the best ingredients in their Govt, the safeguards of 
peace which is the greatest of their blessings." The 
particulars of the XYZ Affair had no influence on Madison's 
thinking, as he believed the Federalists had manufactured the 
French crisis out of the Jay Treaty. Talleyrand's actions were 
no cause for war, Madison wrote to Jefferson, but he fully 
expected the Federalists to use them as such. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on naval action threatened to shift the basis of
69 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 12 and 18, 1798, 
ibid., 17:78, 82.
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American political economy from agriculture to the carrying 
trade. By 1800 Jefferson believed the United States had gone 
"navigation mad, and commerce mad, and navy mad, which is 
worst of all."70
"Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty 
at home is to be charged to provisions agst. danger real or 
pretended from abroad," Madison wrote in response to the 
Federalist program. Viewing events through the lens of English 
Opposition thought, Madison saw the military buildup and the 
Alien and Sedition Acts as the logical conclusion of a 
Federalist attempt to create a British-style corrupt 
parliamentary government.71 As a private citizen, Madison 
could do little except offer advice. In the fall of 1798, 
Madison and Jefferson helped the Virginia and Kentucky 
legislatures draft responses to the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions declared the 
acts null and void and proposed creating committees of 
correspondence. Madison's Virginia Resolutions did not go 
quite as far. Madison did declare that the acts were 
unconstitutional, but advocated no action beyond sending the
70 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 2 and 22, 1798, 
ibid., 17:104, 118; Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestly, 
January 18, 1800, quoted in McCoy, Elusive Republic, 174.
71 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 13, 1798, in PJM, 
17:130; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 259-263; Lawrence 
Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in 
American Society to the Mar of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1982), 137-139.
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resolutions to other states.72
As the Quasi-War continued, Madison stepped up his public 
activity. He published an anonymous essay of "Political 
Reflections," which reiterated his private opposition to 
Federalist policy. He again argued that "the fetters imposed 
on liberty at home have ever been forged out of the weapons 
provided for defence against real, pretended, or imaginary 
dangers from abroad." 7 ^ As a member of the Virginia House of 
Delegates, he wrote the Report of 1800, which reaffirmed and 
expanded on the principles of the Virginia Resolutions. "The 
constitution of the United States was formed by a sanction of 
the states, given by each in its sovereign capacity," Madison 
asserted, using an argument he had rejected thirteen years 
before. The states therefore had a right to determine whether 
or not the Constitution had been violated, and to decide 
whether or not, "such questions as may be of sufficient 
magnitude as to require their interposition." "Consolidation 
of the states into one sovereignty, would be to transform the 
republican system of the United States into a monarchy," 
Madison continued, and he opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts 
on those grounds. The acts concentrated power in the hands of 
the president. The states not only had a right to declare acts
72 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Nov. 17, 1798;
Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798, in PJM, 17:178-181,
188-190.
73 "Political Reflections," Philadelphia Aurora and General 
Advertizer, Feb. 23, 1799, ibid., 17:242.
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unconstitutional, but also a right to coordinate efforts among 
the several states.74 By 1800, Madison was willing to give the 
states a greater role in national affairs than he had favored 
in 1787, a shift dictated by the need to preserve republican 
government. The doctrine of state interposition may be seen as 
the reverse side of the negative on state laws.7^
Federalist diplomacy confirmed for Madison the tenet of 
Opposition Whig thought that the tools of foreign policy could 
easily be turned against domestic liberty. Madison's approach 
to foreign policy in the 1790s reveals a duality in his 
thought regarding the connection between republicanism and 
diplomacy. Madison's long political experience showed him that 
republican theory did not always explain or conform to 
political practice. However, Madison's theories of how a 
republican diplomacy should work were unmodified by diplomatic 
practice. Unlike John Adams, Madison never abandoned the 
reformative aspects of republican diplomacy. It had not failed 
for Madison in the 1790s; it merely had not been tried. As 
secretary of state and president, Madison fully expected 
American agricultural produce to act as the republican sword 
and shield against monarchy at home and abroad. Madison's 
difficulties came when other nations did not act as he 
believed they would.
74 "Report of 1800," ibid., 309-310, 315-316, 324-328, 348.
75 Hobson, "Negative on State Laws," 234-235.
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CHAPTER 7: THE REPUBLICAN CRISIS
Like John Adams, James Madison came to executive office 
with little direct executive experience. Unlike Adams, Madison 
also had no direct experience in the conduct of diplomacy, 
apart from those elements of foreign policy that came before 
Congress. When he became secretary of state in 1801, Madison 
had spent twenty years in national politics determining the 
connection between republican government and foreign policy. 
In many ways, Madison's approach to the problem, and his 
strengths and weaknesses, were revealed in two Federalist 
essays, the famous Federalist #10 and the less well-known but 
for diplomacy equally important Federalist #41. In Federalist 
#10 Madison accepted as a fixed feature of human nature that 
people split into factions for a myriad of reasons. Federalist 
#10 provided a theory that fit around the fact of a 
territorially large and potentially larger American republic. 
Federalist #41, however, showed the extent to which Madison 
tried to force diplomacy to fit republican theory. Federalist 
#41 presumed that distance would shield the United States from 
Europe's wars, and that an effective union and national 
government would provide greater protection than any military 
organization. Madison's reaction to Federalist diplomacy
23:
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revealed what Madison considered a republican foreign policy. 
Madison emphasized the yeoman virtue of economic independence 
rather than classical martial virtue. Commercial coercion, 
Madison believed, was a far safer course for republican 
government than military preparation, agreeing with Gallatin 
and Jefferson that "pretended tax-preparations and army- 
preparations against contingent wars tend only to encourage 
wars."*
Madison's combination of Opposition Whig thought and 
agrarian political economy led him to a belief in the 
omnipotence of American commercial power and an abhorrence of 
what the Federalists considered normal military preparation. 
Madison therefore unwittingly staked the survival of 
republican government on events he could not control. Madison 
assumed that national interests, like human nature, were 
fixed, and fixed in a way that benefitted the United States. 
Britain needed the United States to buy its manufactured goods 
and feed its West Indian colonies. France and Spain, to a 
lesser extent, required American supplies for their colonies, 
and would presumably want to cultivate American political 
friendship as a counterweight to Great Britain. Madison 
expected greater reason from nations than he did from the 
American people. He had no direct experience, as John Adams
* Ketcham, JM, 425; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, c. 
Nov. 16, 1801, in Albert Gallatin, The Writings of Albert 
Gallatin, 3 vols. Henry Adams, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippencott and Company, 1879), 1:71
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had, to make him believe otherwise; there was no foreign 
policy equivalent of his electoral defeat of 1777. Madison's 
success in constitutional matters came when he shaped theory 
to match American practice. His failures as secretary of state 
and president came from his attempts to force the vagaries of 
diplomacy to conform to a theoretical model.
The two issues that shaped Madison's early exposure to 
foreign policy, control of the Mississippi River and trade 
with Great Britain, best reveal the connection between 
republican ideology and Madison' s diplomacy. Pinckney' s Treaty 
had temporarily settled the Mississippi question in 1795, and 
promised to do so as long as Spain owned Louisiana. In Rufus 
King's words, the Spanish were "quiet neighbours," and posed 
little threat to American interests.2 Then Napoleon Bonaparte 
decided to use Louisiana in combination with the reconquest of 
St. Domingo as the basis for a new French empire in North 
America. French and Spanish negotiators concluded the Treaty 
of St. Ildefonso on October 1, 1800, which ceded Louisiana and 
six warships to France in exchange for an Italian kingdom for 
the Duke of Parma. France was not to take possession of 
Louisiana until it delivered the Italian territory. The 
retrocession of Louisiana, combined with the signing of the 
Peace of Amiens between France and Great Britain on March 27,
2 Rufus King to James Madison, April 2, 1803, in King, 
Correspondence, 4:24.
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1802, promised to give France a free hand in North America.-* 
Soon after the secret Treaty of St. Ildefonso was signed
rumors of its conclusion circulated among European diplomats. 
In late March 1801 Rufus King wrote from London that Spain had 
ceded Louisiana and the Floridas to France.4 Two months later 
Madison wrote that "intelligence has come thro' several 
channels, which makes it probable that Louisiana has been 
ceded to France."5 President Jefferson feared the worst. 
Jefferson called New Orleans the "one single spot, the 
possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. "The day 
that France takes possession of N. Orleans," Jefferson wrote 
to Robert R. Livingston, minister to France, would be the day 
on which the United States must ally with Great Britain.5 To 
Jefferson, the Floridas were as important as the port of New 
Orleans itself. "Whatever power, other than ourselves, holds 
the country east of the Mississippi becomes our natural 
enemy," the president warned.7 Spain suspended the American
3 Alexander DeConde. This Affair of Louisiana (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 97-102.
4 Rufus King to James Madison, March 29, 1801, in James 
Madison, The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State 
Series, 3 vols to date. Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds. 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986- ), 
1:55.
5 James Madison to James Monroe, June 1, 1801, ibid., 1:245.
5 Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, April 18, 1802, 
in Jefferson, Writings, 7:364-365.
7 Thomas Jefferson to Pierre S. Dupont de Nemours, Feb. 1,
1803, ibid., 9:439.
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right of deposit at New Orleans on October 18, 1802, leading 
the Jefferson administration to conclude that neither France 
nor Spain was a safe neighbor.8
Madison agreed with Jefferson that anything that 
threatened American access to the Mississippi threatened the 
survival of a republican political economy, and therefore the 
vital interests of the union.8 Officially, Madison argued that 
the West was fully attached to the union and would not throw 
in with France to protect its interests. Madison also believed 
that all sections agreed on the importance of the Mississippi, 
with the only dispute over "the degree of patience which ought 
to be exercised during the appeal to friendly modes of 
r e d r e s s . T h e  union had come too close to collapse over the 
same issue in the 1780s for Madison to be completely 
confident. "We are fully aware of the tendency of the reported 
Cession of Louisiana, to plant in our neighbourhood troubles 
of different kinds, and to prepare the way for very serious 
events," Madison wrote to Rufus King in London.** "A mere 
neighbourhood could not be friendly to the harmony which both
8DeConde, Louisiana, 119-121; Arthur P. Whitaker. The 
Mississippi Question 1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics 
and Diplomacy (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934),
189-192.
8 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 197-198.
10 James Madison to James Monroe and Robert R. Livingston, 
March 2, 1803; James Madison to Charles Pinckney, January 
10, 1803, in WJM, 7:13-14, 2.
11 James Madison to Rufus King, May 1, 1802, in PJMzSS, 
3:173.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
countries [France and the United States] have so much an 
interest in cherishing,” Madison wrote to Livingston on May 1, 
1802, "but if a possession of the mouth of the Mississippi is 
to be added the other causes of discord, the worst events are 
to be apprehended." Madison instructed Livingston to "spare no 
effort" to determine the extent of the retrocession, and to 
convince France to cede New Orleans and the Floridas to the 
United States.^ Madison issued similar instructions to 
Charles Pinckney, minister to Spain, in case Spain still owned 
the Floridas. Madison proposed the make the Mississippi "a 
common boundary, with a common use of its navigation, for [the 
United States] and Spain.
For Madison, some sort of purchase was a policy better 
suited to republican government than the military solution 
advocated by some Federalists, including Alexander Hamilton. 
On February 16, 1803, Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania
sponsored a resolution authorizing the president to call up 
the militia and appropriate $5 million for an expedition 
against New Orleans whenever the president deemed it 
necessary. Madison believed that the resolution "drove at war 
thro' a delegation of unconstitutional power to the 
Executive." Madison was as unwilling in 1803 as he was in 1793 
to use the president's role as commander-in-chief to formulate
12 James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, May 1, 1802, 
ibid., 3:175-176.
James Madison to Charles Pinckney, May 11, 1802, ibid., 
3:215-216.
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foreign policy.^
As long as France was at peace with Great Britain, 
Bonaparte was intent on building his American empire. 
Livingston reported that his attempts to discuss New Orleans 
were "premature" and that France planned to take possession of 
Louisiana.15 The defeat of the French army in St. Domingo and 
the ice-choked French ports that prevented resupply made 
Bonaparte more willing to sell. The prospect of renewed war 
with Great Britain further motivated the French consul. 
Livingston sought to take advantage of the situation in 
January 1803, when he again offered to buy New Orleans and the 
Floridas. He added a buffer zone north of the Arkansas River, 
becoming the first negotiator to suggest a cession of land 
west of the Mississippi.16
In January 1803 Jefferson appointed James Monroe as 
special envoy to assist in negotiations. Madison issued 
instructions on March 2, directing Monroe and Livingston to 
purchase New Orleans and the Floridas, with no mention of 
acquiring land to the west of the Mississippi. As a fallback 
position, if France would not sell New Orleans, Madison
^  McDonald, Hamilton, 357-358; DeConde, Louisiana, 140; 
James Madison to James Monroe, March 1, 1803, in James 
Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, 4 
vols. William C. Rives, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott 
and Co., 1865), 2:178.
15 Robert R. Livingston to James Madison, September 1, 1802, 
in American State Papers: Foreign Relations, 6 vols. 
(Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1833-1861), 3:525.
lf> DeConde, Louisiana, 130-131, 149-154.
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advised the envoys to secure free navigation of the rivers of 
West Florida.*7 By mid-April, Bonaparte was prepared to sell 
all of Louisiana, which he believed to be worthless without 
New Orleans, in order to prevent an Anglo-American alliance. 
On May 2, 1803, French and American negotiators concluded an 
agreement in which the United States paid $15 million for all 
of French Louisiana. Borders were not precisely defined; nor 
were the Floridas specifically mentioned, although Monroe 
later recalled that the Americans understood the cession to 
include territory west of the Perdido River.18 In any case, 
the French project for an American empire was at an end.
"The annexation of Louisiana was an event so portentous 
as to defy measurement; it gave a new force to politics, and 
ranked in historical importance next to the Declaration of 
Independence and the adoption of the Constitution, —  events 
of which it was the logical outcome," wrote Henry Adams, 
himself no admirer of Jefferson or Madison.19 More recent 
commentators have also seen the Louisiana Purchase as the end 
result of Madison's political philosophy. Ralph Ketcham wrote 
that by doubling the size of the nation, Madison provided more
17 Ibid., 135-136; James Madison to James Monroe and Robert 
R. Livingston, March 2, 1803, in WJM, 7:17-19, 28-29.
18 DeConde, Louisiana, 167-172; James Monroe. The 
Autobiography of James Monroe. Stuart Gerry Brown, ed. 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959), 164.
19 Henry Adams, The History of the United States during the 
Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 9 
vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889-1891), 2:49.
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land for yeoman farmers. The Louisiana Purchase was therefore, 
"perfectly suited [to] Republican political and social 
theory."2° Such an analysis, however, reads history backward, 
by assuming that Federalist #10 was a call for expansion, and 
that Madison intended to acquire all of Louisiana. Certainly 
Madison approved of the purchase, but for him the main problem 
was securing the navigation of the Mississippi River.
Reaction to the unexpected result of the negotiations 
varied by party and section. Sectionalist-minded Federalists 
such as William Plumer of New Hampshire feared that the 
Louisiana Purchase made an already too large country 
ungovernable and vulnerable at the frontier.2* The Republicans 
and some Federalists supported the treaty, but policy-makers 
were at a loss as to what to do with the excess territory. 
James Monroe believed it would be best to move slowly into the 
western country.22 william C. C. Claiborne, governor of 
Mississippi Territory and later governor of Orleans Territory, 
believed that Spain might trade East and West Florida for an 
American cession of lands between the Sabine River and the Rio 
Grande. Claiborne advised, however, that the United States
20 Ketcham, JM, 420.
2* Speech of October 24, 1803, in William Plumer, William 
Plumer's Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States 
Senate 1803-1807. Everett Somerville Brown, ed. (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1923), 6.
22 James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, September 25, 1804, in 
James Monroe, The Writings of James Monroe, 7 vols. 
Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1898-1903), 4:256.
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should make no concessions to gain territory between the
Perdido River and New Orleans.22 Jefferson was reluctant to 
give up any new territory, for fear of allowing Spain to 
regain access to the Mississippi.2  ^Jefferson was willing to 
delay settlement, but would only give up territory east of the 
Rio Grande for East Florida. Madison instructed James Monroe 
and Charles Pinckney to purchase the Floridas and forbade 
American diplomats from making any agreement that allowed 
Spain back onto the banks of the Mississippi.25
Madison shared Jefferson's desire to secure the Floridas 
as well as his reluctance to give up lands west of the
Mississippi River. Spanish possession of West Florida,
bordering New Orleans, threatened American control of the 
mouth of the Mississippi. Madison's instructions to Monroe of 
July 29, 1803, fifteen days after receipt of the purchase 
treaty, listed the Floridas as the main objective. Madison 
wrote Monroe that he should not trade western territory, as it 
was potentially too valuable to the United States, and West 
Florida was worthless to France or Spain without New
2  ^William C. C. Claiborne to James Madison, January 24,
1804, in William C. C. Claiborne, Official Letter Books of 
William C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816. Dunbar Rowland, ed. 
(Jackson, Miss.: State Department of Archives and History, 
1917), 1:347.
2  ^Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, August 9, 1803, in 
Jefferson, Writings, 10:28-29.
25 James Madison to James Monroe, April 15, 1804; James 
Madison to James Monroe and Charles Pinckney, July 8, 1804, 
in WJM, 7:141-152, 153-155.
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Orleans.26
The Jefferson administration was convinced that the 
United States already owned West Florida according to the 
terms of both the retrocession to France and the American 
purchase. In 1762 France ceded its territory east of the 
Mississippi River, excluding the island of New Orleans, to 
Great Britain. At the same time, France ceded New Orleans and 
the land west of the Mississippi River to Spain. The British 
had divided Florida into two provinces at the Perdido River. 
The British cession of the Floridas to Spain in 1783 reunited 
the old French province of Louisiana. Under the treaty of St. 
Idefonso, Spain ceded Louisiana as it existed in 1762, which 
the Americans understood to include territory extending to the 
Perdido River. The French government did not explicitly say 
whether or not the Louisiana Purchase included West Florida.27
For the rest of Madison's term as secretary of state and 
his first term as president the Floridas were the main focus 
of his Spanish diplomacy. As long as Spain owned territory 
bordering New Orleans, American use of the Mississippi and a 
republican political economy were not completely secure. 
Furthermore, possession of the Floridas by any European power 
threatened to intrude European politics upon North America, an
2® James Madison to James Monroe, July 29, 1803, ibid., 
7:53-54, 57-58.
27 Isaac Joslin Cox, The West Florida Controversyf 1798- 
1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1918), 84-85.
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event which would also be hazardous to the republic.
Madison revived the arguments he had used against Spain 
in the 1780s, that the rise of American power could not be 
stopped. Madison was unable to understand why Spain did not 
see that its best interests were to give up the Floridas. "The 
Spanish Government must understand in fact that the United 
States can never consider the amiable relations between Spain 
and them as definitively and permanently secured, without an 
arrangement on this subject," Madison wrote to Monroe on July 
29, 1803. Madison's instructions to Pinckney, written on the 
same day, are similar in tone, arguing that the United States 
would eventually possess the Floridas, and Spain would be wise 
to bow to the inevitable.28 The Floridas revived Madison's 
twenty-year quarrel with what he saw as Spanish stubbornness. 
"What is it that Spain dreads?" Madison wrote to Charles 
Pinckney, using the same language and arguments as his 1785 
letter to Lafayette. "She dreads, it is presumed, the growing 
power of this country, and the direction of it against her 
possessions within her [the United States] reach. Can she 
annihilate this power? No. —  Can she sensibly retard its 
growth? No. —  Does not common prudence then advise her, to 
conciliate by every proof of friendship and confidence the 
good will of a nation whose power is formidable to her;
28 James Madison to James Monroe, July 29, 1803, in WJM,
7:54; James Madison to Charles Pinckney, July 29, 1803, 
Diplomatic Instructions, All Countries, Vol. 6, Record Group 
59, General Records of the Department of State.
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instead of yielding to the impulses of jealousy, and adopting 
obnoxious precautions, which can have no other effect than to 
bring on prematurely the whole weight of the Calamity which 
she f e a r s . when France took Spain's side on its West 
Florida claim, Madison could not understand why France would 
pursue a policy that "might end in placing the United States 
on the side of Great Britain."30
Republican fear of executive power left Jefferson and 
Madison with few alternatives beyond waiting for France and 
Spain to see reason, which they defined as acceding to 
American wishes. In November 1803, Congress passed the Mobile 
Act, which extended American revenue laws to the territory 
acquired from France and gave the president the power to 
create a customs district for Mobile, even though that port 
fell within the disputed area with Spain.31 In February 1806 
Congress passed the Two Million Dollar Act, which officially 
provided $2 million for unspecified diplomatic expenses. In 
reality, the money was intended to buy the Floridas from 
Spain. The act passed by a wide margin, but created a rift in 
the Republican party. John Randolph of Roanoke, hitherto one 
of Jefferson's staunchest supporters, become one of his 
sharpest critics, charging that the act was little more that
James Madison to Charles Pinckney, October 12, 1803, in 
WJM, 7:74.
30 James Madison to John Armstrong, June 6, 1805, ibid., 
7:184.
31 DeConde, Louisiana, 214-216; Brant, JM, 4:192-193.
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a bribe and beneath the dignity of a republic.33
Florida remained an unanswered question well into 
Madison's presidency, although external events promised to 
work in Madison's favor. The Spanish Empire collapsed in 1810, 
and most of Spain's American provinces moved toward 
independence. West Florida was among them. American settlers 
dominated the West Florida legislature, and on September 26, 
1810, proclaimed the Republic of West Florida. On October 10 
the new republic asked to be annexed by the United States. 
Madison had watched the developments of the summer of 1810 
closely. On July 17 the president advised Secretary of State 
Robert Smith that Governor David Holmes of Mississippi 
Territory should monitor events. "It would be well for him 
also to be attentive to the means of having his Militia in a 
state for any service that may be called for," Madison wrote, 
believing that European interference was the greatest 
danger. 33 When the west Florida government asked for 
annexation, it seemed to give Madison the chance to act 
without appearing to overstep the bounds of executive 
authority. Madison wrote on October 19 that he expected the
3  ^Ibid., 233; Norman K. Risjord. The Old Republicans: 
Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1965), 46-50.
33 Henry Adams, History, 5:306-308; Cox, west Florida 
Controversy, 416-417; James Madison to Robert Smith, July 
17, 1810, in James Madison, The Papers of James Madison: 
Presidential Series, 3 vols. to date. Robert A. Rutland, J. 
C. A. Stagg, et al., eds. (Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 1984- ), 2:419.
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West Floridians to call for help from either Great Britain or 
the United States. After receiving communications from Baton 
Rouge, Madison issued a secret proclamation on October 27, 
1810, informing Congress of his intention to occupy West 
Florida from the Mississippi to the Perdido.34
Madison hoped that the same circumstances that delivered 
West Florida into American hands would work in East Florida as 
well. On January 3, 1811 Madison asked Congress for the power 
to annex East Florida if the residents of that province asked 
him to do so. Congress, complying with Madison's request, 
authorized George Mathews and John McKee to occupy East 
Florida under certain circumstances, specifically if an 
insurgent movement overthrew the Spanish government and asked 
for American intervention; or in response to British 
interference. In March 1812 Mathews responded to an uprising 
on Amelia Island by invading it. Madison believed that Mathews 
had acted prematurely, and disapproved of Mathews's attempts 
to stir up a revolt, writing that "Mathews has been playing a 
strange comedy, in the face of common sense, as well as of his 
instructions." Madison disavowed Mathews's conduct, and had 
Secretary of State Monroe send official notification.3^
34 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 19, 1810; 
Proclamation of October 27, 1810; in PJM:P, 2:585, 595-596.
35 Henry Adams, History, 6:237-240; Brant, JM, 5:442-444; 
Cox, West Florida Controversy, 522-524; Rembert W. Patrick, 
Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border 
1810-1815 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954), 49- 
50, 68, 120-122; J. C. A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War:
Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American
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The Florida episode revealed two elements of Madison's 
diplomacy; that in dealing with European power his version of 
republican diplomacy limited executive action and tended to be 
overtaken by events, and that Madison's conception of how 
nations should act had not moved beyond the belief that 
nations would act purely in their own interests. Madison 
defined those interests in terms of acceding to American 
wishes, leading him to overestimate the diplomatic value of 
American friendship to France and Spain. Fortune had turned in 
favor of the United States with the Louisiana Purchase, but 
was of little help in acquiring the Floridas.
The maritime crisis with Great Britain revived the second 
issue that shaped Madison's early career. To Madison, British 
claims to sovereignty of the high seas were as dangerous to 
republican government in the United States as foreign control 
of the Mississippi River had been. British claims grew 
stronger in 1805. That spring the Lords Commissioners of 
Appeals handed down the Essex decision which tightened 
restrictions under the Rule of 1756, which stated that trade 
considered illegal in peacetime could not be made legal in 
wartime, on neutrals plying the French and Spanish colonial
Republic 1783-1830 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), 98-100; James Madison to Congress, Jan. 3,
1811, in PJM:P, 3:93-94; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 
April 24, 1812, in James Morton Smith, ed., The Republic of 
Letters: The Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison 1776-1826, 3 vols. (New York: W.W Norton & Company, 
1995), 3:1694; James Monroe to George Mathews, April 4,
1812, in ASP:FRr 3:572.
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trades. The Essex decision revised the Polly decision handed 
down by the Admiralty Court in 1800, which permitted a "broken 
voyage," that is, it allowed neutral participation in the 
colonial trades if broken by a stop at a neutral port. The 
Essex decision closed that loophole and upheld the doctrine of 
continuous voyage. A theoretical domination of the ocean was 
made more real by Lord Nelson's victory over the combined 
Spanish and French fleets at Trafalgar on October 21, 1805, 
assuring British naval supremacy for the rest of the war.36
The same day as Trafalgar, James Stephen, a pro-ministry 
writer who received a seat in the House of Commons for his 
efforts on behalf of the Orders-in-Council, published War in 
Disguise; or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags, a quasi-official 
defense of the British crackdown on neutral trade in the West 
Indies. War in Disguise was similar to Sheffield's 
Observations on the Commerce of the American States, in that 
both works reflected popular and official British anger with 
the United States, and both portrayed control of the West 
Indian trade as vital to preserving British naval supremacy. 
Stephen's thesis was that the so-called neutral trade with the 
West Indies was in fact French and Spanish trade carried on 
under American flags.37 Neutrals had always carried at least
36 Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United 
States 1805-1812 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1961), 76-80.
37 Ibid., 77-78; James Stephen. War in Disguise; or the 
frauds of the Neutral Flags, 2nd American ed. (New York: I. 
Riley and Co., 1806), 57.
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some of the French and Spanish trade, but by 1805 the United 
States carried almost all of it. Stephen had a simple 
solution; Great Britain should seize all ships involved in the 
French and Spanish colonial trade.38 After Trafalgar, Great 
Britain seemed to be able to make good on that threat.
The trade that Stephen attacked, and Madison sought to 
defend, was fraught with ideological tangles, stemming from 
drastic changes in world politics. Madison's diplomacy, formed 
in the 1780s and 1790s, presumed the existence of shippers 
from the colonial powers taking their share of the colonial 
trade and a bloc of northern European powers acting as a 
counterweight to Great Britain on the continent. By 1805 the 
Netherlands had been absorbed into Napoleon's empire, and 
after Trafalgar non-American neutral shipping disappeared from 
the Atlantic. The northern powers to whom Americans 
occasionally appealed for help would provide none. On June 17, 
1801, Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia signed an agreement 
denouncing the British use of paper blockades, but also 
denying the doctrine that free ships make free goods.38 
Madison did not adjust his ideas on diplomacy, and as late as 
1806 he hoped that peace between France and Russia would aid
38 Stephen, War in Disguise, 103, 148.
39 W.P. Cresson, The Holy Alliance: The European Background 
of the Monroe Doctrine (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1922), 10.
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the cause of neutral rights.40 As the neutral nations 
disappeared, the United States assumed more of the world's 
carrying trade. American freight values jumped from $6 million 
in 1790 to over $40 million on the eve of the Embargo. The 
value of the re-export trade, the trade at the heart of the 
British crisis, increased between four and ten times.4* 
Madison supported an American shipping industry only large 
enough to carry American goods to market; most of the new 
carrying trade was in John Randolph's words a "fungus of war," 
which put the agricultural mass of the country at the mercy of 
the port cities of the east coast.43
Jefferson and Madison no doubt cringed upon reading 
Randolph's remarks, as their position on the carrying trade 
was not far from his. In 1785 Jefferson wrote John Jay that in 
a perfect world he would prefer the United States not engage 
in large-scale shipping while there was land to be tilled. 
Jefferson realized that Americans had already claimed their 
share of the ocean and feared the inevitable result would be 
"frequent wars." In the event of war, Jefferson believed the 
United States should withdraw from the sea completely.43 
Twenty years later Jefferson was still torn over how to handle
40 James Madison to John Armstrong, March 14, 1806, James 
Madison Papers, Library of Congress, 2nd series, reel 25.
41 North, Economic Growth, 28, 44.
4  ^b. Perkins, Prologue to War, 112.
43 Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, Aug. 23, 1785, in 
Jefferson, Papers, 8:426-427.
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the carrying trade. British diplomat Augustus John Foster 
wrote that Jefferson, "more than once told me that he wished 
the United States had never possessed a single ship." "He 
would," Foster continued, "have laid the American ports open 
to all the world, let foreigners dispute, if they liked it, 
which should supply at the cheapest rate the richest 
agricultural market in the universe."44
Madison was not as given as Jefferson was to 
philosophical speculations, nor did he have Randolph's luxury 
of saying exactly what he believed at all times. All his 
career Madison had straddled a line between what he could 
write in an anonymous newspaper essay and what he could say on 
the floor of the House of Representatives or in diplomatic 
instructions. He fully shared Randolph's and Jefferson's 
suspicions that shipping was gaining at the expense of 
agriculture, and that shipping was sending American diplomacy 
and political economy far off course. As in 1780, Madison 
believed that New England was putting its interest above that 
of the nation. "In truth, the only obstacles to [a commercial 
treaty] between the United States and that Nation [Britain] 
arise wholly from the patronage by the former of the maritime 
rights and interests of the Eastern States, as a portion of
44 Sir Augustus John Foster, Jeffersonian America: Notes on 
the United States of America Collected in the Years 1805-6-7 
and 11-12 (San Marino, Ca.s The Huntington Library, 1954), 
81.
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the Confederacy,” Madison wrote to William Pinkney in 1808.45
Defense of this trade could lead to war, resulting in taxes, 
debts, armies and navies, all fatal to republican government. 
Furthermore, the carrying trade was only partially linked to 
American produce, and a threat to the agrarian base of
Madison's republicanism. Abandonment of the West Indian trade
meant an equally unrepublican submission to Great Britain as 
mistress of the seas. Madison hoped to resolve his
ideological quandary, and steer a middle course between war 
and submission, by asserting the American right to the West 
Indian trade, and conducting a policy that assumed the 
American carrying trade was more valuable to Europe than to 
the United States. Madison returned to the argument at the 
center of his diplomatic thought, that the West Indies 
depended on the United States "for the supplies essential to 
their existence."46
Madison wrote Jefferson on September 15, 1805 that the 
Rule of 1756 "threatens more loss and vexation to neutrals 
than all the belligerent claims put together." Three weeks 
later Madison noted that he was working on his refutation of 
the Rule of 1756.47 The fruit of Madison's labors, An
45 James Madison to William Pinkney, Dec. 5, 1808, in LOWJM, 
2:427-428.
46 James Madison to James Monroe, March 6, 1805, in WJM, 
7:174-175.
47 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, September 14 and 
October 5, 1805, in James Morton Smith, ed. Republic of 
Letters, 3:1386, 1390.
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Examination of the British Doctrine, which subjects to Capture 
a Neutral Trade, not open in a Time of Peace, appeared in 
January 1806. The Examination served to confirm the link 
between republican government and the law of nations, which 
had always been present in Madison's thought.48
Madison started by attacking the central thesis of the 
Rule of 1756, that trade between a colonial port and a foreign 
port was in principle different from direct trade with the 
mother country. Madison wrote that "a trade between a colony 
and a foreign port is, in a like manner, precisely the same 
with the trade between a foreign port and the parent country; 
which is only a more considerable, as a colony may be less a 
considerable, part of the same country or empire.”48 The 
counter to the Rule of 1756 was the principle that "free ships 
make free goods,” which Madison based on the law of nations. 
Madison cited Hugo Grotius as the father of the law of nations 
and argued that nothing in Grotius's work could justify the 
Rule of 1756, and most of Grotius's work supported neutral 
rights.^8 Vattel concurred "in establishing the general 
freedom of commerce, with the exception of things relating to 
the war.
Having to his satisfaction demolished British claims
48 Onuf and Onuf, Federal Union, 208-209.
49 "Examination," in WJM, 7:206.
50 Ibid., 209-215.
51 Ibid., 230.
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according to the law of nations, Madison proceeded to examine 
the Rule of 1756 according to British practice. Great Britain 
"cannot surely demure to the example of her own proceedings," 
Madison wrote. "And it is here, perhaps, more than anywhere 
else, that the claim ought to shrink from examination.”52 No 
precedent for the Rule of 1756 existed before the Seven Years' 
War, and the Rule of 1756 was not even a fixed feature of 
British practice. Great Britain opened its West Indian trade 
to the United States under article 12 of the Jay Treaty (the 
article rejected by the Senate) and in the Orders-in-Council 
of June 27, 1805.55 The practice of other nations was no
support for current British policy. Madison cited Edward 
Long's History of Jamaica., noting that Spain opened its 
colonial trade to the Dutch to alleviate a shortage of Spanish 
ships and sailors.54
What was Great Britain's real intention? Madison argued 
that Great Britain aimed at nothing less than complete 
domination of the west Indian trade, and the United States was 
the only remaining obstacle. The British government invented 
the Rule of 1756 as legal cover for a power grab.55 "And thus 
we arrive at the true foundation of the principle which has so
52 Ibid., 268.
53 Ibid., 272-273.
54 Ibid., 7:235; Madison's extracts, James Madison Papers, 
Library of Congress, 2nd series, reel 25.
55 "Examination," in WJM, 7:299-300.
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often varied its attitudes of defense, and when driven from 
one stand, has been so ready to occupy another," Madison 
wrote. "Finding no asylum elsewhere, it at length asserts, as 
its true foundation, a mere superiority of f o r c e . Madison 
argued nothing "was more disrespectful to neutral nations, or 
more fatal to the liberty and interests of neutral commerce," 
than the Rule of 1756. Madison concluded, "if she will not 
answer for herself all the world will answer for her," he 
wrote, "that she would not [accept the capture of British 
ships under laws similar to the Rule of 1756], and what is 
more, she ought not."57
Madison's work did not sway his critics, contemporary or 
historical. Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire wrote that 
the Examination showed that Madison, "has read many, & 
consulted more books, upon the law of nations." The book, 
however, suffered from two defects, "that no end is stated for 
writing the work [and] no system intimated by which we- are to 
obtain redress for the wrongs committed by Great Britain."58 
Henry Adams called the rights Madison defended, "worthless 
unless supported by the stronger force."59 The Examination 
revealed that Madison had failed to make the leap from 
republican theory to diplomatic practice. The Examination
56 Ibid., 346.
57 Ibid., 374-375.
58 entry for January 22, 1806, in Plumer, Memorandum, 388.
59 Henry Adams, History, 2:327.
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seems to rest on the assumption of the diplomacy of the 
American Revolution, that the United States had justice on its 
side, and all the United States needed to do was make its 
claims known to the world. Madison wrote an effective answer 
to Stephen's theory in War in Disguise. He had no effective 
answer for the reality of Trafalgar.
Great Britain sought to bolster its control of the high 
seas by declaring French-controlled Europe under a state of 
blockade on May 16, 1806. To maintain naval supremacy Great 
Britain needed seamen, prompting the second sore point with 
the United States, impressment and the right of search. Better 
pay and milder discipline on American ships led many British 
sailors to desert. Also, the British did not recognize 
American nationalization, and included American citizens in 
its hunt for deserters.
Madison and Jefferson gave James Monroe and Maryland 
Federalist William Pinkney responsibility for reaching a 
settlement with Great Britain. Madison hoped to secure the 
rights asserted in the Examination into policy. Madison 
continued to assume that interest would force Great Britain to 
open its West Indian trade. The West Indian trade was a 
"permanent object of the United States,” with geographical 
proximity and economic necessity in the West Indies working in
60 B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 104-106; Reginald Horsman. 
The Causes of the war of 1812 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 27-29; James Fulton Zimmerman. 
Impressment of American Seamen (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1925), 18-21.
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the United States's favor.^ Monroe and Pinkney began 
negotiations on August 27, 1806, and soon realized that the 
British government would not concede on the vital issues. On 
November 11 the envoys informed Madison that there was no 
chance of a settlement of the impressment issue. The two sides 
signed a treaty on December 31 that re-established trade 
relations and ignored impressment. "We are sorry to add that 
this treaty contains no provision against the impressment of 
our seamen," the envoys wrote to Madison on January 3, 1807. 
They hoped an informal agreement would curtail the practice, 
even if Great Britain did not renounce the right of search. To 
Monroe and Pinkney the treaty seemed to be the only protection 
for American commerce in a world torn by Anglo-French war. 
Napoleon's Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806, declaring Great 
Britain in a state of blockade, removed any safe haven for 
American commerce.®^
The Jefferson administration took a hard line on 
impressment. The cabinet met on February 2, 1807 and in
response to Monroe and Pinkney's letter of November 11 
unanimously agreed to reject any treaty silent on impressment. 
Madison wrote Monroe and Pinkney the next day with a new set
^  James Madison to James Monroe and William Pinkney, May
17, 1806, in WJM, 7:391-392.
Henry Adams, History, 3:407-409; Horsman, Causes of the 
War of 1812, 76-92; Burton Spivak. Jefferson's English 
Crisis: Commerce, Embargo and the Republican Revolution 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979), 62- 
65; James Monroe and William Pinkney to James Madison, in 
ASP:FR, 3:137-140, 146.
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of instructions, putting repeal of impressment at the top of 
the list, followed by the rights of colonial trade and a 
further definition of a legal blockade.®^ When the 
administration received the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, it was 
naturally a disappointment. Madison wrote to Monroe and 
Pinkney on May 20, explaining why Jefferson rejected the 
treaty. Impressment was the leading issue. The president 
"laments more especially, that the British Government has not 
yielded to the just and cogent considerations which forbid the 
practice of its Cruizers in visiting and impressing the Crews 
of our vessels, covered by an independent flag, and guarded by 
the laws of the high seas, which ought to be sacred to all 
nations," Madison w r o t e . T h e  Monroe-Pinkney Treaty might 
have preformed the same function for the Republicans as the 
Jay Treaty did for the Federalists, to buy time, build up 
forces, and prepare for a more vigorous defense of American 
rights. Madison did not assume, as Jay had done, that the 
United States was in an inferior position. Madison again 
argued that economically Great Britain needed the United 
States too much to risk war.®-’
 ^Thomas Jefferson. The Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson. 
Franklin B. Sawvel, ed. (New York: The Roundtable Press, 
1903), 251-252; James Madison to James Monroe and William 
Pinkney, February 3, 1807, in WJM, 7:397-404.
64 James Madison to James Monroe and William Pinkney, May 
20, 1807, in WJM, 7:415-416.
65 James Madison to James Monroe and William Pinkney, May 
20, 1807, ibid., 7:444-445.
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Contrary to Madison's hopes, Great Britain was undeterred 
in its quest for command of the seas. Both Great Britain and 
France combined to decree neutral shipping out of legal 
existence. The British Order-in-Council of January 7, 1807 
made all trade with French or French-allied ports subject to 
capture. An Order of November 11, 1807 required that all
neutrals obtain British licenses. Napoleon responded with the 
Milan Decree of December 17, 1807, which subjected to capture 
any neutral ship with a British license.*’®
The Chesapeake affair of June 22, 1807, in which the 
British frigate Leopard attacked and seized four sailors from 
the unprepared American ship, was the strongest example of 
British high-handedness on the impressment issue. "The brand 
seethed and hissed like the glowing olive-stake of Ulysses in 
the Cyclops' eye, until the whole American people, like 
Cyclops, roared with pain and stood frantic on the shore, 
hurling abuse at the enemy, who taunted them from his safe 
ships," Henry Adams wrote to describe the American reaction.®7 
James Madison did not believe the united States was as 
helpless as Henry Adams suggested. The Chesapeake affair 
brought out Madison's answer to British pretensions on the 
high seas. It was the same answer Madison had for the Orders 
of 1793 and 1794, the mercantile houses of Glasgow and
®® Henry Adams, History, 3:416, 103; Horsman, Causes of the 
War of 1812, 121.
®7 Henry Adams, History, 4:27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261
Edinburgh, and the Townshend Duties and the Stamp Act. On 
December 22, 1807, Jefferson signed the Embargo Act, which 
prohibited American ships from clearing out of American ports. 
Combined with a non-importation act, the Embargo closed 
American trade to the world.68
Madison's efforts to apply republican thought to 
diplomacy convinced him that the Embargo was the republic's 
ultimate weapon. It marked a rejection of classical martial 
virtue in favor of the yeoman virtue of economic independence, 
which would prevent creating a military organization and 
consequently an internal threat to civil liberty. It also 
risked little except a branch of trade that Madison did not 
believe to be compatible with a yeoman political economy. The 
Embargo would have the domestic effect of reorienting American 
political economy back toward agriculture by effectively 
killing the domestic carrying trade and forcing France and 
Great Britain to bid for the right to buy American 
agricultural produce. The Embargo was, however, another 
example of the gap between theory and practice. In Federalist 
#10 Madison had listed the numerous reasons that caused 
factions. In explaining the actions of nations, particularly 
Great Britain, Madison narrowed those reasons down to rational 
economic interest. He had not appreciated the role of British 
pride, political anti-Americanism or other factors in Anglo-
68 Brant, JM, 4:397-402; Ketcham, JM, 457; Spivak, 
Jefferson's English Crisis, 68-71, 103-110.
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American diplomacy. By 1807 Great Britain believed it was in 
a death struggle with Napoleon, and that American actions 
aided France. No amount of economic data could change that 
perception. Madison was certainly aware of non-economic 
factors, and noted that only the "pride of the Cabinet" made 
Great Britain resist economic pressure.Nevertheless, such 
observations did not influence Madison's diplomacy.
From the beginning Madison saw the Embargo as an 
offensive rather than a defensive measure, although he was 
careful not to portray it as a war measure. Madison wrote in 
the National Intelligencer on December 23, 1807, that "war 
cannot be the result" and that the "embargo violates the 
rights of none." The Embargo was designed to protect Americans 
from misfortunes on the ocean, "where no harvest is to be 
reaped but that of danger, of spoliation and of disgrace."70 
The Embargo was also a weapon that would punish Spain by 
cutting off its food supply, France by removing American ships 
from the French colonial trade, and Great Britain by cutting 
off supplies to its colonies and by not buying its 
manufactures.7* Madison completely discounted the possibility 
of Canada and the maritime provinces acting as alternate
60 James Madison to William Pinkney, May 1, 1808, William 
Pinkney Papers, Princeton University.
70 National Intelligencer, December 23, 1807.
71 Ibid.
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suppliers for the British West Indies.72
In his second essay Madison described the Embargo as a 
sword that "may be drawn at a moment's warning," and discussed 
its domestic effects. He believed that the only American group 
vulnerable to the Embargo would be those merchants involved in 
the Atlantic carrying trade, or those who would dare risk 
violating the act. "We are certain that the farmer, the 
planter and the mechanic will approve it from the security it 
offers to the public interest," Madison wrote, "and if the 
merchants be honest and enlightened, as we trust they are, 
they will perceive the indissoluble connection between their 
solid and permanent prosperity and the general welfare."7  ^In 
other words, merchants who dealt primarily in delivering 
American goods to market would be protected. Those who gambled 
on John Randolph's "fungus of war" were on their own.
The Embargo ultimately failed as a coercive policy. It 
had no effect on France, and did little economic damage in 
Great Britain, serving only to convince the British government 
that the United States would not fight. The Embargo did far 
more damage to the American economy and nearly drove New 
England into revolt. Madison attributed disaffection to the 
"artificial excitements" stirred up in New England.74 Madison
72 James Madison to William Pinkney, October 21, 1807, 
William Pinkney Papers, Princeton University.
7  ^National Intelligencer, December 25, 1807.
74 Ketcham, JM, 462; North, Economic Growth, 55-58; Horsman, 
Causes of the War of 1812, 142-143; Spivak, Jefferson's
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informed William Pinkney that the Embargo "created a zeal for 
homespun" and speculated that the United States might 
encourage a large-scale manufacture of cotton goods.75 Madison 
probably had not acquired a new found love for domestic 
manufactures, but expected that Pinkney, as minister to Great 
Britain, would pass along the twenty-year-old threat of 
American manufactures to the British government. Madison 
always believed in the Embargo, but its aftermath left him in 
a weak position as he entered the presidency. Republican 
government had deployed its mightiest weapon and it had 
failed. Madison had to find a politically acceptable 
replacement.
Circumstances forced Madison to accept unpalatable policy 
and personnel choices. On March 1, 1809 Congress approved the 
Non-Intercourse Act as a replacement for the repealed Embargo. 
The act barred French and British ships from American ports 
after May 20 and allowed the president to revoke the ban if 
either power changed its policies toward the United States. 
Madison attributed the act to "aversion to war, the 
inconveniences by or charged on the embargo, the hope of 
favorable changes in Europe, the dread of civil convulsions in 
the East, and the policy of permitting the discontented to be 
reclaimed to their duty by losses at sea." Madison had little
English Crisis, 200-201; James Madison to William Pinkney, 
Jan. 3, 1809, in WJM, 8:42.
75 James Madison to William Pinkney, July 21 and July 3,
1808, William Pinkney Papers, Princeton University.
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faith in the act and believed "it seems to be as little 
satisfactory out of doors, as it was within.”76 
Dissatisfaction with the Embargo and the growing rift in the 
Republican party forced Madison to alter his plans for the 
cabinet. Madison had intended to shift Albert Gallatin from 
the treasury to the state department, but the Smith-Giles-Leib 
faction in the Senate made it clear that they would vote to 
reject Gallatin. Madison left Gallatin at the treasury, where 
he did not need to be reconfirmed, and appointed Robert Smith, 
brother of Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland, secretary of 
state.77 The first days of the Madison administration revealed 
that Madison did not have Jefferson's power over Congress or 
his own party and therefore that his policy options would be 
more limited.
Like each of his three predecessors in office, Madison 
pledged to defend American neutrality. "Indulging no passions 
which trespass on the rights or the repose of other nations, 
it has been the glory of the United States to cultivate peace 
by observing justice, and to entitle themselves to the respect 
of the nations at war, by fulfilling their neutral obligations 
with the most scrupulous impartiality," Madison said in his 
first inaugural address.78 Privately, Madison considered Great
76 Brant, JM, 5:38-39; James Madison to William Pinkney, 
March 17, 1809, in PJM:P, 1:56.
77 Brant, JM, 5:23-25.
78 First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1809, in PJM:P, 1:16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
266
Britain the worse threat to the United States and believed 
that most of the country, especially the South and West, 
shared his view. Even "the calculating & commercial spirit of 
N. England" should recognize "the disadvantage of renouncing 
the trade with all the world beside G.B. for the portion which 
her single market would afford."7®
David Erskine offered a republican solution to the Anglo- 
American crisis. The new British minister to the United States 
hoped to reach an agreement and was willing to violate his 
instructions to do so. Foreign Minister George Canning 
instructed Erskine to promise a repeal of the Orders-in- 
Council, but only if the United States enforced commercial 
restrictions against France and formally accepted the Rule of 
1756. Erskine knew that the United States would never accept 
Canning's terms. Two days after Erskine received his 
instructions Madison observed that the minister "has not yet 
opened much of his budget to Mr. Smith." Madison detected fear 
in the British envoy and proof that the Embargo had worked. 
"Private letters from individuals in England, leave no doubt 
that a great dread prevailed of our perseverence in the 
Embargo," Madison wrote to Jefferson.®® Madison and Smith 
agreed with Erskine to reopen trade and offered to relinquish 
the direct trade between France and its colonies in exchange
7® James Madison to Elbridge Gerry, March 14, 1809, ibid., 
1:1:44.
O  A
Henry Adams, History, 5:71-72; James Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson, April 9, 1809, in PJM:P, 1:107.
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for a treaty legalizing indirect colonial trade. Erskine 
agreed to drop the demand for British enforcement of American 
commercial laws. Erskine and Smith signed a note on April 18 
that would act as conditional agreement pending the arrival of 
a special envoy to negotiate a formal treaty. On April 19 
Madison issued a proclamation announcing that Great Britain 
had agreed to repeal its Orders on June 10, and that trade 
with Great Britain could resume at that time.81
"You will see that it [the agreement] puts an end to the 
two immediate difficulties with G.B. and has the air of a 
policy in her to come to a thorough adjustment,” Madison wrote 
to his brother-in-law.8  ^ For Madison, the note with Erskine 
provided a full if belated vindication of republican 
diplomacy's greatest weapon, the Embargo. "It remains now to 
be seen what course will be taken by France,” Madison wrote to 
William Pinkney, "whether it will be prescribed by her 
interest & duty, or by her pride & her anger.”88 Madison was 
fully attuned to the role of pride and anger in domestic 
politics, but strangely deaf to it in diplomacy. He had little 
doubt that France, if not "bereft of common sense,” would 
pursue the logical course of repealing its decrees. "Besides
81 Ketcham, JM, 492-493; Proclamation of April 19, 1809, in 
PJMiP, 1:125-126.
82 James Madison to John G. Jackson, April 21, 1809, in 
PJMtP, 1:128.
88 James Madison to William Pinkney, April 21, 1809, ibid., 
1:128.
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the general motive to follow the example of G.B. she cannot be 
insensible to the dangerous tendency of prolonging the 
commercial suffering of her Allies, particularly Russia," 
Madison explained to Jefferson, "all of them already weary of 
such a state of things, after the pretext for enforcing it 
shall have ceased.”84
Unlike John Adams at a similar stage in his career, 
Madison continued to see other nations's interests in terms of 
American interests. Neither Great Britain nor France followed 
what Madison believed was the only logical course. The British 
government received the Erskine agreement on May 21 and 
rejected it, even though the United States already considered 
it operational. Canning replaced Erskine with Francis Jackson, 
who did not share Erskine's sympathy for the United States. 
Madison was not willing to let go of a republican solution to 
the Anglo-American conflict without a fight. Madison drafted 
Robert Smith's October 19, 1809 letter to Jackson, arguing 
that the British government had not shown sufficient reason 
for disavowing the treaty. Madison also restated the American 
case against the Orders-in-Council. Madison wrote to Pinkney 
in October complaining of Jackson's conduct, especially 
Jackson's "mean & insolent attempt to defraud the U.S. of the 
exculpatory explanation dictated by the respect due them, and 
particularly . . . the insinuation in Jackson's answer that
84 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 24, 1809, ibid., 
1:135.
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this Govt, colluded with Mr. E[rskine] in violating his
qc
instructions."0-1 "Jackson is proving himself a worthy 
instrument of his Patron Canning," Madison remarked to 
Jefferson.88 By early November Madison concluded that the 
United States could no longer negotiate with Jackson. In his 
Annual Message Madison described the collapse of negotiations 
and recommended organizing the militia.87 Relations with 
France were no better. On March 23, 1810, Napoleon issued the 
Rambouillet Decree, subjecting all American ships in French 
ports to capture.88
The Erskine fiasco set Anglo-American diplomacy back to 
the beginning and left Madison in the same position as a year 
before, but with the added embarrassment of the failed 
agreement. Some in Congress had grown tired of commercial 
diplomacy and settled on war. "But I prefer the troubled ocean 
of war, demanded by the honor and independence of the country, 
with all its calamities, and desolations," Henry Clay told the 
House of Representatives on February 22, 1810, "to the
85 B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 220-221; Robert Smith to 
Francis James Jackson, Oct. 19, 1809, in ASP:FR, 3:311-314; 
James Madison to William Pinkney, October 23, 1809, PJM:P, 
2:27-28.
88 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, November 6, 1809, in 
PJM:P, 2:55.
87 James Madison's draft of Robert Smith to William Pinkney, 
ca. November 9, 1809; Annual Message, November 29, 1809, 
ibid., 2:65-67, 91-93.
88 B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 244-245.
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putrescent pool of ignominious peace."89 Madison had not 
decided on war and believed that most of the country had not 
either. Madison also ruled out the other extreme of submission 
to Great Britain. Political considerations ruled out a revival 
of the Embargo, the president's preferred solution. The 
legislation labeled Macon's Bill #2 seemed to offer an 
alternative. The bill barred French and British ships from 
American ports, like the expired Non-Intercourse Act. Macon's 
Bill allowed American ships to trade with any nation, but if 
one belligerent repealed its decrees against neutral shipping 
the president could re-impose non-intercourse on the other 
power.90 Madison still mourned the loss of the Embargo and was 
skeptical of lesser measures. "G. Britain may indeed conceive 
that she now has a compleat interest in perpetuating the 
actual state of things, which gives her the full enjoyment of 
our trade, and enables her to cut it off with every other part 
of the World; at the same time that it increases the chance of 
such resentments in France at the inequality, as may lead to 
hostilities with the United States,” Madison complained to 
Pinkney. Madison conceded that the scheme could work if it led 
France to "turn the tables on G. Britain, by compelling her 
either to revoke her orders, or to lose the commerce of this
89 Speech of February 22, 1810, in Henry Clay. The Papers of 
Henry Clay, 11 vols. James F. Hopkins, Mary M. W.
Hargreaves, et al., eds. (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1959-1993), 1:449.
q  n
B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 239-242; James Madison to 
William Pinkney, January 23, 1810, in PJM:P, 2:195.
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country."9 *
France offered at the bait in August. Word of Macon's 
Bill reached Paris by July. Unfounded rumors of war with the 
United States and hopes of promoting Anglo-American conflict 
led Napoleon to take the opening Macon's Bill provided, and 
hint that he might revoke French decrees. On August 5, 1810 
the Duke of Cadore informed Minister John Armstrong that 
France would revoke the Berlin and Milan Decrees as of 
November 1 if Great Britain repealed its Orders-in-Council, or 
if the United States reimposed non-intercourse on Great 
Britain as Macon's Bill required. Napoleon had little to risk 
and much to gain in offering a reversal of policy. Madison, on 
the other hand, risked much in accepting the Cadore letter as 
a statement of French policy.92
Madison's defenders have generally absolved him of the 
charge of naivete in accepting the Cadore letter without 
further proof that France intended to repeal its decrees. 
Irving Brant wrote that, "Madison took a logical position, but 
with no other evidence to support it," and Clifford Egan 
argued that Madison did not act out of "ignorance, fear, 
timidity or wishful thinking.1,93 Madison did act out of a
91 James Madison to William Pinkney, May 23, 1810, in PJM:P, 
2:348.
92 Clifford L. Egan. Neither Peace nor War: Franco-American 
Relations 1803-1812 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1983), 121-124.
93 Brant, JM, 5:214; Egan, Neither Peace nor War, 122-123.
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certain desperation to preserve what he considered a 
republican form of diplomacy. Madison accepted the Cadore 
letter because his political system required that the letter 
be an accurate representation of French policy. "It promises 
us, at least an extraction from the dilemma, of a mortifying 
peace, or a war with both the great belligerents," Madison 
wrote to Caesar A. Rodney.9<* French action would at least 
force the British hand regarding the Rule of 1756 and the 
"Mock-Blockades." "I do not believe that Congs. will be 
disposed, or permitted by the Nation to a tame submission," 
Madison wrote to Jefferson, "the less so as it would be not 
only perfidious to the other belligerent, but irreconcilable 
with an honorable neutrality."9  ^Madison's target was always 
the entire British maritime policy regarding trade, blockades 
and impressment, which demanded atonement.9  ^Acceptance of the 
Cadore letter promised a return to the full use of the one 
weapon the United States had —  its trade. Madison did not 
think in terms of war and would not for another year. For 
Madison, the Cadore letter and anticipated British 
intransigence gave political cover for a return to the 
Embargo, at least against Great Britain, a policy that Madison
9  ^James Madison to Caesar A. Rodney, September 30, 1810, in 
PJM:Pf 2:565.
95 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 19, 1810, 
ibid., 2:585.
9  ^James Madison to William Pinkney, October 30, 1810, 
ibid., 2:604.
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always believed was the proper weapon of a republic and only 
answer to British naval tyranny.
On November 2, 1810, Madison announced that he would
reimpose non-intercourse on Great Britain under the terms of 
Macon's Bill #2. The wait for official French word of repeal 
became longer and increasingly embarrassing. In his second 
annual message, Madison told Congress that the government had 
received no word on the repeal of the Berlin and Milan 
Decrees, and therefore Great Britain would not repeal its 
Orders-in-Council.97 "On the whole our prospects are far from 
being very flattering," Madison wrote to Jefferson, "yet a 
better chance seems to exist than, with the exception of the 
adjustment with Erskine, has presented itself for closing the 
scene of rivalship in plundering & insulting us, & turning 
into a competition for our commerce & friendship.1,98 For 
Madison's diplomacy to work, he had to believe that the Berlin 
and Milan Decrees had been repealed; the success of republican 
diplomacy depended on Napoleon's being a man of his word. The 
French government continued to seize American ships under 
municipal regulations, and Madison himself realized that it 
was "extremely difficult to keep the public mind awake to the 
distinction between the decrees relating to the trade of the
97 Presidential Proclamation, November 2, 1810, ibid., 
2:612-613; Second annual message, December 5, 1810, in WJM, 
8:123-124.
98 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 18, 1811, ibid., 
8:135.
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U.S. with England, & those relating to the trade with F. 
herself. "99
Not everyone in the government shared Madison's optimism. 
Robert Smith told the British charge’* that he doubted the 
French had repealed their decrees, prompting Madison to 
replace Smith with James Monroe. Smith's firing reopened the 
rift in the Republican party that his hiring was meant to 
h e a l . *00 N e w  England was another source of irritation, showing 
"much impatience" with the renewal of commercial warfare. 
"Whether the appeal be to the sword, or interruptions or 
modifications of customary intercourse," Madison warned the 
inhabitants of New Haven, "an equal operation on every part of 
the Community can never happen."*01
Most important, the British themselves did not share 
Madison's faith in the good will of the French government. The 
foreign minister warned Augustus John Foster, Jackson's 
replacement in Washington, that "no Extremity can induce His 
Royal Highness to relinquish the ancient and established Rules 
of Maritime War, the maintenance of which is indispensable not 
only to the Commercial Interests, but to the Naval strength,
0^ Egan, Neither Peace nor War, 141; James Madison to 
Richard Cutts, May 23, 1811, in PJM:P, 3:315.
100 Brant, JM, 5:273-275; Ketcham, JM, 487-490.
*°* James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 11, 1811 and 
James Madison to the inhabitants of New Haven, May 24, 1811, 
in PJM:P, 3:329, 317.
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and to the National Honor of Great Britain."102 poster was no 
less unyielding than any other minister except Erskine. 
Madison's meetings with Foster, combined with a deteriorating 
domestic political situation, produced a belligerent annual 
message for 1811.^°^ On November 5, 1811, Madison admitted to 
Congress and to himself that France had not revoked the Berlin 
and Milan Decrees, and therefore that Great Britain would not 
repeal its Orders-in-Council. Madison moved on to suggest the 
option he had been dreading and that he hoped commercial 
diplomacy would replace. The president recommended raising a 
regular army and a short-term additional army, purchasing 
cannon and other ordnance, and increasing the navy.104
The next seven months were a countdown to war at three 
different speeds. Henry Adams wrote that Madison "stood midway 
between the masses of his followers," that is, the Republicans 
with Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun and Felix Grundy pushing the 
president to bolder action, and John Randolph of Roanoke
Marquis Wellesley to Augustus John Foster, April 10,
1811, in Bernard Mayo, ed. "Instructions to the British 
Ministers to the United States, 1791-1812." Annual Report of 
the American Historical Association for the Year 1936, Vol.
3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), 317- 
318.
10  ^Brant, JM, 5:374; Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 78-81; Roger 
H. Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964), 33-35; Julius W. Pratt, The 
Expansionists of 1812 (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1925), 50.
104 Third annual message, November 5, 1811, in WJM, 8:158- 
160, 162.
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trying to block any war measure. Madison held out no hope 
for a change in British policy. Madison wrote Jefferson on 
February 7 that "all that we see from G.B. indicated an 
adherence to her mad policy towards the U.S."^** Two months 
later Madison wrote that Great Britain seemed to "prefer war 
with us, to a repeal of the Orders in Council 1" "We have 
nothing left, therefore, but to make ready for it," Madison 
concluded."lO?
On June 1, 1812, Madison delivered the war message that 
had been seven months, if not seven years, in coming. Madison 
declared that the diplomacy of a republic must match its 
domestic institutions. To accept British tyranny on the high 
seas was incompatible with independence or republicanism. 
Madison began with impressment, a "crying enormity" that no 
nation could tolerate. He moved on to the "pretended 
blockades, without the presence of an adequate force and 
sometimes without the probability of applying one," which the 
British used as an excuse to seize American commerce. "Whether 
the United States should continue passive under these 
progressive usurpations and these accumulated wrongs, opposing 
force to force in defence of their national rights," was the 
ultimate question, which Madison reluctantly decided could be
Henry Adams, History, 6:175.
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, February 7, 1812, in 
Republic of Letters, 3:1687.
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 3, 1812, ibid., 
3:1691.
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answered only with a declaration of war.108 In the end, 
Madison concluded that war, even with all of its dangers, was 
safer for republican government than submission.
Most commentators correctly state that Madison went to 
war because the dignity of republican government demanded 
it.*88 Madison differed from the younger Republicans in 
Congress in that the so-called War Hawks warmly embraced the 
classical martial tradition, whereas Madison followed the 
eighteenth-century Opposition fear of war.110 Madison's 
application of republicanism to diplomacy led him into a 
disastrous contradiction. Madison made the dismantling of the 
British maritime program his sine qua non and, in doing so, 
touched on the one sacrosanct issue in British politics. War 
was almost inevitable. At the same time, Madison's 
republicanism prevented him from building the military, 
especially the navy, and denied the United States any real 
weapon against Great Britain. "In a state of military and 
psychological unpreparedness," Bradford Perkins wrote, "the 
United States embarked upon a war to recover the self-respect
108 Special Message to Congress, June 1, 1812, in WJM,
8:192, 194, 199-200.
109 See especially Roger H. Brown, Republic in Peril, 14-15; 
Ketcham, JM, 530-533; Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War 
and the Making of Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 160.
8 Watts argues that the War Hawks overcame a classical 
fear of war. Republic Reborn, 240-246.
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destroyed by Republican leaders."HI
As the Senate debated a declaration of war, Great Britain 
removed the ostensible cause, repealing the Orders-in-Council 
on June 16. Repeal was not, however, a disavowal, and Great 
Britain still claimed the rights it momentarily chose not to 
exercise. Furthermore, the repeal said nothing about 
impressment, resolution of which for Madison had always been 
necessary for a settlement. "Although a repeal of the orders 
susceptible of explanations meeting the views of this 
Government had taken place before this pacific advance was 
made to Great Britain, the advance was declined from an avowed 
repugnance of impressment during the armistice," Madison told 
Congress in his fourth annual message, "and without any 
intimation that the arrangement proposed with respect to 
seamen would be accepted. "On the issue of the war are
staked our national sovereignty on the high seas and the 
security of an important class of our citizens, whose 
occupation give proper value to those of every other class," 
Madison said in second inaugural, marking a shift since 1792 
in his opinion of sailors. In January Madison endorsed the 
Seaman's Bill, excluding foreigners from the American merchant 
marine if Great Britain gave up the right of search, as a 
basis for settlement, despite the fact that Great Britain had
m  B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 437.
112 stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 115-119; Fourth Annual 
Message, in WJM, 8:226.
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already rejected a similar proposal.1-13
Madison hoped to conduct the war in a republican manner. 
His model was the first years of the American Revolution, 
which supposed an armed and patriotic citizenry could defeat 
Great Britain with a few quick thrusts, particularly against 
Canada. He was quickly disappointed on both counts. By 
September 1812 Madison concluded that only "high bounties & 
short enlistments, however objectionable, will fill the 
ranks.”11  ^ Hopes for a successful campaign against Canada, 
which Madison saw as the weak link of empire and the most 
convenient target, were dashed by a number of factors. The 
timidity of General William Hull in the Northwest; squabbling 
among generals Stephen Van Renssalaer, Daniel Tompkins and 
Alexander Smyth at Niagara; and the refusal of the militia to 
cross the border with General Henry Dearborn at Plattsburgh 
conspired to keep Canada in British hands.115
Madison was not opposed to an early and honorable end to 
the war, and Russia promised to provide such an ending. On 
March 8, 1813, Minister Andrei de Daschkov offered his
government's services as mediator. "We shall endeavor to turn
113 Second Inaugural Message, March 4, 1813, in WJM, 8:236; 
Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 295-296.
11  ^James Madison to James Monroe, September 21, 1812, James 
Monroe Papers, Library of Congress, Series 1, reel 5.
115 Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 4-7, 201-205; Harry L. Coles, 
The War of 1812 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1965), 38-39; Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten 
Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 72- 
75, 81-84, 86-88.
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the good will of Russia to the proper account,” Madison wrote 
to Jefferson two days later."^^ Not only did the Russian 
offer promise the chance to end a war that had already lasted 
longer than Madison planned, it was also an opportunity to 
force Great Britain to negotiate over maritime rights. "We are 
encouraged in this policy by the known friendship of the 
Emperor Alexander to this country; and the probability that 
the greater affinity between the Baltic and American ideas of 
maritime law, than between the former and G.B. will render 
this interposition as favorable as will be consistent with the 
character assumed by him," Madison explained to John 
Nicholas.Madison informed Congress that he accepted the 
mediation on May 25, and nominated Albert Gallatin, John 
Quincy Adams and James A. Bayard as commissioners. British 
Foreign Minister Lord Castlereagh suspected that Russia would 
favor a neutral rights agenda and rejected the mediation, 
offering instead to negotiate with the United States 
directly.118
By the time the Madison administration received word of 
Castlereagh's offer in January 1814, the military balance had
Andrei de Daschkov to James Monroe, March 8, 1813, in 
ASP:FR, 3:624; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 10, 
1813, in James Morton Smith, ed., Republic of Letters,
3:1718.
Brant, JM, 6:155-163; James Madison to John Nicholas, 
April 2, 1813, in WJM, 8:243-244.
^ 8 Message to the special session of Congress, May 25,
1813, in WJM, 8:244-247; Henry Adams, History, 7:343; Stagg, 
Mr. Madison's War, 299-302.
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tilted in Great Britain's favor, in Europe and America. The 
American cause was implicitly linked with Napoleon's success. 
Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig in October 1813, combined with 
British victories in Spain spelled the beginning of the end 
for the French emperor. Allied troops entered Paris on March 
31, 1814, freeing thousands of battle-hardened troops for
potential use against the United States. General George 
Prevost crossed into American territory on August 31, but was 
stopped at Plattsburgh. The British army had better success in 
other areas, burning Washington on August 27 and occupying 
eastern Maine on September l.119
Madisonian diplomacy had previously been impervious to 
battlefield results. As the Royal Navy took control of the 
Chesapeake, Madison began to moderate his diplomatic demands. 
The cabinet met on June 23 and 24 to discuss impressment. The 
whole cabinet, except for Attorney General Richard Rush, 
agreed not to insist on the a solution of the issue of 
impressment as a peace ultimatum. The cabinet also determined 
not to accept a treaty completely silent on impressment, 
except for Secretary of War John Armstrong and Secretary of 
the Navy William Jones. The cabinet agreed to accept a treaty 
that referred impressment to a separate treaty, except for 
Rush, who wanted to wait on dispatches from Europe. After 
dispatches from Gallatin and Bayard arrived, the cabinet met
119 Hickey, War of 1812, 158, 182-183, 190-203; Stagg, Mr. 
Madison's War, 369-372, 382-386.
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on June 27 and agreed to accept a treaty silent on 
impressment, as long as American diplomats did not surrender 
American claims on the matter or admit British claims.120 
Initial dispatches from Ghent, indicating a British hard line, 
led Madison to the unorthodox step of making negotiations in 
progress a matter of congressional debate and public 
record.121
On February 18, 1815, Madison transmitted the Treaty of 
Ghent to Congress. By most accounts, that treaty signalled the 
end of the first party system. Madison himself signed a bill 
chartering the second Bank of the United States. He advocated 
a system of internal improvements but vetoed a bill 
establishing a fund for that purpose on his last day in 
office.122 For Madison, the War of 1812 was a vindication of 
republican government. "The war has proved moreover that our 
free Government, like other free governments, though slow in 
its early movements, acquires in its progress a force 
proportional to its freedom, and that the union of these 
states, the guardian of the freedom and safety of all and each 
is strengthened by every occasion that puts it to the test,"
120 Cabinet memorandum, June 23-24, in LOWJM, 3:408.
121 ASP:FR, 3:695.
122 Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 301; Brant, JM, 6:403; 
Ketcham, JM, 604-605; Watts, Republic Reborn, 300-301; 
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Madison wrote in his fifth annual message.12  ^ «It was a
struggle due to the Independence of the present and to the
security of future generations," Madison wrote after the 
124war.
The war was also in Madison's view a vindication of 
republicanism as applied to diplomacy. Contrary to John Adams, 
who left office convinced that the world would never adopt 
American maritime principles, Madison' s optimism never dimmed. 
"If a purification of the Maritime Code ever takes place, the 
task seems to be reserved for the United States," Madison 
wrote to Charles J. Ingersoll in 1814. "Under such auspices, 
truth, justice, humanity, and universal good, will be 
inculcated with an advantage which must gradually and 
peaceably enlist the civilized world, against a Code which 
violates all these obligations," Madison concluded.125 Madison 
wrote in 1827 that the United States would become the world's 
dominant sea power and would act with more justice than Great 
Britain.*2®
The public careers of John Adams and James Madison ran on 
parallel tracks with each ending in a war crisis. Adams's
123 fifth annual message, December 7, 1813, in WJM, 8:274.
*2^ James Madison to Thomas Charlton, June 29, 1815, in 
LOWJM, 2:607.
125 James Madison to Charles J. ingersoll, July 28, 1814, in 
WJM, 8:285.
■^2  ^James Madison to C.C Cambreleng, March 8, 1827, in 
LOWJM, 3:567.
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ability to combine republican thought with diplomatic practice 
allowed him to uphold American rights on the ocean without 
entering a formal war that might have torn the nation apart. 
Madison's inability to do the same led the United States into 
a war which it nearly lost, and nearly divided the union. It 
is perhaps the highest irony that John Adams, who had the most 
right to condemn Madison as a failure, concluded that despite 
"a thousand Faults and blunders, his Administration has 
acquired more glory, and established more Union, than all his 
three Predecessors, Washington Adams and Jefferson, put 
together."127
1 97 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, February 2, 1817, in 
Adams-Jefferson Letters, 508.
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CHAPTER 8: THE EDUCATION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
John Quincy Adams, like John Adams and James Madison, 
received an early introduction to politics, war and diplomacy. 
At the age of eight he watched the Battle of Bunker Hill from 
Penn's Hill, near his home. "I saw with my own eyes those 
fires, and heard Britannia's thunders in the Battle of 
Bunker's Hill," John Quincy Adams later recalled, "and 
witnessed the tears of my mother and mingled them with my own, 
at the fall of [General Joseph] Warren, a dear friend to my 
father, and a beloved Physician to me."* Young Adams later 
accompanied his father on his diplomatic missions to Europe, 
"in the Quadruple capacity of Interpreter, secretary, 
Companion and Domestic."2 From early on John Quincy Adams was 
acquainted with the republican principles of diplomacy, 
reliance on a balance of power, the idea that free ships make 
free goods, and the necessity of a political separation from 
Europe. These principles were at the center of Adams's career 
as a diplomat during the wars of the French Revolution. He 
combined his father's notion of a republican realpolitik with
1 John Quincy Adams to Joseph Sturge, March 1846, in MJQA, 
1:5.
2 John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, April 13, 1779, in PJA, 
8:33.
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his mother's sense of Christian and moral duty throughout the 
course of his diplomatic career.
Both parents trained John Quincy Adams for his career as 
a republican statesman. Abigail Adams gave her son moral and 
religious instruction, writing him that "the only sure and 
permanent foundation of virtue is Religion."3 John Adams gave 
his son political instruction, complemented by John Quincy 
Adams's own study. John Quincy Adams served as Francis Dana's 
secretary in Russia in 1781 and 1782, and spent much time in 
St. Petersburg's English library, reading Hume, Catherine 
Macaulay and Adam Smith.4 When Adams returned home to attend 
Harvard, he feared that others might doubt his attachment to 
republican government, "but I find on the contrary that I am 
the best republican here."5 As an undergraduate and later a 
law apprentice, Adams studied Vattel, Burlamaqui and
3 Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams, Oct. 19, 1780 in AFC, 
3:310; Joseph Illick, "John Quincy Adams: The Maternal 
Influence," The Journal of Psychohistory, Vol. 4 no. 2 (Fall
1976), 191; Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: 
Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 283; George 
Lipsky, John Quincy Adams: His Theory and Ideas (New York: 
Thomas A. Crowell Company, 1950), 75-77; David F. Musto,
"The Youth of John Quincy Adams." Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 113 no. 4 (August 
1969), 270, 280.
4 Diary entries for Jan. 27, 1782, Feb. 25, 1782 and March 
22, 1782, in John Quincy Adams, Diary of John Quincy Adams,
2 vols to date. David Grayson Allen, Robert J. Taylor, et 
al., eds. (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1981-
), 1:103, 108, 115.
5 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 30, 1786, in 
WJQA, 1:29.
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Montesquieu.6
John Quincy Adams devoted his life to what he later 
called "the cause of Christian improvement," meaning the full 
use of God-given talents and resources for the moral and 
material benefit of mankind, linking his view of republicanism 
and natural law to a specifically Christian purpose.7 He 
viewed all political and economic questions as moral problems. 
The right to own property, for example, was a natural and 
moral right. Adams believed that the land belonged to those 
who cultivated or otherwise improved it and therefore accepted 
the Puritan doctrine of vacuum domicilium. "Their [the 
Indians'] cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a 
space of ample sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever 
they had annexed to themselves by personal labor, was 
undoubtedly by the law of nature theirs," Adams argued at 
Plymouth in 1802. He denied that hunting conferred title to 
lands. "Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues 
and enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall he controul 
the civilization of a world," Adams asked.® In a republic of
6 Diary entries for Oct. 24, 1786, Jan. 6, 1787, and Sept.
22, 1787, in DJQA, 2:118, 146, 292.
7 Diary entry, Nov. 12, 1842, in MJQA, 11:267-268.
p
John Quincy Adams, An Oration, Delivered at Plymouth, 
December 22, 1802, at the Anniversary Commemoration of the 
First Landing of our Ancestors, at that Place (Boston: 
Russell and Cutler, 1802), 21, 23; Harold John Callanan,
"The Political Economy of John Quincy Adams" (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1975), 14-15; Greg 
Russell, John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of 
Diplomacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 2-
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individuals, Adams believed each individual "lies under the 
obligation of attending to and promoting that common interest 
to the utmost of his power, compatibly with the discharge of 
his more immediate duties of self-preservation and 
preservation of his kind."9
Trade was also a moral obligation. Adams fully endorsed 
Hume's and Ferguson's view that society passed through four 
stages of development, but unlike Madison, Adams believed that 
the fourth stage, commerce, was best suited to republican 
government. "To commerce considered as the broker and carrier 
of agriculture (for Mr. Jefferson's epithet of handmaid I do 
not approve) still higher importance and more extensive 
protection is due," Adams wrote. Adams tended to distrust 
merchants as a political class, but as he wrote to his father, 
"to commerce . . .  as holding the great link of human 
association between the great vehicle of civilization and 
science, the most distinguished favor and liberal protection 
ought to be given."10 Adams's reaction to the Opium War in 
1841 reveals the connection he drew between religion and
3; Alden T. Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and 
Indians 1620-1675, 3rd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1995), 110-112.
9 Diary entry, Aug. 21, 1809, draft of a letter to his sons, 
in MJQA, 2:12-13.
10 John Quincy Adams, "Society and Civilization," American 
Review: A Whig Journal of Politics, Literature, Art and 
Science, Vol. 2 no. 1 (July 1845), 81; John Quincy Adams to 
John Adams, Oct. 14 and 31, 1811, in WJQA, 4:243, 267;
Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American 
Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 49.
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diplomacy, as well as his independence of mind. Adams, usually 
no friend of Great Britain, argued that it was in the right to 
force Chinese ports open. Adams believed he saw parallel 
duties in Vattel's argument that nations should engage in 
commerce and Jesus's command to love one's neighbor as 
oneself. Adams argued that the best way to love one's neighbor 
was to provide for his needs, that is, to engage in trade 
which might be mutually beneficial. By refusing to trade 
openly, China was in violation of both Christian and natural 
law.** Adams saw American expansion in part as a Christian 
duty, as seen in his diplomacy at Ghent and after.
Both training and temperament usually made John Quincy 
Adams's politics, at least in the 1790s, similar to his 
father's. Adams shared his father's suspicions of the French 
Revolution, writing that "the National Assembly in tearing the 
lace from the garb of government, will tear the coat itself 
into a thousand rags."*^ As "Publicola," Adams argued for a 
balanced government, as his father did. "Distribute the whole 
of your power in such a manner as will necessarily prevent any 
one man, or body of men, or any possible combination of 
individual interests, from being arbitrary," Adams wrote in 
his seventh letter, "but do not incumber your own
** John Quincy Adams, "On the Opium War," Massachusetts 
Historical Society, Proceedings, Vol. 43 (1909-1910), 307- 
312.
*2 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Oct. 19, 1790, in WJQA,
1:64.
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representatives with shackles prejudicial to your own 
interests.1,13 jn hiS eighth letter, Adams congratulated the 
American people for founding their republic "upon an equality 
really existing among them, and not upon the metaphysical 
speculation of fanciful politicians, vainly contending against 
the unalterable course of events, and the established order of 
nature.1,14 Upon reading these essays, James Madison concluded 
that John Quincy Adams, "may have been made the Editor of his 
father's doctrines."15
The Genet affair and the war between Great Britain and 
France brought Adams's pen back into service in defense of 
Washington's policy of neutrality and executive control of 
diplomacy. Writing as "Marcellus" in the Boston Columbian 
Centinel, Adams argued that "to advise us to voluntarily 
engage in the war, is to aim a dagger at the heart of this 
country."16 In his third essay, Adams attacked every possible 
basis for adhering to the 1778 treaties. The United States 
signed the treaties with the king, and the French themselves 
declared that the French king no longer existed. Furthermore, 
the French no longer controlled their West Indian islands. On 
moral grounds, the United States was not obliged to aid French
13 "Publicola," Letter VII, July 2, 1791, ibid., 1:92-93.
14 "Publicola," Letter VIII, July 9, 1791, ibid., 1:98.
15 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 13, 1791, in PJM, 
14:46.
16 "Marcellus," #2, May 4, 1793, in WJQA, 1:142.
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tyranny there. The most important argument was that France was 
at war with almost every major power in Europe, and the United 
States should not be dragged along by the 1778 treaties.17 Six 
months later, Adams wrote as "Columbus” and defended the works 
of Grotius, Vattel and Pufendorf, whom Genet claimed to have 
read but forgotten. Adams further argued, contrary to 
Madison's "Helvidius," for executive primacy in foreign 
affairs. "But the Constitution has not said, that the 
President shall perform no function which in its consequence 
might be productive of war," Adams wrote. "Such a provision 
would have been tantamount to a declaration that the President 
should have no powers at all."18
From 1794 to 1801 Adams served as a participant in the 
making of Federalist diplomacy, first as Washington's minister 
to the Netherlands, then as John Adams's minister to Prussia. 
In both positions, Adams acted unofficially as his father's 
eyes in Europe and sent as many reports to his father as to 
the secretary of state.19 As a diplomat, Adams took a part in 
implementing Washington's system of neutrality, which if 
adhered to, would "place the United States among the most
17 "Marcellus," #3, May 11, 1793, ibid., 1:142-146.
18 "Columbus" #3, Dec. 7, 11 and 13, 1793 ibid., 1:165, 175. 
1 Q Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations 
of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1949), 38-41, 50-52, 58-62, 90-92.
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powerful and opulent nations on earth."20
When France became the greater threat to American 
neutrality, Adams supported his father's policies and choice 
of weapons. "Let us put on the shield and the helmet, and even 
draw the sword," Adams wrote to William Vans Murray, "but 
never cease to hold out the olive branch, and carefully keep 
the odium of aggression upon the enemies shoulders."France 
is forcing upon us a navy," Adams wrote several weeks later, 
"and I wish that all or nearly all of our regular public force 
may take that direction."22 Adams did not share Madison's 
faith that the value of American trade would protect it 
without a naval force and criticized the Republicans for 
wanting to keep American commerce "altogether defenceless." "A 
naval establishment they fear will strengthen the Executive, 
an object of great terror to them," Adams continued.23
The successful conclusion of the Quasi-War and the 
unsuccessful conclusion of John Adams's bid for re-election 
led John Quincy Adams to draw some lessons from his experience 
in Federalist diplomacy. John Quincy Adams, like his father, 
believed that the American reputation in Europe rested on the
20 John Quincy Adams to Sylvanus Bourne, Dec. 24, 1795, in 
WJQA, 1:467.
2* John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, June 7, 1797, 
ibid., 2:301.
22 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, July 22, 1798, 
ibid., 2:344.
23 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, April 11, 1798, 
ibid., 2:344.
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strength of the American navy. "At any rate we must have ample 
experience to prove that between England & France, we must 
expect to be in friendship with both, only when . . .  we are 
in a better state for resistance against injustice at sea," 
Adams wrote to Rufus King.24 unlike his father, John Quincy 
Adams never believed that commercial relations would 
substitute for political relations. Commercial contacts 
inevitably brought political contacts, not only with Great 
Britain and France, but with all the naval powers of Europe. 
The only way to manage this contact was to be in a position to 
prevent both French and British attempts to draw the United 
States into war.26 For John Quincy Adams there was no 
agonizing period of adjustment between republican theory and 
diplomatic practice, as the two had been intertwined from his 
youth.
John Quincy Adams entered the United States Senate in 
1803 as a committed Federalist. He later recalled he shared 
Federalist dislike of Thomas Jefferson, "aggravated by a deep 
sense of his injustice and a profound conviction of his 
perfidity in his personal relations with my father."26 By the
24 John Quincy Adams to Rufus King, Feb. 8, 1800, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 134.
26 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Jan. 31, 1798, in WJQA, 
2:251.
26 Robert R. Thompson, "John Quincy Adams, Apostate: From 
'Outrageous Federalist' to 'Republican Exile,' 1801-1809," 
Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 11 no. 2 (Summer 1991), 
161; John Quincy Adams, "Reply to the Appeal of the 
Massachusetts Federalists," 1829, in Henry Adams, ed.
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end of John Quincy Adams's senatorial term his conflicts with 
Federalist leaders over Louisiana and relations with Great 
Britain drove him from the party. "I never was converted, 
never pretended to be converted, from the Federal to the 
Republican Party," Adams wrote in 1829. "I changed no opinion; 
I denounced no associate.”27 The Federalists had retreated 
into sectionalism, and followed Francophobia to Anglophilia. 
The Federalism of 1808 was incompatible with Adams's creed, 
the Federalism of 1793.28
"It seems as if there was something providential in the 
turn of all those events," Adams wrote of the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1837.29 "The great service of Mr. Jefferson's 
administration was the acquisition of Louisiana, and this was 
rather the effect of good fortune than of design," Adams wrote 
in 1829.®® Adams's support for the Louisiana Purchase flew in 
the face of the growing anti-expansionist trend in New England 
Federalism. While nationalist-minded Federalists such as John 
Adams and Alexander Hamilton supported the purchase, the
Documents Relating to New-England Federalism (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1877), 153-154.
27 "Reply to the Appeal of the Massachusetts Federalists," 
1829, in Henry Adams, ed., New-England Federalism, 139.
28 Thompson, "John Quincy Adams, Apostate," 183.
29 Diary entry, April 25, 1837, in MJQA, 9:351.
30 John Quincy Adams, Parties in the United States. Charles 
True Adams, ed. (New York: Greenberg, 1941), 36-37; see also 
John Quincy Adams, The Lives of James Madison and James 
Monroe (Buffalo, N.Y.: Geo. H. Derby and Co., 1850), 83.
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leaders of New England Federalism feared the power of the 
slave South and the rise of the West.31- John Quincy Adams saw 
the Louisiana question in terms of national power and 
downplayed the sectional conflict. "There is no real 
opposition of interests between any one part of this union and 
another," Adams wrote in 1809.32
Adams did object to Jefferson's policy regarding the 
organization and government of the new territory. "I believed 
that the annexation of Louisiana to the union transcended the 
constitutional powers of Congress, and that it required the 
express consent of the people of Louisiana," Adams wrote in 
1829, separating the power to purchase territory from the 
power to govern the inhabitants of that territory.33 On 
November 25, 1803, Adams moved an amendment to the 
Constitution specifically giving Congress the authority to 
purchase and govern new territories. "We must amend the 
constitution before we can legislate for that country —  And 
it is our duty to amend it without delay," Adams argued in the 
Senate.3  ^ Adams opposed the Louisiana Government Bill as a
31- James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The 
Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in 
Massachusetts 1789-1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 
110-114.
32 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 119-120; John Quincy 
Adams, American Principles. A Review of the Works of Fisher 
Ames, compiled by a number of his Friends (Boston: Everett 
and Munroe, 1809), 37.
33 Russell, JQA and Public Virtues, 35-36; John Quincy 
Adams, "Reply," in New-England Federalism, 156.
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violation of the fundamental principles of republican 
government. "All the power in a republican government is 
derived from the people,” Adams argued on February 18, 1804. 
"The people of that country have given us no power or 
authority to us to legislate for them."'*5 "I considered that 
France could cede only her right of property to the territory, 
and that the right of sovereignty inherent in the people of 
the country, when the jurisdiction of France had ceased by the 
cession, could be ceded only by some act of their own, and 
acquired by some act of the people of the United States," 
Adams wrote in 1811.3® Adams objected to the Two Million 
Dollar Act as simply bad policy. "West Florida I consider as 
our own —  we have bo't & paid for it," Adams told the Senate. 
"Our Country will never be content to purchase the same land 
twice —  They ought not."37 The distinction between the right 
to purchase territory and the right to govern it would 
reemerge in Adams' s response to the Texas question in the 
1830s and 1840s.
Louisiana opened the rift between Adams and the main line 
of New England Federalism; maritime issues made the rift 
unbridgeable. Throughout the first decade of the nineteenth
3  ^Amendment to the Constitution, Nov. 25, 1803, in ffJQA, 
3:20-21; Speech of Dec. 5, 1803, in Plumer, Memorandum, 73.
35 Speech of Feb. 18, 1804, ibid., 143-144.
35 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1811, in WJQA, 
4:204.
37 Speech of Feb. 3, 1806, in Plumer, Memorandum, 413.
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century, the Essex Junto was willing to hide from Napoleon 
behind the Royal Navy and to ignore British depredations on 
American shipping. In 1808 Adams visited his law mentor, 
Theophilus Parsons. "The only protection of our liberties, he 
thinks, is the British navy," Adams noted in his diary.38 
Adams completely agreed with Madison's attacks on the Rule of 
1756, and called the Examination of the British Doctrine an 
"unanswerable vindication of the neutral cause." "To abandon 
the right to this colonial trade therefore is to sacrifice not 
only one of the best rights of an independent nation, but the 
peculiar and most precious interests of New-England," Adams 
argued in his review of Fisher Ames's works.39 In response to 
the Chesapeake affair, Adams offered a resolution condemning 
the attack. Massachusetts Federalism did not share Adams's 
public rage, and Adams later recalled that the Chesapeake 
resolutions were his "unpardonable offense to Federalism."^8 
Adams's preferred solution was to build up the navy, as 
his father had done in 1798. "Had Mr. Jefferson partaken the 
opinions, and preserved the system of policy respecting a 
navy, of his immediate predecessor, he probably never would 
have been compelled to resort to embargoes and non-intercourse
38 Diary entry, May 10, 1808, in MJQA, 1:534.
39 John Quincy Adams, American Principles, 18-19.
Motion of July 16, 1807, in WJQA, 3:161-162; John Quincy 
Adams, Parties in the United States, 66-67.
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against British orders in council," Adams wrote in 1829.4* 
Even with an embargo, Adams believed that Jefferson should 
have increased the navy and allowed merchant ships to arm.42 
Adams did not believe the Embargo to be the ultimate 
republican weapon of coercion, as Madison did, but as a 
measure of defense supported it on those grounds. "The Embargo 
was the only shelter from the Tempest —  the last refuge of a 
violated Peace," Adams wrote to Harrison Gray Otis.43 Adams 
always understood the Embargo as a defensive measure, and its 
greatest use was to take American property off the high seas, 
and out of harm's way. in December 1808 Adams believed the 
Embargo should be repealed, and replaced with other measures, 
both because the Embargo had succeeded in protecting 
commercial and naval resources and because it was creating a 
rift between New England and the union.44 The Embargo 
completed Adams's journey out of the Federalist Party. He met 
with the Republican caucus on January 23, 1808. In response, 
the Massachusetts legislature elected James Lloyd a year ahead
4* John Quincy Adams, "Reply," in New-England Federalism, 
328.
42 John Quincy Adams to Ezekiel Bacon, Nov. 17, 1808, in 
WJQA, 3:249.
43 John Quincy Adams, A Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray 
Otis, a Member of the Senate of Massachusetts, on the 
Present State of our National Affairs; with Remarks on Mr. 
Pickering's Letter to the Governor of the Commonwealth 
(Newburyport, Mass.: W. & J. Gilman, 1808), 11.
44 John Quincy Adams to James Sullivan, Jan. 10, 1808; John 
Quincy Adams to Ezekiel Bacon, Dec. 21, 1808, in WJQA,
3:186, 279.
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of schedule to fill Adams seat. Adams resigned on June 8, 
1808.45
After leaving the Senate, Adams was not long out of 
office. In 1809 Madison appointed him minister to Russia in 
place of William Short, whom the Senate had rejected. On the 
eve of Adams's departure he speculated that the mission was 
"perhaps the most important of any that I have ever in the 
course of my life have been engaged in.”4® Relations with 
Russia would concern trade, maritime rights and American 
neutrality generally. All were issues Adams believed to be at 
the heart of republican diplomacy. Secretary of State Robert 
Smith issued Adams the instructions intended for Short, 
directing the new minister to seek a commercial treaty with 
Russia and secure Russian protection for American shipping.47 
Although in 1781 Adams had described the Russian government as 
"entirely despotical," and upon his return observed that 
Russia "has undergone perhaps the least change of any [nation] 
in Europe since I saw it," he continued, "that change has been 
for the better" and described Czar Alexander as, "a character 
highly distinguished among the sovereigns of the world."48
45 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 143-149.
46 Ibid., 159; Diary entry, Aug. 5, 1809, in MJQA, 2:4
47 James Madison to William Short, Sept. 28, 1808, in WJQA, 
3:322-328.
48 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Sept. 10, 1783; John 
Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, Feb. 14, 1810, in 
WJQA, 1:10, 3:398.
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Moreover, Russia sought closer relations with the United 
States. Adams wrote the secretary of war that "the disposition 
of the Emperor of Russia affords a happy contrast with those 
of France and England."49 Adams met frequently with Count 
Rumiantzev, Chancellor of the Empire, who assured Adams of 
Russia's good intentions. "Our attachment to the United 
States," Rumiantzev told Adams, "is obstinate —  more 
obstinate than you are aware of. ,,50 Given the Russian 
attitude, Adams reported to Secretary of State Monroe in 1811 
that he fully expected to sign a commercial treaty.51
Treaty or no treaty, trade between the United States and 
Russia boomed in the years before the War of 1812. Boston 
merchants plunged into Indian trade in Russian North America, 
to the point where Russian officials stepped in to control 
trade within Russian territory. Adams tried to find out the 
extent of Russia's claim in North America, but Russian 
evasiveness ended negotiations on that subject.52 Trade with 
Russia itself increased as Great Britain and France tried to
49 John Quincy Adams to William Eustis, Feb. 28, 1810, 
ibid., 3:403.
50 Diary entry, Oct. 9, 1810, in MJQA, 2:180.
51 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, April 29, 1811, in 
WJQA, 4:62-63.
52 David W. McFadden, "John Quincy Adams, American 
Commercial Diplomacy, and Russia, 1809-1825," New England 
Quarterly, Vol. 66 no. 4 (July 1985), 615-616; John C.
Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States 
with Russia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1906), 48-52; Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 172-175; MJQA, 
2:178-185.
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close off all neutral trade. By June 1811 Russia was glutted 
with American goods, as American ships often had no place else 
to go. "American vessels are pouring in on us in floods," 
Adams told his father. In July 1811 Adams reported to 
Secretary Monroe that some 200 ships had put in at Russian 
ports, with more expected. Adams believed that the unsettled 
political situation between Russia and Great Britain, Russia 
and France, and Great Britain and the United States would 
prevent a formal agreement, although that same political 
instability encouraged American trade with Russia. In October 
Adams told an American diplomat in London that 130 ships had 
called at Kronstadt alone. Trade continued despite the 60-day 
embargo passed by Congress on April 4, 1812, as Adams told his 
brother that 40 ships had called at Kronstadt by July of 
1812.53
As important as Russian-American relations were in their 
own right, they were only a part of a larger political 
situation, shaped by Franco-British conflict. Adams's mission 
was to observe and report on that war, just as he had in the 
1790s as minister to the Netherlands and Prussia. Just as in 
the 1790s, Adams hoped to keep the United States out of the 
war. "To the policy of neutrality we have greater reason than
53 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, June 25 and July 11,
1811; John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, July 22 and Aug. 9, 
1811, in WJQA, 4:117-118, 142, 148-152, 170-174; John Quincy 
Adams to Jonathan Russell, Oct. 23, 1811; John Adams to 
Thomas Boylston Adams, July 4, 1812, Adams Family Papers, 
Letterbook, reels 136 and 139; Hickey, War of 1812, 39.
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ever to adhere," he wrote to his brother. "The only object for 
which we could engage in war would be commerce, and the moment 
war would take place our commerce would be annihilated."54 
Adams told Benjamin Waterhouse, "the general policy of all the 
American states since the acknowledgement of their 
independence has been peace with all the world, and seclusion 
from the political system of Europe."55
From 1809 to the eve of the War of 1812 Adams entertained 
the hope that the United States could avoid war. He did not 
believe that Napoleon could enforce his Continental System 
without Russian cooperation, comparing the effort to an 
attempt to "exclude the air from a bottle by hermetically 
sealing up the mouth, while there was a great hole in the 
side."56 When Napoleon appeared to repeal the Berlin and 
Milan Decrees in 1810, Adams warned against a possible French 
trap intended to provoke "war with England, which England most 
richly deserves, but which on our part would more than ever be 
impolitic at this time."57 Great Britain and France were 
playing into each other's hands. "The more they [the British] 
continue the war, the more universally will they establish the
54 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 175; John Quincy Adams to 
Thomas Boylston Adams, May 13, 1811, in WJQA, 4:69.
55 John Quincy Adams to Benjamin Waterhouse, Aug. 28, 1811, 
ibid., 4:197.
56 Diary entry, Dec. 30, 1809, in MJQA, 2:91-92.
57 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, April 29,
1811, in WJQA, 4:65.
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control of France over the continent of Europe," Adams wrote 
his father in 1810. "On the other hand the demonstration is 
equally plain, that the longer France and her dependencies 
adhere to what they call the continental system," Adams 
continued, "the more easily will England . . . secure to
herself the monopoly of commerce throughout the world."68 
Adams believed that Great Britain and France would ultimately 
have to permit American commerce in Europe, for their own 
survival. "Their necessities will do more for the restoration 
of our rights than we could do by the exertion of our own 
forces," he argued, in an uncharacteristically Madisonian 
tone.59
Adams was leery of war not because he shared the 
traditional Whig fear of armies and taxes but because the 
United States was woefully unprepared to protect the commerce 
that such a war would be waged to defend. The Republicans had 
already thrown away the navy, the weapon Adams considered best 
suited to a republic. "The prospect of a war with England has 
been so long approaching us," Adams remarked in 1811, "that we 
ought to have been better prepared for it than we are."60 In 
March of 1812 he wrote his mother that the United States would
58 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Sept. 2, 1810, ibid., 
3:482.
59 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 1, 1812, ibid., 
4:286.
60 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, July 31, 
1811, ibid., 4:160-161.
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be fully justified in declaring war against Great Britain to 
defend its rights. "But before we resort to force for 
maintaining them, we must be in possession of the force 
itself," he continued, "and really with our army of five or 
six thousand men, and our navy of ten or twelve frigates, to 
talk of maintaining by force any right whatsoever against such 
a power as Great Britain is too ridiculous."6*
When Adams heard that Great Britain had repealed the 
Orders-in-Council that applied to American shipping, he 
continued to hope that "we shall not be compelled to plunge 
into the fatal vortex of European W a r s . " 6 ^ Adams's hopes were 
dashed on August 6, 1812, as he noted without further comment 
in his diary that the United States had declared war on Great 
Britain on June 18. Although Adams had not wanted war, he 
supported the war when it came. As he told Count Rumiantzev, 
the United States probably would not have declared war had 
Congress known about the British repeal, "yet war once being 
declared, there were other points of collision upon which an 
accommodation became essential for the restoration of peace; 
upon which the chief of these, the impressment of seamen from 
our merchant vessels, it appeared the British government would 
listen to nothing."63 "Our war is the sailor's war," Adams
6* John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, March 30, 1812, 
ibid., 4:302.
63 John Quincy Adams to Jonathan Russell, July 28, 1812, 
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 136.
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told his mother. Like Madison, Adams drew on the classical 
martial tradition at the crucial moment. "There are great and 
glorious qualities in the human character which as they can 
unfold themselves only in times of difficulty and danger seem 
to make war from time to time a necessary evil among men," 
Adams wrote. "A nation long at peace seldom fails to become 
degraded. Symptoms of this spirit of corruption were very 
visible in our country."^ Adams had not been a War Hawk, once 
war came he determined to make the best of it.
While Adams watched the coming of the American war with 
Great Britain from afar, he had a much closer view of the 
approach of hostilities between France and Russia. After 
Russia's persistent refusal to enforce the Continental System, 
Napoleon declared war on June 22, 1812, and marched a 600,000- 
man army toward Russia. On June 29 Adams reported the outbreak 
of war in Poland. Napoleon's army took Smolensk in August and 
entered Moscow on September 14. Napoleon found a deserted 
city, and soon after the French arrived the Muscovites who 
remained behind set the city on fire. Napoleon waited for the 
czar to treat but gave up on October 19 and began his retreat. 
At no point did Russia consider the United States an ally of 
France, de facto or otherwise. At the moment of greatest 
danger to Russia, the czar offered to mediate between Great
63 Diary entries, Aug. 6 and Dec. 7, 1812, in MJQA, 2:396, 
428-429.
John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Feb. 18, 1813, in 
WJQA, 4:436-437.
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Britain and the United States.®® By October Adams believed the 
tide had turned against Napoleon, writing that Napoleon was 
"hemmed in between four Russian armies over whose bodies he 
must either advance or retreat; two thousand miles distant 
from his capitol; having lost one half of the forces with 
which he commenced the war."®® "Russia has henceforth nothing 
to fear from France," Adams reported to Monroe as Napoleon 
approached the Russian frontier. "She must henceforth be the 
predominating power on the continent of Europe."®7
In 1813 Albert Gallatin and James A. Bayard joined Adams 
in St. Petersburg as peace commissioners under the proposed 
Russian mediation. For months the trio waited for a British 
response. In January 1814 Madison learned that Great Britain 
rejected mediation but would engage in direct talks. Madison 
accepted and added Massachusetts Republican and diplomat 
Jonathan Russell and House Speaker Henry Clay to the peace 
commission.®8 Secretary Monroe instructed the commissioners to 
reach some settlement on impressment and to make an attempt to
®5 Charles Bruenig, The Age of Revolution and Reaction, 
1789-1850, 2nd. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.,
1977), 110-112; Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations, 58-60; 
John Quincy Adams to John Adams, June 29, 1812; John Quincy 
Adams to James Monroe, Sept. 30, 1812, in WJQA, 4:360, 389- 
391.
®® John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Oct. 4, 1812, ibid., 
4:395.
®7 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Dec. 16, 1812, ibid., 
4:418.
68 Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 299-302, 369-374.
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acquire Canada. The British, however, sought to press their 
military advantage. Lord Castlereagh appointed a second-rate 
set of delegates —  admiralty lawyer Dr. William Adams, Vice- 
Admiral Lord Gambier, and colonial official Henry Goulburn —  
but he issued an ambitious set of instructions. Castlereagh 
ordered his negotiators to avoid any formal statement on 
impressment, to seek an adjustment of the Canadian boundary in 
Britain's favor, to expel the United States from the North 
Atlantic fisheries, and to make some arrangement for the 
northwestern Indians, possibly establishing a buffer state.
"Between Castlereagh's ideas and those of Madison no 
relation existed," Henry Adams wrote.70 John Quincy Adams 
learned how wide was the division on the first meeting between 
the British and American commissioners at Ghent in August 
1814. Adams hoped to address maritime issues, and the British 
did list impressment as a topic for discussion. The British, 
however, were more interested in an Indian buffer state and 
the Canadian boundary. The British attempted to put the United 
States on the defensive, arguing that the American invasion of 
Canada indicated that territorial expansion was the real 
object of the war.7* Adams had previously written to his
69 Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the 
United States 1812-1823 (Berkeleys University of California 
Press, 1964), 55-69.
70 Henry Adams, History, 9:10.
7* Protocols of the Conference of August 8-9, 1814; The 
British Commissioners to the American Commissioners, Sept.
2, 1814, Albert Gallatin Papers, New York University, reel
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brother that "the acquisition of Canada . . . was not and 
could not be an object of this war," and in a meeting with 
Goulburn on September 1 Adams ignored his instructions and 
denied that the United States wished to annex Canada.72 Adams 
did generally approve of the course of American expansion, 
arguing that the United States had a "moral and religious duty 
to settle cultivate and improve" the Indian territory of the 
old Northwest. His colleagues generally agreed, although Clay 
and Russell refused to call it a religious duty.73 Such 
fundamental conflicts with the British convinced Adams that 
the conference would break up without a settlement. "I have 
never for an instant believed that peace would be practicable 
by the negotiation here," Adams wrote to William H. Crawford, 
"Mr. Clay is the only one among us who has occasionally 
thought it might be."74
Emboldened by the burning of Washington and the surrender 
of Nantucket and parts of Maine, the British ministry came to 
believe that a settlement on the basis of uti possedetis would 
secure Canada better than an Indian buffer state could. On 
October 18, Castlereagh ordered the British commissioners to
27.
72 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, Nov. 24,
1812, in WJQA, 4:407; Diary entry, Sept. 1, 1814, in MJQA, 
3:24-29.
73 Diary entry, Sept. 25, 1814, ibid., 3:41-42.
74 John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, Aug. 23 and
Sept. 23, 1814; John Quincy Adams to William H. Crawford, 
Oct. 5, 1814, in WJQA, 5:90-92, 143-145, 152.
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retain Fort Niagara and the northern and eastern portions of
7 SM a i n e . W i t h  the Indian issue gone, the Americans hoped 
merely to retain their territory and rights under the 1783 
peace treaty. Gallatin and Adams each wrote draft treaties 
that would renew the 1783 articles granting American access to 
the North Atlantic fisheries in return for allowing British 
navigation of the Mississippi, to which Clay objected. "He is 
willing to leave the fisheries as a nest egg for another war," 
Adams wrote in his diary, adding that Clay believed "that a 
renewal of the British right to navigate the Mississippi would 
be giving them a privilege far more important than we would 
secure in return."7** Adams himself lobbied for New England's 
interest in the fisheries. The British would not object so 
strenuously, Adams argued, if the fisheries were unimportant. 
Adams was alone. Gallatin and Clay were ready to give up the 
fisheries, and even Massachusetts resident Jonathan Russell 
would not demand them. The British government, having decided 
that the American war was more trouble than it was worth, 
spared Adams the choice between peace and the fisheries. On 
December 22 the British commissioners agreed to a peace that 
was silent on the major issues, and the two sides signed a 
treaty on December 24, 1814.77
7  ^B. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 105-106.
Diary entry, Dec. 10, 1814, in MJQA, 3:99.
77 Diary entries, Dec. 13, 22 and 24, 1814, ibid., 3:113- 
114, 120-122, 127.
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"We have obtained nothing but peace, and we have made 
great sacrifices to obtain it," Adams wrote to his wife. "But 
our honor remains unsullied; our territory remains entire."78 
The treaty said nothing about the major issues, including 
impressment, the ostensible cause of the war. Adams, however, 
never expected a formal settlement of impressment. As he 
explained to his father in February 1814, the only solution 
was "to leave the situation where it was, saying nothing about 
it [impressment]." Adams was also not surprised that the two 
sides could reach no agreement on the fisheries. If 
Massachusetts objected to the lack of an explicit guarantee 
for the fisheries, she had only herself to blame. "Had 
Massachusetts been tru to herself and to the Union." he wrote 
two days after signing the treaty, "Great Britain would not 
have dared to hinge the question of peace . . . upon the
privileges of Massachusetts fishermen."79
Like his father, John Quincy Adams followed a successful 
peace mission with an appointment to Great Britain. And like 
his father, John Quincy Adams accomplished very little. 
Adams's main goals were to resolve the issues, such as 
impressment and the fisheries, left undone at Ghent. The 
changed political situation in Europe made those issues less 
urgent. "The Political atmosphere both in Europe and America
78 John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, Jan. 3,
1815, in WJQA, 5:261.
79 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Feb. 17 and Dec. 26,
1814, ibid., 5:22, 253.
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for the first time within my remembrance presents the aspect 
of almost total calm," Adams wrote his mother.®® Before 
arriving in London, Adams reported to Monroe that as he 
expected no new maritime war, that the impressment issue "may 
be suffered to slumber until the occasion shall rise when real 
interests will again be affected by them." Adams discussed the 
issue with Castlereagh in May 1815, but dropped it, telling 
Castlereagh that "it was not the disposition of the American 
Government or nation to apply the force of arms in the 
maintenance of any abstract principle."81 Adams periodically 
raised the question of the fisheries as well, but did not 
expect any movement on that issue either.82
Two tours as a diplomat and one term in the Senate proved 
to Adams that the survival of the American republic depended 
above all on a separation from European politics. This belief 
led Adams to support a hybrid of Federalist and Republican 
diplomacy. Adams did not believe the war was a vindication of 
Republican policy, but rather hoped that the United States had 
been "cured of a reliance on embargoes" and argued that "an 
efficient revenue and a growing navy" alone could guarantee
Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 227-228; John Quincy Adams 
to Abigail Adams, Nov. 7, 1815, Adams Family Papers, 
Letterbook, reel 142.
81 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Feb. 23, 1815, in 
F/JQA, 5:282; Diary entry, May 29, 1815, in MJQA, 3:202-203.
82 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Sept. 19, 1815, in 
WJQA, 5:377-388.
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O  O
peace.OJ He would have none of the self-congratulation that 
followed the War of 1812. The war had improved the American 
standing in Europe, but Adams hoped that Americans would also 
remember "how much we suffered by want of adequate preparation 
for war before it was undertaken, how much for the want of a 
more efficient naval force; how much by the miserable 
condition of our army; how much by our unreasonable reliance 
on militia soldiers and militia officers, how much by our 
undigested and unsuitable system of finances; and above all, 
by disaffection, by disunion [in New England]."84
As a Republican, Adams cheered expansion, which would 
remove European colonies as neighbors. He went beyond Madison 
by pronouncing American expansion a divine command. Adams had 
no fear of a decline in New England's influence, as the new 
territories "are rapidly peopling with Yankees." "The relative 
proportion of power between the different members of this 
Union is as insignificant, as the same question between the 
North End and the South End [of Boston]," Adams wrote to his 
father.85 For John Quincy Adams, union was the measure of 
republican government. "Union is to me what balance is to
88 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1815, ibid., 
5:361.
84 John Quincy Adams to Joseph Hall, Sept. 9, 1815, ibid., 
5:375.
85 John Quincy Adams to Benjamin Waterhouse, Oct. 24, 1813; 
John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1811, ibid., 
4:526, 209.
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you," Adams wrote to his father in 1811.®® The battle of the 
revolutionary generation over balanced government had been 
won; the battle to preserve the union, if the Hartford 
Convention was any indication, was far from settled. For 
Adams, union was the main goal of expansion and diplomacy, and 
the bedrock of republican government. "The whole continent of 
North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to 
be peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing 
one general system of religious and political principles, and 
accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs," 
Adams wrote in 1811. "For the common happiness of them all, 
for their peace and prosperity, I believe it indispensable 
that they should all be associated in one Federal Union."87
8® John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Oct. 31, 1811, ibid., 
4:267.
07
John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1811, ibid., 
4:209.
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CHAPTER 9: REPUBLICS AND EMPIRES
When John Quincy Adams took office as secretary of state 
in 1817, he entered a political and diplomatic world far 
different from the one he had left in 1809. The great struggle 
of his father's generation, to establish the republic, was 
over. After the War of 1812 the survival of republican 
government seemed assured.1- Adams's generation faced the task 
of preserving the republic, and to Adams that meant the wise 
use rather than the limitation of government power. Adams did 
not share the revolutionary generation's fear of power and 
blurred the distinction between liberty and power. "Individual 
liberty is individual power,” Adams wrote in 1822, "and as the 
power of a community is a mass compounded of individual 
power, the nation which enjoys the most freedom must 
necessarily in proportion be the most powerful nation."2 
Adams's unionism found domestic expression in his Report upon 
Weights and Measures, where he linked a uniform system to the 
general improvement of mankind.3 Adams believed that a
1 Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 302; Watts, Republic 
Reborn, 316-321.
2 Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 60-63, 69-70; John Quincy 
Adams to James Lloyd, Oct. 1, 1822, in WJQA, 7:312.
314
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government that could use power abroad should also do so at 
home. In 1821 he chided Attorney General William Wirt, and 
Virginia Republicans generally, for opposing the creation of 
a national bank or a system of internal improvements, while at 
the same time approving the Louisiana Purchase, which Adams 
believed was "in substance a dissolution and reconstruction of 
the whole Union."4
Union also formed the core of Adams's conception of a 
republican foreign policy. Adams further departed from the 
world of the founders by calling for a continental union, 
removing any restrictions on the size of a republic. Unlike 
Jefferson, Adams believed that Americans should not only 
spread republican institutions to the whole continent, but 
that the political jurisdiction of the United States must 
follow.5 The main diplomatic enemy of the union, and therefore 
of republican government, was European colonization, a 
monarchical practice. The non-colonization principle 
enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine was therefore the best 
expression of the republican diplomacy that Adams pursued as 
secretary of state and president. Adams opposed colonization 
on three levels; removing the European empires in North
 ^John Quincy Adams, Report upon Weights and Measures 
(Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1821), 134.
4 Diary entry, Nov. 21, 1821, in MJQA, 5:401.
5 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. Empire of 
Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 159-160.
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America that blocked American expansion, preventing the 
introduction of European politics among the newly-independent 
nations of Spanish America, and attacking the maritime 
pretensions of Great Britain, which Adams considered to be the 
colonization of the seas.
"The great European question of the last twenty-five 
years has been solved, at least for the present," Adams 
observed soon after taking office, "but another cannot fail to 
offer itself."® The passing of the problem of revolutionary 
France brought the new problem of reassembling Europe on 
monarchical principles. In 1814 Talleyrand, staying one step 
ahead of political change, put forth the principle of 
legitimacy, a presumption in favor of governments of long 
standing. Legitimacy was the fundamental principle of the 
Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and 
Austria, and the Holy Alliance, which did not include Great 
Britain. The Quadruple Alliance was a political alliance 
formed to preserve the territorial boundaries set at the 
Congress of Vienna. The Holy Alliance, dominated by Russia, 
Prussia and Austria, was a personal league of monarchs pledged 
to defend the principles of Christianity, but posited that the 
cause of Christianity could be served only by absolute 
monarchies. At the Congress of Troppau in 1820 the Holy 
Alliance claimed the right to interfere with the internal
® John Quincy Adams to John Adams Smith, Oct. 8, 1817, in 
WJQA, 6:212.
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politics of other nations, an assertion which began to 
alienate Great Britain from the rest of the Quadruple 
Alliance.7
A presumption in favor of established governments over 
new experiments was not alien to American thought, indeed, it 
was a fundamental article of British and American 
conservatism, forming the basis for Burke's critique of the 
French Revolution, not to mention similar critiques from 
Alexander Hamilton, John Adams and John Quincy Adams.® 
Americans across the political spectrum, however, had no 
sympathy for the pretensions of the Holy Alliance. The Holy 
Alliance was a constant editorial target in newspapers ranging 
from the Daily National Intelligencer, the voice of official 
Republicanism, to the North American Review, a leading journal 
of New England Federalism.® Adams noted the gulf between 
American and European political principles on the eve of his 
departure from London. "There is already in all the 
governments of Europe a strong prejudice against us as
7 W. Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study 
of the European Alliance, 1813-1823 as an Experiment in the 
International Organization of Peace, 2nd ed. (Londons 
Longman's, Green and Co., Limited, 1920), 88-89, 207-210; 
Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827: 
England, the Neo-Holy Alliancef and the New World (London:
G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1925), 4-5.
® Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot. 
7th rev. ed. (Chicago: Regnery Books, 1986), 64-70.
® Edward Howland Tatum, Jr., The United States and Europe 
1815-1823: A Study in the Background of the Monroe Doctrine 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936), 29-34.
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Republicans, and as the primary causes of the propagation of 
those principles," Adams wrote, "which still make the throne 
of every European monarch rock under him as within the throes 
of an earthquake."1°
The new questions in European politics affected American 
foreign policy most directly in the problem of the collapse of 
the Spanish Empire and eventually the Spanish government, 
which encouraged other powers on both sides of the Atlantic to 
seek their own advantage. Adams observed the opening stages of 
the Spanish American revolutions from St. Petersburg, and told 
the Russian foreign minister that all of the colonial systems 
in North America were doomed. 11 Adams did not mourn their 
loss, and in 1822 told Stratford Canning, the British minister 
to the United States, that "the whole system of modern 
colonization was an abuse of government, and that it was time 
that it should come to an end."12 Adams objected to the 
American Colonization Society's request that the government 
purchase land in Africa on the grounds that, "the plan 
obviously imports the engrafting of a colonial establishment 
upon the Constitution of the United States, and thereby an 
accession of power to the National Government, transcending
1® John Quincy Adams to William Plumer, Jan. 17, 1817, in 
WJQA, 6:141-142.
11 Diary entry, Jan. 23, 1811, in MJQA, 2:217.
12 Diary entry, Nov. 25, 1822, ibid., 6:104.
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all other powers."13
Adams believed the Spanish colonial establishment to be 
the immediate problem. The questions of the Floridas and the 
boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase were unresolved when 
Adams took office, and Adams considered settlement vital to 
the preservation of the union and republicanism. Foreign 
possession of the Floridas, either by Spain or another power, 
threatened the safety of American commerce coming out of New 
Orleans. More generally, the Florida question had the 
potential of dragging the United States into European wars. 
Negotiation of the Adams-Onis Treaty with Spain consumed most 
of Adams's first two years as secretary of state to the point 
where "almost all other business runs in arrear."14 Don Luis 
de Onis, the Spanish minister to the United States, had 
started negotiations with Secretary Monroe in 1815, demanding 
that the United States return West Florida and prevent 
American citizens from aiding rebel movements in the Floridas. 
Monroe rejected Onis's terms. By January 1817 Onis was willing 
to cede the Floridas in exchange for an equivalent 
consideration west of the Mississippi.15
Adams began negotiations with Onis in December 1817, and 
the two diplomats moved in opposite directions. Onis hoped to
13 Diary entry, March 12, 1819, ibid., 4:292-293.
14 Diary entry, Feb. 12, 1819, ibid., 4:253.
15 Don Luis de Onis to James Monroe, Dec. 30, 1815 and Jan. 
16, 1817; James Monroe to Don Luis de Onis, Jan. 19, 1816, 
in ASP:FR, 4:422-426, 438.
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use the Floridas as a bargaining chip, and keep the western 
boundary of the United States as close to the Mississippi as 
possible. Adams assumed a Florida cession was almost 
inevitable, and pushed the border farther and farther west. 
Onis denied that the Louisiana Purchase included West Florida 
to the Perdido River but was prepared to back away from the 
Mississippi, suggesting a boundary at the Mermento River, a 
few miles west of the Mississippi, northward to the Missouri. 
Adams countered on January 16, 1818, demanding a cession of 
the Floridas and a boundary at the Colorado River of Texas 
(about 50 miles west of modern-day Houston) to its source, and 
northward along the Rocky Mountains. Onis responded on January 
24 by giving up the Floridas and moving the western boundary 
between the Mermento and Calcasieu Rivers, within the state of 
Louisiana.^ Early negotiations led Adams to believe there 
would be no quick settlement.17 in April, Onis sought further 
orders from his government. Adams instructed George W. Erving, 
the United States minister to Spain, to warn Spain that the 
offer of the Colorado would not last indefinitely. Adams wrote 
that "the impression upon the public opinion of this country, 
of our unquestionable right to the Rio Bravo as the western
16 Don Luis de Onis to John Quincy Adams, Dec. 29, 1817,
Jan. 5, 8 and 14, 1818; John Quincy Adams to Don Luis de 
Onis, Jan. 16, 1818, ASPsFR, 4:452-456; William Earl Weeks, 
John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 73-74.
17 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, March 9, 1818, in 
WJQA, 6:301.
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boundary, is from day to day becoming stronger."*8
Andrew Jackson broke the logjam. In January 1818 Jackson 
urged decisive action against the Seminoles in East Florida. 
Jackson's orders did not explicitly prohibit him from pursuing 
Seminole raiding parties into Spanish territory, and in March 
he led 5000 troops against the Seminoles. Jackson captured St. 
Marks and executed two Britons, Robert C. Armbrister and 
Alexander Arbuthnot, whom Jackson accused of aiding Seminole 
attacks on American territory. Jackson then marched on 
Pensacola, and seized the seaport on May 24.19 Adams noted in 
his diary that Jackson's dispatches from St. Marks arrived on 
May 4. Adams did not immediately approve of Jackson' s actions. 
"Crawford some time ago proposed to send Jackson to give no 
quarter to any white man found with the Indians," Adams 
observed. "I objected to it then, and this day avowed that I 
was not prepared for such a mode of warfare."20
Six weeks later Monroe and the cabinet learned of the 
fall of Pensacola, which Adams feared "makes many difficulties 
for the Administration."2 * Onis lodged a formal protest on 
July 8. The same day Adams met with Baron Hyde de Neuville, 
the French minister and unofficial intermediary between Adams
18 John Quincy Adams to George W. Erving, April 20, 1818, 
ibid., 6:306-307.
*9 Weeks, JQA and American Empire, 109-112.
20 Diary entry, May 4, 1818, in MJQA, 4:87.
21 Diary entry, June 18, 1818, ibid., 4:102.
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and Onis. Adams told Hyde de Neuville that he expected Monroe 
would approve Jackson's conduct. Two days later Hyde de 
Neuville told Adams that Spain was prepared to cede the 
Floridas if the United States assumed American shipping claims 
against Spain. The French minister urged Adams to accept the 
Sabine River as the western boundary, which Adams rejected.22 
Adams met Onis on July 11, and saw that Onis was "more 
tractable on the subject of Pensacola." Onis proposed to give 
up the Floridas entirely and let mutual shipping claims cancel 
each other out if the United States accepted a boundary from 
the Mermento and Calcasieu Rivers north to the Missouri and 
along the Missouri to its source. Adams, sensing his 
advantage, rejected the new boundary and for the first time 
suggested a line running to the Pacific, which would safeguard 
the American claim to the Columbia River. On July 16, Adams 
proposed through Hyde de Neuville a line from the Trinity 
River to the Red River, along the Red to the source of the Rio 
Grande, along the mountains and then to the Pacific.23
Adams could not exploit Spain's weakened position if 
Monroe disavowed Jackson's campaign. "The President and all of 
the members of the Cabinet, except myself, are of the opinion 
that Jackson acted not only without, but against, his
22 Don Luis de Onis to John Quincy Adams, July 8, 1818, 
ASP:FR, 4:496-497; Diary entries, July 8 and 10, 1818, in 
MJQA, 4:105-106.
23 Diary entries, July 11 and 16, 1818, in MJQA, 4:106-107, 
110; Weeks, JQA and American Empire, 119-122.
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instructions,” Adams wrote in his diary for July 15. Secretary 
of War John C. Calhoun seemed "personally offended." The 
constitutional question hung on the power of the president to 
conduct hostilities without a declaration of war. "There is no 
doubt that defensive acts of hostility may be authorized by 
the Executive," Adams argued, "but Jackson was authorized to 
cross the Spanish line in pursuit of the Indian enemy." 
Hostilities were directed against the Seminoles, not Spain. In 
Adams's mind, the power to repel sudden attacks included the 
right to pursue the enemy across international borders.24 On 
July 21 Adams told Monroe that a disavowal would be a 
confession of weakness, a dangerous abdication of power, and 
an injustice to Jackson.2  ^Adams carried the day, and in his 
note to Onis of July 23 threw the blame onto Spain for failing 
to control the Indians within its territories.2^
Adams took the same argument to the Spanish government, 
and from there to the rest of Europe. Adams's instructions to 
George W. Erving of November 28, 1818, which Samuel Flagg 
Bemis called "the greatest state paper of John Quincy Adams's 
career," completed the transformation of Jackson's creative 
reading of his orders into an act of self-defense.27 Adams
24 Diary entry, July 15, 1818, in MJQA, 4:108; Weeks, JQA 
and American Empire, 113-116.
25 Diary entry, July 18, 1818, in MJQA, 4:115.
2  ^John Quincy Adams to Don Luis de Onis, July 23, 1818, in 
ffJQA, 6:383-394.
27 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 326.
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told Erving to remind the Spanish foreign minister that Spain 
was responsible for sheltering hostile Indians, giving Jackson 
no choice but to seize St. Marks and Pensacola. Adams further 
warned Spain that "the right of the United States can as 
little compound with impotence as with perfidity," and that 
the United States would continue to act in defense of its own 
borders, with or without Spain's cooperation.28 Adams's 
vigorous, if not ruthless, defense of Jackson demonstrated the 
gap between his republicanism and that of the previous 
generation. Unlike Madison in response to Mathews's 1812 raid 
on East Florida, Adams did not shy away from the use of power, 
which he believed was necessary for the survival of the 
republic.29 To disown Jackson would be a dereliction of duty 
by not taking a vital action.
Adams completed negotiations with Onis on February 22, 
1819, when the two signed a treaty that ceded the Floridas to 
the United States, and set the boundary between American and 
Spanish territory at the Sabine to the Red River, along the 
Red to 100 degrees west, north to the Arkansas River to its 
source, north to 42 degrees north, and west to the Pacific, 
trading Texas for Oregon.30 "The acquisition of the Floridas
28 John Quincy Adams to George w. Erving, Nov. 28, 1818, in 
WJQA, 6:476-480, 486-487, 502; Weeks, JQA and American 
Empire, 139-146.
29 Madison did approve of Jackson's raid and Adams's defense 
of it. James Madison to James Monroe, Feb. 13, 1819, in WJM, 
8:421.
o n
Weeks, JQA and American Empire, 2-4.
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has long been an object of earnest desire to this country," 
Adams wrote on the day of signature. "The acknowledgement of 
a definite boundary to the South Sea forms a great epocha in 
our history^* A year later Adams remarked to Ninian Edwards 
of Illinois that he was "the last man in the Administration to 
agree to accept the Sabine for the western boundary." He did 
not see the treaty as an effort that benefitted one section 
over another but as an advancement of the interests of the 
whole union.32 It was James Monroe who dropped Texas, for fear 
that the East would come to resent the growth of the South and 
West.33
After Adams removed one colonial threat to the growth of 
the union, two colonial neighbors, Great Britain and Russia, 
remained. The Convention of 1818 temporarily settled the 
territorial question with Great Britain by fixing the boundary 
at 49 degrees north from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky 
Mountains, and opened the territory to both countries. 
Conflict flared up only once, when Stratford Canning asserted 
a British claim to the Columbia River in January 1821. Adams 
denied the claim and after a heated debate snapped, "keep what 
is yours, but leave the rest of this continent to us."34 In a
31 Diary entry, Feb. 22, 1819, in MJQA, 4:275.
32 Diary entry, March 31, 1820, ibid., 5:54.
33 James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, May 23, 1820, in Writings 
of Monroe, 6:127-128.
34 B. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 162-167; Bemis, JQA 
and Foreign Policy, 293-296; Diary entry, Jan. 27, 1821, in
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sense, Adams was speaking not only to Canning, but to all of 
Europe.
Russian pretensions in North America were a more 
immediate problem than British claims. Czar Alexander issued 
a ukase on September 16, 1821, claiming 51 degrees north as 
the southern boundary of Russian North America, and asserted 
an exclusive maritime right along the coast to a distance of 
100 Italian miles (115 English miles). A second ukase of 
September 25 confirmed the Russian-American Company's 
exclusive right to trade north of 51 degrees. Russian minister 
Pierre de Poletica sent a copy of the ukase to Adams on 
February 11, 1822. Adams responded with a note on March 30 
rejecting any Russian claims south of the settlements at 57 
degrees. Poletica left for Russia in April, and promised to 
present Adams's complaints to the czar.35
Non-colonization efforts aimed at Russia were subsidiary 
to the main colonial issue of Monroe's presidency, the 
emergence of the Spanish American republics. After the War of 
1812 Americans increasingly turned their political and 
economic attention to the newly-independent Spanish American
MJQA, 5:253.
35 Hildt, Early Negotiations, 159-162; Bemis, JQA and 
Foreign Policy, 494; Howard I. Kushner, Conflict on the 
Northwest Coast: American-Russian Rivalry in the Pacific 
Northwest, 1790-1867 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1975), 32-34, 46-50; Norman E. Saul, Distant Friends: The 
United States & Russia, 1763-1867 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1991), 96-99; John Quincy Adams to Pierre 
de Poletica, March 30, 1822, in WJQA, 7:214-216.
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nations. The United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (modern- 
day Argentina) emerged first, forming an independent 
government in 1810 and declaring independence in 1816. South 
American ports opened a new field for economic endeavor, 
potentially supplanting other colonial and European markets. 
Baltimore was the center of the new trade, earning fortunes 
for the city's merchants, and owing to the questionable 
legality of that trade, for the city's admiralty lawyers.36
Trade was the most tangible manifestation of American 
sympathy with the republican cause in Spanish America. As 
secretary of state, Adams had to confront the question of to 
what extent should the United States involve itself in efforts 
to establish republics abroad. "There is nothing in Adams's 
attitude toward the new states of South America down to 1823 
that indicates a burning sympathy with them, or even much 
confidence in their ability to establish the free institutions 
of self-government," Dexter Perkins wrote.37 This statement
36 Frederic L. Paxson, The Independence of the South 
American Republics: A Study in Recognition and Foreign 
Policy, 2nd. ed. (Philadelphia: Ferris & Leach, 1916), 53- 
56; Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the 
Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941), 115-123; Laura 
Bornholdt, Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism: A Study in 
the Background of the Monroe Doctrine (Northampton, Mass.: 
Smith College, 1949), 3-4.
37 Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927), 102; see also James 
E. Lewis, Jr. "We Shall Have Good Neighbors: The American 
Union and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 
1994), 309.
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was only partially correct. Adams certainly believed that the 
Spanish Americans were poor candidates for republican 
government and saw no similarities to the American Revolution. 
"Ours was a War of freemen, for Political Independence," Adams 
wrote to his brother in 1818. "Theirs is a war of Slaves 
against their Masters."38 Five years later his opinion was 
unchanged, as seen in a paragraph he excised from the official 
instructions to Richard C. Anderson as minister to Colombia. 
"The revolution of the Spanish colonies was not caused by the 
oppression under which they had been held, however great it 
had been," Adams wrote. "Accustomed to the combined weight of 
military and ecclesiastical despotism, secluded from all 
intercourse with the rest of the world, subdued in mind and 
body, with a people heterogeneously composed of European 
adventurers, of creole natives of the country but of Spanish 
descent, of aboriginal Indians and of African slaves," the 
Spanish Americans did not act from a "spirit of freedom."38 
Adams also discounted the possibility of any permanent 
economic gain from Spanish America, as the new nations most 
wanted manufactured goods which the British could supply and 
the United States did not.48
If Adams had no confidence that the Spanish Americans
38 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, April 14,
1818, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 145.
38 John Quincy Adams to Richard C. Anderson, May 27, 1823, 
in WJQA, 7:442-443.
40 Diary entry, June 20, 1822, in MJQAt 6:25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
329
could sustain republicanism as an internal system, he 
sympathized with and encouraged their efforts to establish a 
republican external system, that is, a system of non­
colonization and separation from European politics. "I am 
satisfied that the cause of the South Americans, as far as it 
consists in the assertion of independence against Spain is 
just," Adams wrote to the president in 1818. "But the justice 
of a cause, however it may enlist individual feelings in its 
favor, is not sufficient to justify third parties in siding 
with it."4* For Adams, whose career began in reaction to the 
French Revolution, American response to the Spanish American 
revolutions had a frighteningly familiar pattern. Adams wrote 
to William Eustis in 1817 that "it is an after piece to the 
french revolution in its republican phase: and Buenos Ayres 
has taken the place of liberty, equality and fraternity.1,42 
"And now, as at the early stage of the French Revolution," 
Adams wrote to his father four days later, "we have ardent 
spirits who are for rushing into the conflict, without looking
to the consequences."43
Henry Clay was the most ardent spirit, and championed the 
cause of the Spanish Americans in Congress, trying to push the
41 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Aug. 24, 1818, in 
WJQA, 6:442-443.
42 John Quincy Adams to William Eustis, Dec. 17, 1817, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 146.
43 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Dec. 21, 1817, in WJQA, 
6:275-276.
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administration into recognizing the government of La Plata at 
Buenos Aires. Adams always found it difficult to concede 
purity of motive to his opponents, and in Clay's case the 
problem was compounded by the fact that Adams and Clay had not 
gotten along at Ghent. After Congress defeated Clay's motion 
demanding the recognition of Buenos Aires, Adams dismissed 
Clay's efforts as merely a pretext for Clay to create a 
personal following by picking a fight with Monroe. Without 
mentioning Clay by name, Adams informed his mother that a 
party, a party leader and an excuse for opposition, "all were 
found, and found out each other; but the political atmosphere 
was calm and the attempts to blow up a gale were not 
successful."44 Clay was undaunted in his efforts to change 
American policy toward Spanish America. On May 19, 1821, Clay 
attended a public dinner in Lexington, Kentucky, and called 
for an alliance among American nations as a "sort of a 
counterpoise" to the Holy Alliance.45
Clay believed that the Spanish Americans could form 
republics and assumed a natural affinity between republics. 
Adams was more skeptical of the Spanish American revolutions 
and believed republican government was best served by 
remaining neutral between Spain and its colonies and by
44 George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1952), 270-271; Whitaker, 
United States and Latin America, 244-245; John Quincy Adams 
to Abigail Adams, May 25, 1818, in FTJQA, 6:338-339.
45 Henry Clay, "Toast and Response at Public Dinner," May 
19, 1821, in Clay Papers, 3:80.
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keeping European nations out, particularly Great Britain and 
the Russian-led Holy Alliance. Meddling in South American 
politics would be as dangerous as meddling in European 
politics. Adams believed that the United States "have been 
neutral, with a leaning inclination on the side of liberty and 
South America."4*> Yet that leaning was not to drag the United 
States into war. In 1820 the Colombian agent Manuel Torres 
attempted to buy arms from the United States government. The 
cabinet met on March 29, 1820. According to Adams, Calhoun and 
Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson wished to make the sale 
if it were possible, with Secretary of the Treasury William H. 
Crawford leaning in the same direction. Adams argued that the 
sale was beyond the president's power. Furthermore, it was an 
open act of war and a direct violation of the neutrality on 
which American safety depended. "It was of the utmost 
importance to adhere inflexibly to that system [of 
neutrality]," Adams concluded. "Between it and that of 
mingling in every European national war I saw no middle term; 
and if once we departed from it, I saw no other prospect for 
this nation than a career of washing their blood-stained hands 
in blood."47
As much as Adams hoped to keep out of war with Europe, he
46 John Quincy Adams to George Washington Campbell, June 3, 
1819, in William R. Manning, ed. Diplomatic Correspondence 
Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, 3 
vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), 1:107.
47 Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 337; MJQA, 
5:46-47.
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hoped as much to keep European powers out of Spanish America. 
On July 23, 1818, Adams talked Monroe out of endorsing a
British proposal to mediate between Spain and its colonies.48 
In 1819 Calhoun was reluctant to act in regard to South 
America without British cooperation. Adams responded with an 
argument he used again in 1821 and 1823. He cautioned against 
following British policy too closely and argued "that we 
should carefully preserve the advantage of taking the lead in 
advancing to the recognition of the South American Governments 
and, while using persuasion with England to move in concert 
with us, take care to let her know that we will act 
independently for ourselves."48
On July 4, 1821, Adams delivered what he called his
"answer to Edinburgh and Lexington," to the Edinburgh Review’s 
call for the United States to enter into European politics on 
the side of liberty against the Holy Alliance and to Clay's 
call for an inter-American alliance.50 Most of the address was 
standard Independence Day fare: the history of political and 
religious tyranny in Europe, a listing of the British acts of 
oppression and the heroic American struggle against them. 
Toward the end, Adams noted the republican system his father
48 Lipsky, JQA, 301-303, 307-308; Diary entry, July 25,
1818, in MJQA, 4:118.
49 Diary entry, Jan. 2, 1819, ibid., 4:207.
50 John Quincy Adams to Robert Walsh, July 10, 1821, in 
WJQA, 7:117; Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 356- 
358.
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had helped establish in 1776, consisting of republican 
governments in the states and reciprocal trade abroad without 
political obligations. The United States had, to its credit, 
adhered to the same republican system since 1776. "She has 
abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even 
when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings, 
as to the last drop that visits the heart," Adams told the
assembled crowd. He then delivered the vital portion of his
address:
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence 
has been or shall be unfurled there will her heart,
her benediction and her prayers be. But she does
not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She 
is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence 
of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of 
her own. She will recommend the general cause by 
the countenance of her voice, and the benignant 
sympathy of her example. She well knows that by 
once enlisting under other banners than her own, 
were they even banners of foreign independence, she 
would involve herself beyond the power of extrica­
tion, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of 
individual avarice, envy and ambition which assume 
the colors and usurp the standard of freedom ... 
She might become the dictatress of the world. She 
would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.51
In his address, Adams restated the century-old Opposition Whig
fear of continental engagements, which now included South
America as well as Europe. To enlist with Mexico or Colombia
would be as harmful to liberty as an alliance with
revolutionary France would have been. That the United States
51 John Quincy Adams, Address delivered at the request of a 
Committee of the Citizens of Washington; on the occasion of 
the reading of the Declaration of Independence, on the 
Fourth of Julyf 1821 (Washington, D.C.: Davis and Force, 
1821), 29.
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should plunge into any war in which it was not a direct party 
would have "the most pernicious tendency to this country, and 
the more pernicious because it flatters our ambition."52
By the end of 1821 the tide in Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
La Plata had turned almost completely to the rebel cause. By 
early 1822 the greatest danger was not Spanish reconquest, but 
interference by other powers. Once Spain was out of the 
contest, Great Britain, France and Russia might enter. On 
March 8, 1822, Monroe announced that the United States would 
recognize the governments established in La Plata, Chile, 
Peru, Colombia and Mexico. Adams informed the Spanish minister 
on April 6, writing that the United States "has yielded to an 
obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognizing as 
independent states, nations, which after deliberately 
asserting their right to that character, have maintained and 
established it against all the resistance which had been or 
could be brought to oppose it." Adams stressed that 
recognition was not intended as an act of hostility to 
Spain.5^
In 1822 the Monroe administration had decided that the
52 John Quincy Adams to Robert Walsh, July 10, 1821, in 
WJQA, 7:117.
5  ^Charles C. Griffin, The United States and the Disruption 
of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822: A Study in the Relations 
of the United States with Spain and with the Rebel Spanish 
Colonies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 268- 
270; Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 371-374; 
John Quincy Adams to Don Joaquin de Anduaga, April 6, 1822, 
in WJQA, 7:218.
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maintenance of a republican hemispheric system, that is, a 
system of independent nations, depended on limiting European 
interference with the new nations. Adams believed such a 
system was complementary to a domestic system of continental 
union. Yet the revolt of the Spanish American colonies was 
incomplete. Cuba remained loyal to Spain. Cuba was also a 
target of American expansion and had assumed the role in 
American diplomacy previously played by New Orleans and the 
Floridas as the territory the United States could not allow to 
be transferred to another European power. The British seemed 
the most likely to challenge the United States for the island, 
as Foreign Minister George Canning believed Cuba was vital to 
preserving Great Britain's Caribbean interests.54 "The 
transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event 
unpropitious to the interests of this Union," Adams instructed 
Hugh Nelson, minister to Spain, adding that possession of Cuba 
may one day be vital to preserving the union. "You will not 
conceal from the Spanish government the repugnance of the 
United States to the transfer of the island of Cuba by Spain 
to any other power."55
By the spring of 1823 the elements that produced the 
Monroe Doctrine as a statement of a republican system of
54 John A. Logan, Jr. No Transfer: An American Security 
Principle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 140-142, 
150-152; D. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 53-54; Whitaker,
United States and Latin America, 422-423.
55 John Quincy Adams to Hugh Nelson, April 28, 1823, WJQA, 
7:372-373, 379, 381.
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diplomacy were all in place. Russian pretensions in the 
northwest and the possible transfer of Cuba from Spain to 
another power formed the main threats to the union and 
therefore to the domestic system of republican government. The 
recognition and appointment of ministers to the new republics 
allowed Adams to spell out the republican system in 
hemispheric and maritime affairs. "With relation to Europe, 
there is perceived to be only one object, in which the 
interests of the United States can be the same as those of the 
South American nations, and that is that they all should be 
governed by republican institutions, politically and 
commercially independent of Europe," Adams wrote to Caesar A. 
Rodney, minister to La Plata. Consciously or not, Adams 
followed Thomas Paine in thinking that South America, like 
Europe, could not be at peace if too thickly planted with 
kingdoms. Buenos Aires, Adams believed, was particularly 
susceptible to European influence.56 Adams outlined the 
differences between American and European systems in his 
instructions to Richard C. Anderson, minister to Colombia. The 
United States approved of the South American revolts as 
expressions of natural right, whereas European nations had 
supported the principle of legitimacy and sought the 
restoration of Spanish power. Adams also took the opportunity 
to introduce what he considered the maritime expression of
56 John Quincy Adams to Caesar A. Rodney, May 17, 1823, 
ibid., 7:426, 428-429.
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republicanism, a system of neutral rights. "The armed 
neutrality of the American war is a memorable example of the 
testimony by almost all the civilized nations of the world to 
the principle, that the protection of all property, excepting 
contraband of war, on board of neutral vessels of neutral 
force, is of natural right," Adams wrote.57
British alienation from the Holy Alliance provided a 
wider opportunity for Adams to push for neutral rights. At the 
Congress of Verona in 1822, the Holy Alliance demanded that 
Ferdinand VII of Spain be restored to absolute power, and in 
1823 France invaded Spain. To Canning the invasion was the 
last straw, and Great Britain broke with the Holy Alliance.58 
In Washington Stratford Canning met with Adams on June 20, 
1823, and observed that Great Britain and the United States 
were pursuing similar policies regarding Spanish America and 
suggested a formal alliance. It was a day similar to July 11, 
1818, when Onis revealed he was willing to cede the Floridas. 
Adams's opponent showed his hand and gave Adams the chance to 
push for more than he expected to achieve. Adams, of course, 
restated the United States's traditional policy of non­
interference in the affairs of Europe. He did suggest that the 
time may be ripe for agreement on the outstanding maritime 
issues. "My belief was," Adams wrote in his diary, "that upon
57 John Quincy Adams to Richard C. Anderson, May 27, 1823, 
ibid., 7:452, 482.
58 Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 396-397.
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all the maritime questions except impressment Great Britain 
would now maintain our principles."59
Adams had attempted without success to resolve the 
impressment question while minister to Great Britain. Richard 
Rush, his successor, frankly hoped that the United States 
would drop the issue and wait for Great Britain to raise it.5® 
When Stratford Canning suggested joint operations in 
suppressing the slave trade, which would involve the United 
States accepting British doctrines on the right of search, 
Adams replied that the United States had just fought a war 
over that very principle and would certainly not accept it in 
peacetime.5 -^ "Search at sea, as practiced in war, is the 
exercise of force by the armed man of a country at war over 
the unarmed man of a nation at peace," Adams wrote to 
Stratford Canning in 1823.62
Adams held fast against impressment and the right of 
search, but for the first six years as secretary of state he 
put neutral rights on hold, as he expected a war with Spain 
over territorial issues that would be fought on land and sea.
59 Diary entry, June 20, 1823, in MJQA, 6:151-153; John 
Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, June 24, 1823, in WJQA, 7:489- 
498.
5® Richard Rush to William H. Crawford, Nov. 24, 1818, 
William H. Crawford Papers, Library of Congress.
61 John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, Aug. 15, 1821, in 
WJQA, 7:173.
52 John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, June 24, 1823, 
ibid., 7:514.
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Adams wrote Rush on November 6, 1817 that "there is no nation 
on the globe, which in contracting conventional engagements to 
enlarge the rights of maritime neutrality would make so great 
and real a sacrifice of their particular interests to the 
principle of general justice, and progressive civilization, as 
this.”63 By early 1823 there were no border issues between the 
United States and Spain, and any power that wished to conquer 
South America would have to go through the Royal Navy. Adams 
was therefore free to reassert traditional American doctrines 
of neutral rights. On July 24, Adams observed that "I have 
been deeply engaged in preparing instructions to R. Rush on 
maritime, belligerent, and natural law," and four days later 
Adams discussed his draft with the president.®4 Adams's treaty 
project was the child of the Model Treaty, establishing the 
principle that free ships make free goods and limiting the 
list of contraband goods to articles of war. The draft 
included a new principle, the limitation of privateering. John 
Adams had relied on privateers during the American Revolution, 
but by 1823 the United States had a navy of consequence and a 
broad-based political commitment to maintain it.65 Adams 
enclosed the treaty project in his July 28 instructions to
®3 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Nov. 6, 1817, ibid., 
6:242, 244-245.
64 Diary entries, July 24 and 28, 1823, in MJQA, 6:164.
®5 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 436-439, 579-585; draft in 
Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose 
Papers, reel 462.
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Rush and noted how much the world had changed since 1817, not 
to mention 1805. Both Great Britain and the United States 
would benefit from the establishment of neutral rights. 
"Maritime war itself, and all the questions connected with it, 
must be affected by the downfall of the colonial system," 
Adams wrote. "Of what use, for example, will her too 
celebrated rule of war of 1756 ever again be to her, when all 
the ex-colonies of Europe and the colonies yet existing, her 
own included, are open to foreign commerce and shipping in 
time of peace? The end of the monarchical system of 
colonization, Adams believed, could put an end to anti­
republican maritime restrictions.
"I appealed to the primitive policy of this country as 
exemplified in the first treaty with Prussia [in 1785]," Adams 
told Monroe and Calhoun on July 28. "I said the seed was first 
sown and had borne a single plant, which the fury of the 
revolutionary tempest had since swept away. I thought the 
present a moment eminently auspicious for sowing the same seed 
a second time." "My plan involves nothing less than a 
revolution in the laws of war —  a great amelioration in the 
condition of man," Adams confided in his diary. "Is it the 
dream of a visionary, or is it the great and practicable 
conception of a benefactor of mankind? I believe it the 
latter; and I believe this to be the proper time for proposing
66 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, July 28, 1823, in 
ASPsFR, 5:531.
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it to the world."67 Certainly Adams had spent too many years 
in diplomacy to be considered a "visionary.” Yet unlike his 
father, Adams had not completely given up on reforming the 
world, or at least improving it somewhat. Adams's neutral 
rights project was the fruit of his republican vision of 
diplomacy, his keen observational skills in spotting the small 
opening Stratford Canning had given him, and his ability to 
adapt to a new diplomatic world.
Adams did not limit his neutral rights project to Great 
Britain but also made it central to his diplomacy with Russia, 
and hoped to link maritime issues and continental non­
colonization. On July 17 Adams met with Baron von Tuyll, 
Poletica's replacement as Russian minister to the United 
States, and "told him specially that we should contest the 
right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this 
continent, and that we should assume distinctly that the 
American continents are no longer subjects for any new 
European colonial establishments."68 Adams instructed both 
Rush at London and Henry Middleton at St. Petersburg to oppose 
the Russian claim of 51 degrees.69
After Adams sent his neutral rights project to Rush, he 
drafted instructions to Middleton proposing the same
67 Diary entry, July 28, 1823, in MJQA, 6:164-165.
68 Diary entry, July 17, 1823, ibid., 6:163.
69 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush; John Quincy Adams to 
Henry Middleton, July 22, 1823, in ASP:FR, 5:731, 436-437.
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convention. In doing so, Adams linked the three aspects of his 
republican diplomacy —  continental union, separation from 
Europe, and freedom of the seas —  all expressions of non­
colonization —  into one system. Adams completed a draft on 
August 7, in which he relied on an appeal to the ostensible 
principles of the Holy Alliance, linking freedom of trade and 
neutral rights as extensions of Christian principles. "Perhaps 
the execution of this great design will depend on the Single 
Will of the Emperor Alexander, and if one Act of his Life, 
more than another could redeem with never-ending glory the 
pledge given to mankind in the Holy Alliance," Adams wrote, 
"it would be that the eyes of all posterity should look to him 
as the Sovereign who first gave effect to the total abolition 
of privateering, and private war at sea."70 Monroe dealt the 
project what Adams considered a crippling blow on August 9, 
when the president asked Adams to remove all references to the 
Holy Alliance. "I accordingly struck it out, and thereby gave 
up what I considered the mainspring of the argument to the 
Emperor," Adams wrote in his diary. ""I relied upon its 
operation incomparably more than anything else."71
Adams's grand scheme of the summer of 1823 represented
70 Diary entry, Aug. 3, 1823, in MJQA, 6:168; Draft of John 
Quincy Adams to Henry Middleton, Aug. 7, 1823 (filed under 
Aug. 13), Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and Other 
Loose Papers, reel 462.
71 Diary entry, Aug. 9, 1823, in MJQA, 6:170; Draft of Aug.
13 shows passages marked for removal, Adams Family Papers, 
Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 462.
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nothing less than a triple play of republican diplomacy, an 
attempt to secure all three aspects of non-colonization. He 
intended to use the stated principles of the Holy Alliance and 
traditional Russian-American accord on maritime issues to 
bring an agreement on the northwest boundary. Similarly, Adams 
used a new-found Anglo-American agreement on South America and 
mutual interest regarding Russia's North American claims to 
introduce a neutral rights project. By August 1823, Adams had 
already enunciated the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
As Adams dealt with Russia and Great Britain over 
American issues, a European issue, the Greek revolt, 
introduced itself into American politics. The revolt against 
Turkey began in 1821, and it was difficult for an American 
generation raised on the Greek classics not to feel sympathy. 
Throughout 1821 and 1822, pro-Greek organizations sprang up 
around the country. Rush met with Greek agent Andreas 
Luriottis in London on February 24, 1823, and sent a note 
describing the meeting to Adams. The cabinet first discussed 
the Greek question on August 15. Albert Gallatin had suggested 
sending a token naval force of one corvette, one frigate and 
one schooner in support of the Greeks. Crawford and Calhoun 
leaned in favor of the proposal.7^
Adams had opposed intervention in the South American
72 Myrtle Cline, American Attitudes toward the Greek War for 
Independence 1821-1828 (Atlanta, 1930), 20-27, 156-158; 
Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings, 266-267; Diary entry,
Aug. 15, 1823, in MJQA, 6:173.
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revolts, an event far closer and more important to the United 
States. He was less likely to favor entering European politics 
on behalf of the Greeks. "But, while cheering with their best 
wishes the cause of the Greeks," Adams wrote Luriottis, "the 
United States are forbidden by the duties of their situation 
from taking part in the war, to which their relation is one of 
neutrality.Adams could scarcely believe that Gallatin was 
serious about military involvement. "Mr. Gallatin still builds 
castles in the air of popularity, and, being under no 
responsability for consequences, patronizes the Greek cause 
for the sake of raising his own reputation," Adams wrote in 
November.74
British foreign secretary George Canning had embraced 
non-interference, as it applied to South America. To a certain 
extent, Canning supported the idea of legitimacy; he 
considered himself a disciple of Burke and he hoped that the 
Spanish Americans would establish monarchies instead of 
republics. His sympathy did not extend to the reestablishment 
of absolutism in Europe or America. Canning turned to the 
United States and hoped to have better luck reaching an 
agreement with Rush in London than Canning's cousin had with 
Adams in Washington. On August 20, Canning proposed a joint 
five-point declaration to Rush, stating that: 1)Spain had no
7  ^John Quincy Adams to Andreas Luriottis, Aug. 18, 1823, in 
ASPsFR, 5:257.
74 Diary entry, Nov. 24, 1823, in MJQA, 6:199.
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hope of recovering its colonies, 2)the recognition of the new 
states was a matter of "time and circumstances,” 3)neither 
side would interfere to prevent a settlement between Spain and 
its former colonies, 4)neither the United States or Great 
Britain aimed at acquiring territory, and 5)neither power 
favored the transfer of any Spanish colonies to another power. 
Rush replied that he did not have the authority to agree on 
the spot and wrote for instructions. The delay seemed to put 
Canning off, and by August 31 he was noticeably cooler on the 
idea of a joint declaration.75 Rush's dispatches arrived at 
Washington in October. Monroe sought the wisdom of his elders, 
Jefferson and Madison, and both former presidents advised 
Monroe to accept Canning's offer.7®
Canning's proposals for Spanish America soon merged with 
the increasing possibility of a Russian threat to Spanish 
American independence. Baron von Tuyll gave Adams an official 
note on October 16, informing the secretary of state that the 
political principles of Russia and the Holy Alliance dictated 
that Russia could not receive the minister Colombia had sent
75 Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 35, 110-112; Bemis, 
JQA and Foreign Policy, 377; B. Perkins, Castlereagh and 
Adams, 316-317; Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 
437-444; J. Fred Rippy, Rivalry of the United States and 
Great Britain over Latin America (1808-1830) (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929), 113-115.
7® Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National 
Identity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), 477-480.
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or receive diplomats from any of the new republics.77 On the 
same day Adams assured Tuyll that the United States would 
maintain a neutral course as long as European nations did the 
same. Adams added that he could not predict what would happen 
if any European power violated that neutrality. Adams met with 
the president on November 5, and Monroe directed Adams to meet 
with Tuyll to find out what the minister meant by "political 
principles." Adams raised the question on November 8, and 
Tuyll replied that "he understood them as having reference to 
the right of Supremacy of Spain over her Colonies."7®
The confluence of Russian and British communications 
demonstrated how diplomatic realism might coincide with 
republican principles. For Adams, the two messages offered a 
chance to revive the project that Monroe's caution had 
curtailed in August, that of issuing a statement of republican 
diplomatic principles to the world. Calhoun inclined toward 
accepting Canning's proposal, even if that meant giving up any 
future claims on Texas and Cuba. Adams rejected that reasoning 
on the grounds that Texas or Cuba may one day ask to join the 
union.7® Adams favored answering the British offer and Russian 
pretensions at the same time. "I remarked that the
77 Baron von Tuyll to John Quincy Adams, October 4/16, 1823,
in Worthington C. Ford, ed "Some Original Documents on the
Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," Massachusetts Historical
Society Proceedings, (January 1902), 400.
7® Adams's Account of his Conversation with Baron von
Tuyll," in Ford, "Some Original Documents," 395, 397-398.
7® Diary entry, Nov. 7, 1823, in MJQA, 6:177-178.
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communication recently received from the Russian minister, 
Baron Tuyll, afforded as I thought, a very suitable and 
convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the 
Holy Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture of 
Great Britain," Adams noted in his diary. "It would be more 
candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles 
explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock­
boat in the wake of a British man-of-war."®®
Adams's naval metaphor should be taken literally as well 
as figuratively. Adams had already discussed British policy 
with Stratford Canning in June, and nothing in George 
Canning's proposal was particularly new. Furthermore, George 
Canning presumably knew Adams's price for any kind of 
agreement was a neutral rights project. Canning's proposal to 
Rush did not mention neutral rights, and Adams doubtless 
feared that following British policy on the recognition and 
disposition of the Spanish American republics might trap the 
United States behind a British attempt to impose its view of 
maritime law on Spanish America. Acceptance of the British 
offer was incompatible with the republican diplomacy Adams 
pursued.
Over the next month, Adams inserted his republican 
conception of diplomacy into three sets of documents —  the 
response to Tuyll, instructions to Rush, and the president's 
annual message. In each case Adams hoped to throw Russia and
®® Diary entry, Nov. 7, 1823, ibid., 6:179.
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Great Britain on the defensive, and force those powers to live 
up to the principles they had already espoused. Adams's first 
note to Tuyll stressed the duty of Christian nations to each 
other and regretted Russia's refusal to receive the Colombian 
minister. Calhoun objected to the reference to Christian 
nations and the Colombian "Minister of Peace" as "sarcastic." 
Adams responded that "all the point of my note was in those 
two words as my object was to put the emperor in the wrong in 
the face of the world as much as possible." Monroe agreed with 
Calhoun and had the offending words struck out.81
The Russian problem took a turn for the worse when Tuyll 
showed Adams a dispatch dated August 30 from Count Nesselrode, 
the Russian foreign minister. Nesselrode offered a ringing 
defense of the French invasion of Spain and of the principle 
of legitimacy against revolution.82 Adams declared that the 
note "beard[ed] us to our faces on the monarchical principles 
of the Holy Alliance," and demanded a response "to be pleaded 
before the whole of mankind."82 Adams proposed to answer 
Nesselrode in kind, defending the republican system of the 
Western Hemisphere and warning Europe against any attempt to 
restore South America to Spanish rule, or put it under any
81 John Quincy Adams to Baron Von Tuyll, Nov. 15, 1823, in 
Ford, "Some Original Documents," 378-379; Diary entry, Nov. 
7, 1823, in MJQA, 6:179.
82 Count Nesselrode to Baron von Tuyll, Aug. 30, 1823, in 
Ford, "Some Original Documents," 402-405.
82 Diary entry, Nov. 25, 1823, in MJQA, 6:201.
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other European power. As usual, Adams wanted to make a bolder 
statement than Monroe. Adams's draft stated that the United 
States government was a republic in which government rested on 
the consent of the people, and that each nation was the sole 
judge of its own government. "The first of these principles 
may be designated, as the principle of Liberty —  the second 
as the principle of National Independence —  They are both 
Principles of Peace and of Good Will to Men." Attorney General 
William Wirt called Adams's statement "a hornet of a 
paragraph," and Adams himself was not surprised when the 
president struck it out.84 "I had much confidence in the 
effect of that paragraph," Adams wrote two days later, "first 
as persuasion to the Emperor Alexander, and, if that failed, 
as our manifesto to the world."85
The instructions to Rush were a less complicated matter. 
On November 15 Monroe received dispatches from Rush indicating 
that Canning had lost interest in a joint statement. The 
president then agreed with Adams to reject the offer.86 Adams 
wrote to Rush on November 29 approving his conduct in 
negotiating with Canning. Adams also registered agreement with 
all of Canning's points while observing that the United States 
had already recognized the new governments, whereas Great
p A
Draft of John Quincy Adams to Baron von Tuyll, Nov. 25, 
1823, in Ford, "Some Original Documents," 405-407; Diary 
entry, Nov. 25, 1823, in MJQA, 6:199-200, 203.
85 Diary entry, Nov. 27, 1823, ibid., 6:211.
86 Ammon, Monroe, 482-483.
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Britain had not. The next day, Adams instructed Rush to 
consider any meeting of the Holy Alliance to decide the fate 
of the American republics as an act of hostility toward the 
United States and to advise Great Britain to act likewise.®7
When Monroe presented a draft of his annual message, it 
was Adams's turn to act as a calming influence. Monroe had 
written a stinging attack on the French invasion of Spain and 
called for Congress to appropriate money for a minister to 
Greece. "This message would be a summons to arms —  to arms 
against all Europe and for objects of policy exclusively 
European, —  Greece and Spain," Adams told the cabinet on 
November 21. Adams observed that Europe had been in turmoil 
for the last thirty years, "and we had looked on safe in our 
distance beyond an intervening ocean, and avowing a total 
forbearance to interfere in any of the combinations of 
European politics." Adams believed that Monroe's draft would 
"at once buckle on the harness and throw down the gauntlet."88
The final message, as delivered to Congress on December 
2, 1823, owed much to Adams. Monroe scaled down his earlier 
draft to express support for Greece and Spain, while restating 
the American position of non-interference, observing that "the 
political system of the allied powers is essentially different
87 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Nov. 29 and 30, 1823, 
in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1:210-212, 215-216.
88 Ammon, Monroe, 484-485; Diary entry, Nov. 21, 1823, in 
MJQA, 6:194-195.
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in this respect from that of America."89 Adams's most direct 
contribution was the passage on non-colonization in North 
America. Adams prepared a sketch on foreign affairs for Monroe 
to use in the message and wrote that "the American Continents 
by the free and independent condition which they have assumed 
and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects 
for future colonization by any European Powers." The exact 
same wording appeared in Monroe's message.90
Adams intended his contribution to Monroe's message as a 
statement of republican principle aimed at both Great Britain 
and Russia. He wrote a secret dispatch to Rush on December 8 
explaining the message. "The concurrence of these sentiments 
with those of the British Government as exhibited in the 
proposals of Mr. Canning, will be obvious to you. It will now 
remain for Great Britain to make hers equally public," Adams 
wrote. "The moral effect on the councils of the Allies, to 
deter them from any interposition of force between Spain and 
America will be complete. It is hoped that nothing more will 
be necessary."9 -^ Eight years later, Adams acknowledged that
89 James Monroe, annual message, Dec. 2, 1823, in 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:217-218.
90 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 366; "Mr. Adams' Sketch," 
Nov. 1823, James Monroe Papers, New York Public Library; 
Message of Dec. 2, 1823, in Richardson, Messages and 
Papers, 2:209.
9* Edward P. Crapol, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe 
Doctrine: Some New Evidence," Pacific Historical Review,
Vol. 48 no. 3 (August 1979), 416-417; John Quincy Adams to 
Richard Rush, Dec. 8, 1823, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, 
reel 146.
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the passage on non-colonization "was my own work." Adams hoped 
to convince Alexander to give up his claims below 51 degrees 
"by presenting a principle which he would consider as bearing 
chiefly on Great Britain," and presenting a warning to the 
British, thereby preventing American policy from being tied 
too closely to Great Britain.9  ^Adams acted to preserve the 
three-pronged system of republican diplomacy he had formulated 
in July and August of 1823. That meant asking European nations 
to uphold the principles they espoused which coincided with 
American goals while the United States maintain an independent 
course.
In 1831 Adams remarked that "with the Emperor of Russia, 
[the message] was completely successful." On April 17, 1824, 
Henry Middleton signed a treaty with Nesselrode setting 54 
degrees 40 minutes as the southern boundary of Russian North 
America.®-* Success was less tangible with Great Britain. In 
October 1823 Canning turned to France and sponsored the 
Polignac Memorandum, in which France considered Spanish 
recovery of its colonies hopeless and renounced any desire for 
territorial gain. When Canning read Monroe's message in 
January 1824, he did not approve of Monroe's emphasis on 
republican ideology, nor of any American bid to become leader
John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Sept. 17, 1831, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 150.
93 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Sept. 17, 1831, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 150; Bemis, JQA and Foreign 
Policy, 523-526; Kushner, Conflict on the Northwest Coast, 
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of the Western Hemisphere. But whatever Monroe's motives, 
Canning was satisfied that American policy in the Spanish 
American republics matched his own. The neutral rights project 
died when Canning showed no interest in negotiations.94
Monroe partially co-opted the Greek issue by his 
expression of sympathy. Daniel Webster's motion in the House 
of Representatives calling for the president to send a 
minister to Greece failed in January 1824. Adams believed that 
the Greek issue had replaced South America as a vehicle to 
"perplex and embarrass the Administration.”®5 Adams summed up 
his feeling on the Greeks, and the operation of his entire 
political system, during a chance meeting in his office on May 
10, 1824. That day William Thornton of the Patent Office
called looking for subscribers to a fund for the Greeks. Adams 
refused on the grounds that such an act would be a violation 
of the neutrality that as secretary of state he meant to 
protect. At the same time, Senator Thomas Hart Benton of 
Missouri came in and introduced the Reverend Salmon Giddings 
of St. Louis, who was raising money to build a Presbyterian 
church. Adams contributed to the church fund. Adams revealed 
to his three visitors the same republican system he had shown 
in his public statements: neutrality in the affairs of Europe
94 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 442-444; Temperley,
Foreign Policy of Canning, 114-118, 127-129.
95 Irving H. Bartlett, Daniel Webster (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 1978), 100-103; Diary entry, Jan. 17, 1824, in 
MJQA, 6:233.
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and the moral improvement of mankind at home.96
Moral improvement through the use of government to 
strengthen the union was the central goal of Adams's 
presidency. Like his father, Adams intended to act as a 
president above party, as a republicanized Patriot King. He 
was hamstrung by his second-place finish to Andrew Jackson in 
the Electoral College and by the popular belief that he owed 
his election by the House of Representatives to a "corrupt 
bargain" with fourth-place finisher and House Speaker Henry 
Clay, in which, contrary to Adams's professed political 
principles, Clay traded his support for an appointment as 
secretary of state.97 Clay had made his decision for Adams 
long before the final vote, believing that Jackson's election 
would be dangerous both for the country and to Clay's own 
political position as spokesman for the West. Most of the 
political differences between Clay and Adams had disappeared. 
The two had always supported a system of internal improvements 
and tariffs. Clay's object was political, seeing the American 
System as a vehicle for giving each section a stake in the 
well-being of the others, thereby preserving the union. 
Adams's purpose, on the other hand, was the moral uplift of 
the American citizenry, a goal to which Clay had no 
pretensions. Diplomatic differences that began at Ghent and
96 Diary entry. May 10, 1824, ibid,, 6:324-325.
97 Ketcham, Presidents Above Party, 130, 134; Mary M. W. 
Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1985), 37-40.
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continued throughout the Monroe administration evaporated on 
December 2, 1823, when Clay told Adams that the paragraphs on 
foreign affairs, Adams's work, were the best part of Monroe's 
message. All that remained in 1824 were two men with vastly 
different personalities who both wanted to be president. Clay 
was willing to serve as secretary of state, as it seemed the 
most direct route to the White House.
Adams as president intended to carry out the three 
aspects of non-colonization —  continental union, separation 
from Europe, and freedom of the seas. With Florida in American 
hands and Spain almost completely removed as a neighbor, the 
preservation of the union was strictly a domestic matter. In 
his first annual message Adams pledged himself to a system of 
internal improvements, scientific explorations, and the 
creation of a national university. Adams told Congress that 
"liberty is power" and "that the nation blessed with the most 
liberty must in proportion to numbers be the most powerful 
nation on earth." Unlike his father, Adams believed that 
liberty was cumulative and that power "shall be exercised to 
ends of beneficence, to improve the condition of himself and
Bemis, JQA and Union, 33; Callanan, "Political Economy of 
JQA," 4-5, 295; Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings, 336-337, 
340-341; Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 33-37; D. Howe, 
Political Culture of the American Whigs, 138; Lipsky, JQA, 
146; Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 225-232, 253-254; 
Diary entry, Dec. 2, 1823, in MJQA, 6:224.
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his fellow man."99 To Adams's opponents, the president was 
proposing a use of federal power in domestic affairs far 
beyond anything the Constitution authorized. By early 1826 old 
Republicans such as William Branch Giles and John Randolph of 
Roanoke joined forces with Jacksonians and Crawfordites led by 
Martin Van Buren to form an opposition better organized than 
pro-Adams forces.1°° Adams himself refused to engage in 
politicking in his own defense. "I see no reason sufficient to 
justify a departure from the principle which I entered upon 
the Administration, of removing no public officer for merely 
preferring another candidate for the Presidency,” Adams wrote 
in 1826.101 A y e a r  later, Adams wrote that using his office to 
promote his own re-election "would be to establish a 
Government of party, and it would disqualify many of the most 
distinguished worthies of the land.” "Such a system would be 
repugnant to every feeling of my soul," Adams concluded.!02
Adams in many ways had the reverse of Madison's 
difficulties. Adams was able to fit republicanism into 
diplomacy, but in domestic affairs he attempted to force 
political reality into a theoretical system. Adams also missed
99 Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 166; John Quincy Adams, 
annual message, Dec. 6, 1825, in Richardson, Messages and 
Papers, 2:316.
1°° Risjord, Old Republicans, 259-261.
1°1 Diary entry, Oct. 28, 1826, in MJQA, 7:163-164.
1°2 John Quincy Adams to George Sullivan, Sept. 22, 1827, 
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 149.
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or chose to ignore the legitimization of party politics that
began during his senatorial career and continued during his
absence in Europe. After 1800 the Federalist party accepted
and tried to use Jeffersonian tactics, such as political clubs
and mass meetings. Adams, by remaining aloof from party
politics, ruined any chance he had of passing his domestic 
103program.
The role of the other two legs of the republican triad, 
separation from Europe and freedom of the seas, is best seen 
in Adams's attempted participation in the Panama Congress of 
1826. The Congress was the grand scheme of Simon Bolivar, who 
envisioned an "Amphyctionic Assembly," representing a 
confederation modelled on the league of Greek city states in 
the fifth century B. C. On December 7, 1824 Bolivar issued a 
circular letter to all of the Spanish American republics for 
a Congress to be held on October 1, 1825. Originally the
United States was not included, but the Mexican and Colombian 
governments sent out feelers in the spring of 1825, and 
Colombia made a formal offer later in the year. The conference 
was expanded to include Great Britain and the Netherlands, 
since both owned Caribbean territories and had financial ties 
to many of the new r e p u b l i c s .
103 David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution in American 
Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of 
Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 29- 
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That Adams was willing to consider sending a delegate to 
the Congress is evidence of the influence of Clay on the 
president. Adams met with Clay on April 23, 1825, and Clay 
informed him that the Mexican minister had proposed that the 
United States be represented at the Panama Congress. Clay 
urged acceptance. That day an agenda for the Congress appeared 
in the National Journal. Adams believed the Congress was "of 
great importance" and was particularly interested in the 
project of codifying "-American principles of maritime, 
belligerent and neutral law," which was "of infinite 
magnitude." "This is a grain of mustard seed," the president 
observed.105 Four days later Clay reported on his conversation 
with Pablo Obregon, the Mexican minister, and Jose Maria 
Salazar, the Colombian minister. "Mr. Clay continues earnest 
in the desire that a Minister should be appointed to this 
Congress," Adams noted, but Secretary of War James Barbour 
"urges many objections against it."106 On May 7 Barbour came 
around to favor the mission, and Adams directed Clay to inform 
Obregon and Salazar that the United States would accept a 
formal invitation to the Congress.107
Adams briefly mentioned that the United States would
America, 571-573; Joseph B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its 
Beginnings (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), 312-313.
105 Remini, Clay, 276; Diary entry, April 23, 1825, in MJQA, 
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107 Diary entry, May 7, 1825, ibid., 6:542.
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attend the Panama Congress in his first annual message.108 On 
December 26 Adams sent a message to the Senate nominating 
Richard C. Anderson, the minister to Colombia and a Clay 
adherent, and John Sergeant, a prominent Philadelphia 
Federalist attorney, as ministers to the Panama Congress. 
Adams explained that the possibility of a maritime rights 
convention establishing that free ships make free goods and 
defining legal blockades was of the utmost importance and 
could be more efficiently done at the Panama Congress than by 
approaching each nation individually. Adams also hoped to use 
the "moral influence" of the United States to advance the 
cause of religious liberty.109 The same coalition of Jackson, 
Crawford and Calhoun supporters that opposed Adams on internal 
improvements opposed him on foreign affairs. In January 1826 
Martin Van Buren submitted a resolution in the Senate denying 
the president the right to nominate ministers to such a 
conference. The Senate defeated Van Buren's motion on March 
14.110
On March 15 Adams transmitted the documents relating to 
the mission to the House of Representatives, along with a 
message defending the mission. Adams stated that "the corner 
stone of all our future relations with them [Latin American
108 John Quincy Adams, annual message, Dec. 6, 1825, in 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:302.
109 John Quincy Adams, message of Dec. 26, 1825, ibid., 
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nations] was disinterestedness." He denied that any alliance 
was in the works and stated that the American role at the 
Congress was "merely consultative" and that there would be no 
agreement unless approved by the proper branches of the 
government. Adams's most difficult task was to square American 
participation in the Panama Congress with Washington's 
recommendations against permanent alliances in the Farewell 
Address. Adams argued that his policy was no different. 
Washington had drawn a line between Europe and America in 
1796, as had Monroe in 1823. In 1796 the United States was the 
only independent nation in the Western Hemisphere. In 1826 the 
United States was the most powerful of a group of independent 
nations. Adams would make no political commitments but 
believed the new nations had more in common with the United 
States than either had with Europe.111
Clay issued instructions to Anderson and Sergeant on May 
8, 1826. if the decision to attend the conference belonged to 
Clay, the instructions belonged to Adams. Left completely to 
himself, Clay might have called for closer political ties with 
the new nations. The instructions embodied the republican 
diplomatic system Adams had devised in the summer of 1823 and 
had inserted into Monroe's message of December 2, 1823. The 
first general instruction was that the United States should 
maintain its neutrality. "All notion is rejected of an
111 John Quincy Adams, message of March 15, 1826, in 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:331, 336-338.
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Amphyctionic Council, invested with power finally, to decide 
controversies between the American States, or to regulate, in 
any respect, their conduct," Clay wrote. The idea of a 
"counterpoise" to the Holy Alliance was officially dead. Clay 
added that "no intention has been entertained to change the 
present pacific and neutral policy of the United States."112
Much of the instructions were dedicated to the American 
doctrine of neutral rights, which Adams considered vital to a 
republican conception of diplomacy and believed he had saved 
by rejecting Canning's offer of a joint statement on South 
America. Getting nations at war to agree on a system of 
neutral rights was no easier in 1826 than it had been at the 
height of the Napoleonic wars. An Englishmen, Lord Thomas 
Cochrane, headed Chile's navy, and brought with him British 
notions of maritime law. In 1825 Brazil and Argentina went to 
war over possession of the Banda Oriental (modern-day Uruguay) 
and proclaimed blockades that the United States considered 
illegal.113 Clay directed Anderson and Sergeant to treat with 
all nations attending on maritime topics, even if the Congress 
as a whole did not. The envoys were to propose "to abolish war 
against private property," and to propose a definition of
112 Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant, May 
8, 1826, in Clay, Papers, 5:314, 316.
113 Edward Baxter Billingsley, In Defense of Neutral Rights: 
The United States Navy and the Wars of Independence in Chile 
and Peru (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1967), 93-96; H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the 
Nineteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 
157-158.
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blockade suitable to neutral powers. Clay enclosed Adams's 
neutral rights project of July 28, 1823, which "proved
abortive" with Great Britain, but might be useful at 
Panama.114
Clay next turned to non-colonization and the problem of 
Cuba. He reiterated the statement in the Monroe Doctrine that 
the Americas were closed off from future colonization, but 
that the United States would not disturb existing colonies. 
Cuba and Puerto Rico provided the most tempting targets for 
other powers, European and American. The United States would 
prefer that Cuba were independent and able to maintain that 
status. The United States would not, however, enter into any 
agreement to defend Cuban independence, nor would the United 
States look favorably on Cuba's annexation by Mexico or 
Colombia, since neither nation could hold the island, and it 
would most likely pass to a European power. Clay also 
instructed Anderson and Sergeant to convince other nations to 
renounce designs on Cuba and Puerto Rico.115
The American ministers never reached the Panama Congress. 
Anderson died on June 24 at Cartegena, and Sergeant refused to 
travel during malaria season. The Congress itself lasted from 
June 22 to July 15, with Mexico, Central America, Peru and 
Colombia in attendance, and concluded a treaty of
114 Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant, May 
8, 1826, in Clay, Papers, 5:315, 322-324.
115 Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant, May 
8, 1826, ibid., 5:330-335.
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confederation, organization of a joint military, and 
provisions for future meetings. The Congress voted to 
reconvene at Tacabaya, Mexico in 1827, after the signatory 
nations ratified the treaties. Joel R. Poinsett, the American 
minister to Mexico, replaced Anderson, and he and Sergeant 
arrived at Tacabaya in January 1827. The Congress never 
reconvened, as only Colombia ratified the first agreement. The 
British, represented by Edward Dawkins, were hard at work 
counteracting American influence at Panama, particularly 
opposing any American attempt at a neutral rights project. 
Dawkins work was done for him, as Mexico and Colombia were 
angered by the American position on Cuba, and opposed the 
United States on neutral rights. Dawkins reported to Canning 
that American influence in Spanish America was minimal.116
Despite the failure to attend the Panama Congress, Adams 
did not believe relations with South America had been harmed. 
Adams informed Richard Rush that the United States would 
continue to pursue a policy of "kindness, moderation and 
forbearance."117 American failure to keep British maritime 
principles out of the Western Hemisphere, however, was a 
bitter blow and was symbolized by American diplomacy with 
Brazil. Brazilian-American relations had been tense throughout
116 Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 157-158; Rippy, Rivalry, 
227-228, 240-246; Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 179- 
186; Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 581-583.
117 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Aug. 16, 1827, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 149.
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Adams's presidency, owing to American objections to Brazil's 
blockade of Argentina. In 1827, Commodore James Biddle, 
commanding the American squadron off the coast of Brazil, 
approached the Brazilian government about accepting American 
rules concerning blockades. Biddle reported to Navy Secretary 
Samuel Southard that Brazil seemed receptive until Great 
Britain intimidated Brazil into accepting British rules. The 
truth was that Great Britain simply accepted the Brazilian 
blockade as legal.118
Southard passed Biddle's report, Anglophobia and all, to 
the president in December 1827. Adams accepted Biddle's 
interpretation. "Cannon law is the law of Great Britain 
towards other nations," Adams complained. "Belligerent, she 
tramples on neutral rights; neutral, she maintains them at the 
cannon's mouth; and the Brazilian courts have been awed into 
submission."118 One of Adams's last acts as president was to 
request the publication of Clay's instructions to Anderson and 
Sergeant, for the use of future administrations.120
John Quincy Adams spent most of his career in diplomacy, 
either as a minister abroad or as secretary of state, and in
118 Richard Carl Froelich, "The United States Navy and 
Diplomatic Relations with Brazil, 1822-1871" (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University, 1971), 59-60; 
David F. Long, Sailor-Diplomat: A Biography of Commodore 
James Biddle, 1783-1848 (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval 
Institute Press, 1983), 136.
119 Diary entry, Dec. 19, 1827, in MJQA, 7:385.
120 John Quincy Adams, message of March 3, 1829, in 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:431.
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those capacities was quite successful in finding an effective 
foreign policy suitable to republican government based on a 
continental union and opposition to political and commercial 
colonization. He also found that the skills of a diplomat did 
not necessarily translate into success as president, 
especially when that president showed no skill or taste for 
the political dealings required to pass a legislative program. 
Adams's own sense of republican theory doomed his project for 
internal improvements. In foreign affairs, Adams was the 
victim of events in South America beyond his control, perhaps 
revealing the limits of the ability of the United States to 
shape the world around them. Adams was at his best in a 
crisis, but his presidency was the quietest of any since 1789. 
Unlike John Adams and James Madison, John Quincy Adams did not 
leave the presidency with any sense of accomplishment and was 
not ready to retire. "The cause of the Union and of 
improvement will remain," Adams wrote in his diary a few days 
before leaving office, "and I will have duties to it and to my 
country yet to discharge."121
Diary entry, Feb. 28, 1829, in MJQA, 8:100-101.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 10: AN OPPOSITION WHIG
John Quincy Adams spent two years in what was at best a 
fitful retirement, dividing his time between Washington and 
Quincy, not ready to retire but having no office. In the fall 
of 1830 he accepted the National Republican nomination to 
represent the Plymouth district in Congress, winning election 
on November 1, 1830.* He joined the Whig party as it emerged 
out of the wreckage of the National Republican and Anti- 
Masonic parties, and for the rest of his life, except for the 
month-long Harrison administration, was a member of the 
opposition. By the outbreak of the Mexican War, Adams was the 
last remaining statesman with any direct personal connection 
to the American Revolution, and the republican thought that 
produced it. The republicanism that Adams learned from his 
father and from English Opposition thought taught him to view 
domestic and foreign policies as parts of a whole, either 
efforts to preserve liberty or conspiracies against it. Adams 
saw the political attempt of the slave South to preserve and 
extend slavery as the driving force behind Democratic 
expansionism, and interpreted it within the framework of
1 Leonard L. Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman 
John Quincy Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
7-8.
36f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
367
Opposition thought.^
The idea of an organized slave power was only one of the 
conspiracy theories in an age awash in reactions to supposed 
conspiracies, among the more prominent being anti-Masonry and 
nativism. Anti-Masons and nativists saw secret societies from 
abroad plotting behind closed doors to undermine American 
republicanism.^ Adams's view of a slave power conspiracy had 
more in common with Opposition attacks on Robert Walpole in 
the 1720s and Republican criticism of Hamilton in the 1790s. 
Adams perceived, a domestic conspiracy whose basic aims were 
in plain view, the Opposition model of executive corruption. 
Adams drew on Opposition thought to make sense of a series of 
seemingly unconnected events.* His depiction of the conspiracy 
came from overzealously connecting events that did not 
necessarily have any connection, but appeared to come from the 
same source. Just as Walpole attempted to create a patronage 
machine out of the fiscal revolution of the early-eighteenth 
century, and Hamilton embarked on a similar program in America 
in the 1790s, slave state congressmen generally acted in 
concert to protect and augment the political power of 
slaveholders and their allies. Adams saw the rapid and cheap
2 Ibid., 54.
2 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1965), 15-23.
* Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: 
Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century." William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 39 no. 3 (July 1982), 421.
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sale of public lands as the bribe the slave states offered the 
West and the fuel of executive corruption. The need to acquire 
more slave lands, and discourage measures that might benefit 
the North, drove Democratic foreign policy.
John Adams had never thought deeply about slavery. James 
Madison had taken great pains not to think about the 
implications of slavery for republican government during his 
political career, although the question tortured him in 
retirement.5 John Quincy Adams could also ignore slavery until 
the Missouri Compromise showed that slavery and territorial 
expansion were inextricably linked. "I take it for granted 
that the present question [of Missouri] is a mere preamble," 
Adams wrote in January 1820, "a title-page to a great and 
tragic volume."5 "Slavery is the great and foul stain upon the 
North American Union," Adams wrote in his diary several weeks 
later, after a conversation with Calhoun about Missouri, and 
speculated that "a dissolution, at least temporary, of the 
Union" might be necessary to abolish slavery. He recognized 
that he was engaging in speculation and seemed to be willing 
to let a future generation solve the problem.7 In discussing 
the Adams-Onis Treaty with Ninian Edwards of Illinois, Adams
5 Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and 
the Republican Legacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 253-322.
5 Diary entry, Jan. 10, 1820, in MJQA, 4:502; Richards, 
Congressman JQA, 100-103.
7 Diary entry, Feb. 24, 1820, in MJQA, 4:531.
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said that if he viewed expansion only "as an Eastern man, I 
should be disinclined to have either Texas or Florida without 
a restriction of excluding slavery from them." Adams did not 
consider himself an eastern man, but a man of the whole 
nation, pledged to defend the interests of all sections. 
Loyalty to the union outweighed any anti-slavery feeling Adams 
had in the 1820s.® Adams was not firmly identified with any 
side of the slavery question and in 1827 remarked that during 
the election of 1824, "I was misrepresented at the South as a 
restrictionist and in the Northwest as a slaveholder.1,9
Adams had no love for Andrew Jackson but did not believe 
that Jackson could erect a tyranny. Adams thought, with 
Madison, that the United States, "is too extensive, its 
component interests too various, its institutions too 
complicated and the law as well as the establishment of 
liberty too universal to admit to establishment of any 
despotism."10 Adams did believe that Jackson would oppose 
tariffs and internal improvements.11 Initially, Adams believed 
the conflict was not slavery against freedom but confederation 
against union. Adams met with Supreme Court Justice Smith
8 Diary entry, March 31, 1820, ibid., 5:54.
9 John Quincy Adams to Edward Everett, April 11, 1827, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 148.
10 John Quincy Adams to Charles Hammond, April 13, 1829, 
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 149.
11 John Quincy Adams to Henry Clay, April 21, 1829, in Clay, 
Papers, 8:33.
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Thompson in 1831 and both believed "that the leading system of 
the present Administration is to resolve the Government of 
this Union into the national imbecility of the old 
Confederation."12
The South Carolina legislature, guided by Vice-President 
Calhoun, led the way by declaring the Tariff of 1828 null and 
void. Calhoun argued that the tariff was unconstitutional 
because it favored one particular branch of the economy rather 
than because it raised a revenue. Justifying state 
nullification of federal laws, Calhoun agreed with William 
Blackstone that absolute sovereignty existed somewhere in 
society and Calhoun placed that sovereignty with the states. 
Adams attacked nullification on both fronts. He denied that 
absolute sovereignty could exist in a free government, calling 
the idea the "most pernicious of political errors." "The 
doctrine that Sovereign must necessarily be unlimited power is 
to my mind so glaringly incompatible with any consistent 
theory of human rights," Adams wrote to John Marshall.14
In a July 4, 1831 oration at Quincy, his first public
12 Diary entry, Jan. 30, 1831, in MJQA, 8:304.
13 William w. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The 
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1965), 136-140, 161-162, 171, 173-176; 
John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union: A 
Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1988), 158.
14 John Quincy Adams to Ambrose Spencer, Sept. 14, 1831;
John Quincy Adams to John Marshall, Sept. 17, 1831, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 150.
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statement since election to the House of Representatives, 
Adams defended the basis of his republican system, the union, 
against the attacks of the South Carolina nullifiers. Adams 
denied that the states were the fundamental political units of 
the nation, arguing that "union preceded their independence." 
Taking the Declaration of independence as the nation's 
founding document, Adams noted that the Declaration referred 
to the United Colonies, rather than to each individual
colony.15 Adams, echoing Federalist thought of the 1780s,
stated that the Articles of Confederation were doomed from the 
start because they were based on a false notion of state
sovereignty and did not rest on the authority of the people.16 
Adams continually recurred to the theory that the Declaration 
of Independence was the foundation of the union. He argued in 
1837 that the Declaration of Independence did not make the 
states independent or sovereign.17 In 1839 Adams stated that 
before the adoption of the Constitution, "a confederacy had 
been substituted in place of a government and state
sovereignty had usurped the constituent sovereignty of the
15 John Quincy Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens 
of the Town of Quincy, on the Fourth of July, 1831 (Boston: 
Richardson, Lord and Holbrook, 1831), 6-7.
16 Ibid., 21, 23; Wood, Creation, 306-307, 532-533.
17 John Quincy Adams, An Oration Delivered before the 
Inhabitants of the Town of Newburyport, at their Request, on 
the Sixty-First Anniversary of the Declaration of 
Independence (Newburyport, Mass.: Morss and Brewster, 1837), 
15.
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people."I®
For Adams, the preservation of a protective tariff, which 
the nullifiers denounced, was tied to his defense of the 
union. On May 23, 1832, Adams issued a report on the tariff as 
chairman of the House of Representatives's Committee on 
Manufactures. Adams justified the protective tariff as a form 
of national defense. "The common defence must be provided for 
against commercial rivalry as against warlike invasion," Adams 
wrote, "for the spirit of traffic, armed with power, as the 
experience of mankind has proved, is more insatiate and more 
grasping than all the Alexanders or Caesars that ambition has 
inflicted on the race of man."*9 Adams further argued that 
Congress had approved the idea of protective duties, with the 
commercial discrimination laws of 1789 and similar acts
through the war of 1812. He pointed out that southern 
congressmen were then at the forefront in supporting a
protective system. Adams saw the tariff as part of a general 
system of national improvement, which was connected to the 
conduct of foreign policy. He noted that the development of
the steamboat added to the value of the land gained in the
Louisiana Purchase, and that canals and railroads made
18 John Quincy Adams, Jubilee of the Constitution, 38-39.
19 Callanan, "Political Economy of JQA," 141; John Quincy 
Adams, "Report on Manufactures," May 23, 1832, Register of 
Debates in Congress, 29 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gales and 
Seaton, 1825-1837), 22nd Congress, 1st session, Part 3, Vol. 
3, Appendix, 81-82.
20 Ibid., 82-85.
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westward movement possible. "Upon every part of this 
inheritance there are obstacles to be removed, and capacities 
of improvement to be exercised,” Adams wrote. "The principle 
of undertaking and accomplishing these improvements by the 
labor and the fiscal resources of the people of the union, has 
been assumed time after time, by the Congress of the United 
States."21
President Jackson, unlike Adams, separated the political 
theory and goal of nullification, opposing the idea that 
states could override federal laws, but favoring a reduction 
of the tariff. In his fourth annual message, delivered on 
December 4, 1832, Jackson called for a lower tariff, attacking 
the idea that one branch of industry deserved permanent 
special protection. Jackson also supported the quick sale of 
public lands. On December 10, 1832, Jackson issued a
proclamation denouncing nullification.22 Adams could not see 
how anyone could oppose both nullification and the tariff and 
attributed the "glaring inconsistencies of principle between 
the message of this year and the proclamation" to personal 
conflict between Jackson and Calhoun.23 The nullification 
crisis was resolved by the passage in March 1833 of the Force 
Bill, allowing the president to suppress insurrection in South
21 Ibid., 87.
22 Fourth Annual Message, Dec. 4, 1832; Proclamation, Dec.
10, 1832, in Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:598-601, 
640-656.
23 Diary entry, Dec. 24, 1832, in MJQA, 8:510.
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Carolina, and a lower tariff, removing the reasons for 
nullification.24
Adams could not quite separate nullification from 
slavery. In 1830 Adams observed that the "South Carolinians 
are attempting to govern the Union as they govern their 
slaves, and there are too many indications that, abetted as 
they are by all the slave-driving interest of the Union, the 
free portion of the population will cower before them and to 
their insolence."25 Jackson's vigorous use of the presidential 
veto convinced Adams that "the overseer ascendancy is 
complete."26 The cruel irony, which Adams himself began to 
see, was that the union which Adams defended was "the only 
thing that can maintain their system of slavery." A union that 
protected all interests would naturally protect the South.27 
"Slavery is, in all probability, the wedge which will 
ultimately split up this union," Adams wrote in 1833.26
The nature and motives of the Jacksonian coalition, and 
the threat Adams believed they posed to republican government, 
soon became clear. Upon reading Martin Van Buren's letter to 
the Democratic convention in 1835, Adams observed that the
24 Donald B. Cole, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 172-175.
25 Diary entry, June 1, 1830, in MJQA, 8:229-230.
26 Diary entry, June 6, 1830, ibid., 8:231.
27 Diary entry, Jan. 10, 1831, ibid., 8:269-270.
26 Diary entry, Oct. 14, 1833, ibid., 9:23.
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"democracy of the country is supported chiefly, if not 
entirely, by slavery." A few days later Adams met with a 
Wareham, Massachusetts, minister, and noted that the southern 
slaveholders bought the support of the West by supporting the 
rapid sale of public lands. "This is the under current," Adams 
argued, "with the tide of democracy at the surface."29 Adams 
repeated this thesis to Robert Walsh, editor of the National 
Gazette, complaining that "State rights and negro Slavery and 
agrarian rapacity, controul the current of our public 
Affairs for the present and for an indefinite futurity." Adams 
directed Walsh to reread Jackson's annual message of 1832.30
Adams was in the mainstream of whig thought on economic 
development, supporting the bank, internal improvements, 
tariffs and domestic manufactures. In 1837 Adams wrote that a 
"divorce of Bank and State," made as much sense as a "divorce 
of Army and Fire-Arms.”31 As president, Adams planned to use 
the gradual sale of public lands to pay for internal 
improvements, a goal he shared with Henry Clay.32 "The Sable
29 Diary entries, Aug. 18 and 25, 1835, ibid., 9:255, 259.
30 John Quincy Adams to Robert Walsh, April 16, 1836, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 152.
31 D. Howe, Political Culture of American Whigs, 18-19, 45; 
John Quincy Adams to Alexander H. Everett, Nov. 7, 1837, in 
Andrew C. McLaughlin, ed. "Letters of John Quincy Adams to 
Alexander Hamilton Everett, 1811-1837," 2 parts. American 
Historical Review, Vol. 11 nos. 1 and 2 (October 1905- 
January-1906), 2:354.
32 John Quincy Adams to Charles W. Upham, Feb. 2, 1837, in 
"Ten Unpublished Letters," 382; Remini, Clay, 380-381, 521- 
522; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston:
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Genius of the South, saw the signs of his own inevitable 
downfall in the unparalleled progress of the general welfare 
of the North," Adams wrote in 1837, "and fell to cursing the 
tariff, and internal improvements, and raised the standard of 
Free trade, Nullification, and State Rights."33 The capstone 
of slavery's political power was the so-called Pinckney Gag of 
May 18, 1836, a rule sponsored by Henry Laurens Pinckney of 
South Carolina and made permanent in 1840, that prohibited the 
House of Representatives from admitting anti-slavery 
petitions. Adams believed that the struggle over the right of 
petition, "is merely the symptom of a deep seated disease, 
preying on the vitals of this union —  and that disease is 
Slavery."34
The Texan declaration of independence and quest for 
annexation to the United States brought out the diplomatic 
implications of the Jacksonian coalition. Adams himself had 
tried to buy Texas in 1827, believing that the Mexican 
government considered the territory worthless and hoping to 
move the border with Mexico farther away from New Orleans. In 
1832 Adams believed that Texas would fill up with Americans 
and come into the union the same way West Florida had. The
Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 253-254.
33 John Quincy Adams to Charles W. Upham, Feb. 2, 1837, in 
"Ten Unpublished Letters," 383.
34 Bemis, JQA and Union, 340; Richards, Congressman JQA, 
120-121; John Quincy Adams to John Greenleaf Whittier, Jan. 
26, 1837, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 153.
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problem was that most of the American settlers were 
slaveholders and Mexico had abolished slavery.35 in May 1836 
Adams struck up a correspondence with Benjamin Lundy, a 
Philadelphia Quaker and editor of the abolitionist newspaper 
The Genius of Universal Emancipation, who had assembled the 
diplomatic pieces of the Slave Power conspiracy to annex 
Texas. Lundy argued in The Origins and True Causes of the 
Texas Insurrection that a combination of slave traders, 
squatters, and northern land speculators plotted to use Texas 
as a bulwark for slavery. "From the commencement of their 
settlement in that Province, we must bear in mind, the most of 
them anticipated its eventual separation from the government 
of Mexico, and attachment to the Northern Union," Lundy wtote. 
"This was early [on] resolved [by] them, . . . unless indeed 
other measures could be adopted for the perpetuation of 
slavery. A full and complete understanding existed between 
them and the advocates of the system in this country and 
elsewhere.,,3<* Lundy further explored the conspiracy theory in 
The War in Texas. " The slaveholding Interest is now paramount 
in the Executive branch of our national government; and its 
influence operates indirectly; yet powerfully, through that 
medium, in favor of the Grand Scheme of Oppression and
35 Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 116; Diary entry, Jan. 31, 
1832, in MJQA, 8:465.
3® Benjamin Lundy, The Origins and True Causes of the Texas 
Insurrection, Commenced in the Year 1835 (Philadelphia: 
National Gazette, 1836), 8-9.
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Tyrannical Usurpation," Lundy wrote, restating a century-old 
Opposition fear of executive power."37
Lundy did not tell Adams anything he did not already know 
or at least suspect. Yet Lundy did help crystalize Adams's 
thinking on the nature of the slave power and connect his 
critique of Democratic foreign policy with the Opposition Whig 
tradition.38 Armed with Lundy's first pamphlet, Adams made 
his first speech on Texas in the House of Representatives on 
May 25, 1836. "The war now raging in Texas is a Mexican civil 
war, and a war for the re-establishment of slavery where it 
was abolished," Adams argued. "It is not a servile war, but a 
war between slavery and emancipation." he continued.39 The 
American desire for Texas meant war, Adams warned, certainly 
with Mexico, probably with Great Britain, and possibly with 
France. Annexation of Texas would stretch American boundaries 
to a militarily indefensible extent. To preserve Texas, the 
United States would need to conquer Cuba and Puerto Rico as 
well, which would bring war with a Great Britain determined to 
wipe out slavery in the West Indies.40 "Mr. Chairman, are you 
ready for all these wars?" Adams asked. "A Mexican war? a war
37 Benjamin Lundy, The War in Texas: Instigated by 
Slaveholders, Land Speculators, &c. for the re-establishment 
of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Republic of Mexico 
(Philadelphia: Merrihew and Gunn, 1836), 3.
38 Bemis, JQA and Union, 354-357.
39 John Quincy Adams, Speech of May 25, 1836, Register of 
Debates, 24th Congress, 1st Session, part 4, 4041.
40 Ibid., 4043-4045.
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with Great Britain, if not with France? a general Indian war? 
a servile war? and as an inevitable consequence of them all, 
a civil war?"41 One of the central tenets of Opposition Whig 
thought was that wars of conquest abroad led to tyranny at 
home. "I see no alternative but that the whole Mexican 
Confederation is destined to be overrun by our Land jobbers 
and Slave makers," Adams wrote to Lundy in 1 8 3 6 .4  ^Adams held 
the same view a year later, writing that he did not "see where 
our encroachments will stop, short of Cape Horn —  but what is 
to become of our Liberties? ”45 Adams believed that the cause 
of Texas was the cause of tyranny, not liberty. "[The Texans] 
are fighting for the establishment and perpetuation of 
slavery, and that is the cause of the South Carolinian 
sympathy with them," Adams wrote in December 1836.44
Andrew Jackson knew that Texas was a hornet's nest of 
political difficulties, and in his message of December 21, 
1836, the president did not advise the immediate annexation of 
Texas. Adams was surprised, to say the least.45 Martin Van
41 Ibid., 4046.
4  ^John Quincy Adams to Benjamin Lundy, June 27, 1836, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 152.
4  ^John Quincy Adams to Timothy Pitkin, April 22, 1837, in 
"Ten Unpublished Letters," 388.
44 Diary entry, Dec. 24, 1836, in MJQA, 9:333.
45 John M. Belohlavek, "Let the Eagle Soar! "The Foreign 
Policy of Andrew Jackson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1985), 233-235; Andrew Jackson, message of Dec. 21, 
1836, in Richardson, Messages and Papers, 3:265-269; Diary 
entry, Dec. 22, 1836, in MJQA, 9:330-331.
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Buren was too shrewd a politician to pick a dangerous fight 
and tried to steer a middle course by opposing the annexation 
of Texas and supporting the gag rule. When Adams met with 
Secretary of State John Forsyth on September 16, 1837, Forsyth 
assured Adams that the administration had made no offer to buy 
Texas from Mexico.48 Two days later Adams moved a resolution 
"that the power of annexing a people of any independent State 
to this Union is a power not delegated by the Constitution of 
the United States to their Congress, or to any department of 
their Government, but reserved to the people." The chair ruled 
the resolution out of order.47
Despite Van Buren's coolness on Texas, southern state 
legislatures and congressmen pushed for annexation. Waddy 
Thompson, a South Carolina Whig, opposed the admission of 
Iowa, or any other northern territory, "while northern 
fanatics were pouring in petitions against the annexation to 
this union of the great and glorious republic of Texas." Adams 
"objected to the peculiar glory of Texas, which consisted of 
having made a land of freemen a land of slaves."4® Adams 
addressed the question of Texas in a long speech "cut up by 
the rules of the House into driblets of a quarter hour a day,"
46 Major L. Wilson, The Presidency of Martin Van Buren 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 149-152; Diary 
entry, Sept. 16, 1837, in MJQA, 9:377-378.
47 Diary entry, Sept. 18, 1837, in MJQA, 9:378;
Congressional Globe, 109 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Blair and 
Rives, 1833-1873), 25th Congress, 1st Session, 38.
48 Diary entry, June 6, 1838, in MJQA, 10:11-12.
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which lasted from June 16 to July 7, 1838.49 Adams attacked 
the gag on anti-slavery petitions, which "had been carried at 
the dictation of the slaveholders” and "was bringing upon the 
House the deepest obloquy.” The gag made a proper debate over 
Texas impossible.50 Adams did not discount the possibility of 
future expansion, and took great pains to defend his own 
attempts to purchase Texas as secretary of state and 
president, denying that he had given up anything more than a 
questionable claim on Mexican territory.51 On June 28 Adams 
restated his constitutional objections to annexation, but 
added that an amendment to the Constitution and a popular 
referendum in Texas and the United States would remove that 
difficulty. Slavery, however, was the bar to expansion. On 
those grounds, Adams could not submit to a union with Texas, 
"not with a People who have converted freemen into slaves; not 
so long as slavery exists in Texas."52
By the late 1830s Adams completed the Opposition Whig 
framework for interpreting the Slave Power's drive for 
expansion, which Adams would use to explain American politics 
until his death. A succession of slaveholding (or in Van
49 John Quincy Adams to Abbot Lawrence, June 27, 1838, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 153.
50 June 22 and 26, in John Quincy Adams, Speech by John 
Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, upon the Right of the People, 
Men and women, to Petition (Washington, D.C.: Gales and 
Seaton, 1838), 54, 63.
51 June 21, 1838, ibid., 44-45.
52 June 28, 1838, ibid., 68-69.
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Buren's case, slavedriven) presidents stood in the place of 
Robert Walpole. The farmers of the South and West, whether 
slaveholders or not, who demanded the sale of public lands, 
played the part of Walpole's army of placemen. Adams reversed 
the Jeffersonian formula of political virtue, writing that he 
did not share Jefferson's "fancies that the tobacco-planters 
of the James were the chosen people of God."55 "The 
continuance of the present administration will, if 
accomplished, open wide all the flood-gates of corruption," 
Adams wrote late in Martin Van Buren's term.54 The main victim 
of the slave power was New England, and Adams warned his son 
that "New England will ere long need sound heads and stout 
hearts to save her from being made the foot-ball of the 
South."55
Adams's fight against the annexation of Texas placed him 
in the front rank of antislavery crusaders in Congress, but he 
did not consider himself an abolitionist. In 1837 Adams wrote 
in his diary that "the abolitionists generally are constantly 
urging me to indiscrete movements, which would ruin me and 
weaken and not strengthen them."56 The chief indiscreet
5 John Quincy Adams, "Reply to the Address of the Thirteen 
Federalists," in Henry Adams, ed., New-England Federalism, 
153.
54 Diary entry, July 25, 1840, in MJQA, 10:342.
cc
John Quincy Adams to Charles Francis Adams, April 7,
1841, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 154.
56 Diary entry, Sept. 1, 1837, in MJQA, 8:365.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
383
measure in Adams mind was the abolitionist demand for the end 
of slavery in the District of Columbia as a prelude to a 
general emancipation. Adams sympathized in principle but 
believed that "the undertaking [is] of such tremendous 
magnitude, difficulty and danger, that I shrink from the 
contemplation of it, and much more from any personal agency in 
promoting it."57 Adams was recognized as an ally, if not a 
full member of the abolitionist camp. Adams friend and 
colleague Joshua R. Giddings, an Ohio Whig, noted that Adams's 
"views as stated would compare with those of the Abolitionists 
generally, except that he declared himself not prepared to 
vote for the abolition of slavery in the District of 
Columbia."5®
Adams hoped that the Whig victory of 1840 would halt the 
progress of slave-driven expansion. That hope faded with the 
death of President William H. Harrison, when in Thurlow Weed's 
words, "the Whig party was demoralized by Tylerism."59 "Tyler 
is a political sectarian, of the slave-driving, Jeffersonian 
school, principled against all improvement, with all the 
interests and passions and vices of slavery rooted in his
57 John Quincy Adams to Charles Hammond, March 31, 1837, 
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 153.
5® Journal entry, Jan. 21, 1839, in George W. Julian, The 
Life of Joshua R. Giddings (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and 
Company, 1892), 61.
5  ^Thurlow Weed, The Autobiography of Thurlow Weed. Harriet 
A. Weed, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1883), 
468.
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moral and political considerations," Adams wrote on April 4, 
1841. A few weeks later Adams added, "I feel an utter distrust 
of the principles of John Tyler, a Virginia nullifier, now 
acting as President of the United States, and no confidence in 
the principles or belief in the sincerity of the Secretary of 
State."**® Daniel Webster, Adams's most prominent constituent, 
earned Adams's undying hatred for remaining in office and by 
implication acting as a tool of the slave power. In 1843 Adams 
denounced Webster as "a heartless traitor to the cause of 
human f reedom."** *
Despite Tyler's nominal identification as a Whig, Adams 
expected that Tyler, like his Democratic predecessors, would 
attempt to annex Texas and act his part as an agent of the 
slaveholders. On September 17, 1842, Adams delivered a speech 
at Braintree in which he gave the fullest outline to date of 
the Slave Power conspiracy. Nullification was the bedrock of 
Tyler's political creed, Adams believed, as nullification 
opposed a strong central government which might curb the power 
of the south. In truth, Tyler opposed Calhoun against 
nullification. Tyler did oppose tariffs and the Bank of the 
United States, positions Adams saw as tantamount to 
nullification. "Nullification, portentous and fatal as it is 
to the prospects and welfare of this Union, is not the only
60 Diary entries, April 4 and May 21, 1841, in MJQA, 10:456- 
457, 469.
61 Diary entry, June 17, 1843, ibid., 11:383-384.
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interest of Southern domination, wielded by the Executive at 
Washington," Adams continued. The other instruments included 
an aggressive foreign policy that demanded Mexican territory 
from the Rio del Norte to San Francisco. This policy had begun 
with Jackson, and was "worthy of Machiavell[i]."®2
Texas was the focal point of the slave power's foreign 
policy. "The Texas Land and Liberty jobbers had spread the 
contagion of their land-jobbing —  Stock-jobbing —  Slave- 
jobbing —  Rights of Man-jobbing, were all hand in hand 
sweeping over the land like a hurricane," Adams argued. "The 
controlling object of this whole system of policy was, and yet 
is, to obtain a nursery for the slave-holding States, to break 
down forever the ascendent power of the free States, and to 
fortify, beyond all possibility of reversal, the institution 
of slavery," Adams continued. The public lands and internal 
improvements were to be sacrificed to the slave Power, and 
Adams again referred to Jackson's annual message of 1832 as 
the foundation of the slave power's economic policy.®2
There was little new argument in Adams's address; most of 
the arguments had appeared in his own writings or in Benjamin 
Lundy's pamphlets. Adams did advance one argument he had never
62 John Quincy Adams, Address of John Quincy Adams to his 
Constituents of the Twelfth Congressional District, at 
Braintree, September 17, 1842 (Boston: J.H. Eastbum, 1842), 
9-10; Norma Lois Peterson, The Presidencies of William Henry 
Harrison and John Tyler (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1989), 19-20.
®2 John Quincy Adams, Address at Braintree, 12, 16, 22-23.
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made before, against naval spending. Adams attacked Tyler's 
annual message for 1841, which called for a larger navy. By 
lumping the navy with the army and other supposed instruments 
of tyranny, Adams picked up on the Republican attacks on 
Federalist policy in the 1790s.6  ^Adams later referred to the 
steam frigates as "infernal machines."66
By mid-1842 Tyler added San Francisco to his territorial 
ambitions. He and Webster devised a plan to gain British 
support for a Mexican cession by giving up the American claim 
to Oregon north of the Columbia River. Tyler also appointed 
Waddy Thompson of South Carolina, a strong proponent of the 
annexation of Texas, as minister to Mexico. The 
administration's plans were presumably revealed on October 19, 
1842, when Commodore Thomas ap Catesby Jones seized Monterey 
upon hearing a rumor that the United States and Mexico were at 
war. Jones withdrew the next day, when he learned the rumor 
was unfounded.66
Adams attempted to call on the president to submit the 
papers and communications related to the raid to the House of 
Representatives, but was blocked by administration 
supporters.67 Adams, disposed as he was to think in terms of
6  ^Ibid., 35-36; John Tyler, message of Dec. 7, 1841, in 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 4:88.
65 Diary entry, March 8, 1844, in MJQA, 11:528.
66 Peterson, Presidencies of Harrison and Tyler, 137-139.
67 Diary entries, Jan. 30 and 31, 1842, in MJQA, 11:304-305.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
387
whole systems, saw administration policy as shown by Jones's 
raid, Democratic agitation with Great Britain over the right 
of search, and Senator Lewis Linn's bill to occupy the mouth 
of the Columbia, as parts of a system to dismember Mexico and 
extend slavery. Adams cornered Daniel Webster at the state 
department on March 25, 1843, and asked if Waddy Thompson had 
been instructed to buy San Francisco. When Webster responded 
that he could not say, Adams believed he had his answer.**® 
Mexican weakness only encouraged "the inflexible perseverance 
of rapacity of our South and West, under the spur of slavery, 
to plunder and dismember her.”69 Jones never would have 
attacked a country that could fight back, and Webster and 
Thompson showed a similar contempt for Mexico. "The spirit of 
encroachment upon Mexico is stimulated and nourished by this 
settled and too well founded conviction of her helpless 
weakness," Adams wrote in his diary, "in conflict with the 
gigantic energy of our national avarice and ambition."70 Adams 
spent several weeks sifting through Anthony Butler's
dispatches from Mexico, plumbing the depths of the Slave Power
drive for expansion. "But Jackson was so sharp-set for Texas 
from the first year of his Administration he set his twin
68 Diary entry, March 25, 1843, in MJQA, 11:345-346; David 
M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon and 
the Mexican Mar (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
1973), 108-109.
69 Diary entry, April 1, 1843, in MJQA, 11:351.
70 Diary entry, April 4, 1843, ibid., 11:353.
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engines to work," Adams observed on March 29, "of negotiating 
to buy Texas with one hand, and instigating the people of that 
province to revolt against Mexico with other."71 After 
completing his labors, Adams concluded that Texas policy had 
run on the same track since 1829.72
As Adams confined most of his observations to his diary 
no one could confront him with his own conduct regarding 
Florida. If one substituted Jackson for Jones, Pensacola for 
Monterey and Spain for Mexico, Adams's own actions might fall 
into the same category as those he criticized in the 1840s. 
There is no evidence to suggest that Adams renounced his own 
expansionism, however. In 1844 Adams wrote that "the Florida 
treaty was the most important incident in my life, and the 
most successful negotiation ever consummated by the Government 
of this Union."72
On April 22, 1844, Tyler sent a Texas annexation treaty 
to the Senate. It was the capstone of slave power diplomacy, 
and Adams feared that "with it went the freedom of the human 
race." Even when the Senate rejected the treaty on June 8, 
Adams believed the danger had not passed.74 Adams observed to 
William Henry Seward that "the rapacious passion of national
71 Diary entry, March 29, 1843, ibid., 11:349.
72 Diary entry, April 10, 1843, ibid., 11:358.
72 Diary entry, Sept. 27, 1844, ibid., 12:78.
74 Diary entry, April 22, 1844, ibid., 12:13-14; Pletcher,
Diplomacy of Annexation, 144-149.
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aggrandizement sharpened by the whetstone of the land and 
stock jobber, is even now plunging us into a desperate war for 
slavery, the issue of which can be no other than the 
dissolution of the Union, and an imperial race of Caesars, 
under the name of Democracy."7  ^Adams was convinced that Texas 
was a prelude to greater conquests, including all of Mexico 
and the West Indies, creating "a maritime, colonizing, slave- 
tainted monarchy," and "a military government with a large 
army and navy."7® Adams combined the primal Opposition Whig 
fear of executive power with his fear of democracy, reversing 
Madison's fear of the 1790s, that the executive would use 
foreign policy to combine with the Senate against the people 
at large.
Adams laid out the Slave Power conspiracy most fully to 
his constituents. He addressed the Boston Whig Young Men's 
Club on October 7, 1844, and argued that a "virtuous senate" 
rejected the Texas treaty, placing the upper house in its 
traditional role as a break on runaway democracy.77 On October 
30, Adams pointed out the stages of the conspiracy. The first 
stage was the preponderance of slaveholders in the White 
House, the cabinet, the military and the Congress. This 
information, Adams said, was available to anyone with a copy
75 John Quincy Adams to William Henry Seward, May 10, 1844, 
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 154.
76 Diary entries, June 10 and 14, 1844, in MJQA, 12:49, 57.
77 Niles' National Register, Oct. 19, 1844.
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of the annual Blue Book. The second stage was the gag on anti­
slavery petitions, approved in 1836, made a standing rule 
in 1840 and repealed in 1844. The third was the drive for 
Texas. The Slave Power openly coveted Texas, schemed to 
acquire it, and would force the nation into a war to defend 
slavery.78 When Congress brought Texas into the union by a 
joint-resolution, Adams saw the move "as the apoplexy of the 
Constitution."7 9
James K. Polk came into office pledging to annex Texas 
and all of Oregon. Yet that program would entail war with both 
Great Britain and Mexico. Adams expected Polk to sell out the 
free states through a compromise on Oregon and a tariff 
agreement with Great Britain. Adams had not completely 
renounced expansion. "I believe slavery to be a sin before 
God, and that is the reason we should refuse to annex Texas to 
the Union," he said in 1838.®® Expansion into Oregon, as it 
was unfettered by slavery, was little short of a divine 
command. Throughout his career Adams believed that land 
belonged to its cultivators, as shown in his 1802 oration at 
Plymouth and his diplomacy at Ghent. He repeated the same 
argument in an 1843 essay on the New England Confederacy of
78 Ibid., Nov. 9, 1844.
79 Diary entry, Feb. 28, 1844, in MJQA, 12:174; Peterson, 
Presidencies of Harrison and Tyler, 256-257.
80 June 28, 1838, in John Quincy Adams, Speech on the Right 
of Petition, 68.
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1643.81
As secretary of state and president Adams had been 
willing to settle for an extension of the boundary at 49 
degrees from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, but twenty 
years of American migration led Adams to claim the whole 
Oregon territory. On January 27, 1845, Adams argued that the 
time had come to end the joint occupancy agreement. Adams 
believed that Polk never should have offered to settle at 49 
degrees or accept if the British offered the same line.82 In 
1846 Adams cited Biblical authority, specifically Genesis 
1:26-28 and the commandm-^nt to be fruitful and multiply. "Now, 
that general authority given to man to increase, multiply and 
replenish the earth, and subdue, it, ” Adams argued on the 
floor of the House of Representatives," was a grant from the 
Creator to man as man, it was a grant to every individual in 
the human race in his individual capacity.”88
Adams suspected that Polk was far more interested in 
acquiring more slave lands from Mexico than in asserting 
American claims to all of Oregon. "It is evident that the 
Oregon question will be settled by a repeal of the corn laws
ft 1 John Quincy Adams, "The New England Confederacy of 
MDCXLIII" [1843] (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Proceedings, 3rd Series, Vol. 9, 1846), 196-197.
82 Diary entries, Dec. 6 and 14, 1845, March 25, 1846, in 
MJQA, 12:218-21, 254-255; Congressional Globe, 28th 
Congress, 2nd Session, 202.
83 Speech of Feb. 9, 1846, Congressional Globe, 29th
Congress, 1st Session, 340-341.
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and the sacrifice of the American tariff,” Adams wrote in his 
diary on February 20, 1846, "a bargain, both sides of which 
will be for the benefit of England, and to our disadvantage; 
a purchase of peace, the value of which can only be tested by 
the lapse of time."84 The British government soon repealed the 
C o m  Laws and lowered duties on imported grain. Congress 
followed with the Walker Tariff, reducing duties on 
manufactured goods. The southerners, Whig and Democrat, who 
clamored for Texas were not interested in Oregon, and in June, 
Polk signed an agreement with Great Britain making 49 degrees 
the boundary between British and American territory.85
Polk needed a settlement with Great Britain to have a 
free hand in pursuing an aggressive policy with Mexico. By 
early 1846 Polk's attempts to purchase territory from Mexico 
had failed. He sent General Zachary Taylor into the disputed 
territory between the Rio Nueces and the Rio Grande. Polk and 
the cabinet hoped that American financial claims against the 
Mexican government were enough cause for war. In May word of 
conflict between Mexican and American troops along the Rio 
Grande reached Washington, allowing Polk to ask for war and 
blame it on Mexico. 88 It was the result Adams had long
84 Diary entry, Feb. 20, 1846, ibid., 12:248.
85 Pletcher, Diplomacy of Annexation, 418-419; Thomas R. 
Hietala, Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late 
Jacksonian America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 72-73, 80-88.
86 Paul H. Bergeron, The Presidency of James K. Polk 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 74-77;
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expected. Adams wrote one of his last letters to Albert 
Gallatin, who was one of the last living Americans in a 
position to appreciate Adams's Opposition-based conspiracy 
theory. "But the design, and the purpose to dismember Mexico, 
and to annex to the United States not only Texas, but several 
of her adjoining Provinces on this side of the Continent, and 
the Californias on the other side, has in my opinion been what 
my old Collegue Caleb Cushing calls 'a fixed fact' at least 
from the year 1830 and has been pursued by means which gave to 
Mexico from that time ample cause of War, in self-defence, 
against the United States," Adams wrote. Adams further argued 
that Polk had sent Taylor as a provocative act, and had 
usurped the war-making power.®7
Adams himself was never reconciled to the war. The last 
vote he ever cast in the House of Representatives was on 
February 21, 1848, two days before his death, against a
resolution thanking various generals for their services in the 
campaign of 1847.88 By all accounts Adams died resigned to his 
fate. His final thoughts on republicanism and diplomacy are 
unrecorded, yet doubtless he believed that his system of 
Christian improvement was in ruins, and that domestic liberty 
would fall victim to tools of diplomacy. According to
Pletcher, Diplomacy of Annexation, 373-377.
87 John Quincy Adams to Albert Gallatin, Dec. 26, 1847, 
Adams Family papers, Letterbook, reel 155.
88 Bemis, JQA and Union, 534-535.
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Opposition thought, if the process of decay was visible it had 
already gone too far to be reversed. The republic, at least 
Adams's version of it, to which he had devoted his life had 
met the fate of all republics, and preceded him to the grave.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CONCLUSION
To view the world as a republican was to see politics as 
a whole entity, not one divided into foreign and domestic 
spheres. Republican ideology posited that the tools of foreign 
policy could easily turn against domestic liberties and that 
a government embracing tyrannies abroad could similarly 
introduce tyranny at home. John Adams, James Madison and John 
Quincy Adams agreed that both foreign and domestic policy were 
to be judged by whether they promoted or subverted liberty; by 
whether they kept the republic or destroyed it. Agreement on 
the desirability of a republic did not necessarily bring 
agreement on the precise nature of a republican foreign 
policy. The stream of thought upon which Americans drew, a 
two-hundred year span of writers that included political 
economists, constitutional and natural law theorists, and 
English polemicists, was far too broad to produce a single 
republican model for diplomacy. The lives and experiences of 
the three figures in this study helped produce different 
versions of republican diplomacy. There were, of course, 
common themes to the diplomatic careers of John Adams, James 
Madison and John Quincy Adams.
One belief common to all three was that a nation's
39!
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interests and diplomacy reflected the nature of its government 
and society. Americans sought limited government and the 
freedom to trade without restrictions. All three figures in 
this study concluded that Americans were not on a permanent 
basis a Spartan people, although they praised and demanded 
such martial virtue in times of crisis. Both John Adams and 
James Madison ultimately discounted martial virtue as the 
foundation of the republic and believed a balanced government 
could at least simulate virtue. The Physiocrats and the 
Scottish political economists provided a framework for 
constructing a republic with economic activity at its center. 
John Adams and James Madison disagreed on whether the United 
States should pursue manufactures and shipping as well as 
agriculture. That disagreement went to the heart of what they 
believed a republican diplomacy entailed. John Quincy Adams 
represented a brand of republicanism arising after the War of 
1812 which held that government policy could promote public 
virtue through guiding economic development and undertaking 
internal improvements. The Erie Canal project, for example, 
was a product of that view.^ Adams's diplomacy as secretary of 
state and president, as well as his positions in Congress, 
reflect a similar commitment to self-defense through 
improvement at home and through advancement of American 
maritime principles abroad.
1 Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and 
the Paradox of Progress 1817-1862 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1996), 24-25.
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Natural law theorists such as Grotius and Vattel, writing 
from the perspective of small nations, provided a moral and 
legal justification for American foreign policy goals and an 
analog to domestic constitutional arrangements. The law of 
nations, by emphasizing neutral rights and advocating a 
balance of power among nations that would limit war, was 
compatible with the idea of a limited government. The most 
concrete example of a republican foreign policy goal taken 
from the law of nations was the principle that "free ships 
make free goods," which combined personal liberty, economic 
freedom and limited government into one policy. John Adams 
placed "free ships make free goods" at the center of American 
diplomacy in the Model Treaty. As president, both John Adams 
and James Madison waged wars in defense of that principle. In 
1823, John Quincy Adams used "free ships make free goods" as 
the glue that unified his British and Russian diplomacy. As 
president, Adams saw the Panama Congress as the opportunity to 
codify freedom of the seas into the international law of the 
Western Hemisphere.
The law of nations provided a legal and moral 
justification for American foreign policy goals, but neither 
Grotius' s Rights of War and Peace nor Vattel's Law of Nations 
nor Madison's Examination of the British Doctrine supplied a 
method for achieving those goals. For a guide to diplomacy as 
well as politics, John Adams, James Madison and John Quincy 
Adams turned to the Opposition Whig school, chiefly Lord
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Bolingbroke, Trenchard and Gordon and James Burgh. Fortunately 
for Americans, the ideology they embraced was compatible with 
a realistic view of foreign policy. The Opposition Whigs 
emphasized that human imperfection required balances of power 
within governments and among nations. Just as Opposition Whig 
thinkers provided a guide to detecting and preventing domestic 
corruption and tyranny, they showed the way to a diplomacy 
consistent with liberty.
The first rule of Opposition Whig diplomacy Americans 
adopted was that political and physical separation from the 
hazards of continental European politics was essential to 
liberty. Bolingbroke and "Cato," as contemporary critics of 
Walpole's foreign policy, warned against Walpole's engagements 
on the European continent, dictated in part by the Hanoverian 
connection, where Great Britain had no essential interests. 
The American situation was somewhat different, with a 
relatively weak United States trying to keep European nations 
from interfering in American politics. The principle that 
separation preserved republican government can be seen most 
obviously in the Declaration of Independence and was the 
central assumption of John Adams, James Madison and John 
Quincy Adams in their diplomacy. In 1823, John Quincy Adams's 
contribution to the Monroe Doctrine restated the principle of 
separation from Europe to apply to a hemisphere full of 
independent republics.
A rule related to physical separation was that separation
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should be enforced by methods not dangerous to domestic 
liberty. Opposition Whigs believed that the navy was the 
constitutionally safest form of defense. It could not 
overthrow the government, as could a standing army. A navy 
also paid for itself by protecting overseas commerce, a 
valuable source of economic power and a training ground for 
sailors. An army created a set of people with an interest 
separate from the common good, drained the public treasury and 
provided a source of executive patronage and corruption.
Reliance on the navy was not as widely accepted in the 
United States as was a reliance on physical separation from 
Europe. Many American statesmen believed that economic power 
could play the strategic role of a navy. Opposition Whigs in 
Britain did not address economic coercion as a means of 
foreign policy, but suggested the idea by emphasizing the role 
the American colonies played in insuring British wealth. The 
careers of John Adams and James Madison, both of which 
concluded with maritime crises, are instructive on this point. 
In 1776 Adams believed that the economic power of America, 
both as a market for manufactures and a supplier of staple 
goods, could substitute, at least temporarily, for a 
substantial navy. By the 1780s Adams gave up on economic 
coercion as an effective policy. During the Quasi-War, Adams 
waged a naval war in defense of commerce, particularly the 
American carrying trade, in a manner he believed was 
consistent with republican ideology and the lessons he had
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learned as a diplomat.
Madison, on the other hand, went beyond Opposition 
thought to lump a navy with a standing army as a threat to 
liberty. Madison believed that a large domestic carrying trade 
was inconsistent with a primarily agrarian republic. He saw 
American economic power as its own defense and framed the 
commercial discrimination bills of the 1790s and the Embargo 
of 1807 to achieve American goals without recourse to military 
force. Madison's version of republican diplomacy forced him to 
believe that American commerce was more powerful than it was 
in reality.
A third rule, tied to the proper weapons of foreign 
policy, was that the power of the executive, while necessary 
for balance within a government and for administration, was to 
be tightly controlled. John Adams believed in a strong 
executive, more so than Madison, but Adams was also careful to 
conduct himself as a republicanized version of Bolingbroke's 
Patriot King. Adams, in defense of his own administration, 
pointed out that he had preserved the republic by refusing to 
follow measures Hamilton pressed on him. Madison was more 
fearful of executive power than Adams, and Madison's writings 
throughout the 1790s are a variation on the Opposition Whig 
thesis that executive tyranny could result from an 
unrestrained power to conduct foreign relations. As president, 
Madison may have come close to violating his own rules while 
attempting to acquire the Floridas, but his circumspection may
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be evidence that he was no more comfortable with his own use
of executive power than he was with that of John Adams. John
Quincy Adams, as secretary of state and president, did not 
seem to hold Opposition Whig fears of executive power. As a 
member of Congress, however, Adams attacked Andrew Jackson and 
the Democrats in the same terms as the Opposition criticized 
Walpole.
The Whig party to which John Quincy Adams belonged made 
freguent reference to the Opposition Whigs in the 1830s and 
1840s in defense of its political positions.^ Generations 
after Adams's death, however, saw the founding generation 
itself as the source of ancient authority. In his 1931 article 
"The Permanent Bases of American Foreign Policy," former 
presidential candidate John W. Davis wrote that "the first
[base] in point of time, if not in point of importance, is to
abstain as far as possible from any participation in foreign 
questions in general and European questions in particular." In 
support of his argument, Davis cited John Adams, John Quincy 
Adams, the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, without 
reference to the earlier republican ideology that had produced 
those statements of policy.^
John Adams, James Madison and John Quincy Adams came to 
serve the function in later American thought that Grotius,
2 D. Howe, Political Culture of American Whigs, 77-78.
 ^John W. Davis. "The Permanent Bases of American Foreign 
Policy." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10 no. 1 (October 1931), 1-5.
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Vattel, Bolingbroke and "Cato" served for the founding 
generation. Even if American statesmen no longer cited the 
Opposition Whigs in debates over foreign policy, it cannot be 
said that their ideas and concerns faded from the American 
consciousness. "Free ships make free goods" reappeared in the 
Civil War, at the Hague Peace Conferences and upon American 
entry into World War I. The idea of separation from foreign 
politics, put forth by the Opposition and transmitted through 
the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, has been at 
center of every subsequent debate over American action 
throughout the world, most obviously in the American entry 
into World War I, World War II and the Cold War. Historian and 
Washington biographer Curtis P. Nettels testified against the 
North Atlantic Treaty on the grounds that the agreement 
violated the tradition, laid down in the Farewell Address, 
against permanent alliances.4 In 1951 Senator Robert A. Taft 
echoed Opposition Whig military thought when he advocated a 
defense policy based on a large navy and air force, but 
opposed the provision in NATO that committed American ground 
troops to Europe.5 The concerns over the president's foreign 
policy powers that Madison raised in his "Helvidius" essays 
are evident in the Bricker Amendment and the War Powers Act, 
to name but two examples. The question of what constitutes a
4 Lawrence Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative 
Years (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 14.
5 Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1951), 19-20.
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republican foreign policy has not been answered for all time. 
John Adams, James Madison and John Quincy Adams were among the 
first to grapple with it. Their use of republican theory 
formed the guide subscribed to by each succeeding generation 
charged with keeping the republic.
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